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SUMMARY 
 
The industrial restructuring of the 1970s, the sluggish economic growth of the 1980s 
and the difficult macroeconomic scenario of the early 1990s which preceded the Italy’s  
joining of the EMU, gradually reduced the space for Keynesian economic policies in the 
country. In certain geographical areas, unemployment remained high over a long period 
of time and the Italian state had to confront this situation which was becoming socially 
and politically unsustainable. The solution found involved the long-term unemployed in 
a wide range of activities provided by public bodies, called socially and publicly useful 
jobs. At the end of the 1990s, under pressure from neoliberalism, many public bodies 
outsourced their public services, labour market deregulation was pursued, while supply-
side labour polices gained ground. 
 
This thesis examines the policy process during the paradigm shift, evaluates its impact 
on unemployment reduction, discusses the ways in which the policy’s outcomes were 
achieved, and highlights the role played by institutions during this long-term process. 
The approach chosen to evaluate the policy of socially and useful jobs distinguishes 
between three intrinsically linked stages of the policy process: policy-making, 
implementation and take-up. Recognising the central role of institutions in providing the 
context in which the policy process develops, the approach chosen for this analysis is 
historical-institutionalism. It is applied within the broader framework of the political 
economy which impacted on the transformation of the Italian welfare state and the rise 
of workfare practices. 
 
The policy process evaluation led to some interesting findings. Firstly, many 
unemployed were re-inserted into the labour market due to their participation in socially 
and publicly useful jobs. Secondly, the activities they delivered allowed the 
communities to avoid disruption to important services and helped the state to save funds 
through the use of an inexpensive and productive workforce. Thirdly, the public 
administrations considered the outsourcing of services successful when they received 
high quality services from workers who were already known to them and were easily 
managed. Fourthly, the participation of the private companies in the last stage of the 
policy did not guarantee efficiency gains and, in several cases, the public 
administrations preferred to employ the socially and publicly useful workers directly.  
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Chapter 1 
Socially useful jobs: an institutional approach to the policy process 
 
‘Our thesis is that the idea of self-adjusting 
market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution 
could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of 
the society; it would have physically destroyed 
man and transformed his surroundings into a 
wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to 
protect itself, but whatever measures it took 
impaired the self-regulation of the market, 
disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered 
the society in yet another way. It was this 
dilemma which forced the development of the 
market system into a definite groove and finally 
disrupted the social organization based upon it’. 
(Karl Polanyi, 1944, 3
rd
 ed. 2001:3-4) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
After the mid-1970s economic policy underwent radical changes in many western 
countries. These transformations were mostly driven by the rise of neoliberalism that 
affirmed the ascendance of a free-market philosophy in the sphere of economics and in 
other aspects of social life. The retrenchment of the national welfare state and decline of 
labour protection represented the areas where the most powerful neoliberal assault was 
felt. Italy was no exception to this transformation, but the peculiarities of Italian 
capitalism, marked by an extensive and relatively recent state intervention (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) determined that this phenomenon occurred later than in other European 
countries. Furthermore, while the economic role of the state was changing, public 
institutions and social actors found new ways to respond to the market claims for 
deregulation, liberalization and privatization. To quote Polanyi’s words, while the 
markets continued to expand, ‘society protected itself against the perils inherent in a 
self-regulating market system’ (Polanyi, 2001: 80).  
This research analyses the last Keynesian labour market policy in Italy, 
namely the socially and publicly useful jobs (SUJs and PUJs). The policy concerned the 
re-insertion of long-term unemployed into the labour market due to their involvement in 
a large range of services promoted by public administrations, especially at local level. 
2 
 
This thesis examines the evolution of this policy during all its stages (policy-making, 
implementation and take-up), evaluates its impact on the reduction of unemployment, 
discusses the ways in which the policy’s outcomes were achieved and also the role 
played by institutions during this long-term process. 
The formation of the policy was a lengthy process which had deep roots in 
the transformation of the Italian economy started in the ’70s. After a sustained period of 
economic growth which characterised the first two decades following WWII, the post-
Fordism era brought a significant downsizing of Italian state intervention in the 
economy, including substantial industrial restructuring and addressing high levels of 
long-term unemployment. The people dismissed by large industrial plants which had 
undergone radical restructuring, remained trapped in a non-work situation for many 
years, despite still being formally recorded as employed. The extensive use of the wage 
compensation funds minimised disruption to their economic and social rights but, with a 
diminishing labour demand, the likelihood of leaving unemployment gradually 
declined, while the period of unemployment increased. This situation, which had lasted 
for many years, became politically unsustainable, especially in Southern Italy (called 
Mezzogiorno), where social disorder occurred in the ’80s. Furthermore, efforts made by 
Italian governments over entry to the European Monetary Union focused on a reduction 
of the state budget deficit and control of the inflation rate. Therefore the government 
was forced to cut public expenditure, especially in those areas considered to be 
structural sources of deficits: pensions, health, public sector employment and local 
government finance (Della Sala, 2007:25). For these reasons many public bodies had to 
face severe cuts to their budgets. If, on the one hand they were expected to deliver 
public services, on the other they were not allowed to replace lost staff. The 
involvement of long-term unemployed in the delivery of these public services was the 
best solution to meet both requests: the public administration had access to an 
economically convenient workforce (paid for by the state) while the unemployed had 
the opportunity to work. 
The socially and publicly useful jobs are considered part of the broader 
group of active labour market policies
1
. What makes the Italian case peculiar is that, 
since its inception, the policy focused on involving the unemployed in a wide range of 
                                                 
1
 One of the most widespread definition differentiates between active and passive labour policies in the 
fact that the former provide labour market integration of specific groups of unemployed through demand 
and supply-side measures, while the latter provide economic benefits to sustain their incomes (Aurer et al, 
2005). 
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public services, created a specific juridical framework within which they could work 
and the public administrations put a great deal of effort into providing the socially and 
publicly useful workers (SUWs and PUWs) with these activities. This demand-side 
approach changed at the end of the ’90s when the twist to a Schumpeterian workfare 
state put pressure on the public administrations to close the projects and privatize the 
services. The transformation of the policy after 2000 was a long and complex process 
that involved public institutions and the main actors implicated in the labour market 
policies. The evolution of their role during this transformation and the impact of their 
actions on the policy process are analysed in this thesis. 
The theoretical framework utilized in this research draws partially on 
categories proposed by Günther Schmid (1997a) in the International Handbook of 
Labour Market Policy and Evaluation for policy process evaluation of labour market 
policies. The author describes this approach as being the third generation of policy 
process evaluation that aims to overcome the limitations of a single programme 
evaluation, through the integration of policy formation and policy implementation 
assessments
2. However Schmid’s approach relies upon a model that presents the labour 
market functioning as a cybernetic system. It fails to consider the role of institutions in 
the policy process that represents an important intellectual ground in this research. The 
analytical categories proposed by Schmidt have therefore been adapted in order to 
consider the role of institutions during the policy process. The concept of institutions 
refers to the meaning proposed by Peter Hall, as ‘formal rules, compliances procedures 
and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in 
various units of the polity and economy’(Hall, 1986:19). 
As the evolution of this labour market policy was influenced by events that 
concerned the transformation of the Italian welfare state under the pressure of the 
neoliberal turn in many western countries, the analysis carried out in this thesis is 
embodied in a political economy approach. In fact, it will be argued, the shift form 
Keynesianism to monetarism which had an impact on the entire economic system, 
transformed this policy in a way that preserved some important features of the demand-
side state intervention, and warded off the neoliberal attempt to introduce labour 
deregulation and a more workfarist approach. For these reasons this policy is presented 
                                                 
2
 An application of this framework can be found in the assessment of the new public management of 
labour market policy, specifically training programs, in four European countries (Schmid, 1997b:747-
789). 
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in this thesis as the last Keynesian labour market policy in Italy and its connections with 
the other transformations in the broader economic context are investigated in the 
following chapter. 
This chapter will instead clarify the theoretical framework of this research 
which is an application of a historical institutionalist approach to the evaluation of the 
policy process. The first section of this chapter presents the main contributions brought 
by the principal approaches of policy programmes evaluation which dominated the field 
for almost thirty years, ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. The second section 
explores the motivations for the choice of a third generation approach that integrates the 
different stages of policy-making and implementation. In this section criticism of the 
model proposed by Schmid is raised, explaining why it has been integrated with a 
historical institutionalist approach. The third section presents the categorical framework 
used to analyse the policy process in this new perspective. This framework draws 
partially upon those categories proposed by Schmid, but also includes new categories 
that consider the role played by institutions, how their interactions changed over time 
and underpin the causal relations of these transformations. The last section introduces 
the research methods in relation to the policy stages and the principal sets of data 
analysed in each chapter.  
  
1.2 Policy programmes evaluation: top-down and bottom-up approaches 
 
 
There is a large body of literature surrounding the evaluation of policy programmes in 
addition to a very large number of examined cases. The first generation of studies of 
policy implementation followed a ‘top-down’ approach, assessing if the policy goals 
decided by central policy-makers have reached their goals at a local, decentralized level. 
The second generation of studies was especially developed by European scholars who 
followed a ‘bottom-up’ approach, stressing the role of implementation in the formation 
of the policy. In their view, the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ involved in the implementation 
have a certain degree of autonomy and play an important role in altering and redefining 
the policy’s goals. 
Some of the most important contributions brought by top-downers belong to 
Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian (1979, 1980). Drawing on previous scholarly 
works, they developed a top-down approach for policy implementation which identifies 
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seventeen statutory and non-statutory variables that influence the implementation 
process (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980:542). These variables are then synthesized 
 
 [...] into a shorter list of six sufficient and generally necessary conditions for the effective 
implementation of legal objective: 1) clear and consistent objectives; 2) adequate casual 
theory; 3) implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance by 
implementing officials and target groups; 4) committed and skilful implementing officials; 
5) support of interest groups and sovereigns; 6) changes in socio-economic conditions 
which do not substantially undermine political support or causal theory (Sabatier, 
1986a:23-25). 
 
The criticism brought to the top-down approach is that it assumes the policy 
has clear and consistent objectives (while most of the policies have partially-conflicting 
objectives), that the proposed framework does not provide an adequate conceptual 
structure to look at the policy changes for periods longer than a decade, and that too 
much focus is put on the program proponents, while it neglects the role of the other 
actors in a more dynamic way (Sabatier, 1986a:29-30).  
The bottom-up approach developed by Bennie Hjern and his collaborators, 
David Porter, Ken Hanf and Chris Hull (1981, 1982), involved an extensive empirical 
methodology. These scholars did not start from a governmental program, but from the 
way in which actors perceived the problems, and the strategies they developed to deal 
with them. Hjern suggests that the implementation research is about finding an approach 
to study ‘how well the body politics links good representation of societal aspirations 
(‘politics’) with their efficient and effective realization (‘administration’) (Hjern, 
1982:302). The policy network, built by means of an explicit technique, is used to 
identify the ‘implementation structure’ (Hjern and Hull, 1982). The bottom-uppers 
evaluate the interactions between a wide range of actors over time. In this way they are 
more able to identify strategic interactions, different from those of the program’s 
proponents. Moreover, as they do not focus on the formal policy objectives, they are 
more inclined to observe unintended consequences of policy programs (Sabatier, 
1986a).  
The most serious criticism brought to the bottom-up approach is that it 
overemphasises the importance of the periphery over the centre, that it takes the 
participation of actors in the implementation structure as given and, more importantly, 
that it fails to start with an explicit theory of the factors affecting these actors (Sabatier, 
1986a:35). 
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Since the mid ’80s many scholars have advocated integration between the 
best features of the two approaches (Elmore, 1985; Goggin, 1986; Linder and Peters, 
1987; O’Toole, 1986; Sabatier, 1986b). The necessity to move towards a third 
generation of implementation research became the preferred subject on the agenda for 
future research. Lester et al (1987:210-212) stress the need to take steps towards a phase 
of research directed by theory development which deals with both conceptual issues 
(e.g. conceptualization of implementation as a process, an output and an outcome; 
identification of the critical variables) and measurement issues (e.g. multiple variables, 
large-scale systematic studies, reliability problems in data collection).  
An important contribution to theory development belongs to Goggin (1986) 
who drew attention to the problem of ‘too few cases/too many variables’ in 
implementation research. According to the author, there are three solutions to this 
problem: ‘first, decrease the number of variables to only those that are critical; second, 
increase the number of cases; third, introduce an element of control by selecting cases 
on the basis of comparability and similarity’ (Goggin, 1986:331).  
Linder and Peters (1987:116) warn that there is a high risk of presenting a 
partial reality that is shaped by the investigator’s values and that ‘selective relativism 
and limited contingency, the two conventions central to patterns of explanation in 
implementation research, limit the ability of implementation studies to make important 
prospective statements about the policy’. Goggin and other scholars believe that a new 
generation of research studies ‘should achieve an ambitious and difficult goal: theory 
building and validation on more rigorously scientific, quantitative (both comparative 
and longitudinal), hypothesis testing’ (Goggin et al, 1990:183). 
In assessing the implementation of certain programmes, it is useful to 
understand the achievement of statutory goals, but this tells us little about the values and 
intentions that guided the formation of a certain policy (Palumbo et al, 1984). These 
authors distinguish between successful implementation of a programme and the 
effectiveness of the policy. The integration into a single approach of the two policy 
stages (formation and implementation) should help in overcoming these limits.  
 
1.3 An historical-institutionalist approach to the policy process 
 
The central idea of the policy process evaluation proposed by Schmid (1997a:205-206) 
is that the relationship between the labour market and political systems works like a 
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cybernetic model: 1) exogenous factors disturb the labour market; 2) these deviances are 
transmitted to the political system which interprets them and, through the decisional 
process, new policies are subsequently chosen (policy choice); 3) the new solutions pass 
into the existing structures for implementation (policy implementation); 4) the resulting 
measures work as positive or negative incentives determining the success or failure in 
reaching the policy goals in respect to the selected target groups (policy take-up). 
Finally, changes in the labour market have repercussions on the political decision-
making process and, depending on the adequacy of the decision-making structures, the 
political system learns (or not) from the whole process. 
The approach chosen to evaluate the policy of socially and publicly useful 
jobs makes a distinction between the three stages of the policy process introduced by 
Schmid: policy-making
3
, its implementation and take-up. There are specific factors that 
determine this structure of the research and that shape its main questions. Firstly, the 
policy of SUJs and PUJs have endured for a very long period; it is more than fifteen 
years since the first data were made available, and this time span has allowed us to learn 
from the evolution of various stages of the policy process and to evaluate the 
continuity/discontinuity between determinant factors for the policy outputs and 
outcomes. Secondly, the factors that led to the policy choice are investigated separately. 
The problem recognition (Sabatier, 1986b) and the formulation of the first set of 
solutions are therefore investigated as premises of the policy choice. The rise in long-
term unemployment after the de-industrialisation and industrial restructuring occurred 
in Italy at the end of the ’70s, and the impact of this process on the formation of a 
specific category of long-term unemployed (former beneficiaries of wage compensation 
funds), who became the main target of the policy in the mid ’90s, are considered 
important premises for the formation of the policy of SUJs and PUJs.  Thirdly, the key 
role played by the public administrations as policy implementers re-shaped the policy-
making (Palumbo and Calista, 1990). Through the privatization of public services, these 
bodies became as important as the final policy beneficiaries and their interests vis-à-vis 
outsourcing determined the characteristics of the policy take-up. For this reason the 
policy take-up is investigated as a separate phase and the policy outcomes are measured 
                                                 
3
 Schmid uses the term policy choice as the culminated stage of the policy-making. Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995:11) identify five stages of the policy cycle in relationship to applied problem-solving: 1) agenda 
setting (goal: problem recognition), 2) policy formulation (goal: proposal of solutions), 3) decision-
making (goal: choice of solution), 4) policy implementation (goal: putting solution into effect) and 5) 
policy evaluation (goal: monitoring results). I use the term policy-making to group together the first three 
stages of the policy cycle (goals: problem recognition, proposal of solutions and choice). 
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against both its achievements, employment creation and services outsourcing. Fourthly, 
this analysis does not focus on best practice recognition. Its aim is, instead, to build a 
‘pattern recognition’ that helps to understand which key determining variables of the 
policy system led to specific outputs and outcomes. Among these variables, those 
concerning the institutional actors play a prominent role (Therborn, 1986), as they made 
the rise and the following evolutions of this policy possible within a broader 
transformation of the Italian welfare state.  Hall and Soskice (2001) demonstrate that the 
interaction between institutions in the political economic field differs according to 
varieties of capitalism; whether these actors seek to pursue their interests in liberal or 
coordinated market economies. Peck and Theodore (2007) advocate an economic 
geographical approach showing how the spatial restructuring of the economy creates 
uneven development and a much more variegated picture of the capitalistic models.  
The role of the institutional factors in the policy process is therefore 
considered crucial; state and institutions are important missing actors in the model 
proposed by Schmid. The criticism brought against this model is centred around the 
statement that labour markets do not function as cybernetic models reacting to the 
disturbance of exogenous factors. As Polanyi powerfully asserts, the economic order is 
embedded in the social one and labour markets are fictitious markets because labour, as 
well as land, are fictitious commodities: 
 
[...] labour and land are not other that human beings themselves of which every society 
consists and natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market 
mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws on the market 
(Polanyi, 2001:75). 
 
The policies involving labour market regulation are not constructed in the 
same way as those concerning the production and distribution of market commodities. 
Beyond the economic reasons, policies contrasting long-term unemployment firstly 
have to deal with the disruptive effects of this phenomenon on the social and political 
orders. Informal rules and cultural factors also play important roles in the policy-
making. The policy makers dealing with complex problems arrive at a common idea 
about what the most appropriate solutions are in certain circumstances, on the basis of a 
shared understanding of those problems (March and Olsen, 1989). Moreover, the 
policy-making in itself is not a completely organized process. Olsen (1972:46) suggests 
that ‘a key to the understanding of public policy-making may be to view a choice 
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opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems, solutions and 
participants may – or may not – be dumped’. All these considerations highlight the 
complexity of the decision making process and the stability of the policy choices over 
time. The relation between problems, solutions and participants can be altered at an 
operational level, where programmes are implemented, and this brings even more 
dynamicity to the model. 
Recognising the central role of institutions in providing the context in which 
the policy process develops, the approach chosen for this research is historical-
institutionalism. This approach is part of a new-institutionalism that emphasises both 
the role of human actions and that of institutions in the development of the policy 
process, highlighting the institutions in mediating the interactions between political 
actors (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). As far as policy-making is concerned, the neo-
institutionalism perspective is summarized by Krasner as follows: 
 
An institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building 
blocks of social and political life. The preference, capabilities, and basic self-identities of 
individuals are conditioned by these institutional structures. Historical developments are 
path dependent; once certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The 
range of options available to policy makers at any given time is a function of institutional 
capabilities that were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in response to very 
different environmental pressures (Krasner, 1988:67). 
 
Historical-institutionalism acknowledges the importance of historical events 
in the incremental development of the policy process, known as path dependency. This 
concept is linked to that of the increasing returns of the policy which was explored in 
depth by Pierson (1994, 2001). In relation to the debate surrounding welfare state 
retrenchment, Pierson argues that, once a policy takes a particular route, the cost of 
switching to different routes tends to increase and this makes the change difficult and 
politically controversial. Myles and Pierson (2001) demonstrated path dependency by 
analysing the pension reform in OECD countries. Some of the countries undertook 
radical reforms moving towards the privatization of pensions schemes, but this did not 
happen in those countries which had well-established institutions where the ‘options 
opened to policy makers, whatever their politics, are constrained by institutional and 
programmatic designs inherited from the past’ (Myles and Pierson, 2001:306).    
Another important contribution is that belonging to Swank (2002), who 
questions whether the increased international capital mobility brought about by 
globalization created pressures for major welfare state retrenchment. He concludes that 
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the answer to this question is generally no; yet the post-globalization debate about 
welfare reform was shaped, in many European states, by the existing welfare provisions 
and by the organization of the national welfare states.  
In a similar vein to the writers above, many historical institutionalists
4
 
maintain that the policies, rather than being the outcome of the policy process, become a 
central part of the policy process itself. These authors emphasize that policy feedback 
influences policy development in ways that are impossible to predict. This concept, 
known as the unintended consequences of the policy choice, was widely explored by 
Baldwin (1992) in his influential analysis of the origins of the European welfare states.   
The role played by institutions in the movement from Keynesians to 
monetarism in the British economic policy was seminally analysed by Hall (1992). The 
author shows how certain kinds of institutional configurations favoured inertia, and 
others favoured change, but both operated during different stages of the British policy 
process.   
Hudson and Lowe (2009) strongly advocate the historical institutionalism 
approach in policy analysis, yet they present some of the most relevant criticism raised 
against this approach; firstly, the theoretical weaknesses of some concepts such as path 
dependency, which cannot be tested empirically and seems too general to be useful 
(Ross, 2007). In turn, the historical institutionalists highlight the dependency between 
institutional response and the context within which these institutions are located, and 
‘believe that the impact of institutions is too complex to be boiled down to a series of 
simple propositions that will apply to all cases at all times’ (Hudson and Lowe, 
2009:190). 
 
1.4 The categorical framework to analyse the role of institutions during the 
policy process  
 
The formation of the policy of socially and publicly useful jobs cannot however be 
separated from other political choices with regard to the Italian economy in the ’80s and 
early ’90s. Some important factors, both national and international, determined the 
different institutional configurations which shaped the policy premises and determined 
its evolution over almost two decades. The role played by institutions is acknowledged 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed review of the main political theories of the welfare state, see Myles and Quadagno (2002). 
For a detailed examination of the role of institutions within the policy process and of the new-
institutionalist approach, see Huston and Lowe (2009). 
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in each stage, showing the impact of their interactions on the policy outputs and 
outcomes. As socially and publicly useful jobs are policies addressing long-term 
unemployment, they are part of those policies concerning labour market regulation that 
were subject to considerable pressure during the shift from Keynesianism to 
monetarism. Market liberalization went at the same pace as labour deregulation and the 
dismantling of the welfare states. The reactions of the institutions to these processes 
were however different in different states and, as this research will attempt to prove, this 
policy marked the end of the Keynesian approach to labour market policies in Italy. 
One of the most challenging aspects of this thesis is its aspiration to analyse 
the policy transformation during the paradigm change. For this reason, different filters 
are used to analyse the policy organizations structures during its three separate stages. 
Using Hall’s definition, ‘the term organization is used as a virtual synonym of 
institution’ because ‘the emphasis is on the relational character of institutions’ (Hall, 
1986:19). While the policy-making was developed during a Keynesian welfare regime, 
the implementation and, in particular, the policy take-up occurred during the 
Schumpeterian workfare regime. It is therefore expected that this paradigm shift (Hall, 
1990) brought about changes to the organizational structures applying the three policy 
stages.  
The categories used to analyses the specific organizational structure that 
characterize the three parts of the political system (choice, implementation and take-up) 
are presented as follows.  
 
1.4.1 Policy choice 
 
The first filter is used to analyse the policy choice and the components of the policy-
making (chapters 3 and 4). According to the framework proposed by Schmid, ‘policy 
regimes can be characterized by four modes of social coordination: a value and attitude 
structure; an associative structure; the social system of material exchange (the market); 
and the state’s basic legal structure' (Schmid, 1997a:209-212).  
These categories are contextualized in this research within the general frame 
of the Italian corporatist welfare regime. Therefore the organizational frame employed 
in the policy choice evaluation makes use of the following categories: the value 
structure analyses the values that underpinned the gradual formation of the policy, 
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focusing on two different stages apparently contradictory to each other
5
; the associative 
structure analyses the relationships between the main interest groups and the state; the 
market economy regime analyses the structure of wage subsidies and the use of the 
public sector. Finally, the state’s legal structure is founded in Italy on the tradition of 
civil law. The main components of the policy’s ‘legal infrastructure’ are analysed, 
showing how the change in regulation in 2000 determined a policy turn. 
 
1.4.2 Policy implementation 
 
The second filter is used to analyse the policy implementation (chapter 5). In the 
framework proposed by Schmid there are four organizational structures of the 
implementation regimes: a competence structure; a decision making and responsibility 
structure; a financial and production structure; and the legal form and the content of the 
programs (Schmid, 1997a:212-215). As the policy of SUJs and PUJs was designed with 
a specific purpose and addressed a precise target group, the way in which the legal form 
and the content of the programs achieved specific configurations is explained in the 
chapter that evaluates the policy choice. The other three organizational dimensions 
proposed are instead adapted to the institutionalist approach of this research and a new 
fourth dimension is added. 
The revisited categories applied to assess the policy implementation are as 
follows: the behaviour of the institutional actors involved in the implementation in 
relation to the implementation goals (competence structure); the interactions between 
these actors during the decision-making process and their responsibility towards the 
implementations objectives (decision making and responsibility structure); the way in 
which the policy implementation was financed and the services provided (financial and 
production structure); the key variables that accelerated/impeded the policy 
                                                 
5
 Due to economic and social premises that brought to the formation of a structural unemployment 
concentrated in certain geographical areas, the policy debuted with a more workfarist approach in the mid 
’90s. This approach was driven especially by communication reasons that allowed policy makers to 
present this policy as a way to cut public expenditures and prevented publicly and useful workers from 
being considered a category of ‘favoured’ unemployed (analysed in chapter 3). The enlargement of the 
policy target to new categories of unemployed and the legislation passed in 1997 affirmed the demand-
side approach of the policy choice, centred on job-creation schemes and promotion of employment in new 
sectors (analysed in chapter 4). Drawing on the game theory, Schmid (1997a:209-210) identifies four 
types of value and attitude structure: ‘aggressive-individualistic (minimizing the benefit for others); 
competitive-individualistic (maximizing the benefit for oneself); solidaristic-cooperative (maximizing the 
benefit for oneself and others) and altruistic-communitarian (maximizing the benefit for others)’.  
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implementation and the relation between them and the policy outputs/outcomes 
(catalysts structure for policy implementation). 
 
1.4.3 Policy take-up 
 
The third filter is used to analyse the policy take-up (chapter 6). This is the third phase 
of the policy system when the measures adopted as the result of program 
implementation determine a positive or negative performance of the target group in 
respect to the policy goals. The ultimate goal of the policy of SUJs and PUJs was the re-
insertion of long-term unemployed in the labour market. In policy jargon this is known 
as ‘employment stabilization’, and its achievements are intrinsically linked to the public 
services outsourcing. The organizational structure of the incentive regimes proposed by 
Schmid (1997a:215-217) contains four different types: moral, social, economic and 
political incentives. Only the last two are considered relevant for this research but, 
again, the competences and responsibilities of the institutional actors involved in this 
stage have been assessed. 
Therefore, the categories applied to assess the policy take-up are as follows: 
the behaviour of the institutional actors involved in the ‘employment stabilization’ in 
relation to the final policy goal (competence structure); the interactions between these 
actors during the decision-making process at a project’s closure and their responsibility 
towards the ‘employment stabilization’ (decision making and responsibility structure); 
the financial rewards related to the policy take-up and incentives derived from legal 
entitlements that strengthened/weakened the other incentives (incentives structure); the 
key variables that accelerated/impeded the policy take-up and the relation between them 
and the policy outputs/outcomes (catalysts structure for policy take-up). 
As can be observed the filters used to analyse the policy implementation and 
take-up have many similarities. This is because there is continuity both between the 
stages of the policy and the institutions involved, namely public administrations, trade 
unions, public agencies and the central state (Ministry of Labour). Some of the public 
agencies involved in these two stages changed (agencies for job and enterprise 
promotion during the policy implementation, and IL/SCO
6
 during the policy take-up), 
while the employers (private companies and cooperatives) acted during the policy take-
                                                 
6
 Italia Lavoro and Sviluppo Cooperazione e Occupazione (Development Cooperation and Employment) 
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up only. The private companies were present as individual actors and not through their 
associations, while the cooperatives were represented by three national consortiums 
stakeholders of SCO (chapter 6). 
Although the same key institutions are involved in both implementation and 
take-up, the competence structure and the decision-making and responsibility structure 
differed in these two policy stages. 
The competence structure can be more demand-oriented or supply-oriented, 
according to the goals pursued in each of the policy stages. If the actions promoted by 
the public actors aimed to create new job opportunities for the unemployed within the 
projects, the competence structure was more demand-oriented. If, instead, the 
unemployed were pressed to exit the projects and search for new jobs, there was a more 
supply-oriented competence structure.  
The decision making and responsibility structure refers to the ways in which 
legal provisions, brought about by the policy-making, are transformed into operational 
activities. This can be either hierarchical-centralized, autonomous-decentralized or 
cooperative
7
 (Schmid, 1997a:213). In the first case an actor has the responsibility for the 
whole process and decisions are transmitted to the other policy actors through a 
hierarchical structure; in the second case there are different actors with self-directed 
responsibilities involved in various stages of the policy process; in the third case 
decisions tend to be made cooperatively and the different levels of responsibility are 
agreed between the actors.  
Finally, policy outputs and outcomes analysed during the implementation 
and take-up phases, are exemplified through a multiple case studies analysis (chapter 7) 
and are drawn together in the last chapter that aims to identify patterns of policy process 
evaluation in a dynamic perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Drawing on collective action and bargaining theories Schmid (1997a:213) explains that ‘there are at 
least five reasons for cooperation: externalities, assistance, conventions, joint ventures and private 
ordering. Collective action theory deals with the first two types of cooperation and bargaining theory with 
the last three. Collective action theory identifies the free-rider problem as the main obstacle to 
cooperation. Bargaining theory suggests that the main problem is failure to agree on the division of the 
benefits from cooperation’. 
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1.5 Research methods relating to principal sets of data 
 
1.5.1 Combining quantitative and qualitative methods 
 
The analysis carried out in this research employs both quantitative and qualitative 
research strategies. The multi-strategy approach that aims at breaking down the divide 
between these two strategies can, however, be viewed as somewhat controversial. The 
arguments against multi-strategy research are based on ‘the ideas that research methods 
carry epistemological commitments and that quantitative and qualitative research are 
separate paradigms’ (Bryman, 2001:452). This is the ‘epistemological version’ of the 
debate which differs from the ‘technical version’. The latter, although recognising 
connections between quantitative and qualitative research, and distinctive 
epistemological and ontological assumptions, does not view these connections as 
deterministic and perceives research methods as autonomous (ibid.454).  
Hammersley (1996) proposes three approaches to multi-strategy research: 1) 
triangulation (one strategy is employed to confirm the other strategy’s findings); 2) 
facilitation (one strategy is employed to help the other research strategy) and 3) 
complementarity (both strategies are used to explore different aspects of the 
investigation). In recent years, there has been an increased interest in triangulation as 
this approach is seen as a way to obtain confirmation and greater completeness (Arksey 
and Knight, 1999). Drawing on Denzin’s work which introduced the notion of ‘multiple 
triangulation’, Arksey and Knight (1999:22-23) introduce different types of 
triangulation that are available to enrich the quality of research: methodological 
triangulation (referring to the use of a variety of methods to collect and interpret data); 
data triangulation (referring to the use of diverse data sources to explore the same 
phenomenon); investigator triangulation (referring to the participation of different 
researchers, interviewers or observers in the study) and theoretical triangulation 
(referring to approaching the research with different theoretical perspectives in mind).  
In this research, the ‘technical version’ of the debate referring to combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods is embraced. Different methods of collecting and 
interpreting data are used complementarily, with the purpose of integrating different 
aspects of the policy analysis.   
The specific research techniques have been chosen in relation to the 
theoretical framework employed. As the analysis focuses on the role of institutions in 
16 
 
the development of the SUJs and PUJs policy over a long period of time, great effort 
was put into collecting data in order to capture the policy evolution and especially those 
factors that influenced the policy process in its various stages and determined its outputs 
and outcomes. The transformation of the policy itself is the object of analysis and this 
was determined by events, timing and locations; all of these variables performed in 
different ways during policy-making, implementation and take-up.   
The guiding principle of theorising in this research is not a causal 
explanation, but an identification of patterns and interpretation. Coffey and Atkinson 
(1996:143) state that: 
 
it is not necessary [...] to assume that all theories need to consist of causal explanations. 
Many of the theories generated from qualitative research [...] often take the form of ideal 
types [...] They are intended to capture the key features of a given phenomenon without 
necessarily displaying all the particulars of individual cases.   
 
However, the effort of going ‘beyond the data’ to develop ideas, raises some 
questions regarding the processes of generalizing and theorizing (ibid.139), which is 
why a wide range of data connected to the evolution of the policy at every single stage 
have been collected. They are briefly described in the following subsections, together 
with the motivation that led to their choice.  
 
1.5.2 Policy process: data, sources and methods  
 
The first part of this thesis (chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) analyses the policy-making, 
implementation and take-up. The main institutional actors involved in these stages of 
the policy process are: the central state (Ministry of Labour), public agencies/structures 
for the implementation of labour-market policies (IL and SCO), local public 
administrations and public bodies, trade unions, and associations of entrepreneurs 
(including consortiums of cooperatives). 
Different sets of quantitative and qualitative data are analysed in chapters 3-
6 with the aim of presenting a detailed analysis of the policy stages, focusing on the 
roles played by the institutional actors in each of them. 
The main sets of data and their sources are briefly presented as follows: 
 Quantitative data from CENSUS sources: employment trends and the 
geography of unemployment (1970-2010); total expenditure allocated to 
different typologies of unemployment aids (1990-2002); stock of 
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unemployed involved in SUJs and PUJs in various years (1997-2001); total 
number of employees in public sectors and related quota of SUWs (2001-
2010); state expenditure for various typologies of allowances paid to SUWs 
(2003-2009). 
 Unpublished quantitative data from the Ministry of Labour, IL and SCO: 
state expenditure for the special laws and agreements related to the policy 
take-up in the regions of Southern Italy after 2000; total number of SUWs 
per region and per typology of ‘employment stabilization’ (2001-2011); 
number of SUWs and PUWs employed and related costs; data concerning 
the transfer of the joint mix companies from IL to the public administrations 
or private companies. 
 Qualitative data from policy documents and legislation: the five main 
agreements signed by the social partners and the state during the period 
1992-1998; the main legislation that constituted the juridical body of the 
policy, various reports prepared for the Parliament. 
 Unpublished qualitative data from policy documents prepared by IL and 
SCO concerning the ‘employment stabilization’ of SUWs and PUWs. 
 Qualitative data from in-depth semi-structured interviews with top-level 
representatives involved in policy-making, implementation and take-up: the 
labour minister,  two under-secretaries of state and two general directors at 
the Ministry of Labour, five trade unions’ executives responsible for  active 
labour policies, the two presidents of IL, the general manager and one 
executive at the Division of joint mixed public-private companies of IL, 
three presidents of the consortiums of cooperatives members of SCO. As the 
research emphasises the policy transformation during the paradigm change, 
it was relevant and necessary to interview institutional stakeholders with 
such responsibilities, both before 1998/2000 and afterwards.  
 My personal narrative as executive in SCO is presented in a separate section 
in chapter 6. The ethical concerns regarding my personal participation in the 
policy implementation and take-up are analysed in a following sub-section.   
 
In-depth interviewing, the main qualitative method involved in this part of 
the research, seeks to gain ‘‘deep’ information and understanding’ (Johnson, 2001:103). 
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The interviews were carried out to obtain the following information, essential to 
understanding the policy process: 
 The problem recognition in the ’80s and mechanisms which determined the 
choice of certain solutions (the introductions of special instruments, 
emergency policies and a shift from passive benefits to welfare-to-work 
policies, chapter 3). 
 How international and national constraints shaped the first set of solutions in 
the early ’90s and the role played by social actors in determining them 
(policy formulation during the period preceding the Italy joining the EMU, 
chapter 3). 
 How the policy choice brought about the creation of socially and publicly 
useful jobs in the late ’90s, as part of a broader labour-market reform (a shift 
from welfare-to-work to job-creation schemes, chapter 4). 
 How the policy changed in 2000 under the pressure of a new neoliberal 
approach aimed at labour-market deregulation, privatization of public 
services and devolution of the state’s administrative authority to the regions 
(the Third Way politics and the welfare state retrenchment, and their 
influence in the policy change, chapter 4). 
 Which factors and actors influenced the policy implementation during the 
start-up of SUJs and PUJs projects, and what consequences this had for the 
policy process (projects start-up and execution, delivery of public services, 
chapter 5). 
 Which factors and actors influenced the policy during the closure of SUJs 
and PUJs projects and what consequences this had for the policy take-up 
(projects closure, privatization of public services and new employment for 
SUWs and PUWs, chapter 6). 
 
In carrying out in-depth interviews three guiding themes are proposed by 
Rubin and Rubin (1995:19) as an approach to qualitative interviews: the understanding 
of culture, the recognition of the non-neutral relationship with the participants and the 
priority given to the public voice of the interviewees. All these themes have been 
acknowledged during the carrying out of the research as well as in the analysis of the 
data collected.  
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1.5.3  Different perspectives of the policy take-up: data, sources and methods 
 
The second part of this thesis analyses in detail how the ‘employment stabilization’ 
occurred and the consequences this had for different groups of SUWs and PUWs. This 
also investigates the subsequent stages of the programs’ closure during the five-year 
period when the services were outsourced. This is achieved through a multiple case-
study analysis (chapter 7). The case study ‘is an exploration of a  “bounded system” or a 
case over the time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources 
of information rich in context’ (Creswell, 1998:61). For this part of the research a 
‘collective case study’ (Stake, 1998:89) was chosen, with the purpose of exploring 
different perspectives of the policy take-up at a micro-level. This ‘collective case study’ 
is a combination of the following four case-studies: 1) a cooperative formed by PUWs 
in Calabria; 2) a cooperative formed by SUWs in Puglia; 3) a joint mixed public-private 
company which employed SUWs in Puglia and 4) a national public body in Abruzzi, 
which directly employed SUWs who had been previously employed and then dismissed 
by a private company.  
In three of these cases the public agencies participated as policy facilitators: 
SCO in the creation of cooperatives, and IL in the formation of the joint mixed public-
private company. The fourth case starts by describing the failure of the previous 
‘employment stabilization’ facilitated by SCO through one of its cooperatives which 
had employed the SUWs and, after five years, dismissed them.  
The choice of this more complex type of policy take-up, which requires the 
involvement of a public agency as ‘facilitator’, represents the key feature of all case 
studies presented in this research. This is because the research explores the role of 
institutions in reaching the policy goals. To a certain extent it can be assumed that, 
every time the ‘employment stabilization’ did not require the involvement of IL or 
SCO, no obstacles were encountered during the policy take-up. However, the case study 
analysis highlights certain problems which are likely to appear, even in these more 
straightforward situations.    
 The quantitative and qualitative data presented within the case studies draw 
on multiple sources of information, as follows: 
 Semi-structured interviews with the policy beneficiaries (SUWs and PUWs), 
the policy actors involved at local level in the ‘employment stabilization’ 
(public administrations, trade unions, IL and SCO as ‘facilitators’) as well as 
20 
 
with some external participants who played an important role during the 
services start-up, e.g. consultants or tutors. 
 Documents related to the privatization of public services and the closure of 
projects: business plans, archived documents belonging to IL and SCO, 
contracts and legal documents prepared for the public administrations. 
 Balance sheets of the cooperatives and joint mixed company, to assess the 
evolution of their business over a period of at least five years of the 
contracts. 
 My personal observations from the field. Most of these data have been taken 
in the form of notes which I transcribed and then included in the analysis. 
 
The data collected through the interviews within case-studies are organized 
according to themes, which are the same in all four cases. These themes are analysed in 
detail in each case study and then become components of the policy patterns in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
1.5.4 Data analysis 
 
In analysing the relationship between social theory and social research May (2001:28) 
states that: ‘data are not collected, but produced. Facts do not exist independently of the 
medium through which they are interpreted, whether that is an explicit theoretical 
model, a set of assumptions, or interests that have led to the data being collected in the 
first instance’.  
The way in which data are constructed is therefore fundamental in social 
research. This thesis involves both analytical and interpretive processes because ‘they 
work in tandem in the construction of meaning’ (Ely et al, 1997:160). The interpretation 
mode is used to ‘draw meanings form the analysed data and attempt[s] to see them in a 
larger context’ (ibid.), while the analytical mode is used to organize patterns and themes 
embodied in each stage of the policy process. Often patterns and themes are 
distinguished in data and these findings are grouped in relation to each other or are 
interpreted against a larger theoretical framework.  
The data collected through interviews with institutional stakeholders are 
used in the construction of narratives that conceptualize the process of policy-making 
(Czarniawska, 2001). Direct quotations from interviews are incorporated in the analysis 
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of other sets of data and are linked to the theoretical stances. Data presented in the 
‘collective case study’ are instead analysed differently. A description of the themes 
which characterise the four case studies is given at the beginning, while a thematic 
analysis across the cases is presented in the conclusions of the thesis (chapter 8); the 
former is called ‘within-case analysis’ while the latter is called ‘cross-case analysis’ 
(Creswell, 1998: 63). The analytical technique used for single case study is the 
‘explanation building’ (Yin, 2003:120-122). Its principal aim is to build an explanation 
around the case in a narrative form, identifying causal links that reflect critical insights 
into the policy.  
The most important problem I have encountered with respect to data 
collection and analysis is my direct involvement in the policy take-up when I was 
employed in SCO. I am aware that this direct participation in the policy process could 
jeopardise the validation of my assessments. Since the beginning of this research I have 
gone to great lengths to access a large number of diverse sources that would allow me to 
apply methodological and data triangulation. Moreover, before starting the research I 
made some specific decisions concerning my data: firstly, I chose to interview only 
stakeholders with whom I had had no previous contact with during my work 
commitments;  secondly, I have never been directly involved in the case studies 
presented in this research and I have never worked for those named public 
administrations and unemployed
8
; thirdly, I deliberately chose not to interview my 
former managers in SCO; data concerning the activity of the company were collected 
from official documents and through interviews with the managers of the three 
consortiums of cooperatives, members of SCO; fourthly, a critical analysis of the role of 
SCO during the policy implementation and take–up, also including my personal 
account, is presented in chapter 6.  Despite the criticism which this research could face 
due to my direct participation, I would like to acknowledge the importance of my status 
as former ‘policy insider’ in collecting a large amount of unpublished data, as well as in 
understanding the nuances and the technical language of my interviewees. Moreover, 
the fact that I and my interlocutors shared a common feeling concerning the complexity 
of this policy, helped to create a more positive disposition towards accessing a deeper 
                                                 
8
 The fourth case study represents, partially, an exception from this rule because I was involved with 
policy beneficiaries directly during the first ‘employment stabilization’. This project was closed with the 
workers being employed by a cooperative of the SCO’s network, but after five years the ‘stabilization’ 
failed and the workers again became unemployed. The public administration ‘took them back’ and 
employed them directly. The first part of this ‘story’ is critically presented at the beginning of the case.   
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understanding of the policy development. In other words, my interviewees always 
answered my ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and it was perhaps my previous understanding 
about the ways this policy worked, that helped them to reveal different layers of the 
policy process. 
All interviews were carried out in Italian and, with the exception of some 
technical terms, they include a standard use of the language. The interviews were 
recorded and then transcribed in Italian. The parts analysed in this thesis have been 
translated into English. 
 
1.5.5 Researcher’s positionality  
 
This section presents further insights from the process of data collection, focusing on 
the difficulties encountered, the solutions found to overcome them and the ways in 
which the researcher’s positionality has impacted on both. Before beginning qualitative 
data collection I was aware that a researcher is not in a neutral position. Feminist 
researchers conceptualized the existence of power-relations in the process of production 
of knowledge (Harding, 1987; Ramazanoğlu and Holland, 2002). 
 The relationship between myself and my interviewees had an impact on the 
research design and also influenced the research outcomes. Haraway (1988) criticises 
the constructionist discourse regarding the objectivity and scientific method in social 
sciences, in which she opposes the approach of critical empiricism employed by 
feminist researchers. She asserts that ‘feminism objectivity means quite simply situated 
knowledges’ (1988:581) and advances criticism against the ‘positivist arrogance’ (ibid. 
580) that ignores the importance of genders, social classes, races etc. in shaping our 
understanding of natural, human and social sciences.  
Although my research methodology does not use a feminist approach, I 
acknowledge two main factors that determined my interaction with the subjects of my 
research and, to a certain degree, shaped my understanding of the policy of SUJs and 
PUJs. The first factor was my previous direct involvement in the policy process, while 
the second was my educational background and, particularly, the fact that the interviews 
were part of a PhD research project undertaken in the UK.  
My previous work experience as a policy practitioner was both positive and 
challenging. On the one hand, my broad knowledge of many aspects of the policy 
process allowed me to address very specific questions and to verify the accuracy of the 
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answers. On the other hand, my interviewees felt that I knew ‘too much’ about certain 
arguments that they would have preferred not to discuss in depth, in particular ‘why’ 
questions addressing the motivation of various choices made by the institutional actors 
during the policy-making and implementation. This difficulty was overcome with a very 
clear presentation of my research purposes. Many of my interviewees were surprised 
that ‘somebody dedicates a PhD to such a lengthy and complicated story’ that has 
remained almost unknown outside the playground of its direct protagonists.  
At this point, the second factor, my educational background, proved  
interesting for my interviewees. My personal ‘story’ as an educated-foreigner who came 
to Italy, learned ‘their’ language, became involved in a policy concerning the long-term 
unemployment and then decided to explore in depth this policy thorough a PhD research 
carried in the UK, was seen as something of genuine interest for Italy and its ‘complex 
problems’. This consideration applies particularly to the interviews carried out with the 
policy stakeholders, most of whom held key positions in various institutions. Even 
though most of the policy-makers were men who had important roles in the policy 
process, I never felt I was in a subservient position and neither did I feel that  the gender 
factor played a role during the interviews. 
As concerns the four case-studies, my interviewees were very interested in 
‘telling their stories’. Many of the people I spoke to would have preferred me to write 
something less serious than a long PhD thesis; a narrative that would have presented 
their achievements, and promoted their companies and institutions to a far broader 
audience. However, they understood the nature of a research project and allowed me a 
considerable amount of time for the interviews, together with their enthusiasm. I admit 
that the relationship created between myself and my research participants made my 
work become more of a ‘with’ and ‘for’, them, rather than ‘about’ them (McDowell, 
1999).  
The selection of the four case-studies was not taken lightly. First of all, 
speaking with my former colleagues in SCO and Italia Lavoro, I searched for cases that 
would  allow me to collect data concerning different policy stages. I was interested in 
successful, but problematic stories, in other words projects that had positive outcomes, 
but encountered difficulties during implementation and take-up. My aim was to  collect 
data from contrasting narratives that would allow me to explore different aspects of the 
policy process. The cooperative of PUWs in Casabona is a case that displays almost all 
elements of an entrepreneurial choice. It is a successful story but there are many turning 
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points that could have led to different results. The cooperative of SUWs in Grottaglie 
represents a case of a successful story that ended negatively. It is interesting to see how 
the existence of positive outcomes during implementation and take-up did not protect 
the cooperative from the risk of failure. The joint mixed company in Taranto 
encountered many difficulties from its outset. Some of them were overcome, but many 
of them remained risk factors for the company. Its future is highly uncertain. The case 
of the National Park is extremely interesting and provides a very good insight into the 
choice between outsourcing and in-house provision of public services.  
The cases are located in different geographical areas, this being another 
criteria that I used for my selection. Once I have received information about the 
potential ‘good cases’, my former colleagues acted as ‘middle-men’ and helped me to 
make the first telephone contact. In the case of the National Park I contacted two of its 
employees who had been involved in the closure of the SUJs project directly. In all four 
cases the presidents of the cooperatives, the president of the joint mixed company and 
the director of the National Park made themselves available for  interview and put me in 
contact with other members of their organizations. 
In order to allow triangulation of data collected through interviews, I have 
used other channels for collecting quantitative data for these case-studies: SCO’s and 
Italia Lavoro’s archives for documents concerning projects’ implementation and 
closure, and the Chambers of Commerce for balance sheets and reports.  
The whole personal experience of qualitative data collection was very 
positive. It took me a certain amount of time to schedule the interviews with the policy-
makers and to carry out the interviews in the different regions. In all situations it was 
very positive being flexible and respecting my interviewees’ time constraints. Before 
completing the analysis of the data collected, I again contacted  the four organizations to 
obtain the latest updates. With the exception of the cooperative of Grottaglie (which had 
become insolvent) all the others provided me with the data requested, re-confirming 
their genuine interest in this research and its outcomes.  
 
1.5.6 Ethical concerns 
 
This final subsection deals with some specific issues regarding the ethical principles of 
the social research (Bryman, 2001:509): how to avoid harming participants; how to 
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avoid the lack of informed consent; how to avoid invasion of privacy; how to avoid 
deception. 
During my research practice I faced only the second and the third areas of 
potential problems. The most straightforward way to avoid the lack of informed consent 
was to prepare an ‘Interviewee Information Form’ containing the following 
information: research title and purpose, nature of participants’ involvement in the 
research, the fact that the participation in research is voluntary and they can withdraw 
from it at any time,  and how data will be stored and processed. Moreover, before 
starting an interview I always spend time giving additional information and responding 
to the interviewees’ questions. In this particular research, the questions were often 
related to the reasons that lay behind my interest for this policy analysis, and the nature 
of my direct involvement in the policy process.  
As concerns the invasion of privacy, the interviewees were informed on the 
same form about the fact that data are processed anonymously, and specific written 
consent was asked to publish their identity. Despite the fact that all participants declared 
that information given during the interviews was ‘not secret’, none of them gave 
explicit consent for their real identity to be used; all of them instead agreed to have their 
initials used. All data were stored in electronic format which was anonymised and 
protected with passwords. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the theoretical framework of the research, the categories of 
analysis employed in the evaluation of each stage of the policy process, as well as the 
research methodology and methods relating to data collection and processing. 
Framework, categories and methods are linked back to the policy of socially and 
publicly useful jobs throughout this chapter in order to contextualize the use of a 
historical-institutionalist approach in a policy process evaluation. 
The analysis of the policy of socially and useful jobs during the shift from 
the Keynesian paradigm to monetarism remains the most challenging aim of this 
research. The model proposed by Schmid (1997a) that connects the three stages of the 
policy system (choice, implementation and take-up) is fundamental to the analysis of 
this policy that had a long period of gestation and has also lasted for many years. This 
third generation of policy process evaluation should overcome the limitations of the 
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‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches which usually emphasized one of the two main 
parts of the policy process, its formation or implementation. The main theoretical 
stances developed by these two approaches were presented in the first section of the 
chapter, while the justification for the choice of a policy process evaluation approach 
was presented in the second section. 
It was emphasised that, compared with the other two approaches, a third 
stage of the policy process was considered in this model; the policy take-up. It is this 
that makes it possible to gain a better understanding of the dynamics which led to the 
policy outcomes in relation with the target group. It was argued that this analysis is even 
more pertinent for the policy of socially and publicly useful jobs which allowed the 
long-term unemployed to re-enter the labour market, but also stressed how important 
the outsourcing of public services became for certain public administrations, and this 
became the policy’s principal goal in the stage of the projects’ closure. It is crucially 
important to investigate the reasons which made the services outsourcing become more 
than a means to an end and to explain how this influenced the policy outcomes. 
However the representation of the labour market as a cybernetic model that 
responds to exogenous factors was completely rejected. Starting from Polanyi’s seminal 
critique of market liberalism and his concept of embeddedness of the economic order in 
the society, it was explained why the evaluation of a labour market policy cannot 
disregard  the crucial role played by the state and institutions in each stage of the policy 
process. For this reason, it was argued, the historical-institutionalist approach was 
chosen for this evaluation and the categorical framework proposed by Schmid (1997a) 
was amended accordingly.  
The categories that will be employed for the policy process evaluation from 
an institutionalist perspective were presented in the third section. These categories draw 
principally on Schmid’s framework for the policy choice, but  differ considerably in the 
policy implementation and take-up. In these two stages the competence, decision 
making and responsibility structures of institutions are investigated, alongside the key 
variables that accelerated/impeded their actions towards reaching the policy’s 
outputs/outcomes. 
The research methods were presented in the fourth section. The combined 
use of quantitative and qualitative research methods was explained in the first 
subsection, while the following two subsections detailed the different sets of data, their 
sources and the specific methods used to collect them, during each stage of the policy 
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process. The main quantitative methods involving in-depth interviews and case-study 
analysis were further explained. The methods of data analysis were presented in the 
fourth subsection together with certain problems raised by the investigator’s direct 
participation in the policy take-up. It was also explained that an interpretative technique 
will be used for the analysis of data concerning the policy system, while an analytical 
technique called ‘explanation building’ will be used for the case studies analysis. The 
last subsection dealt with ethical concerns, mainly the lack of informed consent and the 
invasion of privacy.  
The policy analysed in this thesis is part of a more profound transformation 
which involved the labour market regulation in Italy. It cannot be analysed outside a 
broader frame of the political economy which signalled the end of Keynesianism and 
the rise of neoliberal practices in the economic and social orders. The most important 
consequences are witnessed by the severe attack upon the old-welfare practices based 
on rights-entitlements and the gradual introduction of the workfarist approach driven by 
the ‘Third Way’ politics. These changes are investigated in the next chapter in relation 
to the policy of socially and useful jobs which was particularly, and even surprisingly, 
resilient to a great part of them.  
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Chapter 2 
Welfare state in the transition from Keynesianism to Monetarism 
 
‘The outstanding faults of the economic society in 
which we live are its failure to provide for full 
employment and its arbitrary and inequitable 
distribution of wealth and incomes’. 
(John Maynard Keynes, 1936:372) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The policy of socially and publicly useful jobs was introduced in the 1990s as the 
ultimate solution to reduce  long-term unemployment. Its causes can instead be viewed  
through various crises of Italian capitalism in the previous two decades. While, in 
OECD countries, the first oil crisis was fought with Keynesian demand management 
policies, this did not occur during the second oil crisis when the strategy chosen  
focused on the reduction of inflation and compression of macro-economic demand (De 
Cecco, 2000). This policy accentuated the dire situation of the Italian public debt, and 
the restructuring that occurred in the industrial sector brought increased productivity at 
the expense of extensive redundancies. The public accounts received a hard knock and 
the welfare caseloads seemed unable to sustain the large number of people taking early 
retirement as well as the cost of unemployment benefits put in place to face social 
emergencies. At the same time, under political pressure, the public companies were 
asked to take on more workers in order to compensate for the harsh downsizing of the 
private sector. This situation led to an increase in the public enterprises debt and to the 
deterioration of their economic performance. For all these reasons, ‘the economic 
authorities of the emergency years agreed on the necessity, and also on the desirability, 
of sacrificing the public enterprises for the restructuration of the public budget’ (De 
Cecco, 2000: XXVI). If, on  the one side the policy pursued in the late 1980s focused on 
cashing in on public assets, on the other side, the contraction of the welfare expense 
became the other priority. The change in legislation concerning the wage compensation 
funds and the introduction of other types of unemployment benefits made the paths 
followed by the various categories of unemployed clearer, but did not help these people 
find new job opportunities. The involvement of the long-term unemployed in the 
delivery of local public services was an attempt to make their benefits socially useful, 
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but also to find a temporary solution to the dramatic lack of blue-collar workers in the 
public sector. However, the restructuration of the Italian welfare state continued and, at 
the end of the 1990s,  privatization  was intrinsically involved  with  the sector of local 
services. 
This chapter is organized into two large sections, each divided into five 
subsections. Starting from the principal Keynesian ideas about the role of 
macroeconomic policies in maintaining high rates of employment, the first section 
investigates the main areas of welfare state intervention in relation to policies tackling 
unemployment, focusing on the structural features of labour market regimes presented 
in Esping-Andersen’s taxonomy. These characteristics are important in understanding 
the early foundation of SUJs and PUJs and the role played by different actors in the 
policy formulation. Some issues concerning the trade-off between equity and efficiency 
are also analysed in this section since this debate played an important role in reshaping 
the political agenda of many governments in the ’90s, following the fiscal crisis of the 
state. Attention is paid to the contentious issue of the introduction of a basic income, 
which has provoked heated debates, yet limited results in the reform of the Italian 
welfare state.   
The second section presents the theoretical foundations of the shift from the 
Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare regime brought about by the 
monetarist counter-revolution and the main theoretical debates surrounding the 
privatization of public services. The policy studied in this thesis passed through various 
stages, each of them characterised by a different yet important role of the Italian welfare 
state.  
In many European countries, the welfare state was undermined by many 
changes and workfare practices were diffused in an attempt to prioritize economic 
policies over social policies (Jessop, 2000). The activation of the unemployed became 
core to the new paradigm which focused on supply-side policies and put pressure on 
welfare caseloads. I will argue that despite important transformations brought about in 
other segments of the labour market, the policy of socially useful jobs was particularly 
resilient to these changes and the role of the state and its institutions was reinforced 
during this process.  
In this section, particular attention is paid to the impact of the Third Way 
principles on Italian labour-market policies. I will focus on the practices introduced by 
the New Social-Democrats’ New Deal in the UK that entered the Italian political scene 
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almost at the same time and the government led by Massimo D’Alema showed strong 
empathy with Tony Blair’s politics. The Italian reform stressed activation, 
employability and market deregulation; following this, a significant transformation of 
the socially useful jobs was announced, by means of privatization of public services and 
greater involvement of local actors in the policy process. Again, the state’s institutions 
played a crucial role in this stage and the whole policy process was mediated through 
public actors. The last subsection presents the main theoretical debates concerning 
services outsourcing and public-private partnerships, in order to underline some relevant 
arguments in relation to the last stage of the SUJs and PUJs projects.  
 
2.2 Keynesianism, welfare state and unemployment 
 
2.2.1 Keynesianism and full employment 
 
The opening quotation of this chapter, taken from Keynes’s famous work The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, underpins the leading idea of this thesis; 
specifically that long-term unemployment is one of the most important market failures 
in the capitalist economies and one of the main sources of inequality. Keynes was 
convinced that ‘the world would not much longer tolerate unemployment’ which in his 
view was ‘inevitably associated with present-day capitalistic individualism’ (Keynes, 
1936:380). Heated academic debates have developed surrounding the benefit of state 
intervention in the economy in contrast with the advantages of free market competition, 
yet the most important confrontations have been played out in the arena of public 
policies.  
Since the time of The General Theory’s publication, economists have 
questioned various aspects concerning the theory of full employment. Kalecki (1943, 
on-line reproduction 2010) suggested that ‘there is a political background in the 
opposition to the full employment doctrine, even though the arguments advanced are 
economic’.  He noted that, although the profits would be higher under a regime of full-
employment than under a laissez-faire regime, ‘‘discipline in the factories’ and 
‘political stability’ are more appreciated than profits by business leaders. Their class 
instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view, and 
that unemployment is an integral part of the ‘normal capitalist’ system’(ibid.). In the 
post-1973 era, full employment ceased to be a goal on the political agendas of many 
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governments and the advanced capitalistic democracies appeared to converge ‘in their 
incapacity of ensuring both full employment and balanced economic growth’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:164). At that point in time, the welfare state was in the difficult position 
of negotiating between public commitment to social justice and private economic 
interests which are, apparently, incompatible.  
During the post-war reconstruction, when Keynesian ideas gained 
increasing economic, administrative and political viability (Hall, 1989), similar polices 
which promoted labour-intensive public works to stimulate employment were 
implemented in certain western countries. The counter-cyclical demand-management 
policies
9
 were familiar tools for many policy makers in that era, but the power of 
Keynesian economics consisted of the implementation of those polices and the 
empowerment of those institutions that would allow the state to take an active role in 
the economic management.  During the period 1945-1970, many policy makers in 
Europe, the USA and Japan were influenced to a certain extent by Keynesian ideas
10
, 
although deficit-spending policies were not implemented in many of these countries. 
The economic growth in Germany was supported by the social market model; dirigisme 
was the economic policy in France in the thirty years following WWII; there was 
structural intervention by the state in the Italian economy in significant parts of industry 
and the banking systems; in Japan the state and enterprises commonly agreed policies in 
order to sustain supply and exports from the most dynamic sectors; in the UK the state 
directly controlled entire sectors of the economy and demand-management policies 
were used to stabilize the economy, mainly through fiscal interventions (Romani, 
2009:121-122). In Italy, between 1951 and 1963, GDP rose by almost 6% per year, 
unemployment dropped from 10% at the beginning of the period to 3,9% at the end, and 
prices increased by approximately 3% annually (ibid.).  
                                                 
9
 This definition usually refers to a combination of fiscal and monetary policies for stabilizing economic 
cycles. For a recent extensive analysis of Keynes’s theoretical system embodied in The General Theory 
and other writings, see Sheehan (2009).  
10
 I do not refer here to the evolution of the Keynesian model. The most important Keynesian followers 
were at Cambridge University in the U.K.: J. Robinson, P. Sraffa, N. Kaldor and M.Dobb. They refuted 
the idyllic image of capitalism proposed by the neoclassic economists. The American economists tried to 
find a synthesis between the old theories concerning the income formation and Keynesianism. This 
attempt was called the neoclassic synthesis. Some of the most important contributions have been 
established by Hicks (integration of the Keynesian and neoclassical theories in a short-term model), 
Modigliani (Hicks’ model amended with the introducing of flexible wages), Modigliani and Brumberg 
(the life cycle theory of consumption), Tobin and Baumol (the theory of the preference for liquidity in 
relation to the transaction’s demand). The influential works of Taussig (Principles of Economics) and 
Samuleson (Economics) have further contributed to the development and spread of the Keynesian model 
worldwide.  
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A detailed historical reconstruction of the Italian political economy in the 
20
th
 century provided by De Cecco (1989) shows to what extent the Keynesian ideas 
influenced the political choices which were made during the fascist period and after 
WWII. Capable technocrats who had worked within the Mussolinian corporatist regime 
continued to play an important role during the post-war period. They were actively 
involved in the implementation of policies aimed at developing the national economy 
under state control. 
 
The technocrats who staffed the highest position in these public agencies and corporations 
[e.g. IMI and IRI, public corporations created during fascism], however, tended to belong to 
one pool of talent, which was not touched by discharge after fascism.  
The neoclassical attempt to get rid of this pool of technocrats [...] and of the institutions they 
presided over [...] fended off successfully and the same people who had run the fascist 
economy remained in charge of the Italian economy in the phases of reconstruction and 
expansion. 
It would not be an exaggeration to attribute the long crisis of the Italian economy in the 
1960s, among other factors, to a finally successful attempt, on the part of the political class, 
to wrest power over the public agencies and enterprises away from the technocrats and to 
replace them with their own, often frankly inferior but political loyal, appointees (De Cecco, 
1989:225-226). 
 
The importance of the public presence in the Italian economy cannot 
however be limited to the first decades of the 20
th
 century, especially during the 1930s 
when IRI was formed. The chemical sector became public as a result of a severe 
international economic crisis, during the 1970s, which involved many new chemical 
plants, some of them still under construction, in the Mezzogiorno (De Cecco, 2000). 
During the periods of economic crises many private manufactures were instead rescued 
in order to maintain employment in specific geographical areas. As many private 
enterprises went through deep industrial restructuring, the extensive use of social shock 
absorbers facilitated this process and contributed to the maintenance of social harmony. 
 
2.2.2 Welfare states 
 
Barr affirms that ‘the concept of welfare state defies precise definition’ and the term is 
used today as ‘shorthand for the state’s activities in four broad areas: cash benefits; 
health care; education; and food, housing and other welfare services’. The state is not 
the only welfare provider, as there are other important sources of welfare outside the 
state’s activity: the labour market which allows people to earn incomes, individual 
savings and voluntary welfare within or outside the family (Barr, 2012:7-8).  From this 
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list, wage incomes are of primary importance as, in industrial societies, they are the 
main sources of public welfare and have influence on individuals’ consumption and 
savings. For most of those in economically developed countries, paid work remains the 
main source of income. Beveridge considered full employment
11
 to be fundamental not 
only for the enlargement of the material wealth of a country but also that ‘it would add 
more to happiness than to wealth and would add most of all to national unity, by 
removing the misery that generates hate’ (Beveridge, 1960:129). Most important is the 
distinction made by the author when explaining the consequence of unemployment for 
sellers and buyers in the labour market. The social dimension of labour turns out to be 
far more important than the economic dimension:  
 
‘[the] difficulty in selling labour has consequences of different order of harmfulness from 
those associated with difficulty in buying labour. A person who has difficulty in buying the 
labour he wants suffers inconvenience or reduction of profits. A person who cannot sell his 
labour is told that he is of no use. The first difficulty causes annoyance or loss. The other is 
a personal catastrophe. This difference remains even if an adequate income is provided, by 
insurance or otherwise; idleness even on an income corrupts; the feeling of not being wanted 
demoralizes [...] The human difference between failing to buy and failing to sell labour is 
the decisive reason for aiming to make labour market a seller’s than a buyer’s market’ 
(Beveridge, 1960:19). 
 
The different structures of welfare states illustrate the existence of a variety 
of meanings attached to the importance of employment protection, which has led to the 
development of different sets of policies and institutions. Scholars commonly agree that 
state, family and market are the three agents involved in the production and distribution 
of welfare. In his seminal work Esping-Andersen grouped together the western welfare 
states, identifying three principal “regime-types”: liberal, corporatist and social-
democratic (1990:26-28). The author places Italy, alongside Austria, Germany and 
France, in the second regime-type where ‘the historical corporatist-statist legacy was 
upgraded to cater [for] the new post-industrial class structure’ (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:27). In these conservative-corporatist welfare states, ‘the liberal obsession with 
market efficiency and commodification was never preeminent and, as such, the granting 
of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue’. The author also emphasises 
the role played by the Church in welfare and why it is ‘strongly committed to the 
preservation of traditional family-hood’ (ibid.). The virtual dependence of the families 
upon the bread winners’ incomes and their social rights, pushed trade unions to fight for 
                                                 
11
 Beveridge explains that full employment does not mean no unemployment at all, but a situation in 
which there are more jobs available than unemployed (Beveridge, 1960:18-20). 
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job security as a key condition to preserving the families’ incomes (Esping-Andersen, 
1995). For this reason, and especially during the early period of industrial development, 
the social policies and industrial relations proceeded in the same direction.   
   
2.2.3 Italian peculiarities 
 
Other scholars (Ferrera, 1996; Gough, 1996) felt that Italy fits only partially into the 
conservative-corporatist model and concurred that welfare systems in the Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) have many features in common, 
leading them to be grouped together in a fourth model
12
. Ferrera observes that in these 
countries, the maintenance of the income system is strongly fragmented and ‘cash 
benefits (especially pensions
13
) play a very prominent role, [...] they constitute extreme 
versions of the ‘transfer centred’ model of social protection of continental Europe’ 
(Ferrera, 1996:19). Another important characteristic that, distinguishes the Southern 
European countries, is ‘a particularistic–clientelistic welfare state’ (ibid.25) which takes 
the form of high levels of corruption and the manipulation of welfare benefits for the 
advantages of certain organizations (usually political parties) or even for individual 
benefits.  
A common feature of social assistance in Southern Europe is the absence of 
a general assistance that provides cash benefits for all those people below a minimum 
income standard, but there is a predominance of a categorical assistance that provides 
cash benefits for specific groups, mainly elderly and disabled people (Gough, 1996:4). 
Comparing four Southern European countries and Turkey with their continental 
neighbours, Gough concludes that the southern five have ‘rudimentary assistance’ 
because they ‘are unique in their lack of either an integrated social assistance 
programme, or an institutionalized commitment in the recent past for full employment, 
or a comprehensive social security system’(ibid.13). In Italy, for example, the assistance 
                                                 
12
 Kasza undertakes a radical critique of the concept of welfare regime, arguing that most countries 
practice a disjointed set of welfare polices due to some typical features of welfare policymaking (Kasza, 
2002:271-272). Every time a hybrid type is encountered, a new regime type is added to the list: the 
‘radical’ regime type (Castels and Michell), the ‘post-communism conservative corporatism’ (Deacon), 
the ‘Confucian’ welfare regime (Jones) or the ‘Japanese style welfare society’ (Maruo, Takahashi, 
Watanuki, Garon).  
13
 Zamagni (1981:103) asserts that in 1975 the old age pensions in Italy did not considerably exceed the 
number of those of other European countries (5,029,191). The anomaly consisted of the great number of 
invalidity pensions (5,210,295) which made up 4.5% of Italian GDP, in comparison with 1.3% in France, 
1.8% in the UK and 2.3% in Germany. During the period 1970-75, more than half of the increase in state 
expenditure for pension provision was attributable to invalidity pensions. 
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offered by local authorities, the church, charities and families, partially substitutes an 
official safety net. However, Italian families still play an important role in welfare 
redistribution, particularly in sustaining the load of the social care activities (Ferrera et 
al, 2003; Kazepov, 2002).  
Gough stresses that the family safety net replaces the public one, if at least 
one family member is employed in the primary sector which is associated with a 
reasonable level of social benefits. This model, largely dependent upon men’s stable 
incomes and unpaid women’ work for the family’s care services, was greatly affected 
by the deindustrialization and industrial restructuring which occurred in Southern Italy 
during the ’70s and ’80s. The increase in male unemployment was not compensated 
enough by a higher participation of women at work; moreover, women often accessed 
low-paid employment which did not compensate for the loss of the families’ wage when 
men remained unemployed for lengthy periods. The persistence of high unemployment 
led to the impoverishment of these areas and the rise of inequality favoured the 
formation of chronic pockets of urban poverty (Mingione, 1996).  
 
2.2.4 Fighting social exclusion: basic income 
 
Many scholars have argued for basic income to be considered as the ethical foundation 
for a radical reform of the welfare state
14
. In many European countries, this measure is 
part of activation polices which take various forms between two extreme regimes: a 
liberal one where the market is seen to produce the best solutions in terms of efficiency 
and equity, and a universal one where the society regulates the employment levels 
according to the individual capacities of its members (Barbier, 2002). 
 The need to introduce a guaranteed social minimum wage able to counter 
poverty and social exclusion has become a constant in the debate surrounding Italian 
welfare reform since 1994, but it has not been transformed into a national achievement. 
The lack of such a measure became problematic after 2000 when the increase in short-
term jobs, especially for women, the young, and low-skill workers, brought in new 
types of risks to the labour policies arena. Highly uncertain working trajectories of those 
who face frequent periods without work between several temporary jobs, together with 
                                                 
14
 Goodin (1992), Van Parijs (1992), Offe (1994) and Jordan (1994) questioned the ways in which social 
justice can be addressed through a citizenship-based right of income, and the relation between equity and 
efficiency. 
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the low level of employment security for a large range of atypical contracts that usually 
apply to these jobs, have led to an increased risk of poverty for those most vulnerable  
in the labour market. However, the relationship between social and labour policies is 
critical and the existence of a social minimum wage can certainly provide for income 
compensation and prevent social marginalization, but it is unlikely to resolve the 
problem of unemployment.  
The most interesting criticism of the minimum income is brought by Lipietz 
(1996) who questions the role of this instrument in relation to the labour market 
integration of the unemployed. In his review of Lipietz’s book, Dunford (1997) asserts:  
 
As access to these allowances is, in France, a right to all individuals, either work and labour 
market integration must become rights in themselves, or society does not consider work an 
obligation and should support a certain number of dreamers, anarchists poets etc. Lipietz’s 
own position is the sum of the two: there is a need for an employment policy so everyone 
can experience the dignity and recognition of integration in society, but it is also necessary 
to recognize an unconditional right to life whether one works or not, and whether one works 
legitimately or not (Dunford, 1997:184). 
 
The existence of such an instrument in Italy at the time the policy of socially 
useful jobs was launched would have probably led to very different outcomes. If the 
unemployed had received a minimum income, probably too little to survive on, this 
would have forced them to take minimum income jobs and in illegal conditions. In these 
circumstances the deregulation of the labour market and a societal polarization would 
have increased. Any claims for a right to work would have been blurred and these 
unemployed, instead of becoming socially useful workers, would have entered the 
larger category of working poor, people who in Italy had already been involved in the 
minimum income experiment which did not receive significant results regarding their 
re-insertion in the labour market
15
. 
The introduction of a basic income in Italy would instead be beneficial in 
recognizing ‘an unconditional right to life’ for people outside the labour market and to 
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 Il reddito minimo di inserimento (the minimum income for insertion) was introduced in October 1998 
and was implemented during two periods of two years each: 39 municipalities were involved during 
1999-2000 and another 267 during 2001-2002. Several financial laws entitled the 306 municipalities to 
use the funds allocated for this experiment until the end of 2007. The minimum wage was a means-tested 
scheme which involved 41,000 families overall. It did not address unemployment specifically – although 
many participants were long-term unemployed – but it was used as a tool to counter extreme poverty. In 
fact, the policy was assessed separately for each of its two components: income compensation and labour 
re-insertion. As regards the latter, the policy assessors acknowledged that ‘training and projects for re-
insertion only occasionally led to direct access into the labour market; the bargaining method promoted 
through this policy experiment stimulated the personal responsibility of the largest part of the 
beneficiaries for finding new ways to exit their personal state of need’ (Ministro della Solidarietà Sociale, 
2007:119). 
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substitute financial aids that were improperly used, foremost, the invalidity pensions. 
This aim still seems far from Italian policy-making as problems surrounding both its 
equity and efficiency are not easy to address. One of the most important knots to be 
untied is that of the difficulty in making means-tested benefits efficient; this is also 
linked to the uncertainties involving the resources necessary to finance the policy. How 
can the risk of ‘free rider’ behaviour be avoided, especially in situations where informal 
market activity is rife? Some authors argue that the unbalanced Italian welfare system 
contributes to the upholding of such a situation (Mingione, 1991) while others consider 
that provision for means-tested benefits requires a high level of quality public 
management which is often absent in Southern Europe (Ferrera et al, 2003). Moreover, 
as the scale of illegality in some parts of the country is high, the basic income could be 
subject to criminal blackmail (Saraceno, 2002). These weaknesses are likely to 
jeopardise any attempt to introduce a universal system of social protection in Italy.  
 
2.2.5 Welfare models in crisis 
 
All the considerations made hitherto aim to present the peculiar configuration of the 
Italian welfare state which made the formation and the development of the SUJs and 
PUJs policies possible. Italy is a country where even nowadays there is no national 
assistance
16
 against the risk of losing one’s income. The benefits are provided only 
through insurance-based schemes supported by payments made by both the employer 
and employees. The Italian welfare model is considered unbalanced in the distribution 
of protection between different sectors of the labour market (with preference given to 
the core sectors), across the standard risks (providing high benefits for the elderly) and 
in the ways it is financed (through social security contributions, with private employees 
paying the higher rates) (Ferrera, 2007). On the one hand, this structure has created a 
very unbalanced social distribution which, considering the erratic development of the 
regional labour markets, also has a strong geographic component. On the other hand, 
this social distribution has influenced the ways in which local labour markets work, as 
they are sensitive to both their institutional roots and geographic segregation (Peck, 
1996). 
                                                 
16
 Italy and Greece are the only two countries in Europe which have no national assistance schemes to 
contrast unemployment. 
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This welfare model was useful in protecting the family arrangement 
organized around the male breadwinner. In the last twenty years, this model has 
changed dramatically due to the transformation of the structure of social risks brought 
about by deindustrialization, the increase of employment in the service sector, increased 
participation by women in the labour force, the increased instability of the family 
structure and the rise of non-standard forms of employment (Bonoli, 2007). Like most 
western welfare states, with the exception of Nordic countries, the Italian welfare state 
was unprepared to adapt its instruments to this new structure of risks quickly. Bonoli’s 
analysis of the welfare state adaptation of modern democracies explains how relevant 
the time-based factors have been in this transformation:  
 
[...] countries that experienced post-industrial social transformations in the 1970s (northern 
European, English-speaking countries) faced a more favourable situation for developing 
new social risk policies because competing claims because of population aging and 
generous pension promises were negligible at the time. In contrast, continental and southern 
European countries, where developments such as the tertiarization of employment and 
increased family instability occur with a time lag of 20 to 30 years, are facing emerging 
new demands in a context where competing claims are highest, leaving little room to 
manoeuvre to develop new social risk policies (Bonoli, 2007:497-498). 
  
The argument is pertinent for the policy analysed in this thesis. The first 
group of beneficiaries that joined socially useful jobs were workers made redundant in 
the ’70s. They had to remain tied to their former enterprises for many years in order to 
be entitled to receive wage compensation funds; for many families living in 
Mezzogiorno these benefits were their only available income. The continuation of 
benefits over long periods of time was not a result of the state’s generosity, but rather an 
attempt to regulate labour markets in areas where a structural weakness in the private 
sectors and the development of low-value added services were not able to compensate 
for such a large drop in labour demand following large-scale deindustrialization. The 
third chapter of this thesis illustrates these mechanisms, explaining the reasons why the 
wage compensation funds were used improperly, as substitutes of unemployment 
benefits, until 1991 when the first major reform was implemented.   
The new legislative provision which introduced mobility aid as an 
alternative form of unemployment benefit has not however solved the problem. The 
persistence of unemployment and its geographic concentration contributed to the 
impoverishment of certain areas where large groups of the population experienced 
marginalization. Of particular importance was the ‘movement of organized 
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unemployed’ from Naples whose protests contributed to the formation of the emergency 
policies in the ’80s. 
 
[the] deterioration of the labour market after a phase of development and numerical and 
political consolidation of the core working class, helps us to understand a particularly 
significant phenomenon in Naples: that is, the ‘movement of the organized unemployed’, 
which started in the mid-1970s with an initial nucleus of unemployed and precariously 
employed people who established their seat in the San Lorenzo quarter in the historical 
centre. The protagonists [...] were not the proletariat who had recently moved to the city, 
dwellers but specific social subjects who saw themselves first of all unemployed and whose 
goal was that of emerging through work from a condition of marginalization and 
precariousness (Morlicchio, 1996:331). 
 
The second step of this policy moved towards job-creation schemes aimed 
at ‘making jobs available’ for the unemployed, a goal that is difficult to reach even with 
the existence of other policies fighting poverty, such as the minimum wage. Many 
authors have considered that the allowances for socially useful jobs, which to some 
extent resembled unemployment assistance or basic wages, were used in place of 
instruments that the welfare reforms failed to adopt. My argument is that this is not a 
useful point of analysis for those interested in understanding the reasons behind the 
policy formation and implementation; explicitly the social relevance of this work for the 
public administrations and for the broader society. The fact that the Italian policy 
makers adapted old policy instruments to new circumstances is proof of the cumulative 
nature of welfare policies (Kasza, 2002:273). Most important was that the policy choice 
involved a complex system of public actors and institutions to allow such a large 
number of unemployed to escape marginalization through work. The majority of the 
socially useful jobs gradually became jobs in the private sector, through the 
privatisation of public services, or public jobs for the public administrations themselves. 
The fourth chapter analyses how this Keynesian stance of the policy was 
reinforced in the late ’90s, when the policy was enlarged to include the young 
unemployed and new activities were started with this purpose in mind. The policy of 
socially useful jobs reaffirmed the importance of work as a right of citizenship, bringing 
to attention the fact that the employment crisis and that of the welfare state have 
common roots (Accornero, 1996). For some scholars, full employment was still an 
achievable aim if the coordination between monetary, fiscal and wages policies were to 
stimulate more qualitative growth involving the sectors of healthcare, education and the 
environment, in addition to public infrastructure and information technology (Schmid, 
1995:429). 
40 
 
Criticism expressed over the welfare state’s failures stressed the importance 
of the endogenous factors (such as the fiscal crises of the state) and asserted that the 
whole system of collecting and redistributing resources for welfare needed reviewing.  
However the origins of this crisis are embedded in both supply and demand aspects of 
the economy. In the ’60s the Fordist productive order entered a crisis, the organisational 
model of work changed, and the popular movements of contestation that had surged at 
the end of the decade, put the development model acknowledged in the post-war in 
crisis. In the ’70s the tensions of the internationalization of production, on the one hand, 
and the national regulation of the labour market, on the other hand, added a demand-
side to the supply-side crisis affirmed in the ’60s, ‘while the increasing cost of 
unemployment led to a taxpayers’ revolt against the welfare state’ (Dunford, 1995:186). 
The new model of development that emerged in the ’80s advocated a restoration of 
growth and a rise of profits through the liberalization of markets, deregulation and 
privatization. 
 
At the heart of this strategy was a desire to restore profit as the central indicator of economic 
performance, but in market economies are two ways of making money: one is through 
productivist  strategies whose goal is the creation of wealth and the other is through rentier-
type strategies of appropriation of wealth [...] A major characteristic of the market-led 
strategies of the 1980s was the leading role of the rent-led programmes centred on 
speculation and on the quest for commercial and financial gain (Dunford, 1995:187). 
 
At the same time the welfare state was strongly attacked and the new 
policies of wealth distribution limited the number of people accessing welfare rights. 
The next section will deal with this attack and the transformation of the welfare policies 
tackling unemployment through the development of activation and workfare practices. 
 
2.3 Activation, privatization, workfare and unemployment 
 
2.3.1 Monetarist counter-revolution and fiscal limits of the welfare state 
 
The crisis experienced by the Keynesian welfare state in the 1970s had economic, 
political and social causes, but the economic policy received the strongest attacks. The 
transformations of the domestic economies (firstly, with the growth of the service sector 
and of female participation in the labour force), alongside the increasing opening and 
inter-dependence of the national economies, generated new problems which could not 
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have been managed thorough Keynesian policies alone. These profound transformations 
challenged the national states in finding flexible solutions (more supply-side 
interventions) to manage national economies and to increase competitiveness at an 
international level (Jessop, 2000).  
The radical changes introduced by monetarism confirmed a Keynesianism 
defeat on political ground
17
, and the most difficult attack was in the field of public 
policies. In his most political work, Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman stresses 
the risks brought about by the state intervention in the economy, especially in terms of 
the limitation of an individuals’ freedom which is a fundamental value.  
 
A liberal is fundamentally fearful of concentrated power. His objective is to preserve the 
maximum degree of freedom for each individual separately that is compatible with one 
man’s freedom not interfering with other men’s freedom. He believes that this objective 
requires that power be dispersed. He is suspicious of assigning to government any functions 
that can be performed through the market, both because this substitutes coercion for 
voluntary co-operation in the area in question and because, by giving government an 
increased role, it threatens freedom in other areas (Friedman, 1962:39). 
 
The author considers that the market is able to solve the majority of the 
social problems and the state should only define legal framework and maintain public 
order. The market is a space for innovation and meritocracy which allows the best to 
emerge, while state intervention is bureaucratic, impermeable to innovations and 
favours mediocrity. Private monopoly, public monopoly and public regulation are 
regarded as three equally bad solutions. 
Critics of the welfare state have highlighted the financial costs over 
contribution to economic performance, and the expansion of social expenditure in the 
’60s and ’70s brought to light the limitations of the welfare state. As welfare provision 
is dependent upon the surplus created in the market economy, the most important 
constraints of the welfare state’s development involve the fiscal limits of social welfare 
(Gilbert, 1983:139). O’Connor emphasises the importance of social-industrial 
relationships in the creation of this state of arts: ‘the cause of the fiscal crisis is the 
contradiction of capitalist production itself – the fact that production is social whereas 
the means of production are owned privately’ (O’Connor, 1973:40). Referring in 
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 First of all, monetarists attacked the consistency of Phillips’ curve, proving that the inverse relationship 
between inflation and unemployment is valid only in the short-term. Secondly, they maintained that the 
stock of currency determines the monetary income and price levels. Friedman questioned the effects of 
the fiscal policy recommended by neoclassic-Keynesian economists, maintaining that it is less efficient 
that the monetary policy (Friedman, 1970). Monetarist polices promoted between 1975 and 1985 in the 
UK and the USA were centered around control of monetary stock pursued by the central banks, and 
deflation through monetary restrictions.  
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particular to the USA, the author shows that ‘monopoly capital and organized labour 
have “exported” their conflicts to the competitive and state sectors’ (ibid.41). While 
capital costs have progressively been socialized, the increases in tax rates have become 
necessary in order to finance an enlarged state economy.  
However, the entire philosophy of the welfare state has changed and two 
questions gained ground in the arena of policy-making: the first being how much a 
society can afford to spend on the different needs of various groups, and the second was 
how to identify the individuals in these groups who are entitled to receive benefits.  If, 
for many years, welfare-state entitlements were seen as the social rights of citizenship, 
the focus was moved to what kind of civic responsibilities should be attached to these 
rights (Gilbert, 1995:63). 
 
2.3.2 Enabling welfare state, activation, workfare 
 
These debates particularly influenced the welfare policies focused on labour force 
participation and transformed the political agenda of western welfare states. 
International organizations began to suggest that ‘the improvement of economic 
performance should be one of the functions of social policy: that social policy should, in 
a sense, be concerned with the effective functioning of the supply side of the economy 
as one way to achieve important social aims’ (OECD, 1988:24). The movement from 
entitlements to targeted incentives became fundamental to the discourse surrounding the 
activation of the welfare state, which brought various forms of interventions from 
enabling policies to workfare. Dingeldey (2007:827) emphasises that these two forms 
positioned at the extremes of a spectrum ‘are not understood as alternative paths to 
policy reform, but as mutually constitutive elements of an activating labour market 
policies’. Even in the Scandinavian welfare systems which recognize benefits as social 
rights, elements of workfare can be found in the activation schemes introduced in the 
early 1980s and strengthened in the 1990s (Kildal, 2001).  
The EU and OECD became the strongest advocates of active labour-market 
policies as a hallmark of the ‘old’ welfare state’s transformation. The active labour-
policies have four distinctive objectives: 1) to increase the labour demand in favour of 
targeted groups; 2) to provide communities with services or infrastructures which would 
not otherwise be provided; 3) to improve the effective supply of labour through job 
searching, training or work experience programmes in private or public jobs; and 4) to 
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reduce the number of people claiming benefits, in part identifying those who are not 
regarded as genuinely unemployed (Robinson, 1998:90-91). Robinson suggests that 
‘active labour-market policy becomes workfare when objective (4) is prioritised over 
objective (3); which, with increasing emphasis placed on compulsion, is seen as a way 
of ‘flushing out’ those unemployed who are thought to be avoiding work’ (ibid., 91). 
All European countries moved to unemployment policies based on 
activation, but they carried it out in different ways which reflect different institutional 
arrangements (Clasen and Clegg, 2003) and the different ways in which the interaction 
between ideas and actions transform the labour polices (Taylor-Goodby, 2005). If we 
want to understand different forms of activation and the multi-dimensionalism of labour 
market deregulation, we should clearly identify who the unemployed are so that  a 
policy would be more able to stimulate employment through a particular target group 
(Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2003). For example, the policy of publicly useful jobs 
aimed to address long-term unemployment of young people searching for the first job. 
This policy recorded a large number of participants in Mezzogiorno, although it was 
implemented for a short period of time. It was part of the first labour market reform in 
Italy introduced in 1997 by Pachetto-Treu (briefly described in chapter 4), that 
explicitly aimed at increasing the flexibility of hiring young people through the 
introduction of new forms of job contracts.  
If publicly useful jobs acted as an enabling policy for young people 
searching for their first employment, socially useful jobs pursued a more workfarist 
approach. It debuted in 1994 offering clear political ‘justification’ in a period of harsh 
budgetary cuts: participation of the long-term unemployed in the delivery of public 
services had to be a positive move to make them productive and their benefits socially 
acceptable. Furthermore, these activities were presented for public opinion as ‘new’, in 
contrast to the ‘old’ passive benefits which characterised previous decades. Although 
the SUJs and PUJs were publicized at the beginning as workfare polices, they were 
received positively by many unemployed who saw, through the delivery of public 
services, the possibility to access real jobs. Moreover, as explained in chapter 4, this 
policy was considered a good solution
18
 for many problems and it was later extended to 
other categories of unemployed.  
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 The public institutions and private actors addressed multiple problems through this policy: the state 
found a way to provide public bodies with resources while a strict block of public turnover was in place; 
the public bodies were interested in finding a new (and economically convenient) labour force for 
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The socially and publicly useful work projects started as a demand for 
public services in the local communities. This was a very clear intention of the policy-
makers, as witnessed by Tiziano Treu, Italian Minister of Labour during the period 
when the two laws constituting the policy’s juridical body were passed: ‘the workfare 
policies are efficient in combating unemployment and are socially acceptable if they 
remain within a context of sustained growth and if they correspond with adequate policy 
for sustaining this demand’ (Treu, 2001:103).  
Some criticism focused on the fact that the government used this policy ‘as 
a screening device to detect moral hazard’ but ‘these measures have failed in Northern 
Italy where many workers find work in the black economy and wait until the subsidy 
expires before regularizing their position’ (Samek Lodovici, 2000:288). The large 
typology of SUJs depicts a more complex picture, yet it is not straightforward that the 
responsibility for ‘free-rider’ behaviour can be attributed simply to the workers. The 
policy allowed long-term unemployed involved in SUJs to work part-time if their 
annual income remained below a certain threshold. Although the unemployed would 
have quit the projects when they found regular jobs, earning their allowances until the 
end of the projects allowed enterprises to ‘save’, for a certain period, on their full labour 
costs. It is rather more important to underline that, in the regions where unemployment 
was low, this policy improved unemployed activation and helped them to maintain 
skills.   
Many scholars have analysed the effects of active labour policies on 
different target groups and they almost all agree that positive outcomes are more 
difficult to be achieved for ‘hard-core’ clients such as the long-term unemployed 
(Considine, 2000; Finn, 2003; Sunley et al, 2001). It also appears that ‘territorial 
dimensions’ count and policies tend to improve performances in contexts which succeed 
in building partnerships between various local actors in the labour market (Finn, 2000; 
Nativel et al, 2002). The local dimension for SUJs and PUJs became more explicit in 
the second stage of the policy, after 2000, but it was never as important  as in the case of 
the New Deal, the policy assessed by the above cited authors.  
Since the beginning, SUJs were conceived to address a hard-to-employ 
group formed mostly of former industrial workers who, at the time the policy was 
                                                                                                                                               
providing local services. The unemployed saw further possibilities for obtaining income in these projects; 
training and job stability. The trade unions saw the possibility for work and income to be provided for the 
long-term unemployed and the employers saw a new important market opening as a result of the 
privatization of public services. 
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implemented, already had a very distinctive unemployment history. They received 
various forms of benefits during their long period of unemployment; from special wage 
compensation funds while still linked to their companies of origin, then to special wage 
compensation funds provided by GEPI through ‘box-companies’ (see chapter 3), to 
mobility aids when they became unemployed, and, finally to allowances for socially 
useful jobs when they became beneficiaries of the policy. The fact that these 
unemployed never lost their entitlements for benefits was extremely important in 
allowing them to remain a target group.  
Another hard-to-employ group was formed of people who had never worked 
or had given up in searching for jobs. They were located particularly in the Southern 
regions and many of them were involved in irregular, and sometimes, illegal activities. 
In this case the policy specifically addressed the cultural factors that appeared to 
promote unemployability (Welshman, 2006) and SUJs helped these non-employed to 
build self-esteem and the confidence to carry out and maintain a job.   
The policies of SUJs and PUJs acted within the entire spectrum of 
activation. The positive results achieved by numerous local public administrations in 
implementing the projects and creating work opportunities for unemployed show the 
capacity of intermediate labour markets to deliver paid jobs in areas of high and 
persistent unemployment (Marshall and MacFarlane, 2000). Hudson (2002:331) 
acknowledges that due to institutional innovation in many European countries a new 
sector has been created offering alternative forms of service provision and work 
creation: ‘the Third Sector is also seen as a complement to the mainstream economy 
rather than a route back into it, especially in those areas most marginal to the labour 
market of formal economy’.     
In 2000 the policy changed and focused on the closure of programs and re-
insertion of the unemployed in the labour market through job-creation schemes. This 
more mandatory approach centred on job-creation. However it also pursued a second 
important aim, which was the privatization of public services that SUWs and PUWs 
were involved in. Instead of compelling SUWs and PUWs to search for jobs, the central 
state put pressure on local bodies to find resources for the outsourcing of the services to 
companies that would employ SUWs and PUWs. Unemployed activation and 
privatization became two interwoven sides in the welfare reform. As is demonstrated in 
chapter 7, despite this market-oriented policy turn, many SUWs and PUWs found jobs 
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in the public sector and a smaller number of them were employed by social enterprises, 
especially cooperatives. 
 
2.3.3 Shift from KWNS to SWPR 
 
The monetarist ideas had considerable impact on the polices promoted in the USA and 
the UK in the second half of the ’70s. The political economy changed in many fields 
and the national welfare state was under attack. Jessop’s influential work on the 
transition from the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS) to the Schumpeterian 
workfare post-national regime (SWPR) presents the distinctive features of these ideal-
types as well as ‘the four ideal-typical strategies for moving to SWPR: neoliberalism, 
neo-corporatism, neo-statism and neo-communitarianism’ (Jessop, 2000:177). 
 
 Table 2.1: Main features of the Keynesian welfare national state and the Schumpeterian 
workfare post-national regime 
Keynesian  Full employment 
 Closed economy 
 Demand management 
 Infrastructure 
Schumpeterian  Innovation and 
competitiveness 
 Open economy 
 Supply-side polices 
    
Welfare  Generalized norms of 
mass consumption 
 Welfare rights 
Workfare  Subordinates social to 
economic policy 
 Puts downward pressure 
on   ‘social  wage’ 
 Attacks welfare rights 
National  Relative primacy of 
national   scale 
Post-National  Relativization of scale 
State  Markets and state form 
mixed economies 
 State corrects ‘market 
failure’ 
Regime  Increased role of 
governance mechanisms 
to correct market and 
state failures 
Source: Jessop (2000), p. 173 and 175 
 
The author underlines that there are ‘also obvious continuities between past 
and present welfare regimes [...] in general we can expect greater continuities in those 
areas of economic and social policy that are less directly implicate in international 
competitiveness, permanent innovation and flexible labour markets’ (ibid.181). The area 
of labour-intensive public services seems to fit perfectly into this description. 
The transition to the SWPR occurred in Italy relatively late in comparison 
with other western capitalist countries and the neo-corporatist strategy brought 
privileges to the socially useful workers. Policies oriented towards innovation and 
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competition involved firstly the young workforce who paid the price of the post-Fordist 
economic requisite for flexible working.  
During the ’90s many countries began reforms to their welfare states, 
leading towards the introduction of workfare regimes. Important adjustments were made 
to tackle the increase in unemployment and, in almost all the countries, these took 
different forms of active labour market policies. The way in which they were amended 
was deeply influenced by the institutional arrangements available in different states. The 
workfare states did not however develop in a linear way: ‘workfare ideologies, and 
strategies have emerged unevenly and iteratively, as the outcome of years of 
institutional experimentation, policy reforms or political struggles’ (Peck, 2001a:341). 
The workfare polices aimed to increase labour-markets flexibility through supply-side 
approaches and changed the balance between rights and obligations of welfare 
beneficiaries. Various strategies were adopted, ranging from Human Resource 
Development, which understands rights in a wider sense than basic entitlement to 
economic benefits, to Labour Market Attachment, which uses insertion into the labour 
market as an instrument for preserving benefits (Lødemel, 2001). 
The burden of the huge Italian public debt conditioned the policy-making 
over the five-year period preceding the country joining the European Monetary Union. 
The active labour polices introduced in the late ’90s were aimed principally at the 
flexibilization of labour, the privatization of employment services and the 
transformation of the ‘old’ public employment offices into ‘new’ structures, ready to 
deliver services. In the name of the new faith of employability, the activation of the 
unemployed became a profitable business which provided jobs to many consultants and 
trainers paid from national and European funds. Many of the socially useful workers 
had participated in various training programs during their lengthy period of 
unemployment and further training was provided during SUJs and PUJs. Most of these 
workers, made redundant from industrial plants and large infrastructural projects, were 
over-qualified for the low-skilled positions which were allocated to them during SUJs 
of PUJs. When training was necessary, it was always specific and tailored to the skill 
requirements of public administrations. The relevance of these experiences is 
investigated in chapter 5 which analyses the policy implementation. 
The activation of the Italian labour-market did not, however, open the way 
to ‘pure’ workfare programs, such as those implemented in the Anglo-American 
countries. The principal aim of the these programs was to compel welfare recipients to 
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work under the threat of withdrawal of their benefits, while supporting them with ‘a 
package of actions in form of job-search assistance, subsidised employment, basic 
education and training and work experience in the social and environmental sectors’ 
(Peck and Theodore, 2000a:730).  
Torfing makes distinction between the ‘offensive, neo-statist workfare 
strategy’ promoted in Denmark (which put emphasis on activation, skills improvement, 
training and education, empowerment and inclusive workfare programmes) and the 
‘defensive, neo-liberal workfare strategy’ promoted in the USA and the UK (which put 
emphasis on benefit and wage reduction, increasing job-searching efficiency, work-for-
benefit, control and punishment and targeting the unemployed) (Torfing, 1999:17). 
Moreover, criticism brought against the punitive American workfare explained how it 
became a way to ‘exclude poor from broader social life and political process’ and this 
led to the creation of a new under-class (Shragge, 1997:31). 
Job-search assistance and training have become principal components of 
more recent Italian active labour policies, but they are often limited to improving CVs, 
producing ‘skill-balances’ for potential job profiles and promoting training courses. 
These activities increase to a certain extent the unemployed ‘job-appeal’, but a large rift 
still remains between supply and demand polices. The supply side-actions become less 
and less efficient with the increase of the duration of the unemployment. This situation 
brings to mind Solow’s famous analogy as the labour market as being a game of 
musical chairs. As the number of chairs (available jobs) is smaller than the number of 
players (welfare beneficiaries), when the music stops, the losers are left standing.  
 
Adding more players – which is what forcing welfare beneficiaries into the labour market 
would do – can only increase unemployment. Some former welfare recipients will find jobs, 
perhaps many will, because they are hungry, but only by displacing formerly employed 
members of the assiduously working poor (Solow, 1998:26). 
 
The only possible way to have a smaller number of losers is by adding ‘new 
chairs’. Although findings from micro-econometric studies prove that compulsion and 
screening effects contribute to reducing the welfare expenditure, there is very little 
evidence that active labour market policies increase employment at aggregate level 
(Eichhorst et al, 2008).  
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2.3.4 The Third Way 
 
At the end of the 1990s a New Politics for a dynamic, knowledge-based and globalized 
economy was announced in the UK, after its debut in the USA with Clinton’s 
administration. Presenting his vision about the Third Way, seen as ‘new politics for the 
new century’, Tony Blair writes:  
 
The Third Way approach to the challenge of modern employment is about extending 
welfare to work, making work pay, and investing in the skills individuals need. In a more 
insecure and demanding labour market, it recognises that people will change jobs more 
often, and believes government has a vital role in equipping individuals to prosper (Blair, 
1998: 9).  
 
Many scholars saw the Third Way as a compromise between social-
democracy and neoliberalism and questioned the changes brought about by this set of 
ideas and polices in the USA and the UK
19
.  
In a joint document prepared in 1999 for Prime Ministers Blair and 
D’Alema, four strategies were presented to prevent long-term unemployment. 
Analysing the structure of the British and Italian labour markets, the authors of the 
document underlined that one of the most serious problems with unemployment is that 
‘even when there are large numbers of vacancies, many people remain unemployed 
either because they do not find work sufficiently attractive or because they are not 
offering employers what they want or because the system of matching workers with 
jobs is inadequate’ (Boeri et al, 1999:5). Boeri, Layard and Nickell seem to assume that 
high unemployment is caused by lack of wage adjustment and low regional labour 
mobility. Their solution for the long-term unemployment in Southern European regions 
is ‘a mixture of job promotion through managed programmes, wage flexibility and 
outward migration’ (ibid.). 
Even if we accept this as an accurate assessment of affairs, there is still 
much more to be said regarding the sheer size and geographies of the unemployment. In 
the case of Italy, moving thousands of people from the southern to the northern regions, 
where most of the vacancies were registered, was not a feasible solution. The argument 
becomes even more complicated considering that during the ’90s many sectors of the 
Italian industry were in crisis, economic growth decelerated and job vacancies were 
                                                 
19
 In the UK the Third Way did not seem to bring strong innovation, compared to the ‘old’ social- 
democratic principles (Hall, 1998; Ryan, 1999); neither did it break away from Thatcherite policies 
(Lund, 2008; Rhodes, 2000; Walker, 1999). In the USA the Third Way ‘has succeed in lowering the 
public’s expectations of government’s capacity to deliver either progress or justice’ (Faux, 1999:76). 
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scarce. However, matching the unemployed to vacancies is not simply a numerical and 
geographical issue. The creation of new jobs in emerging sectors which require new-
technology skills have brought about difficulties such as training or even professional 
skill-conversion for a large number of unemployed, particularly older workers. 
The economic literature provides two different approaches to 
unemployment: 1) if the economic capacity is under-utilised we have an under-
utilisation of labour supply usually called ‘Keynesian under-employment’; 2) if the 
demand is sufficient for the existing economic capacity, but the economic capacity is 
growing too slowly to absorb the labour supply, it is called ‘classical under-
employment’. Recent unemployment is caused by both low demand and slow growth of 
the economic capacity. To increase economic output, it would be necessary to increase 
both; that is ‘more demand and more things that combine with labour to produce goods 
and services – consumer markets, physical capacity and business organisation’ (Marris, 
1996:64). The government responds to expanding the macroeconomic demand, while 
the private sector responds to increasing the economic capacity but, in the case of the 
latter, ‘it is more likely to do so if it has confidence in the growth of demand’ (ibid.).  
Boeri et al (1999:26-27) put forward a three-tier reform of active labour 
policies in Italy to bring about the following changes: firstly, a universal employment 
benefit system should be introduced (benefits should be fixed term and should decrease 
over the time in order to avoid people getting caught in long-term unemployment traps); 
secondly, an unemployment insurance on top of this basic allowance could be provided 
only in the context of voluntary, self-financed schemes; thirdly, a third tier of social 
protection should be introduced on a means–tested basis. 
The report to Prime Ministers Blair and D’Alema concludes with 
recommendations to EU heads of government. All four strategies to prevent long-term 
unemployment advocated in the document place activation in the central position to 
restore full employment in Europe: 1) development of a modernized public employment 
service that can compete with private agencies; 2) strict reduction in the unemployment 
benefits; 3) encouragement of regional employment through decentralization of wages 
setting and collective bargaining, labour mobility and taking-up of low-paid jobs; 4) 
phasing out of policies such as early retirement and invalidity pensions (Boeri et al, 
1999:30). 
The exercise of showing how the system should work, if all necessary 
conditions were reached, is always intellectually stimulating. Unfortunately, many 
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policy recommendations draw on assumptions which do not exist in complex realities 
such as those of the southern regions. Implementation of labour market reforms requires 
time and political mediation usually brings different results from those proposed in 
policy reports. Different factors could compromise those which look like good policy 
proposals but, in the same time, good results might be obtained in unorthodox ways. In 
other words, local realities count and local labour markets might need different 
regulatory systems. For example, in certain areas of Mezzogiorno, where unemployment 
rates are high and the criminal economy is developed, the lack of any income forces the 
unemployed to work for very low wages, without social rights and, often, in illegal 
sectors. Therefore, an active attitude towards work is not enough to combat 
unemployment in areas where jobs are scarce and the young unemployed entering the 
labour market for the first time have little alternative to accepting illegal jobs or, in the 
worst case scenario, in companies controlled by criminal organizations. The 
effectiveness of workfare policies is strongly connected to the contingency of the labour 
demand in local contexts. In the UK, a country with universal welfare benefits and 
almost non-existent criminal economy, the evaluation of the New Deal for Young 
People shows this successful workfare programme, ‘worked best and hit more on its 
targets in areas of buoyant employment growth’, while  ‘the limitations of the work-first 
strategy [...] have been most clearly visible in depressed local labour markets’ (Sunley 
et al, 2006:190-191).   
While the neoliberal philosophy has emphasized the poor’s welfare 
dependency, the compulsory work participation has been the foundation stone for the 
workfare programs since their beginning on both sides of the Atlantic:  
    
Compulsion, a defining feature of the US workfare regime, has long been resisted by the 
left in Britain […]  but has since the 1997 election become a central plank of the Labour 
Government’s (strongly US-inflected) ‘rights and responsibilities’ approach (Peck and 
Theodore, 2001: 429). 
 
This new political message influenced the transformation of the Italian 
welfare state, especially after 2000, when two right-wing coalition governments led by 
Silvio Berlusconi, actively promoted labour-market deregulation and introduced many 
forms of flexible jobs. Again, the residual forms of the KWNS were not completely 
dismantled and this new transformation had a greater impact on those entering the 
labour market for the first time. As a result, there are currently about 1.6 million 
atypical contracts, representing 11% of the overall employment (Banca d’Italia, 2009). 
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These workers have no rights to receive any wage compensation in the case of 
unemployment. Anastasia, Mancini and Trivellato (quoted by Pizzuti, 2009:218) 
estimated that only one third of the total number of those unemployed are currently 
insured against unemployment through one of the national schemes in force. This 
polarization of the Italian labour market puts further pressure on the policy makers to 
reform unemployment benefits on a universal basis. Yet nothing followed the positive 
announcement about redefining the safety net for both workers and enterprises, 
increasing protections and assurances that marked the Italian commitment to the Third 
Way politics in 1998, described in chapter 4.   
In the case of SUJs and PUJs, after 2000, the administrations were under far 
more pressure to end the projects, while the workers had to accept more unstable jobs as 
their ‘employment stabilisation’. Nevertheless, the national state has never withdrawn 
financial support to the programs and the overall policy has continued with the aim of 
finding acceptable job-arrangements for its beneficiaries. The state labour agencies 
supported many administrations in closing the projects and outsourcing the public 
services; these activities, examined further in chapter 6, influenced the policy outcomes 
in a significant way.  
 
2.3.5 Public services outsourcing 
 
The neoliberal dismantling of public space concerned not only the welfare state. Market 
liberalization and privatization was another area where much effort was put into selling 
public companies, privatizing the provision of public services and reducing market 
regulations. This section presents a concise review of the main literature concerning 
recent debates surrounding public service outsourcing. Most of the literature dealing 
with the model of public service delivery uses a new institutional economics perspective 
and theories of public choice. These scholars pay particular attention to the transaction 
costs, the trade-off between cost-reduction and quality of the services outsourced, and 
the incentives favouring outsourcing. Scholars criticizing this approach look instead at 
how privatization affects state, democracy and the social contract. Another stream of 
literature investigates the consequences of outsourcing on employment and attempts to 
identify which factors make the privatization of certain public services problematic. 
Finally, some authors analyse various forms of public-private partnerships with the aim 
of evaluating the achievements brought by these partnerships to both parties involved.  
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Looking at the dynamics of outsourcing and insourcing within USA 
municipalities during 2002-2007, Warner and Hefetz (2012) find that monitoring is 
critical for private delivering of public services. During the period 1997-2002, 
insourcing was instead crucial for reducing transaction costs and for ensuring a balance 
between markets, planning and citizens satisfaction (Hefetz and Warner, 2007). Many 
other authors have highlighted the importance of transaction costs in contracting when 
the decision to service outsourcing is taken (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Levin and 
Tadelis, 2010). Bennedsen and Schultz (2011) developed a model that focuses on the 
trade-off between cost and quality in service provision. They argue that cost-reduction 
is the most important objective of the service providers and, if both objectives are 
followed, only one will be met successfully.  
Barbieri and Salvatore (2010) build a model based on incentive power and 
authority types. They conclude that the combination of the two dimensions led to 
contractualization to private, public or non-profit organizations, and when the incentives 
are high-powered and the political authority is low, the services should be privatized 
(Barbieri and Salvatore, 2010:362). Bae (2009) argues that services outsourcing 
requires collaborative relationships and choices that formalize them. She finds that the 
transaction costs of both supply and demand factors affect the choices of collaborative 
arrangements and determine alternative mechanisms of service delivery. 
Hood (1997) argues that approaches such as transactional cost analysis, 
recognition of intrinsic state functions and of core-competence activities fail to explain 
over-outsourcing and inappropriate contracts. These depend primarily upon the values 
characterizing ‘the contract state’: ‘the limits of outsourcing will be different according 
to whether a state aims at ‘steering’, ‘empowering’, ‘consumerism’ or ‘amoral’ goals’ 
(Hood, 1997:120). Analysing the relationship between contractualism and democracy 
Zifcak (2001) questions the ethics of quasi-market provision in relation to three values: 
transparency, probity and public deliberation. He concludes that although through 
market mechanism the best distribution of services of goods may be achieved, markets 
‘are far less suited to addressing the distribution of rights and entitlements’ (Zifcak, 
2001:96).  
Some authors also argue that privatization should be seen as a political 
phenomenon that ‘takes the form of strategy to realign institutions and the decision-
making process so as to privilege some groups over the competing aspirations of the 
others’ (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994:191). On a broader scale, privatization is seen as 
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being part of an international agenda of hollowing-out the state and altering the social 
contract. Osborne and Gaebler (1993) explain how the entrepreneurial spirit was 
reinventing the public sector putting forward the concept of de-bureaucratisation, as a 
sum of decentralization, deregulation, downsizing and outsourcing. Argyriades 
(2010:288) affirms that, in this process, the concepts ‘of the state as a model employer 
and of the public service as a strictly neutral profession’ have lost their vitality and have 
been undermined by the managerial reform.   
Another stream of literature investigates the reluctance of local authorities 
or public companies to externalize public services and the consequences of outsourcing 
for employment and working conditions. Entwistle (2005:194, 203) identifies five 
reasons for a reluctance to externalize: ‘good and big employer, public service ethos, 
control, supply-side problems and core competence’. In the author’s opinion they do not 
seem supported by much academic theory and ‘seem to identify a weak-procurement 
capacity and a risk-adverse culture of the UK local authorities’. Looking at  more 
specific service areas, for example health services, Macinati (2008) and Young (2007), 
arrive at the conclusion that clinical services are not usually outsourced because the 
qualitative nature of these core-services is more difficult to measure. 
Regarding instead the consequences of outsourcing for the workforce, 
Flecker and Hermann (2011) acknowledge that the  liberalization of public companies, 
located in six countries and operating in key service sectors such as electricity, postal 
service, local public transport and hospitals, pursued a cost reduction goal that was 
achieved at the expense of workers, who saw their employment and working conditions 
deteriorating. This situation characterized the public-private partnerships (PPP) 
programmes as well, which were strongly promoted in the UK under the New Labour 
Government. These partnerships were supposed to combine strengths of both public and 
private sectors, namely the profit maximization goal with the ethos of the public sector 
(Smith, 2012:96). Furthermore Whitfield (2010) suggests there is little evidence of job 
creation through PPP contracts, yet these arrangements threatened employment and 
further fragmented and blurred the boundaries of the private and public sectors (Smith, 
2012:108). Grimshaw et al (2002) confirm that there is little evidence about mutual 
gains inside PPP, but there is an imbalance of power between the private and public 
partners and any gains achieved are distributed unevenly.  
Looking at the SUJs and PUJs projects’ closure, there are some important 
considerations that do not seem to be resolved from the theoretical contributions about 
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outsourcing. Firstly, the decision of whether to outsource the public services was 
political and not a result of inexorable proof that services provided by private 
companies are, in all circumstances, more efficient and of better quality than those 
provided by civil servants. The starting point of outsourcing of local public services in 
Italy was the reduction of the funds transferred to public bodies and the block on public 
employment. Since the public administration were forbidden from replacing any lost 
workforce, the only remaining way available to them was services outsourcing.  
Bearing in mind that a public workforce is not more costly than equivalent 
jobs in many private sectors, and services outsourced are only privately delivered but 
paid for with public money, it is not always apparent that privatization brings economic 
advantages per se to the public sector. Moreover, as will be explained in chapter 6, there 
were many economic incentives that reduced labour costs during the first three years of 
the contracts, but this was, in many cases, to the advantage of the employers, who had 
their profits increased, and did not decrease the costs of the services for the public 
administrations. 
Secondly, the transition of bureaucrats into public managers was not just a 
‘natural’ result of the process of privatization. As the public managers continued to play 
an important role within the public administrations, having responsibility for monitoring 
the services outsourced, they needed to develop these skills drawing on their previous 
experience. The coordination of large public workforces delivering services for the 
public administrations was good training for many civil servants to acquire managerial 
skills. The more involved they had been in such activities before, the more skilful they 
became in monitoring the services outsourced. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the broader theoretical framework for the transformation of 
the Italian political economy which influenced the labour market regulation and, first 
and foremost, the policies for tackling long-term unemployment. The gradual 
abandonment of the Keynesian demand management policies, the transformation of the 
welfare state, the deregulation of job markets and the privatization of public services are 
the most significant areas that influenced the policy of socially and publicly useful jobs 
during its various stages, and determined its results. 
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The first part of the chapter explained that the abandonment of the 
commitment to the policy of full employment – a fundamental part of the Keynesian 
economic model –completed the transformation of the welfare state after the second oil 
crisis. The focus shifted to the control of monetary aggregates, and the reduction of 
inflation became the first objective of macroeconomic policies. This was pursued 
through an income policy that managed to keep the cost of labour low, and also through 
deflation due to the contraction of aggregate demand. Furthermore, the depreciation of 
the Italian lira maintained the competitiveness of Italian exports. 
These polices had high costs in terms of unemployment created as a result 
of industrial restructuring. The Italian corporative welfare-regime, nevertheless, 
provided protection for the unemployed created by this phenomenon and people who 
had been employed in large industrial plants benefited from many years of wage 
compensation funds. Moreover, the segmentation of the Italian labour market and 
unevenly distributed unemployment protection fuelled discrimination against other 
categories of unemployed who remained outside the labour market for many years and 
did not receive any benefits. The difficult situation of the public finances, but also some 
specific aspects related to the high level of criminality in certain geographical areas, did 
not allow the introduction of a universal social income. Although this aid could have 
alleviated poverty, such a policy would have been problematic for the labour market 
and, most likely, it would not have counteracted long-term unemployment. The key 
advantage for those unemployed involved in SUJ and PUJs was that they belonged to a 
group entitled to receive economic benefits and, at the same time, had the opportunity to 
access new jobs.  
The second part of this chapter presented the main characteristics of the 
shift to monetarism and the affirmation of a Schumpeterian workfare regime. Two 
important features characterized this transformation: the pressure to reduce welfare 
provision, and the placing responsibility away from the state onto single individuals in 
facing unemployment. The Italian welfare state encountered difficulties in addressing a 
new structure of social risks which had emerged because of the development of the 
service sector, and the increased participation of women in the labour market. In 
addition, the fiscal crisis of the state predisposed the shift of social policies towards 
more active labour market measures  and workfare. These transformations, however, 
involved those entering the labour market for the first time, especially youths, and the 
weakest categories within the labour force, women and immigrants. 
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Third Way politics gave a strong impetus to supply-side labour market 
policies which, alone, failed to visibly change the situation of the long-term 
unemployment. Nonetheless it was efficient in pursuing further deregulation of the 
labour market, and the subsequent right-wing government even increased the typologies 
of flexible short-term contracts.  
The neoliberal transformation reinforced the privatization processes and the 
local public services started to become a target after 2000. The closure of SUJs and 
PUJs projects and the public services outsourcing became two indivisible goals that 
many public administration pursued. In the last subsection of this chapter it was 
questioned to what extent the privatization of public services brought advantages to the 
public administrations. The benefits of cost-reduction and increased quality of the 
outsourced services should be considered carefully. Taking into consideration the 
overall reduction of public workforce, it appears clear that through public service 
outsourcing, the public administrations were able to transform an important share of 
their fixed costs into variable costs. As the public workforce represented a good 
proportion of the PAs annual budgets, this cost became more flexible through 
privatization and, in this new scenario, the PAs could amend the budgets allocated to 
services outsourcing according to their financial capacity. At this juncture, it is less 
clear whether the responsibilities for redundancies and reduced incomes for the workers 
delivering services in the private sector are attributable to the state (which cuts the 
public funds), to the public bodies, (which decide how to allocate their funds), or to the 
private employers (who set their objectives of profitability). 
The first two chapters of this thesis presented the theoretical frameworks, 
the research questions, the methodological approach and the categories employed in the 
evaluation of the three stage of the policy system. The following four chapters will 
investigate each of them in turn. Chapter 3 analyses the early stages of the policy-
making when, mostly in the ’80s, a large number of unemployed receiving wage 
compensation funds become a specific target group, and emergency solutions tackling 
long-term unemployment and social marginalization were implemented. The financial 
constraints imposed on Italy by its joining of the EMU made it even more difficult for 
public funds to be available for such policies. In 1994 there was an explicit introduction 
of socially useful jobs aimed at activating long-term unemployed in the delivery of 
activities of public interest as a condition of their admission to further benefits. For this 
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reason the programmes were presented as workfare, but they were greatly welcomed by 
both the unemployed and public bodies. 
Chapter 4 investigates the culminating moment of the policy-making which 
was the policy choice. New legal provisions allowed the extension of the target group to 
long-term unemployed who were not entitled to receive benefits, and to youth 
unemployed in Mezzogiorno. In 1997 very detailed legislation provided the public 
bodies with instruments that allowed them to activate SUJs and PUJs projects in many 
sectors and also to create new jobs through the privatization of the services the 
unemployed were involved with. Almost 87,000 young unemployed were activated in 
PUJs projects in 1997, while the number of long-term unemployed participating in SUJs 
projects exceeded the remarkable figure of 149,000 in 1999. 
Chapter 5 explores the mechanisms which shaped the policy 
implementation, the key factors for the projects start-up and execution, as well as the 
institutions involved. Many public administrations requested several extensions of the 
projects beyond the maximum period provided by law. In order to block the 
implementation of new projects and to force public bodies to end the existing ones and 
to accelerate the services outsourcing, the legislation was amended in 2000. The policy 
take-up was the most difficult and controversial part of the policy. Many projects were 
closed and the services outsourced, but also several public bodies decided to employ the 
socially useful workers directly and this is explored in chapter 6, focusing on the key 
determining factors and the role played by institutions in this stage of the policy. 
In order to demonstrate how socially and publicly useful jobs projects 
functioned at a local level and to detail the determining factors and processes that lay 
behind their outcomes, four case studies are presented in chapter 7. The last chapter 
presents the conclusion of the whole work, drawing some explanatory patterns for this 
last Keynesian labour market policy in Italy. 
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Chapter 3 
Structural unemployment: problem recognition and first set of policy 
solutions   
 
What is workfare? As usual in this country, when 
you are in a difficult situation and you are unsure 
what to do, you start to think in English!  
(Italian trade unionist interviewed in 2005) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Italian socially and publicly useful jobs programmes began in the second half of the 
’90s. While sporadic policy interventions existed during the ’80s, many laws were 
created between 1995 and 1997 intended to help both local and national public 
administrations set up socially and publicly useful jobs’ projects. The introductory 
quote above encapsulated the philosophy of the period preceding 1997 when the policy 
was launched with a strong activation ethos attached to it. As will be examined, much 
effort was put into creating new policy instruments which would facilitate the re-
insertion of the long-term unemployed into the labour market. This was, in fact, the first 
stage of the policy-making process when structural unemployment was recognized as 
central problem and the first set of solutions were implemented. 
The use of this redundant workforce in the delivery of public services 
appeared to offer solutions to a two-fold problem. Firstly, the activation of the long-
term unemployed in works of public interest transformed passive assistance into active 
policy, making their benefits ‘socially useful’. Secondly, at a time of severe cuts to 
public expenditure, this policy allowed local administrations to deliver public services 
at the same, and in many cases lower, costs. This choice, made in the very first stage of 
policy formation, played an important role in the policy’s later stages, as will be 
assessed in the following chapter. Drawing on Heclo’s, Sacks’, Weir and Skocpol’s 
works, Hall (1993:277) acknowledges that ‘one of the principal factors affecting policy 
at time-1 is policy at time-0’[because] policy responds less directly to social and 
economic conditions than it does to the consequences of past policy’. This path 
dependency can be seen in the policy’s shift between its first and second stages, but also 
from the influence that the emergency polices in the early ’80s had on the early stages 
of the SUJs projects. 
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Another important factor that makes the Italian policy peculiar is that, 
compared to other European programs mainly implemented in Germany and France
20
 
which  targeted ‘hard-to-place’ groups (Erhel et al, 1996), the socially and publicly 
useful workers did not experience temporary public employment, although the 
legislation provided a fixed term for the programmes. The public administrations which 
began the programmes in the ’90s lacked the funds to replace the retired civil servants 
or buy the services in the market. Thus, at this economic conjuncture, this new and 
economically convenient workforce became particularly useful for local and national 
public administrations. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents a short 
overview of the Italian employment and unemployment rates, looking at their 
distribution within economic sectors, gender and age groups. The main trends are 
illustrated through the analysis of time series data for the period 1970-2010. The 
geographies of employment and unemployment are analysed by examining the 
distribution of these indicators across different groups of regions. Some significant 
divisions between the Northern and Southern regions are evident, leading to the creation 
of specific policy instruments designed to address unemployment in different parts of 
the country.  
The second part looks at the preliminary conditions of the policy, beginning 
with the industrial restructuring which occurred in the ’80s, creating mass layoffs 
followed by long-term unemployment. This part focuses on the role of GEPI, a public 
company created to promote specific programs for enterprise restructuring by the 
introduction of new public capital into the enterprises at risk of failure. Many of these 
never recovered but their redundant workforce continued to be employed by GEPI. In 
order to create new ways to activate the long-term unemployed, especially in the 
production of the public-goods, some specific laws were passed initially in the mid ’80s. 
These allowed for the public administrations of cities experiencing high social tensions 
created by long-term and widespread unemployment, to employ large numbers of 
redundant workers to deliver activities of social and public usefulness.   
                                                 
20
 The French Collective Utility Work programme represented another European policy that used 
temporary public employment for the young unemployed to help them re-join the workforce. The target 
was more limited (those aged under 25), the participants worked as trainees and the programs were 
intended to be temporary rather than permanent. The participants were supposed to improve their 
employability and to re-enter the labour market after one or at the most two years. (Enjolras et al, 
2001:59).   
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At the end of the second part the main unemployment insurance schemes 
operating for industrial crises and restructuring are analysed. Particular attention is paid 
to the special wage compensation fund that has been used extensively to deal with 
structural employment redundancies caused by economic crises or enterprises’ 
reorganisation and restructuration.  
The third part refers to the process of policy-making which took place in the 
early ’90s which was strongly influenced by the Italian commitment to achieve the 
economic parameters required for the entry into the European Monetary Union. This 
period is characterised by restrictive budgetary policies, the control of macroeconomic 
variables, particularly the inflation rate and the public deficit, a cut in the public 
expenditure and politically unstable coalitions. The policy-making had to face this 
difficult scenario where the high unemployment resulting from the industrial crises of 
the previous decade was yet another burden.  
With the exception of Britain, many European countries invoked 
‘Europeanization’ as an imperative to pursue unpopular legislative courses (Rosamond, 
2003:53). Included in these countries was Italy which underwent major transformations 
in an extremely short period of time. The impact of European integration was of vital 
importance for the Italian governments between 1992 and 1996. The objective of 
reaching the convergence criteria reshaped state intervention in key areas of economic 
and social policy. With the collaborative participation of social partners, the policy 
formulated new solutions in order to face up to long-term unemployment. Between 
1994 and 1996 there was very intense production of new norms associated with people 
dismissed by enterprises and living on unemployment aids. This was a period when the 
legislation of the socially and publicly useful jobs took great steps forward and which 
was characterized by a strongly galvanising approach. 
 
3.2 Employment trends and geography of unemployment in a long-term 
retrospective 
 
3.2.1 The rise of a service economy 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, industry in Italy underwent a harsh process of 
restructuring, with many industrial sectors seriously being downsized and a large 
number of jobs lost. This phenomenon also occurred in other western European 
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countries, but in Italy it resulted in more serious effects. Reviewing the economic 
background and the labour market in Italy, the European Commission noted  that: 
 
The economic structure has been increasingly marked over the past decade by a sharp 
decline in the number of jobs in the industrial sector, accompanied by an increase in the 
importance of the tertiary sector in the economy as a whole. This state of affairs does not of 
itself justify the view that a process of deindustrialization is in train: it is common to all 
western countries but it has certain worrying connotations in the case of Italy. First, because 
jobs have changed very quickly in a very short space of time and, second, because the 
associated contraction of industry started before the country had reached the levels of 
industrialisation obtained in the main European countries (European Commission, 1997:1). 
 
The following data illustrate in detail the evolution of employment
21
 and 
unemployment
22
 after 1970 as a result of the workforce changes in terms of age, gender 
and geography. The data are sourced from statistics using the national economic 
accounts which have different methods of collecting data than those used by the annual 
workforce surveys.   
From 1970 to 2009 there was a steady increase in employment in the 
services sector, alongside a sharp decrease in the agricultural sector and a steady 
decrease in the industrial sector which experienced a more accelerated trend after 1983 
(figure 3.1). In absolute terms, 960,000 jobs were lost in agriculture which represents 
almost 64% of the level in 1971. In the industrial sector a reduction of 25% was 
registered, in absolute terms 1,400,000 people, between the maximum level in 1974 
(6,886,500) and that in 2009 (5,504,500). During the same time the number of 
employees in the services sector had doubled, reaching 13,000,000 in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The employed are those who are at least 15 years old and performed at least 1 hour of paid work during 
the week when the survey took place. If they have not worked during that week they should prove they 
had a job which give them an income. The following categories are included: people receiving wage 
guarantee aids for less than 3 months or those who receive aids equivalent to at least 50% of their salaries, 
people on maternity leave and on sick leave, self-employees who have enterprises or professional 
activities, unpaid carers out of work for less than 3 months.    
22
 The unemployed are those who are between 15 and 74 years old and they have neither delivered any 
hour of paid work during the week when the survey took place. They should not have had any kind of job. 
Furthermore, they should have done at least one active action to search for a job during the 4 weeks 
before the survey, they should be ready to start a new job within the next 2 weeks or are going to start a 
new job within the next 3 months.   
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Fig. 3.1: Employment rates by economic sector 
 
 
 
 
           
         
         
         
         
     
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
 
A similar increasing trend was registered for self-employment in the 
services sector where the number of people employed increased by more than 45%, 
from 2,152,000 in 1970 to almost 4,000,000 in 2009 (figure 3.2). The fall in the number 
of people employed through independent business in the agricultural sector was even 
sharper: from 2,546,300 in 1970 to 450,000 in 2009, which accounts for approximately 
an 82% decline in self-employment in this sector. Self-employment in the industrial 
sector experienced an increase of approximately 25% followed by a slight decrease. In 
fact, the number of people self- employed was approximately 1,073,000 in 1970, 
reaching 1,506,000 in 1992 and decreasing to 1,382,000 in 2009. 
 
 Fig. 3.2: Self-employment rates by economic sector 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
 
 
           
             
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
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3.2.2 Gender disparities 
 
The downsizing of the industrial and agricultural sectors alongside the rise of 
employment in the services sector has not been manifested in the same way within the 
male and female workforces. The distribution of the employment and unemployment 
rates has fluctuated in respect to age group and geographical distribution. Attention will 
be focused on the first two age groups (workers under 25 years and mature workers, 25 
to 64 years) and will then look at the employment rates for males and females.  
The employment rate of mature male workers (figure 3.3) decreased by 15% 
over 20 years, from 90% in 1977 to 75% in 1997. After a brief increase which brought 
the rate closer to 80%, it fell again with the start of the international financial crisis in 
2007, reaching 75% in 2010.  
The employment rate for young male workers experienced a similar decline, 
from 39% in 1977 to 24.4% in 2010, but with a sharper decreasing trend after 2003. 
 
  Fig. 3.3: Male employment rates by age group 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
           
The female employment rate (figure 3.4) had a contrasting trend during the 
same period, with a steady increase in employment for the mature female workforce 
while the younger workforce experienced cyclical variations. In 1997 the two 
employment rates were very similar, 33% for mature females and 29% for the youngest 
group. The positive trend of the first brought it to 52% in 2008, while the latter 
decreased steadily after 1999, reaching 16.6% in 2011.  
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 Fig. 3.4: Female employment rates by age group 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
           
The trends of the unemployment rates display important variations among 
the age groups and genders (figures 3.5 and 3.6). However, it should be noted that 
unemployment and employment rates for young people were influenced by the senior 
secondary school reforms, which raised the statutory school-leaving age from 14 to 16 
during the second half of the ‘90s. 
 
   Fig. 3.5: Male unemployment rates by age group 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
         
The unemployment rate among young males increased by 10% in 10 years, 
from 20% in 1977 to 30% in 1997, but experienced a major decrease from 1995 to 2003 
when it reached 18.5%. As an effect of the international financial crises it started to rise 
sharply after 2007 and reached almost 27% in 2010.The unemployment rate for the 
mature male workforce was under 5% until 1991. However, the data need to be 
interpreted with caution. A large number of claimants of the special wage compensation 
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benefits had continued to be recorded as employees with zero working hours per week
23
 
before 1991, meaning the data underestimated the actual level of unemployment for this 
age and gender group. 
The unemployment rate for mature females has not been less than 6% since 
1977 and from 1986 to 2002 it has always exceeded 10%. The same rate for young 
females is four times higher. It increased from 28% in 1977 to 42% in 1987 when it 
reached the highest level. Following this it experienced various periods of decline and 
reached 23% in 2007 when it began to rise rapidly again. 
 
Fig. 3.6: Female unemployment rates by age group 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
          
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
          
Finally, the differences between male and female employment and 
unemployment in relation to their age groups are smaller than those that can be 
observed in relation to their geographical provenance. However, it is difficult to assess 
the real extent of the labour market disparities at regional level. Extensive research 
drawn on empirical observation from the UK shows how job loss could result in 
increased recorded sickness rather than recorded unemployment (Beatty et al, 2000). It 
appears that, in industrial northern areas in particular, which mostly suffered from the 
de-industrialization process, job losses affected to a large extent the older, less skilled 
and less healthy workers. A large proportion of the people who ‘have found themselves 
                                                 
23
 The special wage compensation fund (CIGS, cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria) is a wage 
compensation given to workers temporally laid off by enterprises passing through the reorganisation and 
restructuration processes. It is not considered an unemployment benefit tout court because at the end of 
the restructuring it is expected the enterprises to take the workers back on or at least part of them. The 
workers are considered employed whilst the industrial restructuration is on-going. This mechanism was 
extensively used during the ’80 for enterprises which were insolvent and have never restarted their 
activities. In 1991 the jurisdiction was reviewed and ‘the mobility aid’ for mass layoffs was introduced.  
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at the back of the queue for jobs’ claimed sickness benefits and never returned to the job 
market (Fothergill, 2001:244). This phenomenon was also manifest in Italy where, 
particularly in the Southern regions, different types of subsidies were used to tackle 
hidden unemployment. Pension provision for invalidity was widespread in the past and 
even at present it accounts for 40 per cent more than those recorded in the Northern 
regions (MEF, 2011). 
 
3.2.3 Geographical disparities 
 
The following three figures present the geography of the employment distribution for 
age groups. In 1997 the differences between the employment rates for young people 
employed in most developed parts of the country (the North East and the North West), 
and those employed in the less developed (the South and the Islands) was approximately 
20%. The charts plotted in figure 3.7 show short periods of convergence between 1985-
1987 and 1993-1994, and a strong decline in employment in the North after 2001. 
During the last decade the North regions experienced a reduction of more than 16% of 
youth employment, whilst the South and the Islands lost approximately 7% and 5% 
respectively.
24
  
            
  Fig. 3.7: Employment rates by geographical distribution for the age group 15-24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
                                                 
24
 The employment rate for young people dropped from 41.3% in the North West and 44.8% in the North 
East, in 2001, to 25.3% and 28.3% respectively in 2010. In the South it decreased from 21% in 2001 to 14% 
in 2010 whilst for the Islands the decrease was from 20.6% to 15.3% in the same time period.  
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Things are rather different however for mature employees in the age group 
25-64 years (figure 3.8). From 2000 until 2008 the employments rates registered an 
upward trend in the North and Centre of Italy. The most recent international financial 
crisis seems not to have influenced this trend significantly as the employment rates for 
this age group have decreased by only 0.5-1% annually after 2008. The particularities of 
the special wage funds explained earlier, suggest that these figures could change 
drastically when those enterprises which do not manage to recover from the crisis, begin 
mass layoffs and the actual recipients of benefits become unemployed.  
However, the situation in the South is more critical. The employment rate 
decreased slowly during the entire period, falling approximately 9% over three decades, 
from 59% at the end of the ’70s to 50% in 2010. The employment rate for the mature 
workforce in the Islands experienced a reduced variation remaining close to 50%, 
generally lower than the rates registered in the other regions during this period.        
 
Fig. 3.8: Employment rates by geographical distribution for the age group 25-64 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
 Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
 
The employment rates for people over 65 years (figure 3.9) have 
declined steadily since 1977 across the whole country. There are no significant 
differences between regions even though the rates have always been higher in the 
North and Centre (approximately 8-9% in 1997) and lower in the South and Islands 
(approximately 6-7% in the same year). Since 2010 they have maintained this 2% 
gap, registering 4% with the former and 2% with the latter.   
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Fig. 3.9: Employment rates by geographical distribution for the age group 
65 and over 
 
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts 
 
The employment rates for people over 65 years (figure 3.9) have declined 
steadily since 1977 across the whole country. There are no significant differences 
between regions even though the rates have always been higher in the North and Centre 
(approximately 8-9% in 1997) and lower in the South and Islands (approximately 6-7% 
in the same year). Since 2010 they have maintained this 2% gap, registering 4% with 
the former and 2% with the latter. Lastly, the geographies of employment mirror those 
of unemployment. The unemployment rates are higher in the South and the Islands for 
both age groups. The figures regarding the youth unemployment (figure 3.10) are 
dramatically high at the end of the ’80s, reaching 50% in the South and 58% in the 
Islands.  
 Fig. 3.10: Unemployment rates by geographical distribution for the age group 
15-24  
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts         
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These differences are present also between the mature unemployed (figure 
3.11) although the unemployment rates are lower than those registered for the younger 
group. They did not exceed 18% in the South and 14% in the Islands and were much 
smaller for the Northern regions where they have never exceeded 5%. The highest 
levels of unemployment for all groups were registered between 1993 and 2000. As 
regards the economic cycles, there are some important differences instead. The graphs 
show similar trends from 1993 till 2000 but a considerable divergence occurred from 
1987 till 1992 when the unemployment rates decreased in the North whilst noticeably 
increasing in the Centre, South and the Islands. 
 
 Fig. 3.11: Unemployment rates by geographical distribution for the age group 
 25 and over 
 
 
 
           
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Source: adapted from ISTAT, national economic accounts         
 
The data presented above illustrate geographical distribution of 
employment, reflecting different organization patterns of production across regions 
(Massey, 1995). The fragmented distribution of Italian employment has deep roots in 
the history of the country’s capitalistic development and has made many scholars 
assume that Italy is divided into two distinct parts, characterised by different features 
which lead to different forms of social integration. By the end of the Italian economic 
miracle, in the mid ’60s, the North was characterized by the concentration of industries 
and innovation that was lacking in the South. Until 1994 there was a strong alliance 
between large and medium firms in the building industries and in the production of 
intermediate goods. This brought about a fluctuation of ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ 
phases of development (Secchi, 1977). However the South was characterized by a large 
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migration of its labour force to the North and the compensation of its de-ruralisation 
through a system of ‘political patronage’. This compensation was based on monetary 
transfers from the state to families and however, following the state’s fiscal crisis in the 
’70s, it was insufficient and led to the expansion of the criminal economy (Mingione, 
1993:310).   
Many factors have influenced the profound transformation of the Italian 
labour market during the last forty years; some of them being the subject of animated 
political debates; others passing unnoticed but which have foreseen global changes. 
Since the mid ’70s ‘the three creeping revolutions’ came into being: the increase of the 
female labour-supply, the rise of retirement programs used in many cases as instruments 
for industrial restructuration, and the transformation of the welfare state into the major 
agent of labour market clearing (Esping-Andersen, 1990:147-149). The following parts 
of this chapter will explore how the Italian state recognised the problem of the industrial 
change which began in the ’70s and why the instruments used to contrast the 
unemployment following the enterprises’ restructuration came to have specific 
frameworks during the following decades. 
 
3.3 Changes in the ’80s: industrial restructuring processes and role of the 
unemployment insurance schemes 
 
3.3.1 The corporative roots of Italian capitalism 
 
According to Barca (1999) the history of Italian capitalism is marked by many moments 
of political compromises in an attempt to satisfy corporative and often opposite 
interests, but they did not help the country to achieve those important reforms necessary 
for its modernisation. Shortly after WWII, the ruling party, Democrazia Cristiana, made 
a decision to bring state intervention into the economic life of the country. This political 
ethos probably has deeper roots in the Italian fascist past when state intervention was 
used to support a weak private sector. In the same way it was assumed that the state 
must provide key public goods such as energy, water, telecommunication, gas and oil 
refined products. State owned holdings such as IRI and ENI were created for this 
purpose and played an important role in the early development of Italian post-war 
capitalism and were the protagonists of the Italian industrial miracle in the ’60s 
(Saraceno, 1975). 
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IMI was another central public instrument used in this strategy. Created 
after the 1929 crises, this industrial credit company had to protect the deposits of many 
banks from the risks of industrial investment, especially in companies at risk of closure, 
and to supply credit for new industrial investments (Castronovo, 1995). In 1962 EFIM 
was created, another state-owned company for industrial credit as a result of the closure 
of FIM, an industrial fund created in 1947 to reconvert the aeronautical industries 
involved during WWII. EFIM acted in many economic sectors, especially in the South, 
becoming the owner of many industries considered to be of little interest to private 
investors or state bodies. Since the '70s it accumulated a significant number of debts and 
despite the process of restructuration which occurred during the ’80s, it was always in a 
difficult financial situation (Tordi and Bemporad, 1995).   
All these state-owned holdings faced the crises which gradually affected 
many industrial sectors such as the iron and steel industry, mechanics, chemical and 
nautical building sectors. Becoming more and more subordinated to the political 
clientele who used them to subsidize insolvent companies, they accumulated a large 
amount of debt which brought about the closure of many industrial plants (Perrone, 
1991). In the ’90s they were gradually transformed into joint-stock companies.  
Despite the criticism raise over the efficiency of these public companies, 
many scholars acknowledge the fact that, in the early ’80s, Italy had overcome its 
economic backwardness, yet the South was still far behind the North (King, 1992; 
Spooner, 1984). Even with massive industrial investment and infrastructural works, the 
South’s development pattern was seen as a dependent type of development which 
reflects the interests of the owners of Italian capital in the North (Wade, 1980:161).  
The alliances and conflicts between various economic actors and social 
groups in different parts of the country did not however follow a linear trajectory. Both 
capital and labour did not act as monolithic blocks during the different phases of 
development that shaped the territorial inequalities of the Italian economic system 
(Secchi, 1977). The distribution of power among broad social groups with divergent 
interests was acknowledged as a distinctive characteristic of the movement from 
Keynesianism to monetarism which took place in many European countries in the ’70s 
(Hall, 1992). Various segments of the working class and industrialists found themselves 
in conflict but some formed alliances in order to claim protection for their common 
interests. Such collaboration also took place between large industrial companies and 
unionized blue-collar workers in Italy during the lengthy period of industrial 
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restructuring in the ’70s. Therefore, despite the de-industrialization of the Italian 
economy, support from the welfare state was increased.  
GEPI (Società per Gestioni e Partecipazioni Industriali - Company for 
Management and Recapitalization of Industries) was a public company created in 1971 
and which played an important role in shaping the principals of the policy analysed in 
this thesis. It promoted industrial investments with the aim of boosting economic 
development and increasing employment countrywide. Its activity was focused on: 1) 
acquiring stock options from companies undergoing temporary difficulties; 2) creating 
its own companies and joint-ventures for developing industrial areas and 3) providing 
facilitated credit to private companies. 
In a first stage GEPI concentrated most of its activities on the third option, 
but only a small part of the enterprises which received credit returned it. Many of them 
preferred to remain linked to GEPI and some went into liquidation and had to close. The 
company was accused of operating in a discretionary way, by using non-transparent 
criteria in relation to the enterprises’ finances, and it was inferred that it responded to 
political clientele (Bonafede, 1988). 
In 1980 the situation became even more problematic because GEPI had 
been asked to take on the workforce made redundant by enterprises at risk of closure, 
and to provide for their re-employment. Initially this was supposed to be a new extra 
task for GEPI with a fixed time period, in addition to its usual activity. During the ’80s 
more than 30,000 people receiving benefits, especially in the Southern Regions were 
taken-on by GEPI but only a small number of them found further employment. In order 
to manage this large redundant workforce, GEPI created companies for re-employment 
(so-called ‘box enterprises’) which were fictitious companies completely inactive in 
terms of industrial production. The principal role of these companies was to provide the 
central state with an administrative form by which it was able to pay wage benefits to 
people out of work and to carry out activities aimed at their re-employment.  
Although the workers were totally excluded from the production process, 
they were involved in various training programs aimed at their professional progression. 
In 1990 training became an important area of activity for GEPI. As a large number of 
people needed to be re-qualified, a consortium for professional orientation and training 
was created with this purpose in mind. 
At the end of the ’80s serious difficulties were encountered in finding jobs 
for these people, especially in the South where large industrial plants had undergone 
74 
 
harsh downsizing and restructuring. The situation resulted in alarm, both economically 
and socially. The public expenditure for unemployment aid was increasing and long-
term unemployment was reaching high levels; ‘while the proportion of people finding 
work in less than three months fell from 12.0% in 1981 to 6.3% in 1991, the percentage 
who took more than two years to find work rose sharply from 18.8% in 1981 to 32.5% 
in 1991’ (European Commission, 1997:4). 
The longer the time spent on benefits, the more difficult it was to overcome 
this situation. Sometimes the workers refused jobs in small enterprises which seemed 
not to meet their requirements, especially in terms of stability of the new jobs. By 
remaining connected to their previous enterprises and colleagues, they continued to be 
in a strong bargaining position and to receive support from trade unions through 
collective agreements.  
 
The workers continued to stick to their original situation for the reason that the few jobs 
found by GEPI were usually very unstable, in very small companies and they were often 
obtained through mutual agreement under the following terms: ‘I will give you financial aid 
if you employ some of these people. They are also cheap and you can have some additional 
tax benefits too’. In such a situation it was safer for workers to remain connected to their 
previous companies or, when the companies closed, to their former colleagues. This 
connection made them fell less worried from a social point of view. It was not for obtaining 
further extensions of their benefits, but because of the insecurity within unstable jobs in 
these small companies. If they had lost those jobs they would have found themselves in 
serious trouble, without any entitlement for further unemployment aid. In this case we were 
unable to help them (interview with B.M., CGIL, Executive in charge for active labour 
policies before 2002). 
 
3.3.2 Emergency policies in the early ’80s 
 
The long term unemployment became a striking feature in some areas of the country 
where social disorder began to become frequent. Specific solutions were sought in order 
to deal with these emergencies and certain laws were adopted under ‘conditions of 
extraordinary necessity and emergency’. Under Law 390 of 1981 the Regional 
Commissions for Employment (CRI)
25
 had the task of engaging workers who were 
receiving wage compensation funds in activities of public use. The delivery of such 
activities would not establish a job-related relationship between workers and public 
administrations and should have lasted for limited time periods. The participation in 
                                                 
25
 CRI (Commisione Regionale per l’Impiego) were tripartite regional bodies participated by region, trade 
unions and entrepreneurs’ associations. Their role was that of programming, implementing and 
controlling the local active labour policies. 
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public activities was viewed as being compulsory for those who had been called to take 
part, and those who refused would be withdrawn from receiving further benefits.  
The central government was searching for new ways to award benefits and 
involve people who remained out of work for long periods of time in useful public 
activities. This became an urgent necessity in cities such as Naples and Palermo, for 
example. With a dedicated law passed in 1984, the Ministry of Labour gave 27 billion 
ITL to the City and Province of Naples to finance socially useful work for the 
workforce who had been made redundant in the nautical sector. In 1986 a similar law 
was passed to begin socially useful work in the City of Palermo. In this case 25 billion 
ITL were given to the City of Palermo from funds made available from the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs. One thousand people made redundant from the construction sector, 
were employed in varying activities for the maintenance of the city’s artistic and 
architectural heritage.  
This new possibility was extended to the workers employed by GEPI in 
1987. For this to happen, GEPI proposed business plans to the public administrations in 
order to program all costs related to new activities to be undertaken by the unemployed 
and to organize their work delivery. 
 
We started to make the first business plans at the beginning of the ’90s. The first initiatives 
took place in the Region of Lazio and after that we tried to export them to Sardinia. We had 
a ‘box-company’ in Villacidro which had taken-on the employees from a local enterprise 
which was closed. Every month we were going to bring them home the wage benefits 
checks. When we started to look for socially useful work for them we contacted the local 
administration. We adapted the business plan format that we used to prepare for starting 
new companies and we presented an evaluation of the costs connected to the new activities 
to the administration. It was very useful for the administration to understand clearly how 
much each activity would cost. The workers were for free at the beginning [the unemployed 
were receiving benefits] but there were other costs for tools, safety equipment for example 
that the administrations had to cover (interview with P.M., Unit for Business Planning, 
GEPI/ Italia Lavoro).  
 
During the following years, much public administration at central and national 
levels started programmes for people receiving special wage compensation funds or 
unemployment aids
26
. The unemployed were activated in many different activities. 
Some of them were completely new and others were regularly delivered by public 
administrations. Before explaining in detail this complex array of activities and how 
                                                 
26
 In 1991 the Law 223 reformed the main Italian unemployment insurance called the special wage 
compensation fund (CIGS). The law introduced the ‘mobility’ aid for people made permanently 
redundant. In this way the improper use of CIGS made in the past was stopped.  
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they were implemented, an explanation is needed in order to clarify how the Italian 
unemployment insurance schemes operate. 
 
3.3.3 The social shock absorbers: CIG and CIGS 
 
The normal wage compensation fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria - CIG) 
was created in 1941 with an Agreement between the social partners to contrast the 
unemployment situations during the war period
27
 and was ordinarily used as an 
unemployment absorber during the cyclical oscillations of labour demand. It fulfils two 
inter-connected functions: guarantees reduced salaries for people placed in short-time 
employment and allows enterprises to reduce their labour supply without paying the 
cost for the redundant workforce. This aid is normally given for a three-month period 
which can be extended to a maximum one-year period. It is used for occasional 
reductions in the aggregate demand at the end of which people are normally put back on 
full-time work.  
The necessity of having a system of aid to absorb social shocks following 
the mass layoffs entered the political agenda in 1965 when the social partners asked the 
Government to provide instruments to face the problems arising from dismissals. The 
response arrived in 1968 with law 1115, which introduced three types of aid. The first 
two, allowances for senior employees and special unemployment aids, were introduced 
for the dismissed workforce (‘structurally redundant’), while the third, the special wage 
compensation fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria - CIGS) was 
introduced for the ‘temporally redundant’ workforce. The legislation provided a 
maximum period of time for benefits provided to temporally redundant workers and 
only a limited number of extensions were accepted. 
Under the pressure of the economic crisis in the ’70s this legislative system 
changed drastically. Law 464 from 1972 removed these time limits for the extensions, 
stating that these should be requested in relation to the enterprises’ restructuration, re-
organisation and industrial reconversion. In this way the distinction between structural 
and temporal redundancies was cancelled, making the last one the object of political 
bargaining (CNEL, 2003:25). Moreover, in 1977 law 675 was passed, which extended 
the use of the special wage compensation fund to enterprises undergoing industrial 
                                                 
27
 The first law existed in 1945 (D.Lgs. 788/1945) and was revisited in 1975 (Law 164/1975). 
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crisis, transforming factually the instrument into unemployment aid. In this way the 
special wage compensation fund has become the most important unemployment aid in 
facing structural employment redundancies caused by economic crises or enterprises’ 
reorganisation and restructuration. It normally lasts 12 months in the former case and 24 
months in the latter. These periods can be extended accordingly to the age of the 
workers and to the enterprises’ geographical positions (Central-North or South). Despite 
all the restrictions imposed by the juridical norms these limits can be extended through 
ad-hoc legislation usually in cases of emergency.  
CIG and CIGS are measured in number of hours not worked and are paid by 
the National Institute for Social Assistance (INPS), none of which is paid on a universal 
base. They are provided only to long-term employees from large enterprises and 
belonging to certain sectors, mainly industrial sectors and large trading companies or 
enterprises which tender for cleaning services and catering. There is a similar aid for the 
agriculture and another one for the construction sector. The aids are asked at local level 
(Regions and Provinces) following negotiations between enterprises and trade unions. 
In the case of CIGS the enterprises have to present restructuration plans which should 
be discusses with trade unions. The people receiving these benefits remain formally 
employed by the enterprises during their entire period, and this is possible as long as the 
enterprises are not formally closed. 
During the key years of transformation of the industrial sector, this 
instrument was used to provide employees of enterprises without any chance to restart, 
with the maximum amount of benefits possible. As long as the enterprises’ plans were 
subject to many variations during their implementation, it was more advantageous for 
trade unions to ask for benefits gradually and to gain time while searching for further 
solutions, rather than anticipating unemployment. The trade unions’ strategy was to 
‘keep the enterprises hostage in order to guarantee that they would take responsibilities 
for the employment of their workforce till the last moment’ (CNEL, 2003:26). The 
mobility of the workers from employment to unemployment was not yet accepted and 
the focus was on keeping the redundant workforce on benefits as long as possible. This 
is the motivation for the core policy implemented during that period when even some 
unworkable solutions like the ‘box-enterprises’ created by GEPI were put into practice.  
Lastly, the allowance placing older workers into early retirement was 
transformed at the beginning of the ‘80s. The allowance was replaced directly by the 
pension, given in advance, with a maximum five years payment, with respect to the due 
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period. In this way, the anticipation of a pension became an explicit incentive for older 
employees to exit the labour market. After many negotiations the reform of these forms 
of aid arrived with Law 223 in 1991 which will be presented in this chapter.                     
CIGS remains the main important aid in the cases of industrial crises at this 
time. Despite much criticism of the previous system (Garofalo, 2008; Liso, 2000, 2002; 
CNEL, 2003) a proper reform of the unemployment benefits has not been carried out in 
Italy. Whenever a serious situation of mass unemployment is faced, the existing benefits 
receive dispensations which can then be passed onto employees or enterprises which 
have previously been excluded. Recently this happened in 2005 under pressure of the 
crisis which damaged the manufacturing industries in the Northern regions in particular. 
On this occasion the special wage compensation fund with special dispensation (CIGD) 
was introduced. This extended the special wage compensation fund to the small craft 
enterprises (with less than fifteen employees) and to categories of employees who were 
previously excluded. 
The overall number of hours of wage compensation funds paid in 2009 
(914,000,000 hours) and 2010 (almost 1,203,640,000 hours), was considerably higher 
than those paid during the industrial crises which took place during the ‘80s when the 
total for both CIG and CIGS did not rise above 816,500,000 hours. The data plotted in 
figure 3.12 show the predominant use of CIGS during the periods of industrial crisis 
(1981-1986, 1991-1994) and the very high increase of all three funds starting in 2008. 
 
      Fig. 3.12: Number of hours paid by typology of compensation fund  
 
Source: adapted from @-inail, CIG Focus Maggio 2011 and Osservatorio CIG   
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In certain areas the special wage compensation fund was the only aid 
received by people who were unemployed for long periods of time. It was a solution to 
tackle social tensions while allowing the restructuring of various segments of capital. It 
was also an instrument which safeguarded the unemployed from the risk of social 
exclusion. The Italian policy makers attempted to find new ways to make this dismissed 
workforce socially useful and the public sector was the first to benefit from its 
activation. During the ’90s there were certain important moments which marked the 
policy-making process, moving the state and the main labour-market actors in the 
direction of introducing a new welfare-to-work approach.   
 
3.4 Changes in the early ’90s: policy creation during a period of financial rigour 
dominated by the aim of entering the European Monetary Union  
 
3.4.1 Macroeconomic recovery towards EMU 
 
The ’90s represented a difficult decade for Italy from both economic and political points 
of views. In 1992 many problems which Italy had amassed in the past, reached a 
dramatic stage. Following the Tangentopoli
28
 scandal which started in February 1992, 
the political parties which had ruled Italy for the previous 45 years were passing 
through the last stage of a dramatic crisis which led to their dissolution in 1994. The 
main architects of the Maxi Trial against the Mafia in the mid ’80s, the judges Giovanni 
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, were both assassinated by a criminal organization in 
1992, one within a short space of time of the other
29
. 
The inflation rate reached 6.5% in 1990 and the public debt increased over a 
period of six years (from 1987 to 1992) by more than 20% of GDP. The families’ 
savings used for many years to sustain the public expenditures were diminished and 
                                                 
28
 Tangentopoli (“bribesville”) refers to the corruption system involving exponents of many political 
parties and industrial figures, which was revealed through a nationwide judicial investigation guided by 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office from Milan. It began on 17th February 1992 and concluded in 1994 when 
Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the new party Forza Italia, entered politics and won the elections. The four 
parties in government in 1992 (the Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialist Party, the Italian Liberal 
Party and the Italian Socialist Democratic Party) disappeared and this is known as the end of the First 
Italian Republic.  
29
 On 23
rd
 May 1992, Giovanni Falcone was murdered with his wife and their three bodyguards by a 
bomb placed underneath the motorway at Capaci, on the route from Palermo airport to the city. On 19
th
 
July the Mafia shot Paolo Borsellino and the five agents in his escort in Palermo. 
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when the domestic savings began to become scarce, financial resources were required 
by foreign creditors which led to an increase in foreign debt. 
Under strong speculative pressure, the European exchange market spiralled 
out of control and the Italian lira had to abandon the European Monetary System on 18
th
 
September 1992. The country was very close to a financial crisis but was avoided, 
thanks to the Italian central bank’s use of its resources and instruments (Rossi, 2008). In 
such a difficult economic scene, the worst problem remaining was the huge public debt 
accumulated over the previous two decades, which was increasing more rapidly than the 
domestic wealth. The ratio between public debt and GDP increased from almost 100% 
at the end of 1991, to 108 % one year later, to 119% two years later and to more than 
125% at the end of 1994.  The payments for interests accounted for 12% of GDP in 
1993. The notion of having spent the future generations’ income had gradually started 
to find place in the public opinion alongside the feeling that the time for paying the debt 
had already arrived (Rossi, 2008). 
On 7
th
 of February 1992 the Treaty for the European Union was signed at 
Maastricht, meaning that Italy had a very serious commitment to achieve the economic 
parameters required by the European regulations
30
. Most of the efforts made during the 
‘90s towards bringing equilibrium into the main macroeconomic variables were 
significantly influenced by the need to recover the situation created by previous policies 
(Rossi, 2008: 106). 
The European economic convergence was a difficult process for Italy. The 
drastic reduction in the inflation rate and the deficit’s downturn became the most 
important goals in this process. The macroeconomic policies implemented by 1997 
aimed at decreasing the inflation rate through rigorous control of the incomes’ 
dynamics; and secondly, at bringing about the privatisation of the economic public 
sectors and raising revenue by cashing in on public assets; thirdly, provoking a drastic 
downturn in the deficit in the presence of a stable national currency. 
                                                 
30
 The parameters, written in the Treaty and the integrated protocols, were applicable to all European 
countries interested in adopting the euro on 1
st
 of January 1999. The euro-zone member states were asked 
to ensure their long-term stability of public finances and to prevent excessive debit from occurring. The 
following five criteria are part of the convergence goal and their observance is mandatory for admission 
into the EMU (European Monetary Union): 1) ratio between deficit and GDP less than 3%; 2) ratio 
between public debt and GDP less than 60% and if more should decrease quickly and reach 60%; 3) the 
medium gross rate for prices increase must not exceed by more than 1.5% the average of the lowest three 
rates in Europe; 4) the average rate of interest for long-term governments securities must not exceed more 
than 2% the average of the lowest three rates in Europe; 5) the national currency rate exchange must 
respect the normal limits of fluctuation agreed by the European Monetary System at  least two years 
before the joining. 
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 As a result of the continued collaboration between the government and its 
social partners, important steps were taken in reducing inflation. From 1992 the practice 
of closing mutual-agreements supported by the collaborative participation
31
 of trade 
unions and entrepreneurs’ associations was widely used during the policy-making 
process. In a first stage (1991-1993) the drastic reduction of the inflation rate by 
controlling the salary growth was seen as a main concern. In a second stage (1994-
1996) great effort was put into reforming large parts of the labour market regulations. 
On the whole, the laws passed before 1998 were aimed at restructuring the instruments 
that were used to deal with industrial crisis in the previous two decades and to promote 
labour market flexibility through new forms of contracts. Additionally, these laws 
wanted to deregulate careers guidance and vocational training by transferring the state 
authority to regions and local bodies, and to abandon the public monopoly on the 
employment services by encouraging private players to enter the market. Many actions 
towards the privatisation of the public sectors began in 1992. Privatisation involved 
state-owned holdings, entire economic sectors - such as food and the steel industries - as 
well as banking and public utilities services. It brought many financial resources to the 
state funds but there is still doubt regarding its impact on the overall economy in terms 
of both growth and improvement of the economic competition (Boeri et al, 2005; 
Martellini, 2007; Rossi, 2008). The privatisation of the Italian public assets was 
remarkable and exceeded those of the Thatcher and Reagan Governments. It brought 
150 billion Euros to the State at the prices calculated in 2005, representing 10.5% of the 
GDP that year (Rossi, 2008:84).   
The monetary policy was managed successfully and the inflation rate 
decreased to 2% by the end of the decade. The exchange rate was stabilized and the 
Italian lira returned to the European Monetary System in November 1996. The financial 
policy first saw positive results in 1995 when primary surplus was equal to 4.4% of 
GDP and the ratio between public debt and GDP was allowed to fall by less than 1%. 
                                                 
31
 This practice is called concertazione (“harmonization”) and can be defined as a collaborative form of 
participation. The social partners are large organisations (trade unions and entrepreneurs’ organizations) 
which represent widespread economic and social interests. They take part in the decision making process 
by means of agreements with the Government, setting up reciprocal obligations and exchanging 
concessions. During the ’90s this practice was institutionalized. The ‘Protocol surrounding the Incomes’ 
Policy’ (1992), the ‘Agreement between Government and Trade Unions’ (1994), the ‘Agreement of 23 rd 
July 1993’, the ‘Deal for Employment’ (1996) and the ‘Social Deal for Development and Employment’ 
(1998) are the most important agreements carried out to this purpose. This form of collaborative 
participation was abandoned in 2001 when the method was considered inefficient. The ‘White Paper of 
Labour Market in Italy’ claimed the autonomy of the executive in terms of policy-making. The role of the 
social partners was limited to that of being participants in the social dialogue.   
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This trend was maintained over the following years. The interest payments were halved 
in only three years, from 12% GDP in 1993 to 5% in 1996.  The financial resources 
used for this came from a rise in taxation, the reduction of the primary state’s expenses 
and lump-sum taxes collected before1998. 
 
3.4.2 The first labour market reform: a revision of the social shock absorbers 
 
Unemployment reached a remarkable figure in the early ’90s. The crises began in the 
last quarter of 1992, leading to the loss of 750,000 jobs,  representing more than twice 
those lost after the oil shock on 1973 (CNEL, 2002:159). A large number of people 
receiving wage compensation funds were out of work but still linked formally to their 
enterprises. After a long period of negotiations, a reform was passed in 1991, a year of 
significant economic difficulties. Law 231/91 provided for new benefits for industrial 
restructuring and transformed some of the previous ones. The main change introduced 
by this law was a net distinction between temporal and structural redundancies. The 
special wage compensation fund remained the main instrument used in the first case, 
while in the latter ‘mobility aid’32 was used only for the dismissed workforce. The use 
of early retirement was not abandoned totally but it was linked to part-time work
33
 for 
people receiving special wage compensation funds. This instrument was used very 
seldom, but opened the way to extensive use of early retirements in the case of 
workforce redundancies. The reform introduced by law 231/91 had important 
repercussions on the unemployment phenomenon as a whole: 
 
Until then the special wage compensation fund had been used as an unemployment aid. It 
was used for temporary crises but, when the crisis became structural, this instrument started 
to be used improperly; essentially it became an instrument to integrate the employees’ 
wages. Some people have been receiving these aids for fifteen-year periods in Italy. 
Although the legislation established a maximum period for receiving benefits, they were 
extended several times because the aids were given to a large number of people; there were 
entire ‘basins’ of unemployed relying on special wage compensation funds.  
In 1992, following the reform, these people were registered as unemployed. Just a few 
months after law 231 was passed, the number of unemployed claiming mobility aids 
increased exponentially; 70-80,000 people were registered as receiving these aids at a 
certain time. These people had been out of the labour market for many years. Most of them 
                                                 
32
CIGS is equal to 80% of the total income due for the working hours not delivered. Mobility aid is equal 
to CIGS for the first 12 months and after is 80% of CIGS for the further periods. It cannot exceed 
maximum limits imposed on the monthly payments. 
33
 The redundant employees who have already received the special wage integration funds for a certain 
period of time and had reached the requirements described in the previous note were entitle to receive 
their pensions in advance if they agreed to transform their full-time jobs into part-time ones. In this case, 
the pensions would cover that part of the salaries lost due to the transformation of their work contracts.    
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had a poor education and had never been involved in any training program so it was not at 
all easy to re-train them for taking new jobs (interview with C.P., UIL, Executive in charge 
for active labour policies before 2000). 
 
The total expenditure for the unemployment shock absorbers reached its 
maximum level in 1994 (table 3.1). 
The expenditure for special wage compensation funds fell steadily from 
1996 until 1999 and, from 1994 it became smaller than the expenditure for mobility 
aids. The early retirements were used intensively to deal with structural redundancies 
since the early ’90s. Their share of the overall expenditure turned out to be smaller than 
that allocated to the mobility aids only after 1996 (figure 3.13).  
 
Fig. 3.13: Percentage of total expenditures allocated to different typologies of 
unemployment  
Source: adapted from ‘Rapporto CNEL’, October 2003; table 5, p.138 
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Table 3.1: Payments by typology of unemployment aids (Italian lira, billions) 
Unemployment 
shock absorbers  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Normal wage compensation 
funds (CIGO) 
677  1,558  1,905  2,596  1,749  1,155  1,098  958  903  936  752  887  1,146  
Normal wage compensation 
funds for agriculture 
(CIGOA) 
21  28  23  31  27  17  16  17  13  15  17  12  12  
Special wage compensation 
funds  (CIGS) 
1,793  2,024  2,451  2,601  2,542  1,750  1,276  1,135  889  678  912  905  1,110  
Mobility aids  
  219  933  2,272  3,472  2,734  2,761  2,614  2,228  2,313  2,407  2,448  2,542  
Unemployment aids  
4,790  4,891  5,401  6,611  7,331  6,619  7,719  7,630  8,210  8,000  7,621  8,285  8,702  
Other aids for unemployed  
activation: 
          261  826  1,102  1,664  1,686  1,243  630  451  
1) socially useful jobs  
          261  826  1,102  1,263  1,435  550  2  5  
2) publicly useful jobs  
                33  107  139  21  11  
3) socially useful  activities  
                    476  522  350  
4) schemes for professional 
insertion 
                  61  78  85  85  
5) grants for work 
activation  
                368  83        
Early retirements  
3,248  3,931  4,839  4,011  3,280  3,440  3,798  3,158  2,444  1,855  1,900  1,808  1,886  
Total 
10,529  12,651  15,552  18,122  18,401  15,976  17,494  16,614  16,351  15,483  14,852  14,975  15,849  
Source: Rapporto CNEL, October 2003; table 5, pag. 138 
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The other aids introduced in 1995 saw a sharp increase until 1999. These 
aids were allocated for the unemployed activation and mainly financed the socially 
useful jobs programs. In many cases, these programs engaged people who were no 
longer eligible for other forms of unemployment aids. The first of these programs began 
in 1995 in response to protests from a large number of benefit claimants. Since their 
start-up, it was clear that the programs did not have any of the characteristics of the 
‘work first model […] based of a series of active measures, such as assisted job-search, 
mandatory workfare programmes, short-term work preparation and the threat of benefit 
withdrawal, which are designed to propel welfare recipients into the labour market as 
rapidly as possible’ (Peck and Theodore, 2000b:120). On the contrary, they were 
implemented as ‘old style’ Keynesian policy measures, where the state and its local 
bodies functioned as key actors in the creation of labour demand. The participation in 
the delivery of  public services was received positively by the unemployed as they saw 
this not only as way of maintaining their income, but above all, as an opportunity to re-
enter the labour market. 
 
3.4.3 Involvement of the social partners in the policy-making: the first four social 
pacts 
 
Thus far, it has been shown that since the early ’90s the Italian governments became 
aware of the fact that the rational use of public resources has become crucial. The 
political agenda has been significantly influenced by its commitments in joining the 
EMU. Any political choice was bound by the Maastricht parameters, and the 
convergence goals influenced the way in which many domestic policies were 
formulated.  
Starting from the five stages of the policy cycle model proposed by Howlett 
and Ramesh (1995), differentiated by their relationship to applied problem-solving, the 
policy-making process carried out during the whole decade in Italy was characterised by 
the active participation of the social partners to both the agenda setting and policy 
formulation. Despite the instability of the political coalitions and the fact that seven 
different governments ruled the country during that time, five important social pacts 
were concluded between 1992 and 1998. Four of them are briefly analysed below in 
respect to the evolution of the policy-making process. As the last social pact belongs to 
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a different stage of this process, beginning in 1997 and ending in 2000, it is analysed in 
the next chapter.  
As recent research acknowledges, the social pacts in Italy were signed over 
a period characterized by poor economic conditions, weak governments and strong 
unions (Regini and Colombo, 2011:142). The authors show that the pacts of 1992 and 
1993 were stronger because of the urgent need to respond to the economic problems and 
they also seemed to achieve a substantial reduction in industrial conflict, and better 
coordination between the objectives and the outcomes of the industrial relations 
policies. However the positive effect was not long-lasting and ‘the lessening of the 
‘problem load’ proved to be only temporary’ (ibid., 140). 
The agreements are complex documents touching on many policy areas and 
macro-economic goals. In this chapter only a brief list of the macro-economic goals are 
presented, highlighting the overriding policy areas, as well as the strategies used to 
reduce unemployment and to improve employment. With regard to improving 
employment in particular, the focus will be on the activities of social/ public interests 
and the creation of the policy. 
 
Box 3.1: Protocol of incomes’ policy, inflation and labour cost, 31st July 1992 
Government: In power from 28 June 1992 to 28 April 1993 
 
Prime Minister: Giuliano Amato (coalition: the Christian Democrats, the Italian 
Socialist Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party and the 
Italian Liberal Party) 
 
Main goals: To arrest inflation, bringing it to 2% by the end of 1994; to have 
a stable exchange rate; to reduce the public deficit. 
 
Main means:    By the ending of the automatic increase of salaries in relation to 
the rate of inflation; the dynamics of the labour cost and incomes 
are linked to the increase of the programmed rate of inflation. 
 
Policy areas: Prices and tariffs; taxes and social contributions; employment 
and labour market.   
 
Strategies 
 to contrast 
unemployment 
and to improve 
employment: 
a) to promote new employment through flexible contracts; 
b) to optimise the use of the unemployment aids for the  
reorganisation of  enterprises or crisis management and to 
encourage use of flexible contracts to  reduce redundancies; 
c) to adopt specific laws to provide incentives to the regions 
towards promoting vocational training schemes for unemployed 
receiving mobility aids;  
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d) to create a task-force dealing with policies for employment 
growth and defence of professional skills in areas at high risk of 
unemployment. 
 
Box 3.2: Agreement of 23
rd
 July 1993 
Government:  In power from 28 April 1993 to 10 May 1994 
 
Prime Minister: Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (coalition: the Christian Democrats, the 
Italian Socialist Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party and 
the Italian Liberal Party) 
 
Main goals: To have an inflation rate close to that of other EU countries; to 
reduce both public deficit and debt; to have a stable exchange 
rate; to increase GDP and employment, particularly in crisis 
areas and female employment. 
 
Main means:    The increase of salaries in relation to the programmed rate of 
inflation; the enlargement of the employment opportunities 
through the enforcement of efficiency of enterprises, especially 
in the economic sectors unaffected by international competition 
and in the public administration sector; the Government and the 
social partners have two annual meeting sessions to discuss the 
main goals of macro-economic and budgetary policies. 
 
 
Policy areas: Incomes and employment; work arrangements, labour and 
sustainability of the productive system. 
 
Strategies 
 to contrast 
unemployment 
and to improve 
employment: 
Employment management in areas affected by industrial crises 
through: 
a) revision of the legislation concerning the use of special wage 
compensation funds; 
b) support of the regions and local bodies for the promotion of 
vocational training programs; 
c) promotion of specific incentives suitable for the services 
sector. 
Employment promotion and more training for young people 
through: 
a) use of apprenticeship contracts;  
b) revision of the legislation concerning the training-on-the-job 
contracts with the purpose of having more flexible training 
periods. 
Reactivation of the labour market through promotion of: 
a) programmes of public interest, in conjunction with the 
regions, aimed at the activation of long-term young unemployed 
and recipients of special wage compensation funds; 
b) special measures to provide incentive for equal opportunities 
between genders within the labour market, focusing primarily on 
increasing female employment; 
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c) specific legislation aimed at regulating temporary work 
agencies; 
d) short –term employment aimed at improving the skills and the 
work- placement opportunities of unemployed receiving benefits 
(mobility aids or special aids for unemployment). 
 
Box 3.3: Agreement between Government and Trade Unions, 2
nd
 December 
1994 
Government:  In power from 10 May 1994 to 17 January 1995 
 
Prime Minister: Silvio Berlusconi (coalition: Forza Italia, the National Alliance, 
the Northern League, the Centre Democratic Union and the 
Christian Democrats Coalition)   
 
Main goals: To achieve structural adjustments of the public balance for 1995 
aiming to reduce the interest rate; to reach an agreement with 
trade unions with regard to reform of the social security system. 
 
Main means:    The government’s fiscal policies. 
 
The Government’s attempt to make radical changes to seniority pensions faced strong 
opposition from the trade unions and, as a result, failed. In January 1995, it was 
replaced by a technical Government led by Lamberto Dini (in power form 17 January 
1995 to 17 May 1996), which managed to find an accord with the social partners and 
to bring about the pension reform. 
Policy areas: Employment, labour and Mezzogiorno’s development; family 
and social solidarity; aids for flooded areas; health system; 
education and vocational training; research; social security 
system; fiscal drag.  
 
Strategies 
 to contrast 
unemployment 
and to improve 
employment: 
The structural adjustment of the mobility regime was considered 
essential by this Government. The goals were that of interrupting 
the continued extensions of the periods for claiming 
unemployment aids and moving to a ‘more active’ approach (the 
previous agreement was signed on 18
th
 November 1994). At that 
point it was seen as mandatory to: 
a) introduce new regulations for urgent activation of socially 
useful jobs; 
b) help the central state’s administrations to make a decision on 
which projects could start in 1995;  
c) motivate the local public bodies for services of public utility 
delivery through the creation of joint companies with private 
partnerships. 
 
Box 3.4: Deal for Employment, 24
th
 September 1996 
Government:  In power from 17 May 1996 to 21 October 1998 
 
Prime Minister: Romano Prodi (coalition: the left-wing coalition Ulivo and the 
independents) 
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Main goals: To urgently activate a special plan for employment, aimed above 
all at increasing the employment rate, especially in Mezzogiorno. 
   
The agreement relies on the statements of the Delors White Paper on Growth, 
Competition and Employment. The focus is on the increase of investments in 
infrastructures, training and research, services for local systems of small-medium 
enterprises as well as the development of job opportunities in some ‘new employment 
areas’ such as environmental and territory’s maintenance, the upgrading of urban 
spaces, personal care and social services. 
 
Main means:    The Government took responsibility for presenting a project aimed 
at reorganising the agencies for employment services, jobs and 
enterprises creation and at giving more strength to the policies for 
reindustrialisation and development by the end of 1996.   
 
Policy areas: Education and training; scientific research and innovation, 
promotion of employment and improvements in public 
infrastructures and services. 
 
Strategies 
 to contrast 
unemployment 
and to improve 
employment: 
An array of instruments for labour market regulation was 
considered fundamental to increasing employment. They are listed 
as follows: 
 a) apprenticeship contracts; b) work-experience periods;  
c) permanent training; d) on-going training; e) part-time jobs;      
f) temporary contracts; g) socially useful jobs; h) new 
employment services; i) tax reliefs; j) specific instruments to 
promote emersion of informal labour.  
 
As regards the socially useful jobs, the policy focused 
predominantly on two objectives. Firstly to provide incentives to 
transform these into self-sustainable jobs, particularly in the 
new employment areas listed in the above goals. Secondly to 
improve the quality of the projects through the promotion of 
SUJs in new activities such as: transformation of former industrial 
areas, hydro-geological risk prevention, environmental 
reclamation including areas contaminated by asbestos, 
maintenance of protected areas and natural parks, and 
management of cultural goods.  
 
From the documents presented so far it can be observed that the socially 
useful jobs became a clear policy statement in 1994. Their legitimation is strongly 
connected to a broader plan of economic development within the Mezzogiorno. Many 
social actions were organised by the unemployed in that period, principally in areas 
characterised by high unemployment rates where the unemployment aids were a secure 
source of income for many families. 
 
90 
 
A new wave of unemployment arrived at the beginning of the ’90s. The difficulty of 
providing for further unemployment aids was increasing and the long-term unemployed 
became a very urgent social problem. Households were by that time certain to have an 
income thanks to such unemployment aids [special wage compensation funds and mobility 
aids]. They became very worried when they understood that the aids would be stopped 
because of the restrictive budgetary policies. So the unemployed started to organise 
themselves asking more decisively to have their aids made secure.  
They were still in contact with us because, as former employees receiving special wage 
compensation funds, they were still registered as members of trade unions. Therefore in 
1994 we were “forced” to a certain extent to represent, for the first time in the trade union’s 
history, the unemployed (interview with C.P., UIL, Executive in charge for active labour 
policies before 2000). 
 
The agreement signed at the end of 1994 pulled strings for the new policy 
but it also confirmed that the unemployment aids would be available for another one-
year period. In January 1995 a new political coalition came into power and the 
Government, led by Lamberto Dini, had to face the trade unions once again.  
  
At that time, I found myself in a position with the trade unions of negotiating another 
extension of the special wage compensation funds. The story was always the same: the 
receivers were still unemployed and in need, without other source of income. I remember 
that we had lived for two years with these continued extensions carried out by means of 
specific decrees and without passing any law
34
. I may be wrong, but I believe there were 
thirteen extensions in little more than two years. At that point, we decided not to allow 
further extensions. Many of my colleagues were sceptical because everybody was 
convinced that it would be impossible to interrupt the distribution of special wage 
compensation funds, especially in areas with high unemployment. I told them ‘we can do 
this if we offer something else in exchange, another form of allowance, but we will ask the 
unemployed to work for their benefits’. So we decided that the last extension would be that 
one (interview with M.G., Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security from 7 March 1995 to 17 May 1996).  
 
That was not the last extension but this state of affairs was brought to an 
end. The last decree which covered urgent measures surrounding socially useful jobs, 
wage compensations and the social security sector was passed on 1
st
 October 1996 and 
became law on 28
th
 November 1996. Large parts of this law were still concerned with 
the unemployment aids and wage compensation funds but much space was dedicated to 
the regulation of socially useful jobs. At that point in time a wide range of juridical 
instruments were provided by the state with the purpose of promoting social activities 
through unemployed activation. The restructuring of the entire legislation concerning 
the active labour policies was becoming necessary.  
                                                 
34
 The Italian legislation makes distinctions between the two norms. The ‘Decree with the force of Law’ 
(Decreto Legge) is a norm realized directly by the Executive in emergency cases. It lasts for only 60 days 
and after that is has to be transformed in Law by the Parliament through the normal legislative procedure. 
Otherwise it ceases to be valid. Turning to the example given here, every time a decree for the extension 
of the benefits’ length had lapsed, a new one replaced it. For more than a two-year period, this procedure 
was repeated every 60 days. 
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This occurred in 1997 when the policy makers had to face a twofold 
difficulty. The first was ensuring continuity of the wage benefits given to the long-term 
unemployed while finding new ways to keep them active and professionally upgraded. 
The second was activating young unemployed living in Mezzogiorno by helping them 
gain access to the labour market for the first time. For both targets, activating of the 
demand for public services was seen as a good solution.  
 
The extensive use of the socially useful work started around 1994 when about 50-60,000 
people receiving special wage compensation funds and mobility aids arrived at the end of 
the periods of receiving these benefits without having found jobs. For this reason we signed 
an agreement with the Government [led by] Berlusconi in order to use this workforce in 
some way. We thought that it would be better to have such an instrument allowing them to 
work for public administrations while continuing to receive work allowances. This would 
be called workfare today but at the time our aim was to help people whose unemployment 
benefits were coming to an end, in order for them to have a further income. The socially 
useful jobs have arisen as a result of this situation, from a lack of labour demand for this 
redundant workforce. 
As employment was not increasing during those years, we imagined using this policy 
instrument for young unemployed as well. In 1996 the social partners signed an agreement 
with the Government [led by] Prodi asking for the enlargement of the socially useful jobs to 
this new target. We were thinking that it could be a way to help young unemployed to begin 
working, to help them gain their first work experience because many enterprises were 
asking for this before taking on new employees. Young people usually encounter 
difficulties in getting their first work experience after they finish their compulsory 
education (interview with L.R. CISL, Executive in charge for active labour policies). 
 
The reform introduced by law 196 in 1997 intended to address both these 
problems. The law was completed with two specific decrees which reviewed the whole 
legislation regarding the activation of socially and publicly useful activities, as well as 
the main rules for job-creation schemes. They are analysed in the following chapter. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered an evaluation of the policy-making during its first stage, from 
the early ’80s to mid ’90s. During this stage, structural unemployment was identified as 
the core policy problem, and the first set of solutions was created to reform the social 
shock absorbers and to form specific enterprises capable of providing the unemployed 
with further benefits and training. 
The main structural disparities of the Italian labour markets were presented 
briefly in the first part. The data show noticeable disparities between the Northern and 
the Southern regions which, with the exception of rare moments of convergence, have 
tended to widen. The striking rise of unemployment in Mezzogiorno after 1987 and 
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during the early ’90s placed more pressure on the policy makers to find new solutions to 
activate the labour demand and create occupational opportunities for a large number of 
unemployed people.  
The second part presented a detailed overview of the principal social shock 
absorbers that have been used since the ’70s to combat industrial crisis and aid 
restructuring. Their inadequacy in responding to structural crisis and long-term 
unemployment became evident in the late ’80s which led to major labour market reform 
in 1991. This reform brought about the transformation of the wage compensation funds 
which had been used inappropriately to tackle long-term unemployment, yet they were 
an important instrument in insuring a basic income. The sharp increase in 
unemployment in the ’90s called for urgent action, with almost 60,000 jobless at risk of 
losing their benefits, and their needs becoming more pressing. All this happened within 
a complex macroeconomic context, and after the collapse of the first Italian Republic, 
but despite the succession of various political coalitions over a short period of time, the 
policy problem was never dismissed.   
The third part of the chapter has assessed the complex state of affairs which 
played an important role in the policy formation with Italy’s entrance into the European 
Monetary Union. It has been shown that the socially useful jobs came into the policy 
arena offering an urgent solution to the long term-unemployed who were at risk of 
losing their benefits, yet had to comply with the budgetary restriction imposed by the 
macroeconomic policies aimed at decreasing inflation and reducing the public deficit. 
Due to the budgetary constraints and because the policy beneficiaries were receiving 
welfare benefits, this first stage of the policy was legitimated as a welfare-to-work 
approach. The policy was instead demand-oriented, as a large range of institutions 
promoted a plethora of public services, making it possible for a large number of 
unemployed to be involved. The approach towards unemployment was very different 
form workfare in this case: instead of compelling the unemployed to work for their 
benefits in marginal sectors, there was a large mobilization of local and national 
institutions creating new activities that the SUWs could be involved with.  The socially 
useful jobs were therefore considered part of a wider group of policy instruments for 
labour market regulation, aimed at creating employment, especially in the new 
employment areas. From an early stage, the values underpinning the policy-making 
attached an equal importance to the income provision as to the social reproduction of 
labour. 
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The important role played by the social partners in shaping the policy goals 
and building the policy solutions was analysed through the four agreements signed 
between 1992 and 1996. Given the difficult macro-economic scenario of that period, 
and the instability of the political coalitions, it is somewhat surprising to see a strong 
link between the political agendas of different governments with the shared goal of 
SUJs promotion, which became apparent in 1994.   
The final part of this chapter has examined the reason why a policy created 
to tackle long-term unemployment was also extended to youth lack of employment, in 
this way becoming a large scale national policy. The next chapter will examine the 
policy choice which culminated in the creation of a complex infrastructure of laws and 
actors involved in the promotion of different types of socially/publicly useful jobs and, 
most importantly, provided for several job-creation schemes that would facilitate the re-
insertion of the unemployed into the labour market.   
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Chapter 4 
Policy choice: active labour policies and job-creation schemes 
 
I would like to know what the Danish 
Government would have done if they had had to 
face the problems of Naples. Not even they would 
have succeeded! We did all that was necessary.  
(Italian Minister of Labour interviewed in 2009)   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The policy choice represents the core of the policy-making process which began after 
Italy joined the EMU. In this new context, the challenges of implementing domestic 
policies, targeting long-term unemployment and industrial development, had to match 
the country’s commitments to fiscal austerity, flexible labour and low inflation. 
Moreover, in certain geographical areas unemployment had reached a worrying level, 
Naples and Campania being the worst affected. Therefore, under these circumstances it 
was even more difficult for the policy to be framed. 
The Italian state was called to perform in a new international neoliberal 
environment which limited its range of options in public policy. In fact, the shift from 
Keynesianism to monetarism become clear after 1997 when the state began to reduce its 
role, following administrative devolution. This did not mean the role of the state was 
necessarily diminished, but the functions of the state institutions have been entirely 
restructured. Peck (2001b:447) acutely observes that ‘what is ‘hollowed out’ is not the 
state per se but a historically and geographically specific institutionalization of the state, 
which in turn is being replaced, not by fresh air and free markets, but by a reorganized 
state apparatus’.  
The political choices surrounding the policy analysed in this thesis 
foreshadow an attempt to synthesise the challenges placed in both domestic and 
international arenas. The transformation of welfare aids in active labour policies came 
hand in hand with the liberalization of the job market for those entering it for the first 
time. Socially and publicly useful workers therefore gained legitimation as a hard-to-
place group and this would protect them from radical restructuring of the welfare state 
at the end of the decade. The neoliberal adjustment, begun in 1997, would increase 
labour market segmentation and be most detrimental to the young people, women and 
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immigrants out of the labour force or already employed in the irregular economy 
(Ichino et al, 2005). These groups would mostly have the choice of temporary and 
short-term jobs and, after the reform that further deregulated the labour market in 2003, 
they would face increasing job instability. The limited social rights associated with 
these contracts have also raised concern that entire generations would face destitution at 
the age of retirement if they were employed exclusively under temporary contracts 
(Ichino, 2006). The publicly useful jobs addressing long-term youth unemployed were 
an exception from this general trend; it was in fact criticised even by its promoters and 
the reasons behind the formulation of this policy, are analysed in this chapter.   
The chapter is divided into two sections, each formed of three subsections. 
This division corresponds to the paradigm shift occurring in 1997, when the ‘third way’ 
rhetoric entered the political debate in Italy. The idea that the goal of the Social 
Democrats should be to combine social democracy with dynamic economy started to 
take hold in the new politics of many European countries (Giddens, 2001). 
The first section of the chapter presents the choices that formed the core of 
the policy-making, culminating in the legislation passed in 1997. The first subsection 
presents the premises of this process, summarized in the report prepared by the Onofri 
Commission which drafted the plan of an organic reform of the welfare state. Although 
the reform was not implemented in the way it was proposed, and the system of social 
shock absorbers was not revised, some important changes took place within Treu 
Reform. The second subsection analyses this reform, focusing particularly on those parts 
dealing with the revision of SUJs legislation and the new instruments created to combat 
youth unemployment in Mezzogiorno. 
The third subsection is dedicated to the main two laws which set the SUJs 
and PUJs as active labour policies. Many articles of the legislation are analysed here 
paying attention to the policy goals, the participation and activation terms, the 
incentives and penalties regimes and the tools provided for various job-creation 
schemes. The data relating to the number of people activated and the number of new 
projects, gives an overall view of the success of the policy with the local 
administrations. Despite the imposed time limits of the projects, they have remained in 
place for many years because of repeated extensions. This led to a gradual 
internalization of this work force whose tasks closely resembled those of the civil 
servants already employed by the public bodies. Aspects concerning the legitimation of 
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SUWs and PUWs as internal rather than external staff to the administration have been 
questioned by many Italian jurists.     
The second part of the chapter analyses the policy shift which began in 2000 
when the policy changed radically, the goal being the closure of all projects. The fifth 
social pact, analysed in the first subsection, anticipated the restructuring of the central 
state as a result of the administrative devolution. The discourse of the Italian third way 
introduced by Prime Minister D’Alema shows an attempt at reconciling the increasing 
opposite interests of labour and capital. The policy changes anticipated in this 
agreement are examined in the second subsection which deals with the last legislation of 
SUJs, passed in 2000. 
The policy’s aims shifted in the direction of the local administrations which 
were prohibited from starting new projects but were encouraged to concentrate their 
efforts on completing the existing ones. This process was influenced by the 
administrative devolution of the state authority to the local bodies which gave resources, 
autonomy and responsibilities for the implementation of labour market policies. The 
Regions became more involved and the new policy instruments were prepared in 
readiness to respond to the local labour markets’ needs. Most of the norms passed after 
2000 focused on providing various incentives for local bodies to complete the projects. 
After 2003, there was a drastic reduction in the number of jobs created in the private 
sector. Since 2004, the policy structure has not changed, but various incentives given to 
the local administration for speeding up the closure of the projects and, frequently, to 
create new public jobs for the unemployed. This argument is explored in the final 
subsection underlining the role that the central state has continued to play in the new 
scenario. Some unpublished data surrounding the various special norms and related 
funds given to the local administration in order to continue the projects and promote 
‘employment stabilization’ are presented at this point. This chapter closes by analysing 
the resilience of the Italian welfare state, despite the pressures from the neoliberal 
retrenchment. 
Finally, drawn from the data analysed in this chapter, the four structures 
characterising the policy choice emerge in the conclusion: the value structure, the 
associative structure, the market regime and the legal structure.  
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4.2 The policy choice: development of active labour policies for long-term 
unemployed 
 
4.2.1 Proposals for welfare state reform after Italy’s adhesion to EMU: the Onofri 
Report 
 
Fulfilling all the criteria apart from its public debt, Italy jointed the European Monetary 
Union in May 1998. The entrance with the first group of EMU members cost the 
country dearly spanning a six-year period of financial adjustments. Considering the fact 
that by mid-1996 the likelihood of Italy being admitted to the EMU was slim, the efforts 
made during the final eighteen months before its entrance seems now to be even more 
impressive. The fiscal adjustment had already been made in the early ’90s but joining 
the EMU later than the other countries from the first group ‘accelerated the convergence 
of the interest rate and provided a sizeable bonus of interest expenditure [...] The Italian 
government understood this and behaved accordingly. It was in a way a confidence 
trick, but one that could succeed because of earlier adjustments’ (Chiorazzo and 
Spaventa, 1999:130). 
The process of adjustments had costs in terms of employment and growth. 
Some macroeconomic indicators show the difficult conditions of the Italian economy in 
1996: the lowest GDP’s growth rate in the European Union (equal at 0.7%); its 
unemployment rate of 12.1%, above the European average of 10.9%; fiscal and social 
pressure on the ‘standard’ worker of 40%, noticeably higher than the European average 
of 30% (Rossi, 2008:103).  
Unemployment was not at all a homogeneous phenomenon. The 
deindustrialization process promoted in the ’80s and the end of the state subsidies as a 
consequence of the legislation promoted in the ’90s, led to a major collapse in 
employment in the South. Between 1991 and 1996 approximately 600,000 jobs were 
lost and in 1996 less than 38% of the population of working age in this area were 
employed (Bodo and Viesti, 1997). Moreover, in the mid ’90s Italy held an unhappy 
record with youth unemployment which exceeded the alarming level of 60% in 
Calabria, Campania and Sicily. 
The worrying situation of the Italian labour market called for profound 
transformations. The reform of the welfare state was anticipated by the Deal for 
Employment in September 1996. At the beginning of 1997 the Government led by 
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Romano Prodi appointed a commission of experts, chaired by the economist Paolo 
Onofri, to draft the plan for reform. By the end of February 1997 the Onofri 
Commission submitted a report which focused on re-balancing the social expenditure 
with reference to its major components: labour policies, social assistance, housing 
policy, health assistance and pensions (Onofri Commission, 1997:13-25). Specific 
recommendations for every policy sector were made in the document. 
As regards the labour policies, the overall aim of the reform recommended 
in the paper was to ‘give a central place to the active labour policies as main component 
of the welfare state. This implies the transformation of the “passive social expenditure” 
which was simply offering compensations into an “active social expenditure” aiming at 
increasing opportunities and promoting change’ (Onofri Commission, 1997:17).  
A radical transformation of the social shock absorbers was projected, aimed 
at the creation of a new system of universal aids based on citizenship rights and a link to 
real needs; yet the report was not welcomed by the social partners and a number of 
political parties. Some of the policy changes proposed in the document were never 
carried out, while others were partially implemented (for an extensive analysis of the 
welfare reform ten years after the Onofri Commission, see Guerzoni, 2008). The reform 
of the senior pensions which led to the failure of the Government led by Berlusconi at 
the end of 1994 was one of the most debated arguments.  
 
The Onofri report was the subject of a rather heated debate in the summer and autumn of 
1997. In the budget law for 1997, the Prodi government tried to adopt many of the 
Commission’s recommendations, but the fierce opposition of the Rifondazione Comunista 
(Communist Reconstruction Party) – whose votes were crucial for reaching a majority in 
parliament – and the difficult negotiations with the social partners, forced the government 
substantially to scale down its ambitions [...] The most important recommendation of the 
Onofri plan – a much faster phasing in of the new pension formula introduced in 1995 – 
could not be adopted and, by creating a government crisis, Rifondazione Comunista was 
able to obtain the exemption of blue-collar workers from the cuts in senior pensions 
(Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000:192-193). 
 
 
4.2.2 The second labour market reform: the law 196/1997 known as the Treu Reform 
 
Many of the recommendations concerning the labour market activation made by the 
Onofri Commission became new policy instruments as a result of law 196, passed in 
June 1997. It is known as the Treu Reform after the name of the Labour Minister, 
Tiziano Treu. Some important innovations were introduced by this law, considered to 
be the hallmark of the labour market reform in Italy. First and foremost was the 
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annulment of public monopoly on the system regulating labour supply and demand. At 
the end of the ’70s a previous reform had already attempted to liberalise the public job 
placement, doing away with the anonymous hiring system
35
. The Treu Reform opened 
the activities regarding job placement and intermediation, introducing temporary agency 
work contracts
36
 in the private sector. The law contains many regulations concerning 
this atypical
37
 contractual form that is a fixed-term contract characterised by limited 
barriers for accessing new jobs, alongside low costs for dismissals. The law also 
reviewed the apprenticeships and the work-training contracts aimed at facilitating the 
first entrance of the youth into the labour market. 
Many studies have investigated the effects of the Treu Reform and ‘it is 
widely recognised that the promotion of atypical contracts contributed to the 
employment growth of the second half of the 1900s (especially in the period from 1995 
to the spring 2001) when 1,500,000 new jobs were created’ (Ferrera and Gualmini, 
2004:104). The evaluations of the flows from atypical contracts to a new condition 
(non-working, permanent contracts or new atypical contracts) can lead one to think that 
it was a trade-off between employment growth and job stability in the post reform 
period. In particular for young workers, women and white collar workers, these atypical 
contracts determined their exit from the non-working state, but did not represent a 
‘springboard’ towards long-term permanent contracts. On the contrary, and in particular 
for the people working in the services’ sectors, the recurrence of many atypical 
contracts reduced the probability of moving towards permanent contracts (Sciulli, 
2006).  
                                                 
35
 Anyone searching for employment was required to register at the local employment office. This 
registration was classified in terms of professional sector, skills and specialisation of the person. The 
potential employer was not free to choose the person to hire, but could only indicate to the employment 
office the number of workers needed and the skills required. The employment office would select the 
people responding to those criteria according to their numerical order on the list (for this reason this 
system was known as the ‘numerical call’). This principle was not valid for employees moving from one 
job to another who were allowed to respond to the employers’ ‘nominative call’. After this system was 
dismantled the employment offices remained in charge of managing the ‘list for placement’ and the 
‘mobility list’ introduced by law 223/91. The registration on the ‘list for placement’ saw the activation of 
a person seeking a new job. Anyone registered on this list for more than 12 consecutive months had to be 
considered long-term unemployed. This bureaucratic form of registration was compulsory for those 
receiving any form of active labour policies; in the second part of the ’90s most of the activities consisted 
of vocational training courses organized by the Regions. 
36
 This new form of employment is characterised by a triangular contract between the worker seeking 
employment, the company interested in hiring the worker for a limited period of time and the agency 
employing the worker and making him/her available to the company through a temporary assignment. 
37
 In the literature they are also called flexible contracts. The term ‘atypical’ was introduced in contrast to 
‘typical contracts’ which until the Treu Reform, were referred to as long-term full-time jobs.  
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In 2003 a new regulation known as the Biagi Reform
38
 expanded the group 
of flexible contracts, adding new typologies, increased their duration and further 
liberalized the employment services. The Biagi Reform did not consider the SUJs and 
PUJs policy directly, and for this reason it is not analysed in this thesis. However, as we 
shall see in the second section of this chapter, the introduction of flexible contracts did 
influence the closure of the SUJs projects after 2000. If in the mid ’90s a stable job 
consisted of a long-term full-time contract, ten years later it became equivalent to a 
short-term atypical contract. The public administrations adapted their strategies to the 
new labour market configuration but the supply of less stable job arrangements 
increased noticeably after 2003, especially in the private sector. 
Finally, the Treu Reform made a clear statement about the socially and 
publicly useful jobs, incorporating them into the active labour policies. The Government 
asked Parliament to act as delegate for the general revision of the normative regarding 
the socially useful jobs (art.22) and for the promotion of new policy instruments 
addressing the youth unemployment in Mezzogiorno (art.26). Consequently two specific 
decrees were passed in 1997 which provided the core of the normative on socially and 
publicly useful jobs
39
. The parts concerning some specific legal provisions will be 
analysed below, while the implementation of the policy at local level and the 
occupational outputs will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
4.2.3 Socially and publicly useful jobs as active labour policies 
 
Policy makers, bureaucrats and scholars who deal with different kind of norms on a 
regular basis are keenly aware of the difficulty in understanding legislation. The policy 
process is constructed through negotiations and the norms contain many ambiguities 
which offer room for interpretation. In Italy it is not rare for additional legislation to be 
made in order to interpret or clarify laws already in force. Laws become ‘alive’ during 
the everyday process of implementation when their prescriptions become political 
decisions and administrative practices. The main articles of these two laws are presented 
schematically in this section with the aim of providing the reader with an overall 
                                                 
38
 Law 30/2003 took this name after the jurist Marco Biagi who was assassinated by the terrorist group 
Nuove Brigate Rosse in March 2002. 
39
 Decreto Legislativo 7 agosto 1997, n. 280, Implementation of the policies concerning young 
unemployed from Mezzogiorno anticipated by the article 26 of the Law 196 of 24 June 1997; Decreto 
Legislativo 1 dicembre 1997, n. 468, Revision of the normative concerning socially useful jobs as 
anticipated by the article 22 of the Law 196 of 24 June 1997. 
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‘juridical infrastructure’ of the policy. The ways in which these legal provisions are 
interpreted during the implementation process will be analysed in the following two 
chapters and they will be revisited in the chapter presenting case-studies. 
Decree 280/’97 introduced two specific policy instruments to tackle youth 
unemployment in Mezzogiorno: the workships (grants given to the employees for 
taking-on any temporary young unemployed and provide them with training-on-the-job; 
from the Italian borsa lavoro) and the publicly useful jobs (PUJs). Following the 
recommendations made in article 26 of the Treu Reform, this policy activated a unique 
two–year plan for a minimum 100,000 youths in Mezzogiorno. The overall budget 
allocated to this policy was 1,000 billion ITL: 300 billion ITL in 1997 and 700 billion 
ITL in 1998.  
The key contents of the legislation which regulated PUJs are presented 
below.  
 
Box 4.1: D.Lgs. 280/’97 (publicly useful jobs for young unemployed)  
Promoters: National and local public administrations (regions and provinces). 
 
Activities: The ‘new employment areas’: personal care services, environmental 
protection and risk prevention, rural development, rehabilitation of 
urban spaces and management of cultural goods. 
 
Recipients: Young unemployed between 21 and 32 years old residents in those 
regions/ provinces registered as having an unemployment rate higher 
than the national average in 1996 (regions: Sardinia, Sicily, Calabria, 
Basilicata, Puglia, Abruzzi, Molise; provinces: Massa Carrara, 
Frosinone, Rome, Latina, Viterbo).  
 
Participation 
terms:  
Participation in the projects was on a voluntary basis. The 
unemployed had to be registered for at least 30 months in the ‘lists 
for placement,’ managed by the Employment Offices and were 
selected in a ranking order from these lists. 
 
Main goals: To bring about new steady and competitive activities, to promote 
autonomous jobs and to improve the theoretical and professional 
training of the unemployed.  
 
Duration: The maximum duration of the projects was set at 12 months. The law 
did not make any provisions concerning further extensions of the 
projects beyond this period.  
 
Activation 
terms: 
The law required the stability of the new activities throughout the 
time period meaning that it must be economically self-sufficient in 
order for it to continue at the end of the projects.  
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All projects were required to provide a written statement from an 
‘Agency for Jobs and Enterprises Promotion’40 (AJEP) attesting to 
the fact that the project would meet the technical requirements for 
realising sustainable activities. These agencies were entitled to help 
the administrations in designing the projects and were paid for their 
services. 
 
Financial 
provision
41
:  
The monthly allowance of 820,000 ITL per person, corresponding to 
a work commitment of 20 hours per week and a maximum 8 hours 
per day. The public bodies interested in using the workers for more 
than 20 hours per week were asked to integrate their allowances for 
the supplementary hours worked
42
.  
 
Incentive 
regime: 
1) 1,500,000 ITL per person for buying equipment (especially new 
technologies) used during the implementation phase or essential for 
the delivery of the activities at the end of the projects; 2) 500,000 ITL 
per person for paying the AJEPs for their technical assistance 
provided for project design and implementation. 
Thirty per cent of these amounts was provided at the projects start-up 
and seventy per cent was given when the projects were successfully 
ended (explanation given in a successive Decree of the Ministry of 
Labour, June 1999). 
 
Funds: National Fund for Employment (NFE); the resources were distributed 
to the regions in proportion with the number of the young 
unemployed involved in the projects. 
 
As explained beforehand, PUJs were introduced to contrast the strikingly 
high level of youth unemployment in Mezzogiorno. Trade unions considered them a 
useful instrument to help young people boost their employability and to enter the job 
market. The Communist Reconstruction Party was particularly supportive of the use of 
this instrument on a broad-scale and threatened  not to vote for the Treu Reform if  this 
law were not passed.  
 
The first big wave [the increase of the socially /publicly useful jobs] came about because 
we had to give something in exchange to Rifondazione Comunista (Communist 
Reconstruction Party) in order to have their favourable vote for the liberalisation of the 
                                                 
40
 The agencies were public bodies stated by law as having unique experience and expertise in polices for 
re-employment. They were mostly at provincial and regional level, but some agencies operated nation-
wide (e.g. IG that was a company involved in the promotion of youth entrepreneurship, GEPI and, after 
its closure, Italia Lavoro, which become the national agency for active labour policies).   
41
 This legal statement is not written explicitly in decree 280/97, but makes reference to two previous 
norms concerning activation of socially useful jobs (Decree 510/1996 and Law 608/1996) where the 
amount of 800,000 ITL per month per person was specified for the first time. A decree from the Minister 
of  Labour passed in December 1997 specified that the monthly allowance plus any additional expenses 
amounted to 820,000 ITL.   
42
 The maximum hours worked per week was 36. The sum integrating the allowance was calculated on 
the basis of the basic hourly rate of a civil servant doing equivalent work.  
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labour market (they abstained from voting). For this reason we enlarged the target of the 
policy recipients to people who had never worked. Otherwise the reform would never have 
been passed (interview with T.T., Minister of Labour and Social Security from 17 May 
1996 to 21 October 1998). 
 
Just after the Decree 280 was passed, the publicly useful jobs had a true 
explosion in June 1997. There were more than 3,200 applications, most of them 
associated with local projects. Almost 87,000 young unemployed were involved 
nationwide, 80% of whom were concentrated in four regions: 34% in Sicily, 17% in 
Sardinia, 14% in Calabria and 15% in Campania (table 4.1). There was also a strong 
demand for workships with almost 107,000 youths involved. As a result, the overall 
number of young unemployed wanting to participate in PUJs and workships reached 
almost 194,000, showing a high interest for this policy.  
These figures provide evidence that PUJs acted as an active labour market 
policy in regions which suffered from high rates of unemployment. However, after a 
certain period of time it became evident that the creation of economically self-sufficient 
activities at the end of the projects was not at all straightforward. This policy lasted for a 
short period of time and there are no data detailing its outcomes, particularly as regards 
the dimension of the employment/self-employment created
43
. Many projects closed 
without reaching this ultimate goal, yet some of them did manage to achieve this. One 
of the case-studies presented in this thesis analyses the factors which made this possible. 
In the opinion of one prominent policy maker, expressed almost five years 
after the formal end of the projects, PUJs proved not to be the most appropriate policy 
for tackling youth unemployment: 
 
This policy instrument is temporary and exceptional; the youth employment needs a 
strategic policy composed of three aspects: work experience, vocational training and 
incentives for the enterprises interested in providing them with stable employment. In the 
presence of a stable set of active labour policies the publicly useful jobs would be an 
exception. They were used because an emergency situation came about dramatically in 
certain territories. Along with the general reform of the shock absorbers [expected to 
introduce a universal unemployment aid] the future policies for increasing the youth 
employment should be connected to the development of these areas (interview with A.P., 
Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security from 17 May 1996 
to 21 October 1998).  
                                                 
43
 The Regions of Calabria and Sicily, which had a large number of PUJs ‘transformed’ them into SUJs 
during the transitory regime stated by D.Lgs. 81/2000. In 2000 more than 10,000 PUWs in Sicily and 
2,000 in Calabria became SUWs and in this way they were able to continue receiving allowances. 
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Table 4.1: Number of young unemployed involved in publicly useful jobs and projects with their relative costs on 30th June 1997  
 
Regions 
Applications  and number of young unemployed 
involved in the PUJs projects 
Total costs                                       
(Italian liras, millions) 
Average cost per worker                        
(Italian liras, millions) 
Projects  
(D.Lgs. 
280/97) 
Publicly 
Useful 
Workers 
Publicly 
Useful 
Workers 
Publicly 
Useful 
Workers Local 
projects  
National 
projects 
Total 
Local 
projects  
National 
projects 
Total 
(in local 
projects)  
(in national 
projects) 
(total) 
Sardinia        723       14,127             366      14,493       50,939        4,333       55,272  3.606 11.839 3.814 
Sicily        646       28,247           1,517      29,764      115,390       17,961     133,351  4.085 11.840 4.480 
Calabria        518       11,339             450      11,789       51,134        5,328       56,462  4.510 11.840 4.789 
Campania        471       11,805           1,185      12,990       70,781       14,030       84,811  5.996 11.840 6.529 
Basilicata        112         1,262             211        1,473         4,188        2,498         6,686  3.319 11.839 4.539 
Puglia        335         6,745           1,007        7,752       23,303       11,923       35,226  3.455 11.840 4.544 
Abruzzi        102         2,122             141        2,263         6,688        1,669         8,357  3.152 11.837 3.693 
Molise          64            717               37          754         2,897           438         3,335  4.040 11.838 4.423 
Lazio        276         4,685             684        5,369       18,943        8,099       27,042  4.043 11.841 5.037 
Tuscany          18            252               16          268            748           191           939  2.968 11.938 3.504 
Total    3,265      81,301          5,614     86,915    345,011     66,470    411,481  4.244 11.840 4.734 
Source: adapted from AL SOLE (1998), ‘I lavori socialmente utili’,  tables A and B, p. 55-58 
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Decree 468/’97 conducted a general revision of the entire body of 
regulations concerning SUJs and PUJs and provided detailed legal provisions for their 
implementation.  
 
Box 4.2: D.Lgs 468/’97 (socially and publicly useful jobs for long-term 
unemployed)  
Promoters: National and local public administrations, public economic bodies 
(e.g. National Parks, Environmental Authorities), public companies 
(e.g. Local Health Companies, National Railway Company), social 
cooperatives
44
 and their consortiums. 
 
Activities: In general terms ‘activities for the achievement of works and services 
of public utility through use of specific categories of subjects’. 
 
Categories: SUJs were grouped into four categories characterized by different 
aims, duration and possibility of extension. 
PUJs were very similar to those introduced by decree 280/’97. They 
were linked to the ‘new employment areas’, like the others.  
 
Recipients: The various categories of unemployed entitled to participate in SUJs 
and PUJs were grouped together: 
1) People searching for their first employment and who have been 
registered in the ‘lists for placement’ for more than two years; 
2) People not receiving any unemployment aid and registered in 
the ‘mobility lists’; 
3) People receiving mobility aids or special unemployment aids 
and registered in the ‘mobility lists’;  
4) People receiving special wage compensation funds for zero 
working hours; 
5) Restricted groups of workers made redundant because of 
industrial crisis (from specific companies, industrial sectors or 
areas); 
6) Categories of workers made redundant because of major 
industrial restructuring in specific territorial areas; 
7) Prisoners granted permission for external work as part of their 
detention programme.    
 
Participation 
terms:  
Unemployed receiving benefits could be activated by the public 
bodies through a direct call. Their participation in SUJs and PUJs 
projects was compulsory. For all the others unemployed - with the 
exception of the prisoners - participation was voluntary. 
Two principles were applied to all unemployed participating in the 
                                                 
44
 The social cooperatives have a special status in Italy. They are non-profit organisations and benefit 
from a specific regulatory system. There are two types of social cooperatives: A) cooperatives for the 
delivery of social and care services, working mainly in the health system; B) cooperatives for social 
integration, which have at least 30% on their members as people with different kinds of disabilities. All 
social cooperatives benefit from fiscal benefits which are equivalent to those received by NGOs.  
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projects: 1) the matching of people’s professional qualifications with 
skills required to carry out the activities and 2) equal opportunities. 
 
Main goals: The Ministry of Labour and the regions promoted SUJs as an active 
labour policy for professional upgrading and for the creation of new 
jobs and new entrepreneurship, with the formation of cooperatives 
and self-employment covered under entrepreneurship. 
 
Duration: 1) SUJs for professional upgrading: maximum 12 months, no 
extensions; 
2) SUJs for non-ordinary public works: maximum 6 months, 6 
months extension; 
3) SUJs for people receiving special wage compensation funds 
and ‘mobility aids’:  the benefits time-span was the maximum 
duration;   
4) PUJs: maximum 12 months, 6 months for the first extension, 
6 months for the second extension. 
 
Activation 
terms: 
Local administration presented the projects to the Regional 
Commission for Employment, using a format indicated by the 
Ministry of Labour. The inter-regional public administrations 
presented projects to the National Commission for Employment. 
These projects were part of special agreements containing the general 
plan for socially public activities prepared with the Ministry. 
According to each specific category of SUJs or PUJs, the projects 
were required to submit additional documents: 
1) Plans for vocational training (SUJs for professional 
upgrading); 
2) Plans for non-ordinary works (SUJs for non-ordinary public 
works); 
3) Detailed business plans explaining how the new jobs were 
expected to be created at the end of the project and why the 
new activities were considered economically feasible 
throughout the time (PUJs).  
 
Financial 
provision:  
All workers, with the exception of those receiving special wage 
compensation funds or other unemployment benefits, were entitled to 
receive an allowance of 800,000 ITL per month for a work 
commitment of 20 hours per week. The allowances paid for SUJs and 
PUJs were compatible with:  
1) other forms of incomes obtained from autonomous occasional 
jobs with a maximum threshold of 7,200,000 ITL (earned 
during the project period);  
2) salaries earned from part-time jobs and not exceeding 600,000 
ITL per month;  
3) allowances and pensions for civil disabilities or attributable to 
work accidents. 
The cancellation from the lists, the loss of the status of 
unemployment and the cessation of the allowance would occur in the 
following circumstances: employment in a long-term full-time job, 
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start-up of an autonomous activity and retirement. 
 
Incentive 
regime: 
1) 1,000,000 ITL per person for training (SUJs and PUJs projects); 2) 
5,000,000 ITL per person for buying equipment necessary for 
enterprises start-ups (only PUJs projects); 3) 500,000 ITL per person 
for paying the AJEPs for their technical assistance provided for 
project design and implementation (only PUJs projects). Fifty per 
cent of the incentives described in the last two points above were 
given when the business plans for the new enterprises were effectively 
completed. 
 
Penalty 
regime:    
For the long-term unemployed receiving benefits it was compulsory 
to respond to the public administrations’ calls. Any refusal would 
have resulted in the benefits being withdrawn and them being 
cancelled from the ‘mobility list’. However, there were some 
exceptions to this rule: those unemployed participating in vocational 
training courses; activities taking place more than 50 km from the 
workers’ area of residence or in a place more than 60 minutes away 
by public transport. 
The socially useful workers who had not participated appropriately in 
the activities would also be crossed off the ‘mobility list’. In this case 
the public administration had the right to ask for their substitution 
with other unemployed person. 
 
Job-creation 
schemes
45
: 
The law made specific provisions as to the creation of new jobs 
through two job-creation schemes which put in central place the 
outsourcing of the public services to companies that had to hire the 
workers involved in the projects:  
1) Public joint ventures founded directly by the local 
administration together with a private company which would 
employ a minimum quota of 40% socially/publicly useful 
workers and a maximum of 30% other people. 
2) Private enterprises which would employ a minimum quota of 
40% socially/publicly useful workers and a maximum of 30% 
other people. The private enterprises could also be cooperatives 
formed by the workers themselves.  
 
The keys success of these services’ outsourcing from public 
administrations directly to private companies was provided by 
dispensation from European competitive tender rules which was 
made possible by this law which addressed disadvantaged subjects 
such as the long-term unemployed. 
This dispensation would be in force for a maximum of a five-year 
period from the services’ outsourcing. After then the companies 
would tender for the services accordingly to the free-competition 
                                                 
45
 The financial incentives were not indicated in this law. The Inter-ministerial Decree of May 18
th
 
regulated all financial aspects concerning the policy. The law provided for a one-off payment of 18 
million ITL for every SUW employed on a long-term permanent contract; for a part-time permanent 
contract of minimum 20 hours/week the incentive was reduced accordingly. Moreover, this incentive was 
in addition to other tax reliefs provided by different laws and it was also available for the self-employed. 
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rules which characterize the European market regime. 
Finally, there was a third job creation scheme (relatively small at the 
beginning due to lack of public funds) which gave the public 
administrations power to directly hire SUWs and PUWs for low-
skilled jobs, allowing them to fill a maximum of 30% of vacancies 
available with these workers. 
 
Funds: 1) Most projects were financed with resources from the National 
Fund for Employment. Starting in 2000 the financial resources were 
divided between regions which became fully entitled to make their 
own local active labour policies. 2) The law entitled the regions and 
local administrations to finance projects with their own funds. 
The most important of these was the Region of Sicily which, because 
of its autonomous status, passed several norms to activate regional 
SUJs projects.  
 
As can be observed, a wide range of unemployed were entitled to participate 
in the projects, yet participation in the SUJs/PUJs projects was not considered 
equivalent to gaining ‘proper jobs’. The law stated clearly that the public bodies were 
not employers but ‘users’ and the workers were not employees but ‘unemployed 
receiving allowances for socially and publicly useful jobs’ 46(D.Lgs. 468, art.8 and 
D.Lgs. 280, art.1). As a result, many Italian jurists considered SUJs and PUJs, 
especially those related to the unemployed receiving benefits, as mere workfare policies 
(Bettini, 2001; Lunghini et al, 1995; Mazziotti, 1999; Monaco, 2000; Tursi, 1998, 1995; 
Vergari, 1996). Tursi considered this policy a consequence of a renewed European 
welfare state from a  liberal perspective, where ‘workfare  is  part of a bigger and 
ambitious programme that asks public institutions to create conditions for unemployed 
to find an optimum match in the labour market and to increase their employability’ 
(1998:1372). The extension of the policy to the long-term unemployed without benefits 
was instead criticised and seen as an application of the Keynesian theory of full 
employment outside of the labour market (Lunghini et al, 1995:35), or even as the 
creation of sui generis work relationships (Vergari, 1996:698). This dichotomy of work 
relationships occurred because although the public administrations were legally entitled 
                                                 
46
The unemployment status lasted until the moment when they were in employment again. As a 
consequence, during the period of the projects the socially/publicly useful workers continued to be 
registered on the ‘lists for placement’, managed by the employment offices. This part of the legislation 
has never changed although various preferential channels were found for allowing the public 
administrations to hire the socially/publicly useful workers directly. These exceptions to the general rule 
of the public employment - that ask everybody who wants to became a civil servant to pass a public 
assessment - was made more flexible under ‘special circumstances’. Even then ‘internal and restricted’ 
selections have been made.  
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to use the unemployed in SUJs, at the same time they were not entitled to change their 
status from socially useful workers to employees. Bettini (2001:255) also noticed that, 
despite specific regulation, the SUJs allowances provided the unemployed with certain 
rights that brought them ‘dangerously’ close to having the same rights as those provided 
for traditional long-terms jobs (e.g. sick and maternity leave). Merlini (2000:20) sees 
three functions of the SUJs in relation to the employment perspectives of their 
beneficiaries: a ‘park area’, where the unemployed are placed to allow them to receive 
an income; a ‘gym’, where the unemployment are trained to increase their chances of 
re-entering the job market; and a ‘springboard’ which encouraged the recipients of 
passive benefits to become more entrepreneurial. 
The policy design however was not casual. According to Ripley and 
Franklin (1982:5-6)  there is a logical flow between the formulation, legitimation and 
implementation of a policy, although to a certain extent these phases overlap during the 
policy process. The policy formulation occurs when different alternatives to tackling a 
problem are developed; then the policy passes through the legitimation phase when a set 
of alternatives are ratified. Finally, implementation takes place after the laws are passed. 
The enlargement of the SUJs and PUJs policies to the non-employed
47
 operated by the 
decree 468/’97, was a response to the immediate need to provide a large number of 
unemployed with an income, but also to allow them being involved in socially useful 
activities; this was evident in the policy choice. During the policy implementation there 
was a sharp increase in the number of projects and many administrations were 
requesting extensions. These facts brought the problem of the policy’s economic 
sustainability in the long-term to a head. Furthermore, in territories with a scarcity of 
jobs and in the presence of local administrations sensitive to political patronage, these 
policy instruments were at risk of being perceived as a new form of passive benefits. 
The introduction of PUJs was in fact an attempt to increase the quality of the projects, to 
limit political patronage and to encourage the local administrations to take responsibility 
for the projects’ outcomes:  
 
Unfortunately, there are still such high figures in the South because so many people have 
been placed in inactive positions. They have always lived there and until that time they 
were put into these activities without following specific rules. Once the legislative 
                                                 
47
 The non-employed are people looking for their first job. The distinction is made here to highlight the 
difference between those who are unemployed as a result of having lost a job and those who are looking 
for their first job. In order to be entitled to receive SUJs and PUJs, both sets had to be registered in the 
‘list for placement’ managed by the Employment Offices for a certain period of time (usually a minimum 
of 24 months). 
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enforcement arrived, they started to feel stronger. Inside the groups [of socially useful 
workers] you would find ‘everything’. We tried to improve the quality of the participants 
implementing the publicly useful jobs who have always had formal rules and an explicit 
time-limit (interview with T.T., Minister of Labour and Social Security from 17 May 1996 
to 21 October 1998). 
 
At the end of June 1997 the number of unemployed involved in socially 
useful jobs reached almost 114,000. About 81% of the projects were implemented in 
Mezzogiorno and almost 19% in the northern and central regions. Approximately 77% 
of the unemployed participating in the projects were blue-collar workers while 23% 
were white-collar workers, with a very low number of middle-level managerial staff 
(table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Unemployed receiving allowances for socially useful jobs by regions,  30
th
  
June 1997  
Regions Blue-collars  White-collars Managerial staff Total 
Piedmont 3,473 410 0 3,883 
Valle D'Aosta 46 9 0 55 
Lombardy 685 323 15 1,023 
Liguria 705 352 0 1,057 
Trentino A.A. 46 1 0 47 
Veneto 385 150 0 535 
Friuli V.G. 96 28 0 124 
Emilia Romagna 211 227 0 438 
Tuscany 1,115 348 0 1,463 
Marche 831 204 0 1,035 
Umbria 880 225 0 1,105 
Lazio 9,370 1,014 0 10,384 
Abruzzi 2,088 150 2 2,240 
Molise 577 41 0 618 
Campania 26,451 827 3 27,281 
Puglia 12,644 527 43 13,214 
Basilicata 1,906 82 0 1,988 
Calabria  4,877 461 8 5,346 
Sicily 16,411 19,965 1 36,377 
Sardinia 4,990 317 165 5,472 
Italy 87,787 25,661 237 113,685 
Source: AL SOLE (1998), ‘I lavori socialmente utili’, table 1, p.59 (data from the 3rd 
Report to Parliament, 1
st
 semester 1997)  
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The number of SUJs projects continued to increase until 1999 when the 
striking figure of almost 150,000 unemployed joining these projects was reached (table 
4.3).  
 
Table 4.3: Stock of socially useful workers by groups of regions (1997-2001) 
Groups of 
Regions 
1997 
(30 Jun) 
1998 
(31 Dec) 
1999 
(31 Dec) 
2000 
(31 Dec) 
2001 
(30 Jun) 
North-West 6,018 6,506 8,568 2,945 2,116 
North-East 1,144 2,435 3,334 869 321 
Centre 13,987 17,970 18,717 11,370 9,749 
Mezzogiorno 92,536 110,204 118,483 98,067 92,806 
Italy 113,685 137,115 149,102 113,251 104,992 
Source: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Monitoraggio delle politiche 
occupazionali e del lavoro, Nota di aggiornamento luglio 2002, table 13, p.32  
 
However the public administrations, needing employees, were interested in 
using the SUWs extensively. This seemed to be a perfect match between public labour 
demand which had limited financial resources, and an excess labour supply 
experiencing difficulties in re-entering or even accessing for the first time the labour 
market. 
 
The number of projects increased significantly. The regions and the central state have 
started to use these workers to fill the empty positions on their organizational charts. 
Almost all ministries had SUJs projects: Public Instruction, Justice, Civil Protection, 
Environment, Transport, Cultural Heritage. Without socially useful workers these important 
public services  would have stalled. 
Regarding the ‘employment stabilization’, I think we were all under an illusion: as the 
workers were useful to the public bodies, they would form companies that would deliver 
the same services to the administrations; this second part was not so straightforward 
(interview with G.C., Ministry of Labour, General Director at the ‘Directorate-General for 
employment’, from 1995 to 1999). 
 
While the implementation of the projects challenged the local bodies 
concerned with the organization of the activities over this time, the central authority of 
the state has become gradually more concerned with the need to develop tangible job-
opportunities for such a large number of people. The policy was revised in 2000 with 
the aim of halting the start of new projects and closing the existing ones by June 2001. 
This change in the policy will be analysed in the following sections. 
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4.3 The policy change in late ’90s: first and foremost creation of new jobs 
through services outsourcing 
 
4.3.1 An Italian Third Way: the fifth social pact 
 
The entrance into the European Monetary Union tied Italian domestic policies with 
decisions taken at European level. In 1998 the Government was ready to push forward 
the modernization of the country to challenge the increased competition created by 
globalization. Once again the social partners were called on to take part in the policy-
making process. A new agreement was signed in December 1998 but it was different 
from the social pacts signed before 1996.  
At the end of 1997 the government led by Romano Prodi passed a crisis 
raised by the Communist Reconstruction Party (Rifondazione Comunista), which asked 
for the reduction of the working week to 35 hours. The unions and entrepreneurs’ 
associations were opposed to this arrangement and the Rifondazione Comunista 
retracted its political support for the government and Prodi resigned. The new 
government, formed of a new centre-left coalition led by Massimo D’Alema, was very 
interested in renewing dialogue with its social partners. The new social pact reinforced 
this dialogue as its central objective and, as Italy had recently emerged from the 
emergency state, no new reforms were under debate. This social deal ‘was symbolic in 
nature, one in which the actors sought to consolidate their mutual spheres of influence, 
rather than a pact for negotiating detailed reforms’ (Regini and Colombo, 2011:133). It 
was however the last agreement where the SUJs policy was named among the active 
labour policies. 
The document, signed by 32 organisations representing the social partners, 
heralded a very ambitious program for development and employment growth, 
developed through more than 200 policy goals. The most important policy areas and 
goals are presented below, emphasizing those referring specifically to employment and 
SUJs.  
 
Box 4.3: Social Deal for Development and Employment, 22
nd
 December 1998 
Government: In power from 21 October 1998 to 22 December 1999 
 
Prime Minister: Massimo D’Alema (coalition: the left-wing coalition Ulivo, the 
Party of the Italian Communists, the Democratic Union for the 
Republic and the independents) 
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Main goals: To promote development and employment growth through the 
participation of the social partners and the local administrative 
bodies (regions, provinces and municipalities) in the policy-
making process.  
 
The agreement makes explicit references to the European Employment Strategy 
launched by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and which received official ratification 
during the summit held in Luxembourg in November 1997. On that occasion four 
pillars
48
 were identified as the core objectives for the national labour market policies: 
employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities.  
 
Main means:    New stage of collaboration with social partners; reinforcement of 
the link between macro as well as micro economic variables and the 
labour market regulation; maintenance of the incomes policy and 
promotion of macro policies capable to provide incentives for non-
inflationist growth. 
 
Policy areas: Simplification of the administrative procedures and promotion of 
innovative management of public administrations; raise of 
employment; development of the integrative system between 
education, research and training; reduction of the fiscal burden of 
the enterprises. 
 
Strategies 
 to contrast 
unemployment 
and to improve 
employment: 
In 1998, four working groups were set at governmental level with 
the following commitments:  
a) to verify the incentives regime and evaluate their efficiency; 
b) to simplify the bureaucratic procedures for incentives 
distribution, infrastructures and start-up of new businesses;  
c) to evaluate the policy instruments for the employment 
growth, particularly those implemented to promote emersion of 
informal labour and the socially useful jobs;  
d) to identify connections between the different levels of the  public 
administration in order to accelerate and improve the use of the 
European Structural Funds.   
  
The Government was aiming at reviewing the labour legislation in 
four important policy areas: 1) new instruments for the emersion of 
the informal labour; 2) reorganisation of incentives for 
employment; 3) reform of the social shock absorbers; 4) revision 
of the legislation concerning the socially useful jobs.  
 
As the Social Deal for Development and Employment (SDDE) was signed 
immediately after a period of economic emergency and after the Maastricht goals had 
                                                 
48
 Employability means promotion of new skills and incentives with the purpose of enlarging participation 
in the labour market. Entrepreneurship means promotion of active behaviour in order to provide incentive 
for the creation of new firms and business. Adaptability means the promotion of flexibility for both 
companies and workforce in response to external challenges. Equal opportunities are promoted especially 
in terms of reduction of the gender gap in the labour market. 
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been reached, this agreement appears more a political programme aimed at the 
development of a modern Italian economy in Europe. The political values and goals 
expressed in SDDE have many similarities with those stated by Tony Blair’s ‘third way’ 
politics. Both documents emphasise the importance of creation and development of a 
knowledge-based economy in order to allow Italy and Britain to compete successfully 
in Europe and internationally. Both acknowledge the importance of policies for 
education, training and research development. Finally, both underline the importance of 
the markets for economic development and employment growth. 
 The British ‘third way’ politics has no doubts of this approach:  
 
I fully recognize that the private, not government is at the forefront of wealth creation and 
employment generation. Yet government has a vital role in promoting competitive markets, 
encouraging long-term research and investment, and helping to equip citizens with the 
skills and aspirations they need to succeed in the modern economy. Dynamic markets and 
international competition are vital spurs to economic growth and innovation […] Our 
approach is competition where possible, regulation where necessary (Blair, 1998:10)   
 
The Italian approach was more cautious and reassured its social partners that 
both capital and labour would  have their interests secured: 
 
The new economic environment asks to redefine the safety net for both workers and 
enterprises, increasing protections and assurances. As concerns the former, new forms of 
protection are necessary in order to avoid the risk of exclusion: acknowledging the right to 
be re-inserted in the labour market (then an efficient training system), redefining some 
components of the welfare state (among them the social shocks absorbers), creating 
efficient ways of representation and social participation, and reaffirming the right for 
workers’ dignity.  
As concerns the latter, enterprises must be protected not ‘from’ the market, which happened 
too often in the past, but ‘in’ the market, which still happens too seldom at present. The 
social partners sustain the Government’s commitment for markets deregulation and, when 
necessary, their regulation as a key element for assuring an important presence of Italy in 
Europe. Social partners also take the Government’s recommendation upon which all 
enterprises – big, small, medium, art crafts and trade enterprises – are “the primary engine” 
of employment (SDDE, art. 46 and 47). 
 
Five prominent leaders
49
 of the New Left commented on the ‘third way’ 
politics during a public dialogue held in Washington in April 1998. All agreed that the 
goal of the new left politics is to combine a dynamic economy with social solidarity. 
D’Alema said that in pursuit of this goal ‘we will need less national government, less 
central government, but greater governance over local processes as well as opening out 
in the direction of global community’ (Giddens, 2001:5). In 1997 a major reform in this 
                                                 
49
 Bill Clinton (USA), Tony Blair (UK), Gerhard Schröder (Germany), Wim Kok (Netherlands) and 
Massimo D’Alema (Italy) 
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direction began, aimed at the devolution of the Italian state authority to the regions
50
. 
From this new perspective, the SUJs policy passed through a radical review in 2000 
which will be analyse in the next section.  
 
4.3.2 Policy change: DLgs 81/2000 
 
The revision of SUJs arrived in 2000 when a new law both integrated and modified the 
previous legislation. With decree 81 the policy had a radical transformation, as the focus 
was moved from the labour active polices to the firm promotion of ‘employment 
stabilisation’. This law banned public bodies from starting new projects, yet it 
introduced a rule which entitled workers to continue the projects
51
.  
The most relevant provisions introduced by the new legislation are listed 
below:  
 The various categories of SUJs stated by Decree 468 were simplified and the 
differences between SUJs and PUJs were eliminated. The public 
administrations were asked to state clearly what jobs would be created for 
the SUWs at the end of the projects. 
 The area of activities carried out by the unemployed involved in the projects 
was enlarged, adding clerical services to public administrations as well as 
transportation and logistics.  
 The duration of the projects was set at six months and an extension of a 
further six months was permitted. Where the extension occurred, the public 
administration ‘using’ the workers would pay half of the total amount of 
SUJs allowances. The Regions and Provinces would become the new bodies 
governing the employment policies and the job placement. By gaining new 
autonomy in matters of planning, coordination and management of active-
labour programmes, they would also become responsible for the allocation 
of their financial resources. 
                                                 
50
 The so-called Bassanini Reform was introduced by Legge 15 Marzo 1997, n. 59. The reform was led by 
the EU effort towards the harmonisation of different administrative practices of the member states. It had 
two principal aims: 1) the simplification of different administrative practices and bureaucratic limits for 
the private businesses and 2) administrative federalism through the devolution of the state authority to the 
local administrations. The reform was completed by other decrees that set norms for specific sectors. 
Decreto Legislativo 23 dicembre 1997, n. 469 brought about changes in the labour market regulation. 
51 
The workers entitled to continue the projects had to have been involved in socially useful jobs for at 
least 12 months between 1st January 1998 and 31st December 1999. 
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 The various instruments created for the outsourcing of the public services 
were enlarged with a new one: the public administrations were entitled to 
stipulate contracts of collaboration directly with the workers involved in 
SUJs projects. As a result, the public bodies started to become interested in 
preserving this workforce to deliver a wide range of activities.  
 
The innovations brought about by this new legislation reflected the policy 
makers’ awareness of the difficulties encountered during the implementation process. 
Although the former legislation made clear statements about the need to create new and 
stable jobs for the unemployed involved in SUJs and PUJs, this remained more a 
desirable rather than a firmly pursued goal. Many local administrations invested a great 
deal of effort in starting the projects, organizing the activities and increasing the quality 
of the services delivered. Yet it was far more difficult for public bodies to have access 
to the financial resources necessary for the creation of new companies, or the 
outsourcing of services. The administrations were late in reaching this goal, it being 
repeatedly postponed through  project extensions. If the policy found no particular 
obstacles during its implementation, the policy take-up through the privatization of the 
public services was much more complex and controversial.     
One of the most important innovations introduced with the reformulation of 
the policy was the acknowledgment of those activities delivered by SUWs directly to 
the public administrations. There was a considerable number of workers involved in 
clerical activities who were not entitled to receive a job offer, firstly because it was not 
possible to outsource those activities and, secondly because the public employment 
regulation in Italy does not allow public bodies to hire civil servants directly. In order to 
overcome this, the policy introduced a new form of fixed term contract (collaboration) 
that allowed public administrations to hire SUWs directly. This type of contract, 
introduced with the Treu Reform (1997), was enforced in subsequent legislation. The 
number of flexible jobs increased significantly after the Biagi Reform (2003) and it was 
estimated that 13% of more than two million jobs created between 1996 and 2005 were 
freelance jobs and collaborations (Samek Lodovici and Semenza, 2008:163).  
Table 4.4 (pages 119-120) presents the overall number of employees in 
public sectors and the related percentage of socially useful workers in various sectors 
over a ten-year period (2001-2010). It can be observed from these data that the share of 
socially useful workers as the total number of civil servants was relatively small at 
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national level (from almost 1.7% in 2001 to 0.55% in 2010), yet it was significant at 
regional level and for local administrations (from more than 8% in 2001 to almost 5% in 
2005 and 2.7% in 2010). 
On the one hand, the policy makers were confident about the fact that 
employing SUWs with atypical contracts within the public sectors would enlarge the 
area of potential jobs to be offered to this category of long-term unemployed. On the 
other hand, this offered solutions to those public bodies willing to keep the workers 
involved in activities with few possibilities of outsourcing. 
 
This stage was really empirical; our motto was ‘it is better to make them [socially useful 
workers] work just for a few hours, even with atypical contracts, rather than keep them out 
of work’; this was our sole “theory”, all the rest was empirical. The solutions put into 
practice were many. 
When I arrived [at the Ministry of Labour] I found SUJs and PUJs of many kinds created 
by various laws which overlapped during that time. We tried to rationalize them, bringing 
all of them into a single category, to set some limits, to improve the quality of the projects 
and to decentralize the public expenditure. This was our work (interview with R.M., Under-
Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security from 21 October 1998 to 
11 June 2001). 
 
Due to the legislation passed in 2000 the ‘basin’ of the public useful 
workers was definitively ‘frozen’52. Many administrations started to close the projects 
but in some parts of the country, the socially useful activities continued for many years. 
In some public sectors, SUWs have continued to be employed in activities usually 
carried out by civil servants. This created several difficulties for HR management and 
introduced a regime of a two-tier public employment: civil servants employed with 
long-term permanent contracts alongside SUWs employed with short-term flexible 
contracts. On several occasions, SUWs substituted civil servants, thus allowing public 
bodies to reduce their budgets for new staff. 
  
By employing a socially useful worker, the administration ‘froze’ a public vacancy. This 
had a positive effect on the budget, but in some administrations, the public servants almost 
disappeared. I took part in an assembly in a school in Sicily, where only SUWs were 
employed, and I am not referring to the cleaning staff only, but to any kind of clerical job.  
As SUWs were employed as collaborators, they should be considered autonomous workers 
and they could not be constrained with respect to a timetable. This situation created many 
problems and I understand the position of the Head of the School who has tried to manage 
them in the same way he does with long-term employees. The school administrations need 
rules and organization and this should affect every person working there (interview with 
G.B., UIL, Executive in charge for active labour policies after 2000). 
 
                                                 
52
 This is not the author’s ‘jargon’. Many official documents prepared by the Ministry of Labour, INPS, 
CNEL, ISFOL and Italia Lavoro make references to these policy goals: to ‘freeze’ the number of SUJs by  
stopping the promotion of new projects and ‘to empty the basin’ of socially useful workers by promoting 
‘employment stabilisation’.  
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The data plotted in figure 4.1 show that the overall number of public 
employees decreased by more than 160,000 units between 2002 and 2010. In a ten-year 
period, the number of long-term permanent contracts and socially useful jobs decreased 
by almost 4% and 69% respectively. Instead, the fixed-term contracts had a 
considerable increase of 255% (from 3,542,000 in 2001 to 12,573,000 in 2010)  as did 
long-distance work, which increased significantly by 543% (from 216,000 in 2001 to 
1,389,000 in 2010).  
 
 Fig. 4.1: Public employees for different typologies of contracts (2001-2010) 
  
  Source: adapted from National Accounts Department, annual accounts  
  
Due to the devolution of the state authority to the regions and local 
administrations, the national policy came to an end. Decree 81/2000 made specific 
provisions for the financial resources to be transferred to the local administrations by 
the end of April 2001. All SUJs projects were to be entirely financed by the National 
Fund for Employment during the period  1
st
 January – 31st October 2000. This state 
financial contribution would be halved for the following six-month period (1
st
 
November 2000 – 30th April 2001) and, afterwards, the local bodies would finance the 
SUJs projects entirely from their funds. 
After 2000, many regions passed laws providing incentives to create new 
jobs for socially useful workers. Despite the commitment to ‘empty the basin’ in two 
years, the local administrations have continued the projects and claimed funds from the 
state. The following section will present the policy development after 2000 where the 
central state has continued to play a decisive role in the continuation of the policy and 
for the creation of new employment opportunities for socially useful workers.    
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Table 4.4: Total number of employees in public sectors and related quota of socially useful workers(*) during the period 2001-2010 (continues) 
 Public sectors 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total no. 
Employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
National Health 
Services 714,330  1,389  0.19 715,771  1,044  0.15 713,978  1,002  0.14 717,584  910  0.13 723,034  512  0.07 
Non-economic 
local authorities 67,014  794  1.18 67,106  464  0.69 66,936  450  0.67 66,372  189  0.28 65,681  133  0.20 
Research 
organizations 20,540  3  0.01 20,354     20,743      20,405      20,226      
Regions and 
local 
administrations 690,891  56,348  8.16 700,369  49,731  7.10 688,512  42,356  6.15 685,461  37,288  5.44 681,588  33,566  4.92 
Ministries, 
agencies, 
presidential 
office 273,888  574  0.21 270,497  574  0.21 266,354  453  0.17 262,178  439  0.17 260,109      
Autonomous 
public 
companies 38,960      35,605      34,415      35,208      36,410      
Schools and 
training 
institutes 1,143,371     1,139,930      1,127,422      1,128,148      1,137,030  2    
Universities 126,213  475  0.38 130,367  443  0.34 133,185  402  0.30 133,853  195  0.15 121,581  115  0.09 
Police 320,972      321,674      321,238      324,731      330,548      
Army 125,160      125,564      130,229      132,792      132,585      
The Bench 9,961      10,514      10,434      10,768      10,627      
Diplomats and 
prefects 2,589      2,574      2,571      2,532      2,547      
Total civil 
servants 3,533,889  59,583  1.69 3,540,325  52,256  1.48 3,516,017  44,663  1.27 3,520,032  39,021  1.11 3,521,966  34,328  0.97 
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 Public sectors 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total no. 
Employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
Total no. 
employees 
of 
whom 
SUWs  (%) 
National Health 
Services 725,479  392  0.05 727,727  633  0.09 732,390  581  0.08 734,183  674  0.09 728,749  705  0.10  
Non-economic 
local authorities 64,349  374  0.58 64,077  344  0.54 59,922  331  0.55 58,380  215  0.37 57,358  117  0.20  
Research 
organizations 19,940      20,314      22,302      21,876      20,777  1    
Regions and 
local 
administrations 682,551  29,666  4.35 672,868  23,937  3.56 673,639  21,147  3.14 663,963  19,558  2.95 654,887  17,739  2.71  
Ministries, 
agencies, 
presidential 
office 257,277     254,251     244,748     239,165     232,173     
Autonomous 
public 
companies 36,009     36,981     35,587     35,351     35,191     
Schools and 
training 
institutes 1,158,141     1,158,038     1,139,604     1,084,401     1,053,072     
Universities 122,867  102  0.08 122,442  48  0.04 124,672  22  0.02 118,920  31  0.03 114,997  42  0.04  
Police 331,698      331,698      325,664      325,376      320,031      
Army 137,342      137,342      146,393      145,675      146,882      
The Bench 10,428      10,428      10,410      10,486      10,627      
Diplomats and 
prefects 2,544      2,544      2,413      2,334      2,312      
Total civil 
servants 3,548,625  30,534  0.86 3,520,847  24,962  0.71 3,517,744  22,081  0.63 3,440,110  20,478  0.60 3,377,056  18,604  0.55  
Source: adapted from MEF (2001-2010), annual accounts; (*) data refer to all SUWs paid through national and regional funds 
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4.3.3 Local projects with national money 
 
At the beginning at 2001 approximately 113,200 people were involved in socially useful 
jobs: 60,400 paid with resources from the NFE and 52,700 paid with regional funds. A 
striking number of people involved in regional projects were located in Sicily: 42,700 in 
total, 6,000 of whom were working for the City of Palermo. According to the 
administrative deregulation, the central state had to transfer financial resources from the 
NFE to the regions in order to allow them to continue the projects until 30
th
 June 2001 
and to finance job-creation schemes for the 60,400 ‘national’ SUWs. The remaining 
52,800 ‘regional’ SUWs were paid exclusively with regional funds. 
The financial state law 2001 (L. 388/2000) made specific provisions here, 
asserting that financial transfers must be backed by specific agreements between the 
Ministry of Labour and each region. These agreements included specific conditions, 
following are the most relevant:  
 The financial resources transferred to the regions can be used exclusively to 
pay the SUJs allowances and to support job-creation schemes aimed at 
stabilising the employment of these workers. 
 The regions make a firm commitment to empty the basin of SUWs by a 
proportion agreed with the Ministry (minimum of thirty per cent). 
 Italia Lavoro, the national agency for active labour policies, was responsible 
for monitoring the process. The funds were transferred to the regions directly 
by INPS (National Institute for Social Security) according to the figures 
communicated to the Ministry by Italia Lavoro. 
 
Due to the large number of people still involved in the projects in 2001 there 
was less optimism about the real possibility to create new jobs for all SUWs. The 
expectation for the SUJs to act as intermediate labour market that would allow a hard-to-
employ group to be gradually inserted into the labour market faded; the creation of new 
employment proved to be, once again, strongly influenced by the overall demand in the 
local labour markets (Nativel el at, 2002). The public sector became, in fact, the main 
labour market for these workers, and the ‘employment stabilization’ started to appear as a 
process where people’s job expectations needed to be negotiated against the limitations of 
public expenditure. Even the trade unions, strong supporters of the policy in the past, 
were aware of these constraints:  
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There is a part of the Left wing that imagined this policy as a ‘labour army’ formed of people 
who work outside the labour market for non-mercantile businesses (e.g. personal care 
services and environmental protection). The workers would receive an allowance very similar 
to a salary received under a private labour contract. We should have followed this early 
proposal and developed this kind of services, but we did something that enlarged the basin 
greatly while the state of public finances did not improve. So this dimension of the 
phenomenon showed us that, instead of doing things we do not have money for, we should 
find other ways to empty the basin of socially useful workers (interview with C.T., CGIL, 
Executive in charge for active labour policies after 2002).    
 
The continued extensions of SUJs projects and the difficulties encountered in 
the creation of new jobs led to a change of attitude towards the policy. In the Labour 
Market Report 1997-2001 (CNEL, 2002:271) it claims that if SUJs were still classified as 
an active labour policy aimed at the ‘direct creation of jobs’ it would only be ‘as tribute to 
the European criteria’ used by EUROSTAT as a definition and evaluation of labour 
market policies. In fact, from 2003, the official documents classify SUJs as passive 
labour policy, alongside unemployment benefits and early retirements (Ministero del 
Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2003:73) or as ‘expenses for preserving salaries’(INPS, 
2003-2011).  
Despite the rhetoric surrounding the importance of reducing the role of the 
central government, the SUJs national projects have continued to be financed entirely by 
the state after 2001. The central administration played a crucial role in finding resources 
for this purpose and creating new schemes to employ the workers. This choice was 
carefully made and involved different policy instruments, mostly special norms that 
supported various forms of public employment and ‘extraordinary agreements’ with the 
regions that found it difficult to close projects. 
    
The basin was frozen, two laws for early retirement were passed and the local municipalities 
received resources to employ SUWs directly. Early retirement is not a feasible solution any 
longer because it costs too much. New employment was created by the municipalities that 
hired the SUWs. Employment in public companies is not realistic because, for some 
companies, the SUWs do not have adequate skills and most of the companies do not want 
them. So we have the part of the SUWs population that is very difficult to relocate in the 
labour market.  
None of the public bodies felt like closing the projects and sending the workers home; this 
has never been seen as a solution. The choice to keep the SUJs going was shared with the 
central state administration because we do not want to provoke social tensions in those 
regions which already have enough occupational problems, where the unemployment rate is 
higher than other regions.  
For this reason the Ministry has always tried to find financial resources to completely cover 
the SUWs allowances and the family subsidies, where requested. Although it is a law stating 
that the local bodies should cover at least 50% of  the allowances, without the money coming 
from the National Fund for Employment many socially useful workers would have seen their 
activities interrupted (interview with M.M., Ministry of Labour, General Director at the 
‘Directorate-General for social shock absorbers and  incentives for employment’ after 2002). 
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The data presented below illustrate the state expenditure for the special laws 
and agreements which allowed some regions to obtain additional resources for the SUJs 
projects and for the job-creation schemes; the figures relating to the specific number of 
workers involved in these are indicated where available. 
 
1) Special laws: agreements ex art 27 D.L. 159/2007 changed by L. 222/2007 
 
The following two agreements involved the regions Campania and Calabria which 
received additional funds because of ‘employment stabilization’ difficulties of the SUWs.  
 
Table 4.5: Additional funds transferred to the Regions of Campania and Calabria to 
counteract difficulties related to the closure of socially useful jobs projects 
Region Date No. of SUWs to be 
‘stabilized’ 
Funds transferred 
(euro) 
Calabria 22
nd
  October 2008 712 60,000,000 
Campania 3
rd
 July 2008 300 10,000,000 
Total 1,012 70,000,000 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
2) Agreements for additional resources ex art 78, sub. 2, let. D) L. 388/2007 
 
These additional resources were given to the Lazio and Molise regions which 
implemented different measures of ‘employment stabilizations’ aimed at the closure of 
their SUWs ‘basins’. Some of the measures in Lazio focused on providing additional 
incentives to those workers willing to leave the projects. 
 
Table 4.6: Additional funds transferred to the Regions of Lazio and Molise in order to 
close their socially useful workers ‘basins’ 
Regions Date No. of SUWs to be 
‘stabilized’ 
Funds transferred 
(euro) 
Lazio 15
th
 September and 
19
th
 November 2008 
1,038  7,000,000 
Molise 10
th
 June 2009 128  4,363,233 
Lazio 15
th
 July 2011 1,254 25,000,000 
Total 2,420 36,363,233 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
124 
 
 
 
3) Special laws for the regions part of the objective Convergence. Agreements 
for additional resources ex art. 2, sub. 549, L. 244/2007 
 
Fifty million Euros from the National Fund for Employment have been allocated to the 
five Italian regions which have access to the European Structural Funds as part of the 
Convergence Objective (Basilicata, Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicily). The funds 
are provided every year from 2007 to 2013; the sums for 2008 and 2009 have already 
been transferred to the regions. Calabria was excluded from this distribution in 2008 as it 
had allocated 60 million Euros for itself. 
 
Table 4.7: Additional resources transferred to the regions as part of the Convergence 
Objective to pursue the ‘employment stabilization’ of socially useful workers 
 
Regions 
No. of SUWs  
paid by NFE at 
1
st
 Jan 2008 
Funds  
transferred 
2008 (euro) 
No. of SUWs 
paid by NFE at 
1
st
 Jan 2009 
Funds  
transferred 
2009 (euro) 
Basilicata 320 1,224,680 216 836,960 
Calabria - - 3,332 12,417,250 
Campania 7,591 35,970,440 7,079 27,222,430 
Puglia  1,965  9,895,620 1,727 7,622,470 
Sicilia 574  2,909,260 462 1,900,890 
Total 10,450 50,000,000 12,834 50,000,000 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
4) Special contributions for towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, ex art 1, 
sub. 1156, let. F) and F-bis), L. 296/2006 
 
This is a contribution given to almost 500 small towns interested in employing SUWs as 
civil servants. The funds cover the costs of employing a maximum 2,450 SUWs in total 
and are calculated at an amount of € 9,296.22 per annum per person. In the table below, 
the number of SUWs employed refers to the same people; the variations reflect new 
employment or retirement. The costs for the SUWs hired directly by the administrations 
will be covered annually by NFE until they retire. The funds are transferred to the 
municipalities with special Decrees of the General Director of the Ministry of Labour 
(1/4/2008, 3/6/2008, 16/2/2009 and 1/10/2009).  
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Table 4.8: Additional funds allocated to small towns in Mezzogiorno which were 
interested in employing socially useful workers directly 
Towns 
in the 
Regions 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
No. 
SUWs 
Funds  
(euro) 
No. 
SUWs 
Funds 
(euro) 
No. 
SUWs 
Funds  
(euro) 
No. 
SUWs 
Funds  
(euro) 
Basilicata 83 771,586 76 706,513 76 706,513 75 697,217 
Calabria 1,033 9,602,995 911 8,468,856 901 8,375,894 897 8,338,709 
Campania 410 3,811,450 414 3,848,635 411 3,820,746 408 3,792,858 
Lazio 407 3,783562 385 3,579,045 381 3,541,860 379 3,523,267 
Molise 54 501,996 53 492,670 53 492,700 52 483,404 
Puglia 58 539,181 56 520,588 56 520,588 56 520,588 
Sardinia  35 325,368 33 306,775 33 306,775 32 297,479 
Sicily 52 483,403 50 464,811 50 464,811 50 464,811 
Total 2,132 19,819,541 1,978 18,387,923 1,961 18,229,887 1,949 18,118,333 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
 
5) Financial resources for the projects financed with regional funds 
 A contribution of one million euro to towns with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants  
 
This is given to finance SUJs projects started in 2000 at the latest, and financed entirely 
with regional funds. From 2004 to 2007 the contribution was given to finance both the 
projects and the job-creation schemes involving SUWs. Beginning in 2008 the 
contribution was given for job-creation schemes only, with most municipalities receiving 
these funds located in Campania, Calabria and Sicily. The last funds transferred were for 
2008, but further resources for 2009 and 2010 are available. 
 
Table 4.9: Additional funds allocated to towns with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants to 
pursue the ‘employment stabilization’ of socially useful workers (projects paid by 
regional funds) 
 
Year 
Funds 
transferred 
(euro) 
No. of 
SUWs 
Laws 
2004 1,000,000 370 Art. 3, sub. 82, L. 350/2003 
2005 1,000,000 342 Art. 1, sub. 263, L. 311/2004 
2006 1,000,000 343 Art. 1, sub. 430, L. 266/2005 
2007 1,000,000 146 Art. 1, sub. 1156, let. E), L.296/2006 
2008 1,000,000 37 Art. 2, sub. 552, L. 244/2007 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
 An annual contribution for the City of Palermo which has seen a remarkable 
number of SUWs. The project began with funds from the Region of Sicily which, after 
some time, had insufficient resources to finance the various job-creation schemes.  
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Table 4.10: Additional funds allocated to the City of Palermo to carry out  activities and 
pursue the ‘employment stabilization’ of socially useful workers   
 
Year 
Funds 
transferred 
(euro) 
Laws 
2002 51,642,000 CIPE Decision n. 17 of 28
th
 March 2002 
2003 80,000,000 Art. 1, sub. 1, L. 289/2002 
2004 47,063,000 Art. 3, sub. 76, L.350/2003 
2005 22,000,000 Art. 1, sub. 262, L.311/2004 
2006 35,000,000 Art. 1, sub. 430, L. 266/2005 
2007 35,000,000 Art. 1, sub. 1166, L. 296/2006 
2008 55,000,000 Art. 2, sub. 550 and 551, L. 244/2007 
2009 55,000,000 Art. 41, sub. 16 –ter., D.L. 207/2008 and L.14/2009 
2010 55,000,000 Art. 41, sub. 16 –ter., D.L. 207/2008 and L.14/2009 
2011 55,000,000 Art. 41, sub. 16 –ter., D.L. 207/2008 and L.14/2009 
Source: unpublished data, Ministry of Labour, D.G. for social shock absorbers and 
incentives for employment 
 
Although the administrative devolution led to an enlarged autonomy of the 
local public bodies, along with a reinforced responsibility for the local political choice, it 
did not come with the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Peck, 1996). The data presented above 
show that the high national financial provisions have allowed the policy to continue after 
2000 and integrated the local resources allocated to the SUJs projects and their related 
job-creation schemes. 
Swank argues that although the structure of conservative welfare states like 
Germany, France and Italy ‘facilitated the integration between labour and capital, offered 
a formula for sharing the proceeds of national economic growth and promoted a “culture 
of solidarity” and trust in the welfare state’, this model was less able to address problems 
of social exclusion of immigrants, long-term unemployed or workers in irregular labour 
markets (Swank, 2002:213). As concerns Italy, the evolution of SUJs policy after 2000 is 
an example of how the problem of long-term unemployment was challenged by the 
Italian welfare state, despite the pressure of the neoliberal retrenchment. How institutions 
and local actors acted during the implementation of the policy will offer further 
understanding of this process in the following chapter.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the culminating stage of the policy-making known as the 
policy choice, that consisted of the creation of socially and publicly useful works as 
active labour policies. A clear shift from welfare-to-work interventions designed to help 
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long-term unemployed obtain further benefits was made in 1997 when a rich body of 
laws was passed with the aim of promoting new jobs through the public services 
outsourcing. Although the creation of new jobs was declared to be the policy’s ultimate 
goal, the outsourcing of a wide range of public services was considered an important 
means and it was pursued diligently by many public administrations. The way in which 
the activities were carried out during the projects’ implementation was of fundamental 
importance to make this goal more or less achievable. 
The first section of the chapter presented the elements on which this policy 
choice was based, starting with recommendations towards a labour market reform. 
Socially useful workers are recognized as a special hard–to–employ group and then 
entitled to further intervention for their re-insertion into the job market. The actions put in 
place to achieve this goal responded also to the need of the state to deliver public services 
with limited financial resource. The value structure of the policy choice was therefore 
solidaristic-cooperative and tried to maximize the benefit of both the public sector and 
unemployed. It led to the creation of a set of norms and rules able to deal with the claims 
of various categories of unemployed and to satisfy the labour demand of a wide range of 
public bodies. This ‘legal infrastructure’ was formed by a rich body of laws, but also 
made provision for specific institutions which played an important role in the 
implementation of the projects and during the policy take-up. The second and third 
subsections explain the core parts of the legal provisions introduced by the Treu Reform, 
with specific focus on the two decrees that designed the policies of socially and publicly 
useful jobs. 
Regarding the associative structure of the policy, the analysis principally 
showed a corporate regime that represented the interests of a definite group of people 
who were of significant relevance because of their large number and had the capacity to 
represent these interests collectively due to their strong unionization. In fact, the 
important role played by the social partners, firstly the trade unions, in proposing the first 
set of policy solutions has already been illustrated in the previous chapter. These have 
continued to play this role over a long period of time and all three principal Italian trade 
unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL) created dedicated sections for socially and publicly useful 
workers. The inclusion of the non-employed into the policy targets was an attempt to 
enlarge the group of interests represented and this signalled a shift towards a more 
pluralistic regime. However, many policy makers considered this transformation 
problematic for different reasons; firstly it led to a rapid increase in the number of 
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projects and secondly, it created problems in managing the projects during their 
implementation. Once the public administrations were prohibited from promoting new 
projects, SUWs and PUWs were seen to be privileged in comparison to other categories. 
The conflict between their interests and those of other disadvantaged groups in the labour 
market was resolved by means of regulations, often to the detriment of the ‘new interest’ 
expressed by young unemployed or workers with unstable jobs.  
The policy change in 2000 ‘froze the basin’ of the unemployed participating 
in SUJs and, consequently, the group was further limited. Specific data presented in this 
section acknowledge the importance of the SUWs in the local public administrations. The 
relevance of the public sector in policy choice displays a social market regime. The social 
status recognised in this category of unemployed justified promotion of activities in the 
public sector, although the job-creation schemes promoted by the policy recognized the 
role of both private and public markets in creating new jobs. Moreover, the change in the 
legislation, enabling the public administration to employ these workers directly, enlarged 
the area of the public sector. 
Various wage-subsidies schemes were used cumulatively to provide an 
incentive to the employers to hire SUWs and PUWs, but also different types of incentives 
for public administrations implementing PUJs. The policy regulated a particular regime, 
where the companies which employed SUWs and PUWs were protected from the market 
competition for the first five-year period. These norms, alongside many others analysed 
in detail throughout this chapter, provided a legal structure founded on the tradition of 
civil law where rights are formal, defined in every detail and therefore difficult to change 
by political means. This also explains to a certain extent why the special norms that 
followed the first decrees have touched on and often enlarged, the rights already acquired.  
After the administrative devolution, the central state continued to play an 
important role in supporting the policy at regional level, even when the local bodies 
should have had full responsibility for the projects they promoted and funded them 
themselves. This is analysed at the end of the chapter, where it is highlighted that the 
thesis of ‘hollowing out the state’ is not applicable in the case of this policy which, 
despite the gradual change of the paradigm, preserved many characteristics of the 
Keynesian national welfare state. 
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Chapter 5 
Policy implementation: exploring the ‘black-box’  
 
 
‘How were the socially and publicly useful workers 
considered by the administration? Difficult to say; 
they were neither employed, nor unemployed. 
Instead I can say what they did, because without 
their work, we would never have been able to 
deliver all those services without asking money 
from our citizens’. 
(Mayor of a small town in Calabria interviewed in 
2005)  
 
5.1 Introduction      
 
Policy implementation represented the most complex part of the policy process. This 
complexity is not simply attributable to the length of programmes, but also to the 
multitude of roles that local contexts have played in determining several adjustments of 
the policy. The implementation stage includes all actions put into place beginning with 
the projects’ start-up and ending with their closure. The policy take-up is analysed in the 
following chapter, investigating the different modalities to close the projects and the ways 
in which the outsourcing of services was pursued. 
The state administration at local, regional and central levels, local trade 
unions and public agencies represented those institutions actively involved in both policy 
implementation and take-up. The interaction between these actors played an important 
role in all the stages of SUJs and PUJs projects (start-up, execution and closure) and 
created a link between the projects’ implementation and the outsourcing of services and 
the creation of jobs for socially and publicly useful workers. Both entrepreneurial 
organizations and private enterprises were involved in the outsourcing of public services, 
but had little influence during the implementation stage.  
The public administrations (PAs) implementing SUJs and PUJs projects were 
local institutions
53
. Their actions in respect to this policy were driven by two 
                                                 
53
 The projects have also been promoted by other types of public bodies (regions, provinces, national parks, 
public companies, ministries etc.), but for the purposes of this research this typology was chosen because, 
numerically, the local public administrations were the most important in this policy and the procedure to 
approve the projects promoted by a local public administration was more complex than in the case of 
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complementary objectives: firstly, there was a political objective, concerning labour 
market regulation in geographical areas with structural unemployment; secondly, there 
was a more administrative objective, driven by the need to find a balance between 
continuous cuts in public budgets and the commitment to providing services to the local 
communities. As the projects endured for many years, these attitudes achieved different 
importance during the policy process under the influence of many factors: the actions put 
in place by the actors involved in the process (firstly trade unions and the unemployed 
themselves), the interactions between local administrations and the national state which 
continued to play an important role through the financial leverage, but also changes 
involving the Italian welfare state and privatization of the public services. 
The analysis presented in this chapter draws on interviews with various 
stakeholders and on a large number of observations collected when I was personally 
involved in these projects. The policy change in 2000 marked a divide between the two 
periods of the policy implementation in which different goals were pursued: expansion, 
mainly during the period 1997-2000, and contraction, after 2000. The period of expansion 
occurred after decrees 468 and 280 were passed in 1997 when the number of projects 
increased and many SUJs and PUJs had been extended several times over the maximum 
length provided by the law. During this period, most of the projects started and the public 
bodies focused on the activities’ start-up. There were a small number of administrations 
that implemented SUJs and PUJs for short periods of time and did not extend the 
projects. This occurred in particular in the northern regions where unemployment was 
reduced and the PAs activated a small number of SUWs and PUWs. Some of these 
projects finished without any ‘employment stabilization’ promoted by the PAs and in 
these cases the unemployed had to find alternative employment in the labour market. 
The period of contraction occurred after decree 81 was passed in 2000 when 
the public bodies were banned from starting-up new projects and great pressure was put 
on them to close the existing projects and outsource the public services. During this 
period the administrations focused their efforts on preparing the outsourcing and on 
governing the process of ‘employment stabilization’. This stage, corresponding to the 
policy take-up, is analysed in the next chapter. Policy implementation and take-up were 
                                                                                                                                                 
national public authorities. In addition, this unit of analysis helps in identifying the relationships between 
the local and central levels of the state administration in the implementation of SUJs and PUJs projects. 
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not disjointed. Some of the policy choices made during the projects’ start-up influenced 
their closure. 
The evaluation of policy implementation provides recognition of the 
institutions, processes and key determining variables involved from the projects’ start-up 
to their closure. This chapter is divided into three sections. 
The behaviour of the policy actors during the implementation process 
determined hazards which are analysed in section one. Beginning with the activities 
carried out in an ideal-type of project, it is explained in which ways these activities 
moved away from this model and which factors determined this shift. In this section the 
importance that both politicians and public managers had in the projects’ start-up is 
acknowledged, together with the agencies for jobs and enterprises promotion (AJEPs) 
that acted as an independent technical actor during the phase of the projects’ preparation. 
The second section investigates the interaction between the institutional 
actors during the implementation stage, in order to understand the competence structure 
that governed their behaviour, and the decision making and responsibility structure that 
ruled the transformation of the legal provisions into operational activities. The 
competence structure examines whether the activities put into place in this stage were 
more demand or supply-oriented, while the decision making and responsibility structure 
examines whether it was a hierarchical, autonomous or cooperative interaction. The 
financial and production structures of the services which were provided are also analysed 
in this section.  
The key variables are then examined in section three, illustrating the way in 
which they shaped the policy implementation and pre-determined conditions for the 
policy take-up. The projects’ length, the numbers of unemployed involved in the projects 
and the amount of time for which the unemployed were engaged in the activities 
influenced the quality of the projects and, in different ways, the policy outcomes.  
 
5.2 The ideal-type project and implementation hazards 
 
The use of the long term unemployed in public works has a long history in Italian labour 
policies. The first examples of this can be found after the end of WWII, with the so-called 
‘work-sites’ (cantieri-lavoro), which were public programmes involving a large number 
of unemployed building public infrastructures. Looking at more recent periods, the first 
projects of socially useful jobs managed by public bodies arrived during the ’80s. These 
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projects, which were aimed at the re-insertion of the unemployed, often young people, 
into the job market usually had a maximum duration of twelve months. Private 
companies were often involved in training these unemployed and had the opportunity of 
recruiting any of them at the end of the projects. The activities developed with these 
projects were of public interest, but they were not usually services that public 
administrations delivered on a regular basis. For example, activities such as the 
maintenance of the artistic and archaeological patrimony were without doubt important, 
but a mayor would not have seen them as urgent as cleaning hospitals, keeping refectories 
in public schools open or organizing the city’s waste collection.  
During the ’90s, two important factors occurred simultaneously. Firstly, the 
number of unemployed increased rapidly and different public actors were involved in 
their re-insertion into the job market. The ‘box-companies’ created by GEPI in many 
provinces – which had names like ‘Development of Initiatives for Re-insertion’, ‘New 
Occupational Initiatives’ or ‘New Entrepreneurial Activities’ – had their own 
organization and staff which they wanted to maintain. Secondly, over a short period of 
time, the restructuring of the public expenditure saw many public bodies lacking the 
financial resources necessary for the delivery of essential services. Moreover, the reform 
of local governments started in the ’90s was pushed ahead in 1995 with the 
reorganization
54
 of the public accountancy and financial system (Grossi and Mussari, 
2008; Mussari, 2006). The reform aimed to renew the relationship between local 
governments and their communities, and to reduce the central state control. If this 
signified in reality an increased degree of autonomy of local administrations, it came 
together as an increased responsibility concerning the use of resources and the 
accountability of the results achieved. This process of renewal brought a transformation 
of the entire model of administration which was now known as new public management. 
The promotion of market-type-mechanisms in the public sector and of new public 
management was seen by international organizations as the best strategy to modernize the 
administrative systems (OECD, 2005). 
The policy of SUJs and PUJs aimed, in the first instance, to return the 
unemployed into the labour market. Decrees 280 and 468, passed in 1997, introduced an 
articulate normative body for addressing long-term unemployment that was mainly 
associated with specific categories of subjects from certain geographical areas of the 
                                                 
54
 This reform was included in the Consolidated Act for Local Governments approved in 2000 (Law 
267/2000, Testo Unico degli Enti Locali). 
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country. Could this legislation be a factor in explaining the extremely high increase in the 
number of projects after 1997? As this research will show, the presence of the socially 
and publicly useful workers helped the administrations in implementing new services and 
delivering activities which would otherwise have encountered difficulties because of lack 
of public personnel and insufficient financial resources.   
This situation is associated with the fiscal adjustments that took place during 
the early ’90s which interfered with the public expenditure in different ways: the 
structural reform of pensions, limits to public employment and change to the rules 
regarding public bargaining, the introduction of rigid rules for public balances both for 
local and national public bodies, and limitation of public expenditure of local 
administrations determined at national level (Balassone et al, 2008). 
Concerning the expenditure for civil servants, three different limits were 
placed on public employment from 1990 to 1997. Between 1994 and 1996 all public 
administrations with the exception of the public education sector could take on new 
employees with a limit of 10% of long-term contracts which had ceased the previous 
year. For a limited part of the public administration, a total ban on hiring was imposed 
after 1997. These measures led to a reduction in public employment of 2.7% between 
1991 and 1997 followed then by an increase of 3.6% from 1998 to 2003 (Marino et al, 
2008:37). The ban on hiring civil servants is also the result of a process of profound 
transformation of the public administration, aiming to increase the overall efficiency of 
the public personnel, to reorganise the services delivered, to improve their quality by 
evaluating new forms of management and delivery. For this reason, many organisational 
charts were revisited and the administrative procedures were streamlined. 
Taking into account the legal provisions of the two cited decrees, an ideal-
type of SUJs project can be drawn. It represents a case in which there is perfect 
correlation between ‘programme rationality’ and ‘implementation rationality’ (Schimd, 
1997a:214), when implementation does not deviate from the statutory provisions for the 
projects. The actions put in place in such an ideal-SUJs project would follow a linear 
trajectory made up of three sequential phases in which the public actors perform specific 
actions: 
1) Start-up: the public administration decides on the services to be delivered 
through the implementation of a socially useful jobs project. The political and 
administrative parts of the public body collaborate perfectly. The number of 
unemployed is decided according to parameters of productivity and the 
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required skills are defined in order to perfectly match the job description. The 
approval procedure for the project is short and no problems are encountered as 
concerns the selection of unemployed. The requisite number of people with 
the necessary skills are selected, and the project starts. 
In the case of PUJs projects, there is an additional start-up action that 
corresponds to the activity carried out by an Agency for Jobs and Enterprise 
Promotion. The AJEP helps the PA in designing the project and assesses 
whether it meets technical requirements to meet sustainable activities. This 
kind of project provides an estimation of how much the outsourcing of the 
services is likely to cost at the end of PUJs and a proposal about the detailed 
organization of the activities. An ideal-type of PUJs project would follow, 
during its implementation, the prescriptions specified by the Agency and the 
outsourcing of the services would cost approximately the same amount as 
projected in the budget. 
2) Execution: the project runs smoothly under the supervision of public 
managers. The activities proceed without problems, the unemployed improve 
skills and productivity and boost their motivation. As the project is financed 
with national funds, the PA saves the money that would have been spent on 
the delivery of the same services if they had been outsourced. 
3) Closure: at the end of the project the PA decides to outsource the services to a 
private company or to a joint mixed public-private company which will 
employ the workers, or to a cooperative formed by the workers themselves. 
Trade unions and the unemployed welcome all of these decisions. The 
unemployed form the cooperative or accept the jobs offered by the company 
which the public services are outsourced to. The PA remains involved in the 
services’ monitoring after their outsourcing while the former socially useful 
workers consolidate their employment in the new company, through careers’ 
development, or are actively involved in the growth of their cooperative.  
 
In areas where the number of unemployed was high and public money scarce, 
it was very rare for SUJs and PUJs projects to follow these phases without any 
impediments. None of the policy actors behaved in the ways described above. The 
behaviour of each key group of actors involved in the implementation of a social policy is 
associated with a type of hazard that is relevant for the policy success (Quaid, 2002). As 
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concerns the SUJs and PUJs projects, their potential hazards are briefly described below. 
The first three types of hazards came to light in the early stages of a project, while the last 
two were more frequent in the final stage, when the public administration decided on the 
project’s closure through the outsourcing of public services.  
Political hazard: the politicians sell the idea of creating local jobs in order to 
obtain votes from the electors. No attention is paid to the organization of the services and 
to the financial resources necessary for their delivery. 
Public managers hazard: the public managers create opposition to the project 
start-up or delay the project’s closure. In the first case, the public managers act in 
opposition to the political part. Managers believe that the project raises organization 
problems and generally see it as a burden for the administration. If, however, the project 
starts, public managers try to obstruct the activities being carried out to illustrate the 
futility of the project, the inadequacy of the unemployed and the managers’ preference 
for the services to be outsourced. In the second case, SUWs and PUWs fit perfectly into 
the gaps of the PA organization chart, and the managers want to use the workers as long 
as possible and try to delay the ‘employment stabilization’.  
Target-group hazard: the long-term unemployed are interested only in 
earning their allowances, but put little effort into carrying out the activities. SUWs and 
PUWs limited participation in the project comes hand in hand with a steady involvement 
of these workers in illegal jobs. 
Trade-unions hazard: trade unions claim public jobs for all SUWs or PUWs, 
which is why the unemployed are strongly opposed to any different proposal of 
‘employment stabilization’ (e.g. jobs in private companies or cooperatives). Trade unions 
claim that a PA offers employment prospects to all unemployed involved in the project at 
the same time, meaning no partial solutions (e.g. jobs could be offered to one group of 
unemployed while another group remains involved in the project) and no different timing 
for different groups (e.g. the PA could decide to outsource different types of services over 
a longer period of time). 
Employers hazard: the companies are interested in obtaining the services 
without competitive tendering and use the socially useful workers merely for this 
purpose. Once the services are outsourced, the companies increase their profits by 
cashing in on the economic benefits provided by law for employing SUWs or PUWs. 
When the benefits end the companies drop their services and dismiss the workers. 
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How could these hazards be avoided during the project implementation? 
There was no ‘one solution fits all’ that could be applied. These hazards did not manifest 
themselves as independent events and, in most of the cases, it was the interaction between 
the target group, institutions and private companies that determined the failure or success 
of a project. 
Project implementation was driven by two objectives explained in the 
introduction, which were not incompatible. Although many projects were focused on the 
delivery of activities of public interest to local communities, the public administrations 
pursued the goal of job creation for SUWs and PUWs. In fact, the most important 
attainable outcome of the SUJs and PUJs projects remains the re-insertion of the long-
term unemployed into the job market, principally by means of public services 
privatization. The outsourcing has always been a means and not an end, even though in 
the last stage of the policy it has assumed as much importance as job creation itself. The 
outputs of the policy are, instead, the activities delivered during the projects’ 
implementation. Their relevance for the local communities, as well as for the unemployed 
involved in their delivery, is part of the policy evaluation. 
One should not overlook the fact that the implementation success does not 
coincide with the policy success, neither is it a simple measuring of the degree of success. 
As Palumbo et al (1984) show ‘there are many varieties of implementation, all of which 
might be judged successful in some regard and unsuccessful in others’ (Palumbo et al, 
1984:47). In fact, according to this perspective of the analysis, the policy outputs were 
positive if the activities were delivered adequately, proved to be useful for the local 
communities and also if they helped the SUWs and PUWs to make up for the period of 
their long-term unemployment. Therefore, when SUJs and PUJs projects did not end with 
the outsourcing of services, this did not mean that the policy implementation had failed; 
as long as the activities carried out during the projects were socially relevant. For this 
reason it is important to understand the variables that determined the behaviour of 
institutional actors during the implementation stage, and to explain the variables change 
during the policy process. 
 
5.3  Institutional actors involved in the policy implementation 
 
Almost twenty years after the socially useful jobs began, the (very few) scholars 
interested in understanding this policy examined its outcomes exclusively in terms of the 
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employment created through the public services outsourcing. Very little consideration 
was given to the fact that the activities carried out by SUWs and PUWs had a 
considerable social benefit for the local communities since the beginning of the projects.  
In many cities, schools and hospitals were cleaned, public spaces were 
cleared and waste was collected, all due to the socially useful workers. In several small 
towns, new services for elderly care or people with learning disabilities were introduced 
with publicly useful projects. Important environmental engineering work was carried out 
in five national natural parks exclusively using SUWs and PUWs. The list of works 
completed and new services implemented due to the SUJs and PUJs projects is extensive. 
They represent an important policy output that remained difficult to quantify in economic 
terms. If all these services had been delivered by public staff employed by public 
administrations, the overall cost of these activities would have been noticeably higher. 
Table 5.1 presents the structure of the activities provided by SUWs and PUWs in 2001 
and their geographical distribution. It can be observed that services of environmental 
protection were prevalent in the northern regions, the personal care services in the central 
regions and the ordinary administrative services in Mezzogiorno.  
 
Table 5.1: Distribution of socially useful workers per services and geographical areas (%) 
Service  
 
Total North Centre South 
Environmental protection and green spaces 
maintenance 
28.80 34.40 15.70 29.50 
Ordinary administrative services 17.60 6.90 30.00 17.80 
Personal care 14.00 21.00 17.20 12.50 
Services for schools 11.00 4.70 2.90 12.90 
Upgrading of urban spaces 10.50 14.00 2.30 10.90 
Cultural heritage maintenance 6.50 11.00 10.70 5.30 
Waste collection 4.30 4.10 2.30 4.60 
Non-ordinary administrative services 2.60 1.60 15.90 1.20 
Protection of safety work environments 1.40 0.60 1.30 1.50 
Environmental reclamation of disused industrial 
areas 
1.10 0.00 0.30 1.30 
Improvement of the hydrological network 0.90 0.30 0.30 1.20 
Integrated technical services for the PAs 0.50 0.00 0.10 0.60 
Improvement of public transport 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 
Management of scrap-yards and systems for waste 
treatment 
0.20 0.60 0.60 0.10 
Hydrological assets protection 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.10 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: IL (2001a), ‘La ricollocazione dei lavoratori socialmente utili’, table 1, p.25 
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The public administrations were the most important institutions involved in 
projects start-up. The projects were first approved at regional and then at central level 
which also provided the financial resources. The projects involving publicly useful jobs 
had to first be certified by an AJEP and following this were passed to the regional 
authorities. The local trade unions championed the projects’ start-up and eased the 
relationship between the unemployed and PAs. Their presence was constructive, but not 
compulsory. Young unemployed for example had less contact with the trade unions 
because they were not members. 
 
5.3.1 Public administrations (politics) 
 
The activities presented below describe the implementation of the SUJs and PUJs 
projects promoted by the local public administrations. Beginning with the activities that 
the unemployed were supposed to be involved in, the SUJs projects were prepared by the 
PA. In this case, both the political and technical parts of the administration were fully 
prepared for the project start-up. 
 
A new project initiative always started with the politicians. They were sensitive to the 
unemployment issues and were willing to show that they were able to find solutions to this 
problem. But in order to decide which services were to be targeted, how to organize them, 
how many people and what kinds of skills were necessary for them, politicians had to involve 
the PA managers. Only the managers of the public services knew these exact technical details 
and they were also able to suggest how to improve certain services, or the new ones that the 
PA could promote. When there was collaboration between politicians and public managers, 
the implementation of the projects worked well. When the politicians came with new ideas, 
but the administration opposed them, the projects failed. 
A project would be strong if it started from a genuine need of the PA, if there was money to 
allow the outsourcing of these services at the end of the project or if, at least, the PA was 
committed to finding this money for the project’s end. 
One of the most common problems I met in the field is that, as the projects were extended for 
many years, the politicians changed and, several times, this ‘communion of views’ between 
the politicians and managers failed. After a mayor worked to outsource a service and employ 
the SUWs, their successor may have very different views. In this case, the ‘employment 
stabilization’ may not be a priority and, consequently, the new mayor would not be engaged 
in finding the funds and closing the project. Sometimes the projects lasted because the 
managers did everything possible to keep them alive. At other times managers helped 
politicians to find the funds necessary for the outsourcing of the services [in the PA annual 
budget]. In other words, without the managers’ collaboration, in most cases the ‘employment 
stabilization’ failed (interview with R.DS., GEPI/IL, executive in the Region of Abruzzi). 
 
The SUJs projects contained the description of the activities and the place 
where they were to be carried out, the number of people needed and their required skills. 
The projects were approved by the Regional Commission for Employment or by the 
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Tripartite Commission
55
. In both cases, the projects approved at regional level were sent 
to the Ministry of Labour for the approval of the financial resources necessary for their 
execution. As explained in the previous chapter, after the administrative devolution 
occurred, the resources from the National Fund for Employment were sent to the regions 
based upon specific annual agreements. This two-tier structure of decision-making and 
responsibility has been maintained to the present; as long as the projects continued to be 
financed with national funds, the final decision was taken centrally, although the 
activities were promoted and approved locally. This rule concerned the start-up of new 
projects as well as the extensions to existing ones. 
 
5.3.2 Public management (administration) 
 
Once approved, a project was immediately executable, meaning that the workers could be 
selected and the activities started. The workers were selected in a ranking order, from the 
list managed by the local centre for placement
56
. This list contained all the unemployed, 
who were classified according to their professional sectors, skills and specialisations. 
When the selection involved unemployed receiving wage compensation funds by GEPI 
through its ‘box-companies’, the selection was made directly by these companies 
following the same criteria: the ranking position in the list and the skills requested for 
performing the activities described in the project. 
After the workers were selected, the activities were put in place. The cost of 
SUJs and PUJs activities was covered by a national fund, financed through tax revenue. 
The unemployed received their allowances directly from INPS, after the PA had provided 
proof on a monthly basis that they were present at work. The administration was more 
involved in this stage than the political part. The public managers responsible for the 
                                                 
55
 Before the so-called Bassanini Reform (March 1997) the projects were sent to the Regional Office for 
Labour and Maximum Employment (Ufficio Regionale del Lavoro e della Massima Occupazione - 
URLMO) which prepared them and send them for approval to the Regional Commission for Employment 
(Comissione Regionale per l’Impiego – CRI) which was made up of trade unions, entrepreneurial 
associations, the Ministry of Labour represented by the regional councillor for labour and the URLMO’s 
general manager. The Bassanini Reform brought the administrative devolution of the state authority to the 
regions. As a result, CRI was transformed into Comissione Tripartita (Tripartite Commission) made up of 
trade unions, entrepreneurial associations and the region represented by the political part (the regional 
councillor for labour) and the administrative part (the regional manager for the labour sector). 
56
 The local centres for placement (centri per il collocamento) merely had bureaucratic functions. After the 
reform they were transformed into centres for employment (centri per l’impiego) that were to provide 
services for the unemployed. The centres for employment are organized on a provincial basis and are 
specialized particularly in supply-side services: counselling, CV checks, unemployed training, skills 
balances, preparation for job interviews etc.  
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various operational sectors were in charge of the execution of the activities and for 
checking workers’ compliance with their employment duties.  
There is a strong body of research that has investigated the role of public 
management in the delivery of public policies and programmes (Behn, 1991; Denhardt, 
1993). Other writers have analysed the positive effects of the public management from 
the point of view of the administration (Ingraham and Kneedler Donahue, 2000; 
Ingraham et al, 2003) or focused on behaviours and practices of public managers 
(Ingraham et al, 1998; Ricucci, 1996, 2005). Heclo (1977) argues that it is extremely 
difficult for managers to change the culture of public organizations and often do not 
succeed in challenging the inertia of bureaucratic systems. 
Generally speaking, the role of public managers was substantially empowered 
in Italy after the radical transformation of the political system brought about by 
Tangentopoli in 1992. The investigations and processes carried out during this period 
placed an entire political class under suspicion. In order to limit corruption and reduce 
politicians having a role in running public economic activities, the public management 
received powers and responsibilities in this field. The managers responsible for different 
economic services in a public administration are in charge of competitive tendering and 
contracting (CTC), to authorize payments and monitoring the accomplishment of the 
quality of the services contracted out. 
The implementation of SUJs and PUJs projects usually meant the public 
managers faced three different scenarios: 1) if the activities were completely new, SUWs 
and PUWs were the only workforce involved in their delivery; 2) if the activities were not 
new and the PA already had their own staff involved in those sectors, managers had the 
task to administer this mixed workforce made up of public employees and unemployed; 
3) sometimes SUWs and PUWs were used to replace public staff in those sectors where 
the PA was not allowed to use any unemployed without running a public selection (e.g. 
clerical services, accountancy, HR and, generally all kinds of ‘white-collars’ jobs). These 
three scenarios determined different modes of work organization for SUWs and PUWs 
which created pre-conditions for different types of ‘employment stabilization’. 
The decision to outsource has impacts on public organizations. A comparative 
survey of outsourcing conducted by the Cranfield School of Management demonstrated 
that the public sector managers could control the transactional aspects of outsourcing 
better than the private sector managers; yet the former, unlike the latter, affirm that 
outsourcing is detrimental to the public service companies (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
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2001). In the late ’90s public managers in local public administrations in Mezzogiorno, 
dealing with SUJs and PUJs projects, were divided between two choices: some were 
championing the outsourcing of services and the SUWs being employed into the private 
sector, while others were in favour of the reinforcement of public employment through 
hiring SUWs.  
 
5.3.3 Public agencies involved in the projects’ start-up 
 
All stages described up to this point characterize the start-up and execution of both SUJs 
and PUJs projects. There is an important stage concerned only with the PUJs projects, 
which was relevant for their execution which is succinctly described below. 
The statutory provision for PUJs projects was to improve the quality of 
services and, above of all, to promote activities in the so-called ‘new employment areas’ 
such as environmental and land management, the upgrading of urban spaces, personal 
care services and social services. These projects had to be certified by AJEPs, which were 
entitled by the law to carry out activities that supported the PAs. Drawing on data 
provided by a PA, an Agency would in fact prepare the project. Starting with the 
parameters of productivity necessary for carrying out certain activities (gathered from 
technical descriptions available for almost all categories of public services), the Agency 
would present the PA with an estimation of the number of unemployed needed for the 
project, an organizational structure of the activities and also the cost of these activities in 
the eventuality they would be outsourced to a private company at the end of the PUJs. In 
this way, the PA would have a reasonable cost estimation concerning the PUWs 
‘employment stabilization’ at the end of the project. Once the project was approved by 
the Agency, the Town Council
57
 ruled on it and this document was send to the Regional 
Commission for Employment or the Tripartite Commission. Although this procedure 
required a more formal commitment from the PA towards the ‘employment stabilization’ 
of PUWs, it was however easy for an administration to change this decision before the 
project’s end. The lack of public funds for the outsourcing of the services was a 
compelling enough reason for any PA to revoke this bylaw.  
                                                 
57
 The Town Council (Giunta Comunale) is a collective body, formed of the Mayor and Councillors, 
running policies, financial and administrative issues in a city. The Town Assembly (Consiglio Comunale) is 
a political body formed of all those elected, representing the majority and minority parities. The Town 
Assembly votes on the city’s annual public budget and approves all expenses that the PA needs in order to 
deliver various services to the community. 
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Moreover, the fact that the AJEPs were paid for their technical assistance by 
providing the project design, should not be underestimated. They received an amount of 
500,000 ITL (approximately 250 Euros) for each unemployed individual involved in 
publicly useful jobs. Therefore, the PUJs projects involving a large number of workers 
were economically attractive for the agencies. This service, paid with resources from 
NFE, was imposed by law and it was seen as a routine for the agencies. As the 
responsibility for closing the projects always belonged to the PAs, no responsibility for 
the projects’ failures was attributed to the AJEPs.  
The involvement of a significantly higher number of SUJs and PUWs than 
the required number of those needed for carrying out an activity, had a strongly negative 
impact on the perspective of their ‘employment stabilization’. This variable played an 
important role in determining many extensions of the projects over long periods of time 
and influenced the policy outcomes. 
Finally, it should be stressed that during this start-up stage there was strong 
agreement between policy makers and implementers over initiating SUJs and PUJs 
projects. At local level, the politicians and trade unionists were concerned about the 
permanence of long-term unemployment and their geographical concentration; the public 
administrators were worried about the continued cuts to their budgets and the consequent 
negative impact on PAs’ capacity for providing services to the citizens; the entrepreneurs 
were interested in the privatization of public services at the end of the projects. At 
national level, there was a shared view surrounding the usefulness of the projects in both 
social and economic terms, which is why their extension was approved and financed over 
long periods of time. However, while many local PAs were motivated to start up projects, 
only a limited number were working to privatize the services. During this stage, a great 
deal of effort was put into carrying out the activities, along with involving a large number 
of unemployed in the projects. Some key variables of the projects implementation, which 
played an important role in the whole process and set priorities for the policy take-up are 
analysed in the following section. 
 
5.4 Key variables for policy implementation 
 
The majority of the PAs needed more than one extension to the projects before being able 
to outsource the activities carried out by SUWs and PUWs. When the number of 
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unemployed involved in the projects was greater, the organization of the activities was 
more complex, and the outsourcing of the services became more costly. 
The strongest argument in support of the public services outsourcing was that 
private companies were able to organize these activities more efficiently than the public 
administrations. Therefore, the organizational economies brought thorough outsourcing 
to reduce costs are beneficial for the PAs and, as the public expense for public services is 
covered by tax revenue, for the entire community. Nonetheless, there are examples of 
services that became more expensive through outsourcing, and therefore detrimental to 
customers (O’Donnell et al, 2011)58. 
Other studies show that cost-savings are made when the outsourced services 
are measurable and easily monitored, but outsourcing is far more difficult for complex 
and ‘subjective’ services, such as welfare provision; in these cases the cost reduction is 
obtained at the expense of a lower quality of services delivered (Bendick, 1989).  Even 
more interesting is the case of the city of Leipzig which, facing a high budget deficit, 
rejected privatization and created large-scale municipal companies which brought the 
needed revenues, social benefits, and greater efficiency in delivering the services (Garcia-
Zamor and Noll, 2009). 
The PAs interested in outsourcing the services however needed time to 
organize the activities and to find the financial provisions necessary for the privatization. 
The execution of the SUJs and PUJs projects allowed both.  
If the creation of new jobs for SUWs and PUWs is the policy’s ultimate 
outcome, the execution of the projects is its output. Carrying out of the projects 
successfully was often the best premise for the ‘employment stabilization’. There are 
three key variables that influenced this stage of the implementation: the length of the 
projects; the number of unemployed involved; the amount of time for which the 
unemployed were engaged in the activities (part-time or full-time).  
 
5.4.1 Projects’ length  
 
Goggin puts forward ‘two “critical” variables that differentiate one style of 
implementation from another: duration and change’ (1986:332). He asserts that when the 
                                                 
58
 The authors analyse the case of the privatization of Sydney Airport, highlighting the need for an 
appropriate regulatory system for this former public monopoly. After the privatization there was an 
increase in charges for the use of the airfield and car parks, which led to complains from the major airlines 
and consumers.  
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implementation is delayed and the policy is substantially modified during this stage, the 
implementation becomes more political and is more likely to fail. If the implementation is 
instead rapid and the policy is little modified, it involves more administration and is more 
likely to be successful.  
As regards the policy of the socially useful jobs, the main variable altered 
during the implementation process was the duration. The change of the policy during this 
stage was reflected by the fact that some administrations were implementing ‘good 
projects’ (characterized by real activities and SUWs actively involved in their delivery) 
while others were implementing ‘bad projects’ (characterized by a lack of real activities 
and SUWs who were receiving allowances without being involved). The reformulation of 
the policy in 2000 took into account these aspects and tried to favour the good practices: 
  
The administrations who really believed in the policy benefited enormously, because with 
very little expense, entirely supported by the state from the beginning, they delivered useful 
services requested by the people. In fact there are many administrators requesting a renewal 
of  the projects exactly for this reason, because in the absence of the services [delivered by 
the SUWs] the administrations would have faced complaints from the local residents. Other 
administrators were instead populist and responded to their political clientele. In this case, 
projects were inconsistent and the workers who were supposed to deliver the activities did 
very little. With the new legislation we required the administrations to improve the activities 
and, due to the devolution of the state authority at local level, we tried to increase the number 
of good projects and reduce the bad ones. So the real divide between the public 
administrations was not between those who implemented many projects and those who 
implemented only a few, but between the administrations who really believed in the policy 
and those who did not (interview with R.M., Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security from 21 October 1998 to 11 June 2001). 
 
The projects’ length depended upon many factors: the collaboration between 
politicians and public managers in the elaboration of the projects; the organizational 
capacity of the public management that determined how this new workforce was 
managed in relation to the activities to be carried out; and positive feedback from the 
local community and media concerning the utility of the activities which determined a 
positive reaction vis-à-vis the workers themselves. 
The duration in itself did not determine a negative policy outcome because 
many of the unemployed were offered jobs at the end of the projects, but rather, it 
overshadowed the policy’s positive outputs. After 2001 the activities carried out by 
SUWs and PUWs started to be considered irrelevant and great emphasis was placed on 
the permanence of these unemployed with the public administration and their (presumed) 
adversity to work in the private sector. Nonetheless, having a large number of extensions 
could hide a political hazard, in particular in those situations in which a public 
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administration was not committed to the ‘employment stabilization’ objective but 
continued to ask for a project’s extension, in order to  gain time. These situations came to 
light  more clearly during policy take-up, due to the close involvement of the trade-unions 
in this stage. 
 
5.4.2 Number of unemployed 
 
The number of unemployed involved in the projects is linked to a certain extent to the 
previous key variable. If SUJs and PUJs were implemented in order to prioritize the 
quality of the services, the PAs selected a congruent number of workers with the required 
skills to carry out the activities. This was not however an easy aim to achieve, especially 
concerning the quantitative aspect. The gravity of long-term unemployment in certain 
geographical areas was an important determinant in this process. In fact, the majority of 
the PAs attempted to involve as many as possible of their citizens who were facing long-
term unemployment in SUJs and PUJs projects. 
For some policy implementers, the need to find employment solutions for a 
large number of unemployed was incompatible with that of providing public services 
based on market productivity parameters. 
 
This process cannot be efficient because the parameters needed to deliver an optimal service 
are not taken into account when it is necessary to respond to an employment emergency. 
Attempts were made to match both these needs, but it is obvious that while the former 
determines the conditions for a company to survive in the market, the latter follows a totally 
different aim. In my opinion, it is the latter that determined how the policy worked; in other 
words, the public administrations looked firstly at the number of unemployed and lastly 
decided which activities these people could deliver.  
Another important aspect is the geographical constraint: many enterprises could have offered 
jobs in the North, but most of the unemployed were in the South and they were not willing to 
move. We should acknowledge that the employment conditions came first with respect to the 
objective of efficiency followed by private enterprises (interview with N.F., President of 
Italia Lavoro from 2000 to 2009). 
 
However, even when the projects began with an over-subscription of 
unemployed in relation to the actual number required to carry out the activities, certain 
PAs attempted to find more activities to involve the workers in, while other 
administrations did not. Instead, as regards the matching of a worker’s skills to the job 
description, many administrations ran short training courses to close such skill gaps. 
Again, the PAs which considered it important to train the unemployed sufficiently were 
committed to carrying out activities of a high quality throughout the projects’ execution. 
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The involvement of an extremely large number of unemployed in the activities prepared 
the ground for the public management hazard and for the target-group hazard. On the one 
hand, public managers found it difficult to administer large groups of workers who risked 
becoming a burden for the administration. However, on the other hand, the unemployed 
felt unmotivated and began to view their participation in the project as a compulsory, yet 
useless, activity required in order for them to be entitled to receive their allowances. 
The enlargement of the target group from the unemployed receiving wage 
compensation funds to the wider group of the long-term unemployed placed great 
pressure on local administrators, particularly in those areas of Mezzogiorno where 
unemployment had reached worrying levels. From the point of view of one of the most 
experienced policy makers interviewed for this research, the relation between the target-
group and the active work process had a strong influence in determining the success of 
the projects. He also believes that the most important factors are related to the efficiency 
of the PAs promoting the projects and championing the feeling of civic duty to a 
community. 
 
It is much easier to activate people receiving wage compensation funds because they are still 
linked to their enterprises as well as people receiving unemployment aids because these are 
usually given for short periods. These are two cases of unemployed who are still close 
enough to active work, so there are margins for recovery. Instead it is very difficult with 
people who never worked or stayed outside the labour market for long periods of time. 
Furthermore, there is an opportunistic culture in some places that make things more difficult. 
At the demonstrations organised in Naples, as well as in Palermo, some Mafia bosses 
participated without fear.  
Beyond the legislation, the policy is, above all, a matter of organisation and civic sense. The 
law introduced limitations and imposed alternative choices, but if there are no structures, no 
job opportunities, what can one do? Provisions for the project to last only six months can be 
made, but after six months when they [the unemployed] will occupy the City Council, what 
alternatives are available? Therefore the project will be extended for a further six months. It 
has always worked in this way. 
Unfortunately the policy worked better in areas where there was less need, in Friuli, Veneto, 
Lombardy, in small counties were the labour market was already in a good situation and the 
number of unemployed was low. Their activities were checked, the administrations were 
efficient and everything worked well. In these places the workers were useful, but less 
needed than they were in Campania, for example (translated from an interview with T.T., 
Minister of Labour and Social Security from 17 May 1996 to 21 October 1998). 
 
The question to be raised at this point is ‘what would have happened if the 
unemployed had not occupied the City Council when the project ended and they had been 
sent back home; what alternatives would they have had?’ In reality, the striking level of 
the long-term unemployed in these areas had already caused serious riots in the ’90s. In 
Naples for example, the movement of the organized unemployed was very active from 
this point of view.   
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The institutional success in certain Italian regions is explained thorough a 
number of specific social and economic factors. Institutions perform better in those 
regions where there are more favourable political traditions, more advanced social 
economic development, greater social stability and slower social change (Putnam et al, 
1983). National policies such as those analysed in this research, are instead requested 
more in less developed regions, where all these factors that favour institutional success 
are fragile. The question remains therefore what configuration there needs to be to 
achieve a policy in order to be effective in such challenging conditions. The neoliberal 
turn blurred these concerns. In early 2000 the discourse in the field of labour policy 
started to emphasise the responsibility of single individuals with respect to their 
employment hazards and to stress the need to reduce the direct participation of public 
institutions in the economic field. 
 
5.4.3 Part-time vs. full-time activities 
 
The legislation provided for the amount of work for a minimum of twenty hours per week 
for a socially/publicly useful worker. The allowance covered this work supply, but the 
public administrations were allowed to use the unemployed up to thirty six hours per 
week, equivalent to a full-time contract in the public sector. The supplementary hours 
worked were paid by the public administrations with their own resources and were 
calculated on the basis of the basic hourly rate of a civil servant doing equivalent work. 
The decision to use SUWs and PUWs either part-time or full-time was taken 
at the beginning of the projects but the PAs could change this during the execution of the 
activities. The total amount of work per person was, to a certain extent, determined by the 
overall numbered of unemployed involved in a project. In those cases were the number of 
unemployed was high, it was preferred to ‘share’ a full-time socially useful job between 
two people. Another important variable was the availability of public funds, so the PAs 
with very limited resources were not able to spend additional money for SUJs and PUJs. 
The unemployed who had their allowances integrated with supplementary 
hours worked, earned net incomes close to those of the public servants. The gross cost of 
labour was however different, because the PAs did not pay national insurance for SUWs 
and PUWs. It is difficult to gauge whether there was a difference concerning people’s 
work commitment between the unemployed involved part-time and those involved full-
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time in the projects, but it was generally agreed that the SUJs and PUJs allowances were 
rather small, even with respect to the minimum living expenses in Mezzogiorno.  
The income from socially useful jobs was nonetheless important for workers 
and their families. During 1997-2000 Italia Lavoro carried out a survey on a 
representative sample of 10,598 SUWs. One of the variables investigated was the 
percentage of income received through participation in SUJs in the family’s income. 
Table 5.2 reports these results, divided according to gender and categories of unemployed 
involved in SUJs (former recipients of wage compensation funds and long-term 
unemployed without any form of benefit). It can be observed that the income from SUJs 
was crucial in those families where males, former recipients of wage compensation funds, 
were the sole bread-winners. In the same category the majority of females’ income was 
instead supplementary to that provided by their partners, yet more than 19% of long-term 
unemployed women were the sole bread-winners.   
 
Table 5.2: Sources for family income for socially useful workers (%) 
 Former recipients of wage 
compensation funds 
Long-term unemployed 
without benefits 
Males’ 
families 
Females’ 
families 
Males’ 
families 
Females’ 
families 
Only the socially useful 
worker 
59.0 16.6 46.5 19.3 
Socially useful worker and 
another family member 
33.7 68.7 33.4 61.2 
Socially useful worker and two 
or more family members 
7.3 14.7 20.1 19.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Italia Lavoro (2001b), ‘Socially useful workers’, tables 9, 10, 30, 31, p.21 and 49 
 
The law provided the possibility for SUWs and PUWs to earn additional 
money from other jobs, for a maximum of 600,000 ITL (about 300 Euros) per month. As 
the unemployed were interested in maintaining their “status”59 as SUWs and PUWs, the 
most common way to increase their incomes was by taking temporary jobs on the illegal 
market. It seems that the target-group hazard was, to a certain extent, increased by the 
fact that SUJs and PUJs allowances were generally insufficient when the workers were 
involved in part-time activities:  
                                                 
59
 This status entitled SUWs and PUWs to take part in projects implemented by the PAs, and, more 
importantly, to receive an offer for their ‘employment stabilization’ once the administrations decided to 
close the projects. Finding stable jobs was the most important goal for the unemployed and, as long as this 
opportunity was available, they preferred to remain involved in the projects. There are obviously cases of 
people leaving the projects for external job offers, but this was not on a large scale. 
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The black labour market exists, but it is not only for the working class. How many managers 
deliver consultancy services outside their jobs, without paying taxes? It is clear, if I have an 
income of 500 Euros per month, this is an incentive to work illegally. If you deduct the cost 
of the bills from the allowance for socially useful jobs, you have almost nothing left. If an 
MP tried to live on 500 Euros per month, he would understand that the law he made would 
encourage people to work on the black market. This crime involves, however, high risk. A 
person involved in this and then caught, faces serious allegations of robbery and fraud. There 
are two instruments of leverage, if we do not want SUWs and PUWs working on the black 
market: 1) they could work full-time for the public administrations and receive decent 
salaries; 2) they could receive allowances for part-time jobs but, for the remaining time, they 
could be paid to participate in training courses financed by European funds and this would 
also be useful to re-qualify them for jobs offered by private employers (interview with G.DO, 
Secretary of CGIL in the Province of Teramo, Region of Abruzzi). 
     
The activities financed with their own funds were better monitored by the 
public administrations and this suggested a better outcome of public management in 
controlling the projects outputs. The unemployed involved for thirty six hours per week 
had major economic benefits for taking part in the projects. Moreover, this variable was 
important for the ‘employment stabilization’, because the trade unions did not accept 
reductions of SUWs salaries as a result of the services outsourcing and put pressure on 
the administrations to find enough financial resources to guarantee full-time jobs after the 
projects’ closure. These processes are investigated in chapter 6. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the policy implementation that represented a complex part of the 
policy system. A well-structured group of laws, created to address many categories of 
long-term unemployment, entitled public bodies to implement socially and publicly 
useful jobs. After 1997 the number of projects noticeably increased and many public 
services were delivered by socially and publicly useful workers at both local and national 
levels. 
The first section of this chapter presented the sequential phases of an ideal-
type of project and the potential hazards relevant to the policy’s success. These hazards 
are associated with the principal actors involved in the policy process: politicians, public 
managers, trade-unions, potential employers and the unemployed themselves. Politicians 
and public managers were greatly involved during the projects’ start-up and execution. 
Trade-unions and employers played a major role during the projects’ closure, when the 
public services were privatized.  
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All activities carried-out during this policy stage were aimed at involving 
long-term unemployed in public activities. The competence structure of the policy 
implementation was therefore demand-oriented. The projects were promoted locally, but 
they needed central approval and funds were allocated at central state level. Moreover, 
any extension of the projects followed the same procedures and the final decision always 
came from the central state administration. As a result, the decision making structure 
associated with the project implementation was hierarchically-centralized for most of the 
projects. When the projects were paid instead with regional funds, they were approved by 
the Regional Commissions for Employment and, only in these cases, was the central state 
not involved in the decisional process. 
The local and central state institutions had responsibilities during this stage. 
Trade unions championed project start-up, but the responsibility for implementation was 
always given to those public bodies that had prepared the projects, requested formal 
approval and then organised the execution of activities. The agencies which certificated 
the PUJs projects are acknowledged as an independent institution involved in 
implementation, although their responsibility vis-à-vis the final project outcomes was 
very limited. However, without their involvement in this policy stage, the PUJs projects 
would not have been implemented. 
The way in which these three institutions have been involved in the 
implementation process was examined in the second section. A distinction is made 
between the roles of the PAs’ political and administrative parts (politics and 
administration) in the projects’ start-up. The role of the public management 
(administration) in the execution of the projects is examined separately, showing different 
scenarios which they were confronted with while the activities were carried out. It was 
also acknowledged that the transformation of the public administration due the devolution 
of the central state authority brought administrative power to local governments. This in 
turn, favoured the rise in market-type-mechanisms of the organization of public services 
and a new public management model. 
 The decision making and responsibility structure of the policy 
implementation was therefore hierarchical-centralized up to the time of  administrative 
devolution. It became more autonomous-decentralized afterwards, although the financial 
leverage of the central state continued to play an important role during the further 
extensions to the projects. The AJEPs were involved in the implementation process as an 
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independent actor, but these agencies had cooperative relationships with the public 
administration through which PUJs projects were certified. 
The financial and production structures of the policy were both entirely 
public. The cost of the allowances was covered through tax revenues, while the services 
were delivered by public structures without charging fees. The use of SUWs and PUWs 
in new types of activities has, in fact, allowed the delivery of new services without any 
additional cost to the communities. In the case of the most traditional public services, 
they have continued to be delivered without increasing taxation and, in many case, a 
better quality of the services was provided. 
The third section analysed the key variables for the policy implementation 
which form the catalyst structure. The number of unemployed involved and the typology 
of socially useful jobs they accessed (part-time or full-time) influenced the development 
of the projects. The political and public managers’ hazards increased when this number 
was too high in relation to the workforce necessary to carry out a certain number of the 
activities. On the one hand the organization was more complex when a higher number of 
workers were involved and, at the same time, the likelihood of them accessing 
‘employment stabilization’ in a short period of time was smaller. On the other hand, the 
participation of the unemployed in SUJs and PUJs projects with full-time contracts was 
more positive and this allowed them not only to earn higher incomes, but also to feel 
more motivated and consider themselves as ‘internal’ to the public organizations. For 
these reasons this factor reduced the target group hazard. 
The most important variable was the long duration of the projects due to 
repeated extensions. In 2000 the frequency of extensions brought changes to the 
legislation to prevent the implementation of new projects and to close existing ones. 
However, the long duration of a project was not equivalent to a negative policy outcome. 
The projects were extended in order to allow the delivery of services to the local 
communities and also aid PAs in finding the funds for the outsourcing. When, despite 
several extensions to the projects, this did not happen, it is likely that political hazard 
occurred. 
The services delivered by the unemployed during the execution of the 
projects remain a rather neglected policy output. The moral attitude against the public 
administrations which decided against privatizing the services and employed directly the 
workers was negative. However, the central state institutions did not withdraw their 
support and, as explained in the previous chapter, substantial public funds were allocated 
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to those public administrations which made this choice. The following chapter will 
explore the controversial process of the policy take-up which corresponds to the 
‘employment stabilization’ together with the public services outsourcing.  
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Chapter 6 
Policy take-up: the ‘employment stabilization’ 
 
‘While the public administrator tries to cut 
costs, the politician aims at creating jobs. 
Reaching both goals is how to try to square the 
circle. This was the ‘employment stabilization’ 
of socially useful workers’. 
(President of Italia Lavoro interviewed in 2009) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The policy take-up, as described by Schmidt (1997a), is the last part of the policy process 
where the goals associated with the target groups are achieved. The policy of socially and 
publicly useful jobs had as its ultimate goal the re-insertion of long-term unemployed in 
the labour market. The legislation called this objective ‘employment stabilization’, seen 
as the creation of new jobs that would be maintained over a long period of time. The 
means by which this goal was to be reached was specified during the policy formation: 
public services were to be outsourced to companies which would employ the socially and 
publicly useful workers for the delivery of these services. Four options were offered to 
the workers within this frame: to form cooperatives by themselves; to be employed by 
private companies; to be employed by joint mixed private-public companies (formed of 
PAs and IL); or to be employed directly by public administrations. This last option was 
not part of the initial policy choice, but was added when the policy was revised.  
As already explained in chapter 2, a large part of the academic literature 
dealing with public services outsourcing stresses the importance of transaction costs in 
service outsourcing and appears to recognize a trade-off between cost efficiency and 
service quality. While some authors acknowledge difficulties encountered in the 
outsourcing of quality services, they fail to provide an explanation of the way in which 
non-economic variables, such as institutions, local communities, national and 
international regulations etc., impact on whether outsourcing occurs or not. Although cost 
efficiency was taken into consideration, most of the public administrations willing to 
close SUJs or PUJs projects prioritized social goals over economic ones. Moreover, as the 
final policy goal was that of providing opportunities for stable jobs, its achievement 
cannot be limited to the moment of outsourcing the services. The success of  
‘employment stabilization’ can be attributed to a combination of factors that continued to 
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play a role beyond project closure and, in fact, it is essential to understand under which 
circumstances those jobs were maintained over a longer period of time.    
There are strong connections between the last two stages of the policy. Many 
actors involved during the implementation continued to play an important role in relation 
to the ‘employment stabilization’. Some public agencies which had been involved in the 
certification of PUJs projects, such as Italia Lavoro (former ‘Itainvest’), became key 
policy facilitators during this last stage. Trade unions continued to champion SUWs 
rights for jobs, but their strategy became stricter in order to respond to the new goals. 
Although the enterprises entered the policy scene later, they displayed a clear strategy to 
access the potentially large market of local services which was opened through 
privatization. In the previous chapter the trade-unions’ and employers’ hazards were 
pointed out. The ways in which they affected the policy outcomes are explained in this 
chapter. 
The analysis of policy take-up provides recognition of the actors, processes 
and key determining variables involved in the last stage of the projects and, in many 
circumstances, during the first five-year period of services outsourcing. This chapter is 
divided into three sections.  
The first section explains ‘employment stabilization’ and the other ways in 
which the projects could come to an end. Unpublished data provided by Italia Lavoro 
through its institutional function of monitoring the SUWs ‘basin’ are analysed here, 
looking at the geographies of the new employment and its temporal distribution. Drawing 
on these data, the competence structure that governed the behaviour of the institutional 
actors during the policy take-up is also presented.  
Section two focuses on the role of Italia Lavoro and SCO as policy facilitators 
and on their relationship with the other actors (public administrations, trade unions and 
private employers). Drawing on the models of intervention of Italia Lavoro and SCO, the 
various stages of services outsourcing are also presented in this subsection. When the 
public administrations decided against using these two public agencies in this stage, they 
still had to perform the same activities with the private enterprises involved in the 
process. The decision making and responsibility structure concerning the transformation 
of activities into services is therefore investigated here, together with the incentive 
structure that sped up outsourcing. 
The third section identifies the key variables acting during the ‘employment 
stabilization’ that are broadly recognized as determinants of policy success or failure. All 
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these categories employed in the analysis of policy take-up are then summarized in the 
conclusion.   
 
6.2 ‘Employment stabilization’ and the different ways of bringing the projects to 
an end 
 
The legislation concerning SUJs and PUJs entitled the public administrations to outsource 
services without running any competitive tender. The services were outsourced for a 
maximum five-year period and after this the public administrations organized competitive 
tenders, as for any other service outsourced. This dispensation from free-competition 
rules was temporary (until 31
st
 December 1999) and it concerned exclusively companies 
hiring disadvantaged groups such as the long-term unemployed. However, this derogation 
was used after 1999 and, in 2003, Italy was subject to legal proceedings regarding its 
disrespect of the principle of free competition. As a result, the legislation was changed in 
2003-2004 and, starting in 2005, the outsourcing of public services without competitive 
tendering and contracting (CTC) was strictly limited.  
The use of CTC for public services outsourcing is a highly contested issue. 
Rimmer (1998) argues that the impact of CTC should be measured against accountability, 
service quality, costs, the sources of cost savings, broader social and economic impact, 
and its economy-wide effects. As concerns the cost savings, it is important to understand  
‘whether this savings have been measured properly; whether savings are maintained in 
the long term; and the extent to which savings represent efficiency gains or simply 
transfers from a group to another’ (Rimmer, 1998:78). 
More recent research carried out in Scandinavian countries investigated the 
politics of competitive tendering (Fredriksson et al, 2010) and the modernization of the 
regulatory state, focusing specifically on the regulatory regimes for tenders (Veggeland, 
2008). Investigating the perceptions of local-level Finnish politicians, Fredriksson et al 
(2010:650) found that politicians do not have strong expectations that CTC will 
substantially reduce costs. Furthermore, the left-right dimension does not influence 
politicians’ opinions about tendering and all of them were instead worried about CTCs’ 
effects on local democracy, as they were expecting tendering to reduce the likelihood of 
them influencing services provision. Veggeland (2008) demonstrates that Norway and 
Sweden, setting their upper limit for bidding much lower than required by the EU 
regulation, favoured the growth of small and medium businesses with a lower investment 
156 
 
 
capacity. As a result, small enterprises had the opportunity to participate in tenders, win 
bids and become contractors. In this way, the number of small and medium businesses 
grew and employment increased between 1993 and 1998 in these countries.  
The unpublished data analysed below are collected annually by Italia Lavoro 
within its institutional role as national agency for active labour policies. These data refer 
to SUJs projects promoted by local public administrations which are financed with 
resources from the NFE. The data presented in tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 therefore 
do not include the projects promoted by the national public bodies and those paid for 
directly by the regions (especially the projects involving approximately 40,000 SUWs in 
Sicily), but also take into consideration those workers who have temporarily interrupted 
their participation in the projects
60. This activity of monitoring the SUWs ‘basin’ began 
in 2001 and it represents an important instrument for the Ministry of Labour in 
determining the amount on funds to be transferred to the regions through annual 
agreements. 
Few detailed records exist before 2001 when the stock of SUWs was recorded 
at certain dates, usually the start, middle and end of the year. Overall, at the beginning of 
2001 there were approximately 113,200 SUWs:  60,400 paid with resources from NFE 
and 52,800 paid for by the regions (about 42,700 SUWs in Sicily and 10,100 in the other 
regions). As Sunley et al (2001:494) acutely observe, ‘unemployment is not just about 
stocks, but also about flows into and out of joblessness: unemployment is not simply a 
state, but a process’. During the period 1994-2000 there was a high variation in both  
inflows of long-term unemployed into SUJs, who were not entitled to receive wage 
compensation funds, and outflows of unemployed who benefited from early retirement 
schemes. In 2000 the stock of SUWs remained steady, and all data recorded annually 
thereafter dealt only with the outflows. 
Table 6.1 presents the geographical distribution of the SUWs used by local 
public administrations at the beginning of the period monitored by IL, and at present (the 
most recent data available), as well as the total number of people who exit the projects 
finding new jobs (‘with employment stabilization’) or for other reasons (‘without 
employment stabilization’). In order to have a more complete representation of the 
                                                 
60
 The law allowed for socially useful workers to interrupt their participation in the projects for periods less 
than 12 months. In this case they did not receive the allowances during the period of interruption, but did 
not lose their ‘status’ as SUWs and were entitled to be re-integrated in the projects at the end of this period. 
For this reason the data recorded by IL are slightly higher than those recorded by INPS for the same 
periods. 
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projects’ evolution, these data must be matched with those presented in chapter 4 (tables 
4.2 and 4.3) which take into consideration the SUWs paid for by regional funds as well.  
 
Table 6.1: Stock of socially useful workers employed by local public administrations and 
number of exits 
 Regions 
SUWs active 
at 1st Jan 
2001 
Exits between 1
st
 Jan 2001 – 31st Dec 2011 
SUWs active 
on 1
st
 Jan 
2012 
With 
‘employment 
stabilization’ 
Without 
‘employment 
stabilization’ 
Total 
Aosta Valley              17                       -                    17                  17                      -  
Piedmont         1,403                  466                  937             1,403                      -  
Lombardy            397                  209                  188                397                      -  
Liguria         1,287                  368                  919             1,287                      -  
Veneto            298                  186                  112                298                      -  
Friuli V. G.               44                    16                    28                  44                      -  
Emilia 
Romagna            220                       -                  220                220                      -  
Tuscany         1,102                  687                  415             1,102                      -  
Umbria            779                  585                  194                779                      -  
Marche            768                  459                  309                768                      -  
Lazio         6,865               4,248               2,617             6,865                      -  
Abruzzi         2,835               2,241                  594             2.835                      -  
Molise            847                  665                  182                847                      -  
Campania       19,764               9,672               4,543           14,215             5,549  
Puglia         6,872               4,126               1,438             5,564             1,308  
Basilicata         2,404               1,984                  275             2,259                145  
Calabria         7,879               3,512               1,680             5,192             2,687  
Sicily         3,548               2,435                  793             3,228                320  
Sardinia         3,069               2,251                  736             2,987                  82  
Total       60,398            34,110            16,197           50,307           10,091  
Source: unpublished data, Italia Lavoro – Division for crisis management assistance, 
monitoring of social shock absorbers and socially useful workers 
 
An attempt to partially reconstruct the annual stock of all SUWs
61
 during a 
ten-year period is made in table 6.2. The data referring to the geographical macro-areas 
are an elaboration on data from the IL database. Additional data referring to the projects 
financed directly by the region of Sicily are indicated.  
                                                 
61
 Decree 81/2000 cancelled out the difference between SUJs and PUJs, unifying them in a single category; 
socially useful jobs. The PUJs were more restrictive in terms of creating new jobs as the PAs had to specify 
how the new jobs would be created at the end of the projects, as well as the economic feasibility of the new 
activities. The PUJs which had not reached these goals but had been extended by the end of 2000, were 
therefore transformed into SUJs. In certain regions, such as Calabria, this transformation also interested the 
PUJs for the young unemployed promoted by law 280/’97, although these projects should have been 
completed by 2000.  
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Table 6.2: Distribution of socially useful workers by geographical macro-areas and 
Region of Sicily (2001-2011) 
Group of 
Regions 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North-West 3,104 722 509 
       
  
North-East 562 7 
        
  
Centre 9,514 6,193 5,246 3,957 3,648 3,456 3,080 2,827 2,254 1,789 1,344 
Mezzogiorno 47,218 32,249 26,845 20,674 19,007 17,977 17,111 15,724 13,371 11,509 10,361 
Total 60,398 39,171 32,600 24,631 22,655 21,433 20,191 18,551 15,625 13,298 11,705 
   
Region of 
Sicily  
42,735 27,816 25,591 22,000 16,000 10,000 7,327 7,321 6,708 6,000* 6,000* 
Source: adapted from Italia Lavoro, unpublished data, and Region of Sicily (2009); (*) 
estimated 
 
The regions of the North-East closed all their SUJs projects by the end of 
2002 and those in the North-West one year later. Beginning in 2004, the SUWs in the 
central macro-area were all located in the region of Lazio. The highest number of SUWs 
was located in Mezzogiorno and, in particular, in the following three regions: Campania 
(accounting for 33% in 2001 and 55% in 2012), Calabria (accounting for 13% in 2001 
and 27% in 2012) and Puglia (accounting for 11% in 2001, at parity with Lazio, and 13% 
in 2012).  
Considering that statistics accounted for 113,251 SUWs, in total, on 31
st
 
December 2000 (table 4.3.), there were still 10,118 SUWs activated directly by the 
regions at the beginning of 2001. With the exception of Sicily, there is little evidence 
available from official sources of the geographical distribution and ‘employment 
stabilization’ for those unemployed paid by regional funds. It is striking that the number 
of SUWs activated in the region of Sicily in 2001 was almost equal to that of those 
activated in all the other Southern regions. The special status of autonomous region 
allowed Sicily to create a rich set of laws and regulations to this purpose. The regional 
norms followed the national legislation, but, due to its financial autonomy, the region was 
less limited in deciding the number of SUJs projects to be activated. However, as 
previously shown, the financial difficulties encountered during the last decade made the 
national institutions determined to provide financial support to some public 
administrations managing large numbers of SUWs in Sicily, primarily in the City of 
Palermo.  
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Fig. 6.1: Distribution of socially useful workers per geographical macro-areas 
and the Region of Sicily (2001-2011) 
 
Source: adapted from Italia Lavoro, unpublished data (2001-2012) and Region 
of Sicily (2009); 2010 and 2011 estimated 
 
 
During the period 2001-2011, more than 50,000 SUWs exited the projects: 
68% of them were employed or started their own business (so-called ‘employment 
stabilization’), while 32% exited the projects for other reasons (retirement, voluntary exit, 
a project’s end, death, a project being abandoned etc.). 
The tables 6.3. and 6.4. (pages 161-162) present the geographical and annual 
distribution of different forms of ‘employment stabilization’ (the first seven columns, 
starting from the left side) and forms of exits from the projects (the next four columns 
moving to the right). All data refer to projects promoted by local PAs and financed with 
national money. 
At national level the most frequent form of ‘employment stabilization’ was 
public employment, with more than 16,000 jobs accounting for 47% of the overall 
number of jobs created. More than 12,000 jobs were created in private companies, 
accounting for 37%, while  almost 3,800 jobs
62
 were created by the joint mixed private-
public companies (JMPPCs) promoted by Italia Lavoro, which account for 11%. 
Voluntary exit was the most significant form of exit, accounting for 33% of 
the total. This form was especially promoted by the regions of Lazio and Campania 
(accounting together for the 68% of the total voluntary exits) which both provided for 
generous financial incentives to those SUWs willing to wind down the projects. The 
                                                 
62
 This figure does not include the people employed in the JMPPCs before 2001 who accounted for about 
4,400 jobs for SUWs, long-term unemployed and people receiving mobility aids. 
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second form of exit was retirement, accounting for 27% of the total exits. The highest 
number of SUWs retired during this eleven-year period was recorded in the region of 
Campania (38%), due to the demographic features of the policy target group in this 
region.  
As for the temporal distribution of the new jobs, the period 2001-2003 was 
crucial for  ‘employment stabilization’: 82% of the jobs in private companies, 97% of 
those in cooperatives and 80% of those in JMPPCs were created in these three years. This 
situation was as a result of the increased pressure placed upon local PAs in order to close 
the projects but also by the derogation from the competitive tendering until 2004. 
Moreover, the technical assistance provided by Italia Lavoro was intensified in all 
southern regions during this period and many regions passed regional laws providing 
additional incentives to those companies which would employ socially useful workers in 
the delivery of public services. Almost 60% of the public jobs were created in the same 
three-year period but targeted legislation promoted in 2008 and 2010 helped small PAs to 
further employ SUWs directly. The contracts of collaboration were used for SUWs 
working in clerical positions until 2005; the majority of these contracts (64%) were 
stipulated in 2001. Finally, approximately 70% of all various forms of exit occurred 
between 2001-2003: 85% of total retirements, 55% of all voluntary exits, 75% of all exits  
due to a project’s end and 70% of all other forms of exit not classified.   
From the data analysed above it can be seen that the pressure to close the 
projects noticeably increased in 2001 and, in certain cases, the public administrations did 
not create opportunities to employ the SUWs at the end of the projects. Flexible contracts 
were offered, as well as incentives to accelerate their exit from the projects. Early 
retirements were another measure promoted to reduce the number of SUWs. Therefore, 
the competence structure of the policy take-up that describes the behaviour of the 
institutional actors in this policy stage recognizes a shift from demand-driven to supply-
driven measures after the policy change in 2000. 
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Source: unpublished data, Italia Lavoro – Division for Crisis Management Assistance, Monitoring of Social Shock Absorbers and Socially 
Useful Workers 
Table 6.3: Geographical distribution of different types of ‘employment stabilization’ and other forms of exits (1st Jan 2001 – 31st Dec 2011)  
Regions 
Employed 
by joint 
mixed 
companies 
formed by 
IL 
Employed 
by private 
companies 
Employed 
by 
cooperatives 
Employed 
by the PA 
which 
promoted 
the project 
Employed 
by another 
PA 
Flexible 
Contracts  
with the 
PA which 
promoted 
the project 
Self-
employment 
Retirement 
Voluntary 
exit 
Project 
end 
Other 
forms 
Total 
Aosta Valley                   -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                       -                    -                 1               12                 4               17  
Piedmont                   -                 83                 60              317                    -                   4                      2                 66                 9             242             620         1,403  
Lombardy                   -                 91                    -              108                    -                   3                      7                   4                 4             180                  -             397  
Liguria                   -                 19              138                 76                    -              132                      3                   2               79               86             752         1,287  
Trentino Alto Adige                   -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                       -                    -                  -                  -                  -                  -  
Veneto                   -                   5                 44              119                    -                 15                      3                   4                 8               99                 1             298  
Friuli Venice Giulia                   -                    -                    -                 11                    -                   5                       -                    -                 1               27                  -               44  
Emilia Romagna                   -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                       -                    -                  -             205               15             220  
Tuscany                   -                 71              163              399                    -                 51                      3                   9             212             122               72         1,102  
Umbria                   -                 90              152              306                    -                 20                    17                 23               61               54               56             779  
Marche                   -                 29              157              174                    -                 97                      2                   3               66             213               27             768  
Lazio                47              429              165           3,265              284                 37                    21              451         1,227             409             530         6,865  
Abruzzi                   -              420              823              568                    -              410                    20              122               76             328               68         2,835  
Molise                   -              117              127              401                   1                   6                    13                 42               67               54               19             847  
Campania          2,460           2,728              341           4,001                 20              114                      8           1,653         2,421               35             434       14,215  
Puglia             327           1,568              572           1,203                 44              362                    50              719             350             157             212         5,564  
Basilicata                   -           1,170              115              331                   2              360                      6              119               70               40               46         2,259  
Calabria             100              721                 52           2,572                   3                 14                    50              615             477             126             462         5,192  
Sicily             712              453              203              897                 13              152                      5              193               70               95             435         3,228  
Sardinia             141              859              102              791              163                 14                  181              377             159               14             186         2,987  
Total          3,787           8,853           3,214         15,539              530           1,796                  391           4,402         5,358         2,498         3,939       50,307  
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Table 6.4: Annual distribution of different types of ‘employment stabilization’ and other forms of exits (1st Jan 2001 – 31st Dec 2011) 
Years 
Employed by 
joint mixed 
companies 
formed by IL 
Employed 
by private 
companies 
Employed 
by 
cooperatives 
Employed by 
the PA 
which 
promoted 
the project 
Employed by 
another PA 
Flexible 
Contracts  
with the PA 
which 
promoted the 
project 
Self-
employment 
Retirement 
Voluntary 
exit 
Project 
end 
Other 
forms 
Total 
2001 
              
1,696  
             
4,010  
                  
2,331  
             
6,644                     -              1,146              97              341  
              
1,573  
     
1,492  
   
1,897  
      
21,227  
2002 
                 
319  
             
2,059  
                     
626  
             
1,474                     -                 327            100              195  
                 
953  
        
131  
      
387  
        
6,571  
2003 
              
1,014  
             
1,159  
                     
154  
             
1,013                     -                 258              61           3,187  
                 
411  
        
257  
      
455  
        
7,969  
2004 
                 
350  
                
294  
                       
53  
                
526                  39                   64              34              208  
                 
168  
        
215  
        
25  
        
1,976  
2005 
                   
29  
                
153  
                       
25  
                
486                  24                     1              28                72  
                 
205  
          
12  
      
187  
        
1,222  
2006 
                   
33  
                
448  
                         
7  
              
330                  40                     -              24                56  
                 
244  
            
4  
        
56  
        
1,242  
2007 
                 
328  
                
225  
                         
5  
              
649                  87                     -              11                35  
                 
233  
            
2  
        
65  
        
1,640  
2008 
                   
18  
                
173  
                       
10  
             
2,265                105                     -              30                35  
                 
126  
          
32  
      
132  
        
2,926  
2009 
                      
-  
                
151  
                         
3  
              
613                127                     -                2              103  
              
1,015  
            
9  
      
304  
        
2,327  
2010 
                      
-  
                
160  
                         
-  
           
1,026                  31                     -                3              109  
                 
182  
          
11  
        
71  
        
1,593  
2011 
                      
-  
                  
21  
                         
-  
              
513                  77                     -                1                61  
                 
248  
        
333  
      
360  
        
1,614  
Total 
             
3,787             8,853  
                
3,214  
          
15,539               530            1,796           391          4,402  
             
5,358     2,498    3,939  
      
50,307  
Source: unpublished data, Italia Lavoro – Division for Crisis Management Assistance, Monitoring of Social Shock Absorbers and Socially Useful 
Workers 
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Table 6.5. presents the geographical distribution of five types of 
‘employment stabilization’ occurring in the period 2001-2011. The data are presented 
incrementally, from the most stable form of employment (public employment) to the 
least stable (self-employment). The jobs created by the JMPPCs promoted by Italia 
Lavoro are categorized as ‘quasi-public employment’, those created by PAs using 
flexible contracts are categorized as ‘precarious’ and those created by private companies 
and cooperatives have been grouped together. 
 
Table 6.5: Geographical distribution of different types of ‘employment stabilization’ (1st 
Jan 2001- 31
st
 Dec 2011) 
Regions 
  
Public 
employment 
Precarious 
public 
employment 
Quasi-public 
employment 
Private and 
cooperative 
sector 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Total 
 
(val.) 
  
val. % val. % val. % val. % val. % 
Piedmont       317  68         4  1         -            -       143  31        2  0         466  
Lombardy       108  52         3  1         -            -         91  44        7  3         209  
Liguria         76  21      132  36         -            -       157  43        3  1         368  
Veneto       119  64        15  8         -            -         49  26        3  2         186  
Friuli V.G.         11  69         5  31         -            -            -  -        -  -           16  
Tuscany       399  58        51  7         -            -       234  34        3  0         687  
Umbria       306  52        20  3         -            -       242  41      17  3         585  
Marche       174  38        97  21         -            -       186  41        2  0         459  
Lazio     3,549  84        37  1       47  1      594  14      21  0      4,248  
Abruzzi       568  25      410  18         -  -    1,243  55      20  1      2,241  
Molise       402  60         6  1         -  -      244  37      13  2         665  
Campania     4,021  42      114  1  2,460  25    3,069  32        8  0      9,672  
Puglia     1,247  30      362  9     327  8    2,140  52      50  1      4,126  
Basilicata       333  17      360  18         -  -    1,285  65        6  0      1,984  
Calabria     2,575  73        14  0     100  3      773  22      50  1      3,512  
Sicily       910  37      152  6     712  29      656  27        5  0      2,435  
Sardinia       954  42        14  1     141  6      961  43    181  8      2,251  
Total   16,069  47   1,796  5  3,787  11  12,067  36    391  1    34,110  
Source: adapted from Italia Lavoro, unpublished data – Division for crisis management 
assistance, monitoring of social shock absorbers and socially useful workers  
 
In order to better understand which variables shaped different choices 
concerning the projects’ closure, the next section will look more closely at the process 
of ‘employment stabilization’, focusing on the role played by the key actors during its 
main stages. 
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6.3 Public agencies as policy facilitators: Italia Lavoro and SCO 
 
As the outsourcing of public services is not possible without the availability of public 
funds, the PAs were the most import actors, with formal responsibility for ending the 
SUJs projects. The national state authorities played a binding role in this process, 
warning the PAs that their funds would be withdrawn if they did not adopt specific 
measures to promote ‘employment stabilization’. The annual agreements for the transfer 
of funds from the Ministry of Labour to the regions gradually became more stringent 
regarding this requirement, although it was the responsibility of every public 
administration to find the best solutions for outsourcing of services and the creation of 
new jobs. Nevertheless, the existence of public funds was necessary, but not sufficient 
to close the projects. The services had to be organized in such a way that they would 
permit a private company to carry out the activities without interfering with the PAs 
organization. This implied collaboration between the political and administrative sectors 
of the local bodies and the capacity to organize on an entrepreneurial basis the activities 
that were usually carried out in different ways. 
The trade unions were another actor that put pressure on public 
administrations to create new jobs and close the projects. Public employment was the 
solution preferred by the unemployed and sustained by trade unions because it was 
considered to be the most stable over time. Another motivation that supported trade 
unions in their action which was in favour of public jobs was the belief that, given the 
activities and the organization of work, SUWs were formally unemployed, but basically 
did the same work as the civil servants, and it would have been discriminatory to 
employ them under a different type of contract. However, the law did not allow SUWs 
to be employed as civil servants without running a public selection. Specific legislation 
provided for a ‘reserve’ of 30% of the PAs vacancies63 which were to be made available 
for disadvantaged individuals as SUWs.  
The third actors involved in this process were the private enterprises that 
aspired to deliver these services. In general, many companies in this sector were not 
aware of the legal mechanisms which would give direct access to public services if they 
                                                 
63
 This rule was available for the first three levels of public employment only, those corresponding to 
operational jobs. The clerical jobs, for example, could not be covered without recruiting externally or in 
the absence of specific legal dispositions. Before the arrival of special decrees that allowed PAs to hire 
SUWs directly, those employed in clerical positions had been ‘stabilized’ with flexible contracts (so-
called co.co.co, contracts of coordinated and continued collaboration).  
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employed socially useful workers. The intense activity of supporting the PAs in 
promoting the ‘employment stabilization’ carried out by IL and SCO helped the 
entrepreneurial world to become closer to the reality of the SUJs. Those PAs that 
decided not to use IL and SCO directly during the projects’ closure, still used the 
activity of providing counselling on legal and technical areas delivered by these 
agencies in order to learn how to draw up ‘plans for employment stabilization’ (piani di 
stabilizzazione occupazionale) and to stipulate ‘contracts for services outsourcing’ 
(convenzioni per l’esternalizzazione dei servizi). The employers were the other actor 
responsible for the ‘employment stabilization’ and for the delivery of outsourced 
services. In the case of the JMPPCs formation Italia Lavoro played the role of the 
‘private’ employer during the first period of the outsourcing and it became a formal 
contractee until its exit from the companies. As concerns SCO, it had the role of 
introducing its private shareholders (consortiums of cooperatives) to the PAs and to 
guarantee the accuracy and legality of the outsourcing process, but in this case the 
contractees became the consortiums. 
Italia Lavoro and SCO played an important role as policy facilitators, not 
only in terms of the number of new jobs created due to their activity, but also because 
they introduced a method of intervention that increased the projects’ quality and the 
rigour of the whole process.  
 
6.3.1 Italia Lavoro 
 
The joint mix public-private companies were first created by GEPI, when it had to find 
solutions to the unemployed taken by its ‘box-companies’. Law 498/’92 provided the 
PAs with the possibility of forming mixed companies with private partners chosen 
through competitive tendering. The administrations could participate with a minority 
quota in the capital of the new joint companies which aimed at the delivery of public 
services, the realization of public works and other infrastructures related to the services.  
GEPI passed under control of the Treasury in 1993 and changed its name to 
‘Itainvest’. Law 95/’95 gave ‘Itainvest’ the task of creating joint mixed companies for 
specific social purposes, firstly with the re-insertion of long-term unemployed receiving 
mobility aids into the job market. In this case, the public administrations could form the 
companies directly with ‘Itainvest’, without running competitive tenders. The 
participation of the public agency in the joint mixed companies was limited to five 
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years, after which its quota of capital had to be sold on the market to private 
competitors. In 1997 ‘Itainvest’ merged with a new public agency for the development 
of new entrepreneurial initiatives, ‘Sviluppo Italia’, but the branch dedicated to active 
labour policies was dropped and formed Italia Lavoro. Nine JMPPCs formed by 
‘Itainvest’ passed to Italia Lavoro in 1997, along with a fund dedicated to this activity. 
At that time business plans for forty other new joint mixed companies were in their first 
stage of elaboration in different regions and Italia Lavoro participated in the formation 
of many of them. 
Decree 468/’97 enlarged the target group of long-term unemployed to 
SUWs and PUWs, who became entitle to be hired by joint mixed companies formed 
with the purpose of new job creation in the public services sector. Until the end of 2005 
Italia Lavoro formed sixty eight JMPPCs with local and national PAs and eighteen 
instrumental companies which had specific duties, all connected to the general 
institutional aim of the agency
64
.  Over ten years of activity the JMPPCs formed by IL 
created 13,895 jobs, 8,245 of which concerned SUWs, the long-term unemployed and 
people receiving mobility aids. According to the services delivered, the average 
investment of IL was between €3,500 and €8,000 per job created65. 
Italia Lavoro participated with a share of maximum 49% of the capital in the 
JMPPCs and remained in the companies for a maximum period of five years. 
Afterwards IL had to sell its share on the market to private enterprises chosen thorough 
public tender. At the end of 2012, for an overall share capital issued of €26,950,928, the 
capital gain from all joint mixed companies of IL was €13,880,885 (table 6.6) 66 . 
Moreover, IL earned dividends from a small number of JMPPCs, for an overall amount 
of €7,182,329. The data presented below show also that IL lost its quota of capital in 
those companies that went badly. In that case, if the loss was not covered by IL, it was 
                                                 
64
 Italia Lavoro was created by the Treasury (today, the Ministry of Economy) to promote and manage 
SUJs and PUJs projects, in any economic sector, aimed at the creation of stable job opportunities for this 
target group, especially through the creation of joint mixed companies. This goal changed in 2001 when 
IL became the national agency for active labour policies and its role as technical instrument of the 
Ministry of Labour was formally recognized. The activity concerning SUWs declined rapidly after 2002 
and the company started to carry out many different projects aimed at promoting employability of specific 
target groups who experienced difficulties accessing the labour market: the unemployed youth, disabled 
people, prisoners, unemployed women resident in the southern regions, the long-term unemployed over 
fifty, etc.  
65
 All data presented in this section are taken from the ‘Joint Companies Report’ (2008 and 2010) 
prepared by the IL internal Division for Joint Companies and presented to the company’s board of 
directors (unpublished documents). 
66
 The capital gain was calculated when IL dismissed its quota of issued capital by transfer to the PA 
partner, to a private company or, if the JMPPC was closed. The data include also eight of the nine joint 
mixed companies formed by Itainvest, which were passed to IL in 1997 and were sold by the latter. 
167 
 
 
the PA partner in charge for this. In one way or another, the losses of JMPPCs were 
however covered with public money. 
Although IL is a public company, it participated in the JMPPCs as a private 
partner, as substitution for the private enterprises which entered only after the five-year 
start-up period. In another possible scenario, the private enterprises could participate in 
the management of JMPPCs from the beginning, but apparently they were not 
interested. 
 
When IL was created I went to speak with Confindustria about their participation in the 
JMPPCs. I thought that this would be a real challenge. I asked them if they were interested 
in participating in the management, if they could indicate any managers who would be 
interested in working on the boards of directors of these new joint mixed companies, but 
they refused. I do not know why Confindustria did not agree to be involved directly. 
Although I repeatedly told them they could play an important role in determining how these 
companies would perform, Confindustria was sceptical and did not believe in this policy. 
We were not interested in asking for money, but expertise (interview with M.G., President 
of Italia Lavoro from1997 to 2000). 
 
Without the direct involvement of private managers, IL tried to find a way 
to play this role in the JMPPCs by selecting the head of the board of directors or at least 
one member. The formation of a joint mixed company involved the following stages: 
1) Business plan preparation: starting from data provided by different technical 
offices of the PA, IL prepared a detailed plan of the services organization and 
quantified the costs relative to their delivery.  
2) Business plan negotiation: following discussions with the PA, the plan was 
adjusted. The most important items for discussion were the number of SUWs to 
be employed, the typology of contracts, the amount of funds necessary for the 
outsourcing of the services and the amount of capital to be subscribed for the 
formation of the new company. Trade unions were an active partner in this stage, 
usually alongside the political branch of the PA. 
3) PA formal approval: once the plan was agreed, the City Assembly ruled on it, 
together with other official documents such as: company’s statute, shareholders 
agreement and assembly regulation. 
4) IL formal approval: IL board of directors approved the company statute, the 
share of capital to be subscribed (maximum 49%) and the period of time that IL 
would  remain in the company (maximum five years). In this occasion IL also 
nominated at least one member to the board of directors of the new company and 
an auditor.  
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5) The JMPPC constitution, carried out in front of a public notary. 
6) ‘Employment stabilization’ and activities start-up: once the company was 
formed, it was ready to employ SUWs (minimum 40% of the labour force 
necessary to deliver the services) and to start the new activities which were paid 
for by the PA according to the business plan. 
7) Control and monitoring were regularly carried out by the IL internal Division for 
Joint Companies which checked the new company’s balances and acted to 
prevent or solve managerial problems. 
8) IL exit: the PA had the right to make an offer to buy the IL share of capital. If 
this did not happen IL would exit the company selling its quota through 
competitive tender. The new private partner would be entitled to deliver the 
services without further tendering for another five years. The reform of local 
public services through decree 269/2003 and law 350/2003 completely changed 
this rule. The new regulation introduced the concept of in-house provision
67:
 a 
JMPPC is permitted to have the services outsourced directly by a PA without 
competitive tendering only if the former works mainly for the latter, and the 
latter controls the former in the same way it usually does with its own structure. 
In other words the public partner has to maintain the majority in the JMPPC 
ownership, but also to control the organization and services delivery.  
 
Because of the new regulation concerning the outsourcing of public 
services, the interest of private companies in entering the JMPPCs changed. Under these 
circumstances, PAs remained the only partners entitled to buy the IL capital shares 
directly but, as their financial resources were limited, almost all the PAs were 
unprepared to make this acquisition at the end of the five-year period. As a result, the 
dismissal of IL financial participation in JMPPCs was delayed and these companies lost 
their appeal to potential private partners. As can be observed in table 6.6. in forty five 
JMPPCs out of sixty one the capital share of IL was bought by the local PA partner. 
A.V., Coordinator of the Division for joint companies in IL form 2002 to 2010, believes 
that ‘changes to the regulation started because Confindustria became interested in the 
                                                 
67
 In 2005 the European Court of Justice further explained the specific characteristics of the in-house 
provision of public services. It was highlighted that the outsourcing of public services without public 
tendering to JMPPCs was illegal and could not be considered in-house provision if it did not respect the 
very strict rules of control over the joint mixed company (Judgment of 11 Jan 2005, Cause C-26/03/CE 
and Judgement of 10 Nov 2005, Cause  C-29/04/CE). 
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market of local public services and the private enterprises were dissatisfied having to 
compete with the JMPPCs formed due to this policy’ (interview data). 
Finally, it should be made clear that all activities carried out by IL with the 
purpose of SUWs ‘employment stabilization’ were paid for with national funds. Until 
the end of 2001 the money was provided by the Ministry of Labour through the so-
called Project OFF (Orientamento e Formazione Finalizzata – Targeted Job Orientation 
and Training) that used financial resources from the European Social Fund. IL received 
in total €34,873,993 of which €1,801,661 had been given to SCO for the activities 
carried out by this company for the same policy goal. 
In addition, the law entitled the AJEPs that certified PUJs projects to receive 
3,000,000 ITL (approximately €1,500) for every publicly useful worker that exited the 
project through ‘employment stabilization’. IL also earned money from this activity 
because it was the public agency that certified the highest number of PUJs projects. It is 
interesting to note that the payment of this sum was not linked to the efforts put in by 
the agencies into activities aimed at ‘employment stabilization’ (technical aid for the 
PAs, training or counseling covering a large rage of legal and practical issues) and an 
agency that had done nothing to help a public administration in closing the project 
would still have received this money. The most notorious case was that of IL receiving 
€18,000,000 68  in 2001 for 16,300 SUWs employed as technical-administrative 
assistants in schools, an operation that was entirely projected and carried out by SCO 
and with minimal involvement from Italia Lavoro.  
                                                 
68
 If the law was applied IL was entitled to receive more than €25,000,000. Taking into consideration also 
that IL was not implicated in this operation at all, the Ministry of Labour considered that €25 million was 
too much and decided to pay a lump-sum equal to €18 million.  
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Table 6.6: Joint Mixed Public-Private Companies formed by Italia Lavoro with local/ national public administrations. Accountability data at the 
moment of the companies’ transfer or their closure (continues) 
 
Joint Mixed Public-Private Companies               
created by Il and Pas 
 Issued Share 
Capital 
(Euros)  
 Capital 
(Euros)  
IL 
quota  
 IL shares (Euros)   Price at 
transfer 
(Euros)  
 Capital gain 
(Euros)  
Date of 
transfer 
Type of 
transfer  Issued share 
capital  
 Capital  
ACSE s.p.a. 
   
1,032,920.00  
          
798,396.00  5.00% 
            
51,646.00  
         
39,919.80  
          
59,458.67  7,812.67  
12/07/2005 
local PA 
partner 
ADRANO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
2,000,000.00  
       
1,981,605.00  49.00% 
          
980,000.00  
       
242,746.61  
        
245,000.00  -735,000.00  
11/10/2005 
local PA 
partner 
ALBA SERVICE s.p.a. 
      
774,684.00  
       
2,027,455.00  49.00% 
          
379,595.16  
       
993,452.95  
     
1,029,000.00  649,404.84  
01/06/2005 
local PA 
partner 
ALES s.p.a. 
   
5,616,000.00  
       
9,130,873.00  70.00% 
       
3,931,200.00  
    
6,391,611.10  
                       
-    0.00  
19/06/2009 by law 
ANDRIA MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
361,480.00  
       
1,131,687.00  49.00% 
          
177,125.20  
       
554,526.63  
        
281,560.00  104,434.80  
16/06/2006 
local PA 
partner 
ARAL s.p.a. 
      
669,500.00  
          
747,984.00  23.00% 
          
153,985.00  
       
172,036.32  
        
173,023.00  19,038.00  
07/02/2005 
private 
company 
ARPAC MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
150,000.00  
          
102,296.00  49.00% 
            
73,500.00  
         
50,111.81  
          
73,500.00  0.00  
16/06/2005 
local PA 
partner 
ARTI s.p.a 
      
104,000.00  
            
98,750.00  40.70% 
            
42,328.00  
         
40,191.25  
          
42,500.00  172.00  
08/10/2002 
private 
company 
ASUB s.p.a. 
   
1,549,200.00  
       
1,722,829.00  49.00% 
          
759,108.00  
       
844,186.21  
     
1,035,119.12  276,011.12  
01/10/2006 
local PA 
partner 
BARI MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
1,033,000.00  
       
1,307,033.00  49.00% 
          
506,170.00  
       
640,446.17  
        
911,400.00  405,230.00  
25/07/2005 
local PA 
partner 
BRINDISI MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
102,291.00  
          
102,291.00  49.00% 
            
50,612.50  
         
50,612.50  
     
1,084,559.49  1,033,946.99  
30/07/2001 
private 
company 
CAPRI AMBIENTE s.p.a. 
      
361,520.00  
          
278,559.00  49.00% 
          
177,144.80  
       
136,493.91  
        
775,718.26  598,573.46  
20/07/2001 
private 
company 
CARBINIA s.p.a. 
      
400,000.00  
          
473,615.00  49.00% 
          
196,000.00  
       
232,071.35  
          
70,031.00  -125,969.00  07/03/2012 
local PA 
partner 
CASORIA S.p.a. 
   
1,030,640.00  -409,492.00  23.71% 
          
244,364.74  -97,090.55  
                       
-    -244,364.74  29/11/2007 
local PA 
partner 
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Joint Mixed Public-Private Companies               
created by Il and Pas 
 Issued Share 
Capital 
(Euros)  
 Capital 
(Euros)  
IL 
quota  
 IL shares (Euros)   Price at 
transfer 
(Euros)  
 Capital gain 
(Euros)  
Date of 
transfer 
Type of 
transfer  Issued share 
capital  
 Capital 
CASTELLAMMARE DI STABIA  
MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
1,796,082.00  
       
1,944,658.00  42.28% 
          
759,383.47  
       
822,201.40  
        
965,775.28  206,391.81  12/09/2001 
private 
company 
CATANIA MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
4,128,000.00  
     
12,127,724.00  49.00% 
       
2,022,720.00  
    
5,942,584.76  
     
2,281,000.44  258,280.44  28/11/2008 
local PA 
partner 
CATANZARO SERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
866,400.00  
          
971,190.00  49.00% 
          
424,536.00  
       
475,883.10  
        
472,714.00  48,178.00  20/10/2006 
local PA 
partner 
CITTA' SOLIDALI s.p.a. 
      
120,000.00  
          
121,964.00  49.00% 
            
58,800.00  
         
59,762.00  
          
59,762.00  962.00  06/04/2006 
private 
company 
COPERTINO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
516,450.00  
          
775,835.00  47.00% 
          
242,731.50  
       
364,642.45  
        
242,732.00  0.50  01/08/2006 
local PA 
partner 
ETRURIA SERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
2,678,040.00  
       
2,824,841.00  49.00% 
       
1,312,239.60  
    
1,384,172.09  
     
1,764,911.00  452,671.40  13/12/2004 
local PA 
partner 
FINALE AMBIENTE s.p.a. 
      
722,400.00  
          
757,925.00  46.40% 
          
335,193.60  
       
351,677.20  
        
394,655.00  59,461.40  27/11/2004 
local PA 
partner 
FLEGREA LAVORO s.p.a. 
   
1,300,000.00  
          
379,438.00  49.00% 
          
637,000.00  
       
185,924.62  
        
333,000.00  -304,000.00  25/01/2011 
local PA 
partner 
GEMMA s.p.a. 
      
774,685.00  
       
5,484,772.00  25.00% 
          
193,671.25  
    
1,371,193.00  
     
2,373,221.57  2,179,550.32  22/05/2002 
private 
company 
GE.SE.MA s.p.a. 
      
750,000.00  
          
169,337.00  49.00% 
          
367,500.00  
         
82,975.13  
        
409,354.00  41,854.00  27/05/2009 
local PA 
partner 
GEO ECO s.p.a 
      
463,441.00  
          
115,040.20  49.00% 
          
227,086.09  
         
56,369.70  
          
56,369.70  -170,716.39  26/06/2009 
closed 
GESIP PALERMO s.p.a. 
   
2,323,800.00  
     
13,116,544.00  49.00% 
       
1,138,662.00  
    
6,427,106.56  
     
4,000,000.00  2,861,338.00  16/02/2007 
local PA 
partner 
GHELAS MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
400,000.00  
          
499,923.00  49.00% 
          
196,000.00  
       
244,962.27  
        
229,361.72  33,361.72  15/06/2011 
local PA 
partner 
IGICA s.p.a. 
   
2,066,000.00  
       
2,630,489.00  49.00% 
       
1,012,340.00  
    
1,288,939.61  
     
1,300,000.00  287,660.00  07/11/2007 
local PA 
partner 
INFRATARAS s.p.a. 
      
516,400.00  
          
464,052.00  49.00% 
          
253,036.00  
       
227,385.48  
        
289,797.69  36,761.69  10/09/2004 
local PA 
partner 
 
 
ISCHIA AMBIENTE s.p.a. 103,291.00  
          
280,953.00  49.00% 
            
50,612.59  
       
137,666.97  
        
402,836.70  352,224.11  25/12/2001 
local PA 
partner 
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Joint Mixed Public-Private Companies               
created by Il and Pas 
 Issued Share 
Capital 
(Euros)  
 Capital 
(Euros)  
IL 
quota 
 IL shares (Euros)   Price at 
transfer 
(Euros)  
 Capital gain 
(Euros)  
Date of 
transfer 
Type of 
transfer  Issued share 
capital  
Capital 
LAZIO SERVICE s.p.a. 
      
408,000.00  
       
1,535,820.00  49.00% 
          
199,920.00  
       
752,551.80  
        
900,000.00  700,080.00  25/11/2005 
local PA 
partner 
LUPIAE SERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
520,000.00  
          
353,477.00  46.00% 
          
239,200.00  
       
162,599.42  
        
268,344.69  29,144.69  13/10/2004 
local PA 
partner 
MEGA SERVICE s.p.a. 
      
500,000.00  
          
260,597.00  49.00% 
          
245,000.00  
       
127,692.53  
        
259,167.21  14,167.21  03/04/2007 
local PA 
partner 
MELITO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
310,000.00  
          
271,344.00  49.00% 
          
151,900.00  
       
132,958.56  
        
177,000.00  25,100.00  24/04/2011 
private 
company 
MOLFETTA MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
516,000.00  
       
1,192,323.00  49.00% 
          
252,840.00  
       
584,238.27  
        
473,430.00  220,590.00  15/12/2006 
private 
company 
MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
258,230.00  
          
224,299.00  49.00% 
          
126,532.70  
       
109,906.51  
        
142,985.79  16,453.09  05/07/2004 
local PA 
partner 
MULTISERVIZI PALERMO s.p.a. 1,032,000.00 0.00 49.00% 505,680.00 0.00 
   
closed 
NAPOLI SERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
2,013,960.00  
       
2,427,449.00  49.00% 
          
986,840.40  
    
1,189,450.01  
    
1,418,054.00  431,213.60  26/02/2004 
local PA 
partner 
O.P.S. s.p.a. 
      
516,457.00  
          
682,240.00  19.00% 
            
98,126.83  
       
129,625.60  
        
168,150.00  70,023.17  24/07/2002 
local PA 
partner 
PICENO DA SCOPRIRE s.p.a.  
      
153,000.00  
          
153,721.00  49.00% 
            
74,970.00  
         
75,323.29  
          
75,322.00  352.00  17/10/2003 
local PA 
partner 
QUALIANO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a 
      
413,100.00  
          
631,351.00  49.00% 
          
202,419.00  
       
309,361.99  
        
309,127.00  106,708.00  21/12/2007 
local PA 
partner 
QUARTO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
   
1,068,948.00  
       
1,416,256.00  49.00% 
          
523,784.52  
       
693,965.44  
        
672,782.74  148,998.22  12/07/2005 
local PA 
partner 
RECAM s.p.a. 1,0000,000.00 1,314,077.00 49.00% 490,000.00 643,897.72 554,844,81 64,844,81 01/08/2008 
local PA 
partner 
ROMA MULTISERVIZI S.p.A. 
   
2,065,828.00  
       
2,891,733.00  49.00% 
       
1,012,255.72  
    
1,416,949.17  
     
3,581,628.69  2,569,372.97  10/05/2000 
private 
company 
SALERNO MANUTENZIONI s.p.a. 
   
1,032,900.00  
       
2,409,418.00  49.00% 
          
506,121.00  
    
1,180,614.82  
        
935,695.00  429,574.00  10/01/2006 
local PA 
partner 
 
 
SANTA TERESA s.p.a. 1,000,000.00 1,803,453.00 49.00% 490,000.00 883,691.97 490,000.00 0.00 29/12/2009 
local PA 
partner 
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Joint Mixed Public-Private Companies               
created by Il and Pas 
 Issued Share 
Capital 
(Euros)  
 Capital 
(Euros)  
IL 
quota 
 IL shares (Euros)  Price at 
transfer 
(Euros) 
 Capital gain 
(Euros)  
Date of 
transfer 
Type of 
transfer  Issued share 
capital  
Capital 
SEA SERVIZI E AMBIENTE s.p.a. 
   
1,669,355.00  
       
1,562,146.00  38.00% 
          
634,354.90  
       
593,615.48  
        
634,355.00  0.10  18/01/2006 
local PA 
partner 
SERSAN s.p.a.  
      
516,400.00  
          
295,627.00  9.00% 
            
46,476.00  
         
26,606.43  
          
26,607.00  -19,869.00  29/10/2010 
closed` 
SE.TER.NA. s.p.a. 
   
1,291,100.00  
       
1,294,700.00  49.00% 
          
632,639.00  
       
634,403.00  
        
632,639.00  0.00  09/12/2004 
local PA 
partner 
SIAL SERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
500,000.00  
          
166,669.00  49.00% 
          
245,000.00  
         
81,667.81  
          
81,667.32  -163,332.68  25/05/2011 
local PA 
partner 
SIRACUSA RISORSE s.p.a. 
      
750,000.00  
          
870,188.00  49.00% 
          
367,500.00  
       
426,392.12  
        
426,392.00  58,892.00  07/07/2010 
local PA 
partner 
SIT SICILIA s.p.a 
      
120,000.00  
            
92,349.00  51.00% 
            
61,200.00  
         
47,097.99  
          
61,200.00  0.00  13/02/2007 
local PA 
partner 
SIT NAZIONALE s.p.a 
      
350,000.00  
          
313,935.00  49.00% 
          
171,500.00  
         
38,457.37  
          
42,875.00  -128,625.00  14/05/2007 
national PA 
partner 
SOMER s.p.a. 
      
310,967.00  
          
357,077.00  30.00% 
            
93,290.10  
       
107,123.10  
        
102,564.43  9,274.33  22/01/2004 
local PA 
partner 
TASTI s.p.a.  
      
125,000.00  
            
30,444.00  49.00% 
            
61,250.00  
         
14,917.56  
            
9,909.67  -51,340.33  17/07/2009 
closed 
TARANTO ISOLAVERDE s.p.a. 
   
1,000,000.00  
       
1,236,963.00  49.00% 
          
490,000.00  
       
606,111.87  
        
489,996.50  -3.50  29/03/2011 
local PA 
partner 
TARANTO MULTISERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
516,400.00  
       
2,221,074.00  49.00% 
          
253,036.00  
    
1,088,326.26  
        
500,000.00  246,964.00  23/01/2006 
local PA 
partner 
TECNOCIVIS s.p.a. 
      
258,000.00  
          
388,545.00  35.00% 
            
90,300.00  
       
135,990.75  
        
175,000.00  84,700.00  12/03/2004 
private 
company 
TERRA DI LAVORO s.p.a. 1,032,800.00 1,413,888.00 49.00% 506,072.00 692,805.12 692,805.12 186,733.12 17/01/2008 
local PA 
partner 
T.ERRE.E. CARE CAMPANIA s.p.a 
      
150,000.00  
          
153,507.00  24.00% 
            
36,000.00  
         
36,841.68  
          
36,000.00  0.00  03/08/2007 
local PA 
partner 
TRAPANI SERVIZI s.p.a. 
      
413,120.00  
       
2,300,378.00  49.00% 
          
202,428.80  
    
1,127,185.22  
        
700,000.00  497,571.20  22/07/2010 
local PA 
partner 
TOTAL JMPPCs 56,521,789.00 92,423,614.20   
        
26,950,928.47  
   
43,765,131.26  36,394,903.61 13,880,855.14 
  Source: adapted from unpublished data from the Division of Joint Companies, Italia Lavoro 
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6.3.2 SCO (Sviluppo Cooperazione Occupazione) 
 
SCO was a key company of Italia Lavoro which had the same goals as the national 
agency, but made use of different means: the creation of new job opportunities for SUWs 
and other categories of disadvantaged subjects through the formation of cooperatives or 
employing them in cooperatives already existed. SCO was created in 1998 with 60% of 
capital coming from IL and the remaining 40% equally divided between the most 
important national consortiums of cooperatives in the sectors of production (CNS – 
Consorzio Nazionale Servizi) and social services (CGM – Consorzio Gino Mattarelli). 
CNS is a consortium of Legacoop that, at that time, had 180 associated 
cooperatives, while CGM is a group of Confcooperative that connected 44 territorial 
consortiums, accounting for more than 600 social cooperatives. In 2000, in order to re-
balance the earnings between SCO’s private shareholders69, another two consortiums 
joined the company. The IL maintained 60% of the shares of the capital, while the four 
consortiums had a share of 10% each. The new entrants were CICLAT (Consorzio 
Italiano Ausiliari del Traffico), a large structure of Confcooperative in the sector of 
production, that connected 96 cooperatives, and DROM, a new consortium of social 
cooperatives connected to Legacoop which had 11 territorial consortiums accounting for 
190 cooperatives. CNS was the most important consortium in the service sector, and with 
some important exceptions
70
, it has not cooperatives in the area of social services. The 
most important consortium in this area was CGM which had a very definite view of the 
importance that cooperation had in helping the social integration of long-term 
unemployed: 
 
I believe that we need the others to solve problems. What I want to say is that, if you do not 
start from this starting point, it is difficult to understand the cooperative’s values. This is how 
we interpret cooperation in a global world; otherwise, without these values, what should we 
expect from competition? A global war? I do not want such a world. Thinking of our activity, 
we work for the social integration of people. If we are responsible for the re-insertion of 
somebody who was unemployed for a long period of time, it means that we are responsible 
for that person. This means, if they need a house, it should be possible to provide them with 
it; if they are experiencing a personal crisis, they should receive help to overcome it. I think 
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 The services outsourced to production cooperatives were more expensive than the social services, the 
reason being that the turnover that CNS (Legacoop) had as a result of SUWs ‘employment stabilization’ 
was higher than that obtained by CGM (Confcooperative). The entrance of new members was carried out to 
increase Confcooperative’s turnover by bringing its production cooperatives into the policy process. 
DROM was a less active partner and the number of projects closed through its cooperatives was very 
limited.  
70
 The Italian legislation recognizes two types of social cooperatives (see footnote 43, page 100). CNS has 
specialized cooperatives for social integration (type B).  
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that SCO should have recognised these values in a better way. The cooperative spirit is not 
separate from a competitive one; they should co-exist and this is what we mean by economic 
democracy, which we want to build. There is, instead, a sort of hegemonic-thought: the best 
enterprise is that which obtains the greatest profit at the end of the year. I think that an 
enterprise should reach its goals, and those are not at all exclusively economic (interview 
with G.D., General Manager of CGM, consortium member of Confcooperative). 
 
The reasons behind the adhesion of the consortiums of cooperatives to SCO 
are instead far more pragmatic: SCO was seen as a commercial organization which, due 
to its connections with institutions and public bodies, was able to bring contracts to its 
private shareholders. As long as they were recipients of outsourced services and if no 
contractual problems occurred, the cooperatives were engaged in employing the SUWs 
for the periods stated in the contracts. There are a few situations when the cooperatives 
formed by SUWs and PUWs were integrated in the consortiums and became competitive, 
but, in general, the consortiums were interested in hiring the unemployed in large, well 
established, cooperatives. When SCO was no longer useful for opening this market, the 
consortiums dropped it and tried to build a relationship directly with the contractees 
(Ministries for national services and local PAs for local services). 
 
The enormous advantage brought by SCO was that it was a public agency that had its own 
preferential channels for dialogue with the institutions. It had contacts with various 
ministries, and also with INPS. It was similar to a commercial structure, but it was also able 
to solve our problems with the public administrations. At the time when SCO was closed 
[SCO was incorporated into Italia Lavoro at the end of 2006] we had to re-organize our 
regional structures in a short period of time. When Italy was the object of EU legal 
proceedings because of its disregard for the legislation of competitive tendering, SCO had 
largely lost its reason for existing. We also had to deal with a new government [a right-wing 
coalition] that did not want dialogue with SCO. We were actually told that they [the 
government] wanted to speak to us, but not with SCO. At that point the institutional mission 
of SCO was no longer recognized
71
. We overtook SCO because we wanted to build direct 
dialogue with the Ministry in order to have a direct contact with our service providers 
(interview with M.A., General Manager of CICLAT, consortium member of 
Confcooperative). 
  
SCO carried out its activities in the same regions as IL, but usually in those 
cases where the PAs were not interested in forming joint mixed companies because of a 
lack of financial resources or for other reasons (e.g. a small number of SUWs, an interest 
to externalize the services to the private market, preference given to cooperatives with 
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 In April 2005 Italia Lavoro considered the mission of SCO redundant. It bought the SCO’s private 
shareholders shares and became the sole owner of the company. In December 2006 SCO was closed and 
incorporated into Italia Lavoro. At this time SCO had seven long-term employees, approximately ten 
people employed as consultants in different regions, and €2,708,074 in capital. Italia Lavoro took-on SCO’s 
full-time employees and cashed in its capital. 
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respect to other arrangements of companies). The model of intervention of SCO was 
similar to that of Italia Lavoro, but the approach was very different. There are many 
interesting features regarding SCO’s technical intervention in the policy process, but the 
most important is that this small
72
 company was able to act to support private interests 
using public spirit. I will explain what this meant in reality by referring to my personal 
experience of working with SCO for a period of seven years.  
From the beginning of SCO’s activity, we were aware that public funds 
would finish by the end of 2001 and, at that point in time, we should have enough 
financial resources to be financially independent and carry out our activities in the 
market. SCO was paid by its private shareholders, the consortiums of cooperatives, with 
1.5% on the business turnover generated by each ‘employment stabilization’. This was 
transparent and each business plan indicated clearly an additional 3% that the PA would 
pay. This sum was divided between SCO (for its technical assistance pre and post 
‘employment stabilization’) and the consortium (for tutoring and technical assistance 
during the delivery of services). 
The part preceding a project closure was usually rich in negotiations. In the 
majority of the cases, SCO was called into action on those projects were IL had already 
determined the lack of opportunities for the formation of a joint mixed company, first of 
all the lack of money to pay the costs of a JMPPC (the board of directors on this type of 
company cost on average €200,000 yearly). The outsourcing to a cooperative was then 
seen as a more convenient solution, despite the additional 3% on the overall cost.  
The PAs were not obliged to work with SCO and, in those situations where 
local enterprises were interested in taking on SUWs and deliver the services existed, our 
assistance was not requested. In certain situations, especially where the local enterprises 
were not seen to be reliable enough, trade unions requested PAs to ask for SCO’s 
assistance. During the stage of the projects’ closure, trade unions were concerned about 
the economic feasibility of the ‘employment stabilization’ and its duration. The 
involvement of a public company owned by IL was seen in itself as a guarantee yet, most 
importantly, it allowed trade unions to be more actively involved in this process, 
especially over the negotiation of the labour contracts. 
Those at SCO who were involved directly in this activity had to negotiate 
requests that were very often difficult to resolve: 1) PAs wanted to spend a minimal 
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 During its period of most intense activity, SCO employed a maximum of twenty people, while IL started 
its activities with about one hundred employees and this had risen to about seven hundred people by 2001. 
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amount, but in order to receive quality services of which the cost usually increased 
significantly from the fourth year, many administrations preferred to outsource the 
services for three years only; 2) trade unions and SUWs asked for the maximum period of 
time of outsourcing, decent salaries and full-time jobs, which in almost all cases, cost 
more than the expenditure carried out by the PAs during the execution of SUJs projects; 
3) cooperatives asked for enough money to cover all expenses related to the services 
delivered and to assure them a profit. On top of this, we knew that any outsourcing of 
services that failed would mean that there would be a lack of money in the budget for 
SCO when the public aid would finish. For this reason great effort was put into closing a 
project, as well as our productivity for many business plans, re-drafting or for preparing 
other documents requested by the PAs. 
In order to respond to the three different requests mentioned above we always 
followed a three-pronged goal in building up the business plans: economic convenience 
for the public administration, decent jobs for the workers and controlled profits for the 
cooperative. Firstly, we made use of all incentives
73
 provided by the legislation for the 
enterprises taking on SUWs in order to reduce the cost of the outsourced services. In this 
way the incentives were not cashed in on by the employers, but were discounted from the 
overall cost of the services and allowed the PAs to pay less during the first three years of 
the outsourcing. This method was different from that used by IL in calculating the costs, 
which has always taken into account the full costs of labour only. In this case the 
incentives were cashed in by the JMPPCs that usually closed during the first three years 
of activity with good profits. The IL’s justification for this choice was that this surplus of 
money would allow the joint mixed companies to create a fund for future investments, 
but things did not always work out in this way and ‘bad administrators used this money to 
employ more people in exchange for political consent’ (interview with A.V., Coordinator 
of the Division for joint companies in IL from 2002 to 2010). This practice was also 
encouraged in the cases of JMPPCs employing the minimum number of SUWs required 
by law (40% of the overall number of employees). Applying this rule, the PAs had more 
room to employ people outside the SUWs group. SCO was instead very strict on this rule 
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 The total number of incentives available for the companies employing SUJs and PUJs was by no means 
small, particularly in Mezzogiorno and were all provided during the first three years of the ‘employment 
stabilization: 1) wage-subsidies of 6 million ITL per SUW employed (until decree 81/2001, this amount 
was given for a full-time long-term contract and it was reduced accordingly for part-time jobs; after 2001 
this incentive began to be offered for short-time contracts of a minimum of 12 months and for part-time 
contracts of a minimum of 30 hour per week); 2) total exemption from employees national insurance for 
enterprises located in Mezzogiorno; 3) additional incentives provided by regional legislation which usually 
doubled the national wage-subsidy of 6 million ITL per capita.   
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and formulated business plans in which the labour force was made up exclusively of 
SUWs. 
Secondly, we respected the legal provision of the collective national contracts 
of labour as regards job description and salaries. We always tried to help the PAs in 
finding more services to outsource in order to secure full-time salaries for SUWs, but the 
system of full-time incentives for thirty hours per week was not helpful from this point of 
view.  
Thirdly, we considered many costs necessary for the delivery of services, but 
in our business plan the profits were low for the cooperatives employing SUWs because 
we gave priority to the internal mutuality of a production cooperative, which provided its 
members with jobs. This rule applied to a lesser extent to the new cooperatives (formed 
by SUWs) which we were interested in seeing their assets increasing because it was 
beneficial for them to obtain sizeable profits during the start-up period. 
Due to the principles explained above, during the period 1999-2002 we 
brought ‘employment stabilization’ to 2,000 SUWs, 260 of whom formed their own 
cooperatives. Additionally, the largest ‘employment stabilization’ operation was carried 
out in 2001 when 16,300 SUWs working in schools as technical-administrative assistants 
were employed by our cooperatives (9,000 people) and by another two private enterprise 
consortiums
74
 (7,300 people) which worked under the coordination of SCO. After the 
closure of this operation, SCO reduced the amount paid by its consortiums from 1.50% to 
0.50% in 2001 and increased to 0.75% in 2002. 
Finally, the average investment of SCO was €2,300 per job created, not 
accounting for the SUWs working in schools. If this large operation is taken into account, 
the average investment drops considerably to €250 per job created.   
The operational process applied by SCO for the ‘employment stabilization’ 
involved the following stages: 
1) Business plan preparation. 
2) Business plan negotiation. 
3) Pre-assignment of the project to one of the consortiums: in this stage the 
cooperative which would employ the SUWs was indicated. In the case of 
cooperatives formed by SUWs, the consortium would indicate a tutor, an 
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 One consortium (Manital) belonged to Confindustria’s services sector, while the other (Miles) to 
CON.FA.PI, an association of small companies.  
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experienced cooperative that would help the new one to overcome the 
difficulties during the start-up period.   
4) PA formal approval. 
5) Final assignment of the project to the cooperative formed by SUWs or to a 
cooperative chosen by the consortium: in this stage the cooperative would 
prepare, together with SCO, the operational plan for the delivery of services and 
the contract.  
6) Creation of the cooperative formed by SUWs in the presence of a public notary 
and contract signing with the PA. The contract for the assigned services was 
always signed by the consortium in charge which indicated the name of the 
cooperative delivering the services.  
7) ‘Employment stabilization’, activities start-up and tutorship activation. 
8) Monitoring of the activities during the five-year period. SCO monitored the 
activity carried out by the tutors and provided business assistance to the newly-
formed cooperatives.   
  
Many projects were closed without SCO and IL intervention. In these cases 
the process was shorter, although certain steps were inevitable: business–plan and 
contract preparation, PA formal approval, contract signing and employment of SUWs.  
The public administrations were the actors responsible for promoting the 
creation of new jobs for SUWs. However, they were not the only contractees for the 
outsourced services. IL, SCO and private companies also shared the responsibilities of 
the policy take-up. In addition, trade unions played an important role in determining the 
different choices regarding the ‘employment stabilization’. The decision-making and 
responsibility structure was therefore both autonomous-decentralized and cooperative. 
Although the Ministry of Labour still continued to hold financial leverage 
through funds transferred to the regions, it did not question decisions taken locally as 
long as they continued to pursue the goals of job-creation and project closure. 
 
6.4 Key variables for policy take-up 
 
From data analysed hitherto it can be deduced that the likelihood of SUWs ‘employment 
stabilization’ being successful depended upon the way in which the projects began and 
how the activities were executed. Therefore, those projects concerning a large number of 
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unemployed not involved in the activities, but participating merely to receive their 
allowances, had little chance of being closed.  
The assessment of any ideal-type of ‘employment stabilization’ could be a 
much contested issue. Some projects finished smoothly because the PAs employed SUWs 
directly, possibly during an electoral campaign; in other cases the PAs paid generously 
for services outsourced to companies that cashed in SUWs benefits and fired the workers 
when the benefits finished; some smaller PAs had insufficient financial resources to 
outsource services delivered by SUWs they had used for many years, but employed them 
directly when this opportunity became available.  
The stigmatization of this policy after 2003 was very much driven by the shift 
to the neoliberal paradigm that brought about the privatization of the public sector and 
labelled the services delivered by the state as inefficient. There is no evidence to support 
the claim that SUWs ‘employment stabilization’ in the private sector was better than that 
obtained in the public sector in terms of costs. However, in term of duration it was more 
positive because, in general, the public administrations employed SUWs with long-term 
contracts. Therefore, the evaluation of policy take-up should take into consideration the 
following key variables: the suitability of outsourced services, their costs and the 
duration of the ‘employment stabilization’. 
 
6.4.1 Services outsourced  
 
The suitability of outsourced services was influenced by the nature of the activities SUWs 
and PUJs were involved in. The outsourcing of the clerical services to private companies 
delivering a totally different service (for example cleaning) created organizational 
problems
75
. This was a way of preventing the PAs from employing public personnel and 
to promote instable jobs within the public administration.  
Another problematic situation was the ‘two-tier service delivery’ which meant that 
services were delivered in part by public employees and in part by the companies which 
employed the SUWs. In this case there were problems of personnel management due to 
differences applied to diverse categories of workers who did the same work. This case 
was more apparent for those administrations that decided to outsource a service but still 
had their own employees involved in those activities. In these cases, the trade unions 
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 This was the case for example of the ‘outsourced secretaries’ who were paid only by the external 
companies, but worked for and responded to the public mangers exclusively.  
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championed the public employment for SUWs, but this was rarely successful, as many 
PAs pursued a strategy of outsourcing and did not replace their retired public workforce. 
 
6.4.2 Cost of the outsourcing 
 
However, the cost of the outsourced services was the most disputed issue. As already 
explained in the previous section, the simplest way to reduce the cost of the outsourced 
services was to deduct wage-incentives and tax reliefs provided for SUWs employment in 
favour of the PAs, but this did not always happen and many administrations were not 
even aware of the incentives that companies employing SUWs could obtain. A further 
means of reducing the cost of the services was to reduce the cost of labour, by promoting 
part-time jobs. This solution has always been contested by the trade unions, but in those 
projects accounting for a number of SUWs much higher than the workforce that was 
usually necessary to deliver those services, it was accepted as a form of solidarity which 
allowed all to obtain a job. 
The likelihood of being offered full-time jobs at the end of the projects was 
however greater for the SUWs who were already involved in those activities for thirty-six 
hours per week (a full-time contract in the public sector). The legal provisions introduced 
by decree 81/2000 made this goal less attainable because full benefits were provided for 
part-time jobs of thirty hours per week (75% of a full-time contract in the private sector, 
corresponding to forty hours per week) and this was a disincentive for full-time 
employment. 
Finally, another attempt to diminish the cost of any large projects’ closure 
was that of promoting ‘employment stabilization’ of small groups of SUWs. This strategy 
is similar to that of ‘creaming’, when administrators of public programs provide a 
disproportionate share of benefits to the most advantaged in a target group. Robertson 
(1984:392) argues that ‘creaming offers an excellent test for the claim that policy design 
and implementation are disconnected’. In the case of SUWs, there was an attempt to 
introduce this practice in the final stage of the programs offering the opportunity to obtain 
‘employment stabilization’ for a smaller number of workers only. Trade unions strongly 
opposed this practice and, although in certain projects the ‘employment stabilization’ 
occurred at different times for different groups, they continued to put pressure on the 
public administration in order to provide equal opportunities for all unemployed involved 
in a project. In this way creaming was obstructed and the closure of some projects was 
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delayed until the PAs had found solutions for the whole group of SUWs. This was a 
disputed strategy because, in certain cases, the trade unions’ opposition to the 
‘employment stabilization’ of small groups of SUWs did not bring more opportunities for 
the whole group. In those circumstances, the trade unions hazard occurred and the 
unemployed remained involved in the projects, waiting for further offers. In other cases, 
this strategy was seen as positive and the PAs put more effort into finding the funds that 
allowed all SUWs to receive job offers. 
The selection was, however, necessary in those cases where SUWs decided to 
form their cooperatives because any entrepreneurial project was expected to fail without 
strong support from its promoters. In these cases, the workers were encouraged to form 
their groups autonomously and they selected their partners themselves.  
 
6.4.3 Duration of the ‘employment stabilization’ 
  
The duration of the ‘employment stabilization’ was, on the whole, longer than five years, 
the maximum period of time for the outsourcing of public services without competitive 
tendering. The national collective contracts of work in the service sector provide for the 
so-called passaggio di cantiere (literally translated as ‘work-site transfer’). This means 
that when a public tender was won by a company the winner was compelled to hire the 
employees of the company (who were already working in that work-site) which had lost 
the tender. This legislation protected the workers from being hired and fired as a result of 
changes in employers who followed on from one other. 
The stability of jobs was guaranteed by the continuity of outsourced services 
and this was the greatest concern for trade unions, IL and SCO when the projects were 
closed.  IL and SCO have never agreed to sign contracts for the outsourcing of services 
for periods of less than three years, yet the PAs were the only actors able to guarantee the 
continuity of the services. In turn, this continuity was strongly influenced by the nature of 
the outsourced services and the availability of long-term public funds. 
For all the reasons explained above, services of low added value such as 
cleaning were safer than other ‘experimental’ services than could be more challenging 
but risked being interrupted because of a chronic lack of public funds. 
  
There is a high incidence of labour within cleaning services. If one looks at the national 
market, from Trapani to Valle d’Aosta, one sees that there are some differences in 
productivity, but the most important thing is that in the South, cleaning employs many 
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people, while in the North it is marginal work. The majority of workers in the cleaning 
services are migrants in the North, but not in the South. In the North you go to work in a 
cleaning company because you are limited in finding work, and at a certain time you will 
leave it for something better. In the South, if you find a job in a cleaning company that is 
THE JOB, because that job could last forever (interview with B.P., General Manager of CNS, 
consortium member of Legacoop). 
 
The stability of the jobs created through the outsourcing of public services 
was far more important than any other factor that would render a job attractive for a 
socially useful worker. Public employment was much championed by both the 
unemployed and trade unions that were aware that the failure of the ‘employment 
stabilization’ would have very serious consequences for people who had been out of the 
labour market for such a long period of time.  
The involvement of IL and SCO in the policy take-up reduced the employers’ 
hazard, because the services were usually outsourced for the maximum period of time or 
for period of at least three years. Nonetheless, it was impossible for the public agencies to 
foresee what would happen at the end of the five-year contracts. If there was an explicit 
option for the public administrations to buy IL’s share of capital in the JMPPCs, the 
cooperatives introduced by SCO were companies that decided autonomously whether it 
would be convenient or not for them to participate in a new CTC at the end of the 
contract. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The success of the policy take-up goes beyond the choice between efficiency and efficacy 
of the services outsourced. This chapter has shown that there were different forms of 
‘employment stabilization’ which, although regulated by law, took different 
configurations by the end of the projects. These forms depended upon the activities 
carried out by different public and private actors involved in the process. The situations 
where public actors were strongly involved led to different results in comparison with 
those situations where private enterprises had the leading role.  
The first section of the chapter presented the geographical and annual 
distribution of different forms of employment stabilization showing that most of the 
results were reached by the end of 2003. The slowing down of the process, starting in 
2004, is due to the change of the national regulation of competitive tendering which 
noticeably reduced the interest of private entrepreneurs in hiring the unemployed. 
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Therefore, the legal incentives played a much more important role than the economic 
ones for the policy success in this stage. The economic incentive however substantially 
reduced the cost of the outsourced services during the first three years, but this has not 
always been to the advantage of the public administrations.  
The competence structure of the policy take-up was, on the whole, demand-
driven, yet many supply-driven actions were put into place in order to put pressure on the 
SUWs to exit the projects. The central state used the financial leverage to accelerate the 
‘employment stabilization’, but the resources were never withdrawn to the regions which 
did not respect their commitment to the Ministry of Labour when they signed the annual 
agreements. 
Public administrations, public agencies, trade unions and private employers 
were the actors responsible in this policy stage. In most of the cases these actors operated 
cooperatively but, as the public administrations determined the conditions concerning 
projects’ closure, their decision could be made independently of those actors, sometimes 
resulting in disagreement. Therefore, the decision-making and responsibility structure of 
the policy take-up was both cooperative and autonomous-decentralized.  
The second section analysed two different ways of closing the projects with 
the support of the main public agencies involved, Italia Lavoro and SCO. Although the 
legal procedures for closing the projects were similar, the evaluation of the outsourced 
services differed substantially between JMPPCs and the cooperatives brought by SCO or 
formed by the unemployed themselves. Contracts with the cooperatives were far more 
convenient from an economic point of view, but jobs in cooperatives were seen as less 
stable than those in joint mixed companies. For this reason, trade unions encouraged 
SUWs to be employed by large cooperatives that offered more guarantees than 
cooperatives formed by the unemployed themselves, or than small enterprises. Public 
employment has always been seen as the most stable employment, yet, at the beginning it 
was limited and generally was not easy to be promoted by PAs employing large groups of 
SUWs. Trade unions’ opposition to job instability brought, in general terms, positive 
results for the unemployed, but it also delayed the ‘employment stabilization’ of large 
groups of SUWs who risked not receive any job offer when the projects closed. These 
were the cases where the public administrations had too few services to outsource to 
create jobs for such a large number of people, but they could have found solutions for a 
small number of them. It was difficult however for trade unions to ensure equal treatment 
of all the unemployed in those cases where the number of SUWs in relation to services 
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had been over-estimated. Many projects had been closed without any involvement from 
the public agencies and it is supposed that, in those cases, no policy facilitator was 
needed. Unfortunately, apart from the total number of exits from the SUJs projects, there 
are little data about the cases concerning the ‘employment stabilization’ with private 
enterprises, and it is difficult to determine the terms of those contracts, the duration of the 
outsourcing and to what extent the employers hazard occurred. 
The third section investigated the key variables for the ‘employment 
stabilization’ (catalyst structure) that determined a more positive behaviour of the public 
actors involved towards the projects’ closure. The suitability of outsourced services was 
the first stage in determining the success or failure of the contracts. Yet, as the funds were 
scarce and the public bodies were banned from employing new workers, there were cases 
involving clerical jobs that were outsourced to companies which had a completely 
different focus of activity. Nonetheless, due to specific legislation, many public 
administrations were able to employ the SUWs directly after 2007. 
The cost of the outsourcing was yet another critical variable. It was explained 
that the economic incentives provided during the first three years of the ‘employment 
stabilization’ were a positive accelerator for the projects’ closure. When these incentives 
were deducted from the overall cost of the contracts, these benefits were socialized; 
when, instead, the companies employing SUWs cashed them in, these benefits were 
privatized. It was also explained that SCO and Italia Lavoro applied totally different rules 
in their business plans when they were called into action. 
Finally, the duration of the ‘employment stabilization’ was a very important 
factor, especially for trade unions and the unemployed. Part-time jobs were promoted in 
order to help a greater number of SUWs to access jobs, and much effort was put into 
securing maximum-term contracts. It was also explained that the chances of keeping 
these jobs was higher for those workers delivering essential services which were not 
stopped at the end of the first five-year contract.  
This chapter and the previous one analysed the policy process during its more 
operational stages (implementation and take-up) explaining the complexity of the policy 
process at meso-level, that of the local public administrations. In particular, the changing 
roles of the institutions and public actors involved in both stages were investigated, 
including the hazards they faced and the key variables that influenced their decision 
making processes. The next chapter will analyse how these factors took effect at micro-
level, in four different situations of services outsourcing.  
186 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Analysis of case studies 
 
The difficulties encountered during the start-up, execution and closure of SUJs and PUJs 
projects were analysed in the previous two chapters. Through the analysis of certain key 
determining variables it was shown that policy implementation and take-up were complex 
and controversial. The actions of the main public actors involved in these stages were 
investigated in order to understand the different ways in which the projects were carried 
out and the ‘employment stabilization’ occurred. What happened after the projects’ 
closure and the services outsourcing is even more difficult to be assessed. Italia Lavoro 
and SCO continued to monitor the process for their specific areas of competence: the 
JMPPCs formed by IL and the cooperatives belonging to the four consortium 
shareholders of SCO. IL was expected to exit the joint mixed companies after the 
maximum five-year period, which is why it was interested in seeing its net capital assets 
increased during this period. SCO was keen to cash in its percentage on the overall 
turnover of the cooperatives which employed SUWs or were formed by SUWs 
themselves. Both IL and SCO aspired to have positive feedback from the PAs and 
workers concerning the broader impact of the policy on the local communities.  
The evaluation of labour policy impacts over a specific amount of time after 
the end of the programmes is a very difficult task. Data are not easily collected over long 
time periods and, if a job-creation programme ends successfully and new enterprises are 
created, there is little interest from its promoters in checking eventual failures which 
might have occurred afterwards. It is also problematic to attribute the closure of these 
cooperatives directly to the policy failure because many other factors influence business 
performance. How stable was the ‘employment stabilization’ and how can this be 
assessed? Have the outsourced services been delivered in a satisfactory way and in 
respect of the contractual provisions? What happened after the projects’ closure, in other 
words, after the moment in which it was declared that the policy had achieved positive 
outcomes on both sides: new employment and services outsourcing?  
This chapter presents a multiple case study formed of four types of 
‘employment stabilization’. The first two case studies are cooperatives formed by SUJs 
and PUJs through the SCO’s technical assistance in Casabona and Grottaglie, two small 
towns located in the regions of Calabria and, respectively, Puglia. The third case-study 
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analyses the formation of a joint-mixed public private company between the Province of 
Taranto (Region of Puglia) and IL. The fourth case study deals with the National Park of 
Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains (Region of Abruzzi) which directly employed the 
socially useful workers after the failure of their first ‘employment stabilization’ with a 
cooperative introduced by SCO.  
As already explained in chapter 1, the analysis of the data presented in this 
part of the thesis aims at the construction of explanatory patterns around the closure of 
these projects and the events that followed it. In fact, at a micro-level, what happened at 
the moment of the projects’ closure cannot be the only indicator of the success or failure 
of the policy. The narratives encompass the entire period of the ‘employment 
stabilization’ that coincided with the services outsourcing and look at the evolution of the 
enterprises and groups of former SUWs and PUWs. The following  themes are 
investigated in each case study: 1) the key factors describing the policy implementation; 
2) the  factors that influenced the ‘employment stabilization’ and relevant events 
occurring during this final stage of the policy; 3) the economic performance of the 
enterprises and relevant events occurring during the outsourcing of public services; 4) the 
overall impact of the policy on its beneficiaries and on the public administrations, and 
future perspectives for the outsourcing. 
Finally, the data collected thorough in-depth interviews are organized around 
the role of the main actors involved in the policy process: public administrations 
(politicians and public managers), trade unions, Italia Lavoro/SCO, the consortiums (and 
the cooperatives responsible for the tutorship) and the former unemployed.   
 
7.1 First case study: a cooperative formed by publicly useful workers (D.Lgs. 
280/’97) 
 
This project was implemented by the Municipality of Casabona, a small town of almost 
3,000 inhabitants, located in the Province of Crotone, in south-eastern Calabria. 
After decree 280/’97 was passed, the Region of Calabria identified two sectors of activity 
for potential new employment: services for personal care and environmental services. 
The municipalities interested in starting PUJs for young long-term unemployed were 
invited to prepare projects surrounding these two areas. The projects were certified by 
‘Itainvest’ which became Italia Lavoro in 1997. 
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In October 1998 the administration of Casabona started a project of publicly 
useful jobs for ten young unemployed, five of whom were involved in environmental 
services. The PUJs project was implemented during the period 1
st
 January – 31st 
December 1998 and it was extended for a further six months. The unemployed were 
involved full-time, for thirty six hours per week. At the beginning of 1999 the technical 
assistance of SCO was requested. In March 1999 eight of the PUWs formed a small 
cooperative
76
 and, as they were strongly motivated in starting to work within their own 
cooperative, they contested the second extension of the project. On 24
th
 June 1999, the 
Municipality of Casabona outsourced the following services, for a five-year period, to the 
cooperative ‘Giovani del 2000’ (‘Youth of 2000’) which had adhered to the consortium 
CNS: 
 waste collection, roads sweeping and public buildings cleaning in Zinga (a 
small part of the urban territory); 
 maintenance of  the town’s hydrological network and sewerage; 
 green areas maintenance; 
 cleaning and minor maintenance of schools; 
 school bus service; 
 management of the town’s public library and of the recreation centre for 
the elderly;  
 public billposting service; 
 reading and activation/closure of public water consumers. 
 
Before the implementation of the PUJs project, most of these services had 
been delivered by the PA with its own employees. The services concerning the territory 
of Zinga had been outsourced to another company, but the PA evaluated their quality as 
low and decided not to run the tender again, but waited for the PUWs cooperative to be 
formed. The contract between the PA and CNS indicates clearly that the principal aim of 
the services’ outsourcing is the optimization of the services and cost-saving. The 
expected turnover was 198,000,000 ITL (about €102,000) in the first year and 
203,000,000 ITL (about €105,000) at the end of the first five years. The cooperative’s 
tutor was located in Sicily, but in reality the tutorship was provided directly by CNS 
                                                 
76
 The Italian legislation indicates two types of cooperatives of production: ‘small cooperatives’ (with fewer 
than nine members) and ‘cooperatives’ (with at least nine members).  
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through its local branch in Mezzogiorno (with its HQ in Naples) and its national HQ in 
Bologna.  
The cooperative ‘Giovani del 2000’ appeared to start modestly but its striking 
development in the following years shows how a small group of people (reduced from 
eight to five in the first year) had become genuine entrepreneurs. When I carried out the 
interviews in 2005 the cooperative had one hundred and fifty employees and the turnover 
in 2004 exceeded €900,000. From the table below it can be seen that the cooperative’s 
turnover had a sharp increase in 2002 and also the net result, with the exception of the 
first year of activity, was always positive and its share in the overall turnover was 
extremely high during 2002-2003.  
 
Table 7.1/CS1: Coop. ‘Giovani del 2000’: turnover and net results, 1999-2004 (Euros) 
 
1999 
(Jul-Dec) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
            
2004 
 
Expected 
turnover* 
44,498  102,258  102,258 104,841  104,841 52,420 
(Jan-Jun)  
Turnover**  159,455 138,717 304,207 602,924 802,557 923,767 
Net result 
after taxes**  
-5,681 8,121 42,195 136,517 148,624 22,291 
Source: (*) contract for services outsourcing between the Municipality of Casabona and 
the consortium CNS and (**)balance sheets, 1999-2004 
 
The ‘secrets’ of such a success are: 1) sub-contracting with CNS which 
allocated them the management of several services won by the consortium in the 
Province of Crotone, and 2) new services won in partnership with CNS, as well as 
participating alone in various CTCs.  
In 2001 the cooperative began delivering cleaning services in schools on 
behalf of CNS, and employed eighteen former SUWs for these activities. In 2003 the 
cooperative won the first competitive tender. In the following years, the more tenders 
they won, the larger the group of their employees became. In 2004 they had to face the 
decision to enlarge the cooperative to new members in order to avoid difficulties 
concerning internal mutuality
77
. Eighty-five new members joined the cooperative in 
2005, selected on a voluntary basis. 
                                                 
77
 The reform of the Business Law in 2003 introduced the concept of ‘prevalent mutuality’ for the 
cooperatives. In order to maintain the fiscal advantage, a cooperative had to prove that the majority of its 
members participate in the cooperative’s social scope. For the cooperative of production this statement 
meant that the majority of its members were engaged in the production of goods or services that constitute 
its object of activity. A small cooperative employing a large number of people who were not its members 
was at risk of losing the character of ‘prevalent mutuality’.  
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The group of five members that have remained together since the beginning is 
the managerial group of the cooperative: they feel that the cooperative is ‘their’ creation, 
consider themselves responsible for its success or failure and see their personal futures 
strongly connected to it. The president is the leader of the group, this being 
acknowledged not only by his colleagues, but also by the PA, CNS and the local trade 
union (CGIL). He is very ambitious and is continuously pushing the cooperative ahead by 
implementing new services, obtaining qualifications which allow participation in new 
tenders and asking the members of the cooperative to take part in training courses and 
improve their skills (most of the courses are organized by CNS in Bologna and locally). 
 
A.S. (President of the cooperative):‘Sometimes I found I was in conflict with myself. 
Something inside me tells to always be active, to continuously evolve, and not to remain 
static. I would greatly continue to expand the range of services we deliver; I would diversify 
the sectors of activity. If the services we are delivering now remain our main activity, I think 
we will be in crisis in a few years, because this is a traditional area of activity. Lucky, the 
local services are the only thing that cannot be produced in Eastern China. These services 
must be produced here, by a local company, but we need to measure ourselves against others 
in the market. If we are good, the cooperative will get the services, otherwise we will lose. 
 
The motivation to work in a cooperative is high. It brings enthusiasm, but also 
creates problems for those who do not accept sacrifices or who are searching for secure 
jobs (posto fisso). 
 
A.S. (President of the cooperative): Some members left the cooperative because they were 
not ‘in tune’ with us. One left because the money from the Region arrived late and the 
administration did not want to advance the sum. A further two preferred to be ‘stabilized’ by 
the administration later, under contracts of collaboration. Those who believed in this project 
remained. At the beginning we had no money to employ other people, so we were the only 
workers; we organized shifts in order to be able to deliver all services. In July 2001 we 
employed eighteen former SUWs-TAA in the schools, on behalf of CNS, and we became 
employers. We started to grow and then we understood what it meant to be entrepreneurs, to 
manage other people and have responsibility for their work. When we won the first big tender 
in 2003, we felt that we had arrived at a turning point and the cooperative has started to grow 
rapidly. 
 
In order to have sufficient cash flow to carry out the current activities, it is 
important that the cooperative has a good number of on-going contracts. This implies that 
the managerial group needs to take decisions concerning new activities and the tenders 
they want to compete in. Almost since the beginning they tried to diversify their offer and 
opened a small laboratory to produce traditional local sweets which were sold in several 
supermarkets in the Province of Crotone. This business remained opened until 2004 
when, due to the increased amount of contracts for services, they could not continue to 
produce confectionery and closed it. 
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A.P. (member of the management group): The secret of the founders group is that we have 
always enjoyed working together and we really cared about the cooperative. We used to have 
discussions for hours, sometimes without concluding anything. In fact, the people who did 
exit the cooperative thought that working in a cooperative should be ‘easier’. They consider it 
as a job. We saw it, instead, as our future. They did not believe in the cooperative as much as 
us, especially as AS did.   
 
M.F. (member of the management group): Anytime we meet we speak about work. Once we 
started to grow, we needed to continue. The only important thing now is to continue, not to 
stop. When we formed the cooperative we had little money but, despite this, we opened the 
confectionery laboratory. We had debts, and many months we had to save some money to 
pay the overdrafts. At that time I was scared, but if we receive overdrafts now I am not scared 
at all. Now we look only to have portfolio of contracts full.  
 
Forming a cooperative in Mezzogiorno represents an audacious choice. Many 
interviewees stressed the negative associations with this type of enterprise, especially 
when cooperatives close for dubious reasons: ‘cooperatives were opened by some people 
to steal from the others’ (A.P.) or ‘because this was a way for obtaining public funds’ 
(M.F.). Accordingly to A.P. and M.F. these facts do not only involve cooperatives, but it 
appears that the censure against opportunistic behaviour is stronger when the facts 
involve cooperatives rather than private enterprises. This could have an explanation, if 
one considers the failure of agricultural cooperatives in Casabona, in the past: 
 
F.S. (Mayor of Casabona): Many left-wing administrations championed the formation of 
agricultural cooperatives in the past. The agrarian reform brought a fragmentation of the land 
and many small farms raised in Casabona. During the ’70s and ’80s it was tempting to form 
cooperatives which would be an ideal size for agriculture, but they went wrong. These 
bankruptcies involved many citizens and the negative publicity was transmitted from one 
generation to another. The cooperative is ‘yours’, while a private enterprise belongs to 
‘others’. If you work for a private enterprise which fails, it is not your fault, but in the case of 
a cooperative, you have a direct responsibility. 
 
The former mayor of Casabona, who had implemented the PUJs project and 
wanted the ‘employment stabilization’, attributes the lack of trust in cooperatives to an 
excess of individualism in Mezzogiorno that, he thinks, should change. 
 
F.B. (former Mayor of Casabona): They [the cooperative] did the right thing and have been 
able to resist the attacks. Here, in the South, when something good is born, it is always an 
adverse attitude. Unfortunately, there is not a cooperative culture here; we are not in the 
region of Emilia Romagna. There is too much individualism, too much distrust. 
 
If forming and managing a cooperative of unemployed youth in Calabria was 
not easy in itself, there are two important factors that made it successful: the 
determination of the PA in pursuing the ‘employment stabilization’ and the role played 
by CNS in the development of the cooperative. 
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The former mayor of Casabona believes that PAs’ determination in 
implementing small and feasible projects led to these positive results. He is also 
convinced that many other PAs were not so determined in pursuing this goal. 
 
F.B. (former Mayor of Casabona): I think that our success is due to the fact that we 
implemented projects which we knew since the beginning we were able to maintain our 
promises about. Through the implementation of PUJs projects with pachetto Treu [decree 
280/’97] the PAs were committed to achieving certain results. We took this decision bearing 
the final goal in mind: we decided the activities to involve the youths with and we made 
available the funds necessary for outsourcing services to the small cooperative when it was 
formed. It was important to keep the number of workers low, because we wanted to create 
something feasible. How could have we guaranteed the ‘employment stabilization’ for a high 
number of people? All our neighbours implemented projects involving a large number of 
unemployed. I was criticised for my choice, but my aim was to give a concrete future to these 
workers, otherwise their stabilization would have failed. In fact, I did not like to act as a 
politician; I rather preferred to be an administrator. During the ’90s the economic situation 
was very difficult and we, the mayors, were asked to be administrators more than politicians. 
Before starting the PUJs project I was sure that outsourcing would allow the delivery of these 
services to our community without increasing taxes and, at the same time, would allow the 
administration to have them delivered at lower costs. Pachetto Treu allowed us to reach both 
these goals and to create employment, but it was not seen in the same way by other PAs. If I 
had to re-write the law, I would make the ‘employment stabilization’ compulsory78 for the 
administrations; and I would ask for the money to be returned to the state by those PAs which 
do not respect their commitments. This would be a serious deterrent. 
 
The political elections ran only a few months before the project’s end and the 
mayor changed, but not the political coalition that maintained a left-wing majority. In 
many cases, the arrival of new politicians slowed down the closure of PUJs and SUJs 
projects because the new administrations wanted to put their new ‘imprint’ on the 
‘employment stabilization’; sometimes new solutions were chosen. None of these 
happened in the town of Casabona. The new major signed the contract with CNS on time 
and the project was closed without problems. 
 
F.S. (Mayor of Casabona): this was a continuation of the former administration’s political 
decision. We read the project and prepared the contract. We thought it was a good thing that 
would allow the administration to save some money and it would also create new jobs. 
Considering that they are now one of the most important enterprises in Calabria, it was a 
good bet. The quality of services delivered has always been good. Our school refectory was 
considered one of the best in our province, in 2002. We are among just a few towns that are 
able to have the meals prepared in the school and not buy ready-cooked meals. The teachers 
remain by choice to eat there. In a small community as ours, having high quality services is a 
great thing. 
 
                                                 
78
 Decree 280/’97 provided for such a rule in the case of a project closure, but it was rarely applied. As the 
PAs were asked to state their commitment towards ‘the employment stabilization’ in the projects, they 
would have to account for the closure of a project that did not reach its objective and, if it were evaluated 
that the project was speculative, the PAs would be asked to return to the state the funds spend during a 
project implementation. Nevertheless, this rule did not take into consideration the possibility of asking for 
several extensions of the projects in order to make the most of this workforce.  
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The new mayor is also convinced that outsourcing is the only possible choice 
for cost-savings, but when the provider is a cooperative, a good quality of services can be 
reached too. The manager responsible for the outsources services thinks that the fact the 
cooperative is local is also important. This favours the whole community to have direct 
control of the services delivered and, in this way, the cooperative should be more 
committed to maintain a high standard of quality. 
 
F.S. (Mayor of Casabona): Due to permanent cuts in funds transferred from the state, the 
local PAs consider service outsourcing as a unique solution for cost-saving. There are 
entrepreneurs who look more at the quality of the services, and others that are interested in 
obtaining profits only. In my opinion, at least theoretically, outsourcing to a cooperative 
should be better, but it depends on how this cooperative is organized. As work is prevalent in 
a cooperative, they do not consider profit as a primary aim. 
 
N.I. (public manager): whether the streets are clean or not is ‘measured’ directly by our 
citizens because if they were not happy with the service they would complain. The school 
refectory is directly checked by the school’s personnel and by the children’s parents. It is 
clear that, as this is a cooperative of youths from Casabona, its members pay more attention 
to how they work. If we were not happy with the services, their contract would not have been 
extended.  
 
Starting with a small, yet stable contract was important for the cooperative, 
but being part of CNS allowed them to grow and to improve as an enterprise. In 2004 the 
contract with the municipality of Casabona was renewed and the cooperative continued to 
deliver almost the same services until 2009. 
 
F.S. (Mayor of Casabona): Being part of a national consortium of cooperatives is very 
important. This helped them to have requirements to participate in certain tenders and also 
improved their personal skills. Being entrepreneurs is not easy. CNS transmitted an 
entrepreneurial culture to them and also helped the cooperative to assimilate it. These youths 
could have waited for another kind of ‘employment stabilization’. We had other PUWs here, 
working for the Mountain Community
79
, who preferred to cash in the incentives and to work 
for private enterprises that obtained more incentives to employ them. Other PUWs and SUWs 
waited instead to be employed by the public administrations. 
 
The consortium covered three specific areas of tutorship that have been 
crucial for the development of ‘Giovani del 2000’: 1) technical support that helped the 
cooperative to learn how to prepare CTCs; 2) training for the managerial group, but also 
for other members involved in more operational activities; 3) financial support, first and 
foremost advancing of bills issued to PAs that paid late, helping the cooperative avoid 
cash flow shortages. 
                                                 
79
 The Mountain Communities are local public bodies formed through a specific legal disposition provided 
by the president of a Regional Council. They are formed by municipalities located in mountain and 
highland areas (although from different provinces), with the aim of protection and upgrading these areas.   
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A.S. (President of the cooperative): CNS gave us effectively new works when we employed 
the former SUWs-TAA, but the most important help is they have supported us practically in 
our entrepreneurial development. 
Firstly CNS helped us to set our budgets and told us to control our growth. They literally told 
us: ‘your turnover can reach this point next year’. They taught us that our strategy should be 
to have our turnover doubled every year, but not more that this because we could risk failing: 
‘you could risk finding yourselves not being able to respect the requirements, without human 
resources and money; who would manage your work-sites, who is prepared, among you, to 
manage a twenty-billion contract?’ In this way we learnt to decide when it is convenient or 
not to participate in a tender. 
Secondly CNS helped us in our training. They invited us to several courses in Bologna and 
advised us which trainers to use for courses we organized in our cooperative; most 
importantly, they advised us which cooperatives to visit in order to learn from their 
experience. Thirdly, CNS helped us financially. None of the banks in Calabria helped us. 
When we asked for an advance of our bills issued the banks required ten per cent interest, a 
loan-shark’s rate! 
Furthermore, CNS has helped us with many bureaucratic practices that we would never have 
been able to carry out in certain periods because we have a small number of people involved 
in preparing all necessary papers for tenders and other practices. When we take part in the 
assemblies in Bologna we see the cooperative spirit that exists in other parts of the country, 
in other youths, and it reinforces our will to bring it to our place. B.P., the general manger of 
CNS often says: ‘you are the only true cooperative that I have seen formed during recent 
years’. And we are proud of this. 
 
Learning how to participate in and win competitive tenders was the most 
important entrepreneurial goal for the cooperative. Tenders are not easy to be won and 
sometimes it is not even clear why they are won by certain enterprises. Most competitive 
tenders are organized according to the rule of maximum price reduction as regards a 
given threshold. The law
80
 states clearly that the offers that are too low compared to the 
average offer should be excluded. Otherwise the PA running the tender should ask why 
they are such a low price, but this does not always happen. 
 
E.A. (new member and vice-president of the cooperative): We were expecting the worst from 
the competitive tenders here, in Mezzogiorno. First of all it is a general lack of transparency 
and tenders are also managed badly by the PAs who are not able to evaluate the quality of the 
services, but are interested only in the cost-reduction. The PAs do not understand that those 
companies that win due to very high price reductions often are not able to deliver those 
services. Many times they do not respect the labour contracts. Although the law asks 
enterprises to prove payment of their workers’ national insurances, this does not mean that all 
workers have regular situation. Sometimes we won tenders unexpectedly and this means that 
the PA did not expect us to win and they were surprised. When the tenders procedure asked, 
instead, for a technical project to be provided, we usually do well and are in a good  position. 
 
We won a tender with ANAS [National Company for Roads and Highways Network] from 
Cosenza because we were the first lowest offer acceptable. This means that, after they 
excluded the differing offers, we had the best offer. In this case we were able to obtain this 
result because we estimated the price reduction offered by our competitors and we presented 
an offer very close to this figure. ANAS started to ask for an explanation for this price. We 
answered their questions, but also wrote a letter stating that, if they did not sign the contract, 
we would appeal to TAR [Regional Administrative Court]. The best thing for us is to win 
competitive tenders. We all feel part of this success because we are a cooperative, exactly 
like a family. 
                                                 
80
 Law 157/’95, art. 25: ‘Offers abnormally low’. 
195 
 
 
 
The HQ of the branch of CNS in Mezzogiorno is located in Naples. The 
director of this branch is the closest person to the cooperative for preparing the tenders. 
He acknowledges the high motivation of the group and their genuine interest in learning 
new things, but he considers the role of the PA as being a key determiner in the first 
stage. However, being a successful enterprise in Southern Italy depends on some specific 
factors, one of the most important being  access to  bank credit. 
 
N.E. (CNS, manager for Southern Italy): The service sector, especially in Mezzogiorno, is a 
little bit ‘special’. It is seen as a marginal sector and does not receive much attention, the 
tenders do not always follow the right rules. Creating, in such an environment, an 
entrepreneurial community that brings true cooperative spirit creates ‘disorder’, is 
unexpected.  These youths are very humble. They have tried to learn from others who were 
more experienced, to understand how tenders work; they were scared of  their lack of 
experience, but were very receptive. The administration of Casabona has played a crucial role 
in this initiative start-up; they believed in it and sustained it. The youths participated with 
enthusiasm and CNS provided support to the cooperative’s development. All of us worked 
well, but without a good start locally, we would not have come so far. 
However, the access to banks’ credit remains a fundamental factor for enterprises working in 
Southern Italy. I am sure that, if this problem will not be solved, it is difficult to imagine a 
real entrepreneurial development in Mezzogiorno. In other countries you can obtain credit for 
ideas and initiatives. There the banks are used to evaluating potential. In Italy, and especially 
in Mezzogiorno, you firstly must provide proof of your financial solvency and after you can 
ask for money. How can we promote new entrepreneurial initiatives if there is no trust in 
them! In fact it is not a case that it is difficult to find true entrepreneurs in Southern Italy. The 
entrepreneur is, in Mezzogiorno, the person who works as a result of public funds. This is not 
entrepreneurial spirit, there is little initiative, and this is just an instrument formed because it 
is required by the state, often in sectors with low intensity of capital. In our sector, tenders 
based on projects have been introduced just recently; tenders are usually based on a 
maximum price reduction and sometimes the threshold is so low that it does not permit an 
enterprise to pay legal salaries (in respect of the national labour contracts) to those who work 
on the delivery of services.  
 
From data presented in this case, there are three actors that appear as key 
determiners for the success of the PUJs project and the ‘employment stabilization’: the 
public administration, consortium of cooperatives and target group themselves. As the 
young unemployed had little connections with trade unions compared to long-term 
unemployed, the absence of trade unions in this process is justified. The efficiency of the 
public administration also contributed to this fact. 
 
G.M. (CGIL, Region of Calabria, trade union leader): Most of the PUJs projects looked like a 
photocopy of the others; they were all identical: social services and environmental services. I 
think that is was a mistake that the Regional Commission for Employment approved all these 
projects without assessing them. All twenty-seven municipalities in the Province of Crotone 
started PUJs projects for young unemployed. Only the town of Umbriatico did not make a 
request, and only the town of Casabona closed the projects. All these youths were supposed 
to form cooperatives and this happened in many parts of the province. With the exception of 
‘Giovani del 2000’ the other cooperatives never started their activities because the 
administrations did not outsource the services to them. At a certain moment they had to close, 
196 
 
 
because of financial costs. Due to a successive regional law these PUWs became ‘regional’, 
the region has started to pay them with its own funds
81
. 
It is difficult to say which the best solution is. I am convinced that these people need to have 
a job, but this does not mean necessarily long-term contracts within the public 
administrations. Some years ago, quite a few of them were ‘stabilized’ by local private 
enterprises and, after about a year, these enterprises closed and sent them back home or asked 
for wage compensation funds. We do not have here an entrepreneurial community that can 
give guarantees for at least five years. Everybody tries to cash in on the benefits by 
employing PUWs and SUWs and keep the enterprises open for the minimum period 
requested by law. So, if the PAs really need them, PUWs and SUWs should be employed by 
the PAs. I am not looking for ‘posts’, I am looking for true employment for the people. 
  
The cooperative has continued to grow and the contract with the municipality 
of Casabona has gradually become marginal in its overall turnover. In 2009 they did not 
compete any more for this contract. The cleaning sector continues to have an important 
role in the turnover, but in recent years the cooperative has become specialized in 
industrial cleaning, especially industries using biomass. This is a sector they would like to 
develop and that would allow them to move from the public service sector to the private 
sector. At present sixty per cent of their turnover comes from contracts with clients 
located outside the Province of Crotone. 
 
Table 7.2/CS1: Coop. ‘Giovani del 2000’: turnover per typology of clients and sectors of 
activity, 2005-2011  (Euros) 
 
Municipality 
of Casabona 
Other  
clients 
Cleaning 
services 
Environ- 
mental 
services 
Other 
services 
Total 
Turnover 
2005          32,664     986,869   996,133 - 23,400 1,019,533 
2006         32,664   1,101,245 1,110,509 - 23,400 1,133,909 
2007         32,664     870,589   879,853 - 23,400    903,253 
2008            32,664     836,837  846,101 - 23,400    869,501 
2009         40,500     926,681   934,681            7,500 25,000    967,181 
2010          17,500  1,073,228 1,035,728          22,000 33,000 1,090,728 
2011 -     939,295   898,295          41,000 -    939,295 
Total       188.656  6,734,744 6,701,300          70,500   151,600 6,923,400 
Source: data provided by the cooperative according to the annual balance sheets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 In practice the region provided for the ‘integration’ paid by the local public administrations: 20 hours per 
week/worker  were paid by the central state and the difference of 16 hours per week/ worker was paid by 
the region of Calabria. As has been shown however, this money arrived from the central state through 
annual agreements. 
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Table 7.3/CS1: Coop. ‘Giovani del 2000’: labour costs and net results, 2005-2011  
(Euros) 
 Source: data provided by the cooperative according to the annual balance sheets  
 
Some important contracts finished in 2005-2006 which brought about a 
serious deficit for these two years. However the cooperative overcame this and continued 
to search for new CTCs. The relationship with CNS is still important, but they have 
enlarged the network, starting to work with another two cooperative consortiums. Their 
principal objective for the future remains the diversification of their mix of services, 
empowering those most requested on the market, particularly in sectors that require more 
technology and specialised qualifications. 
The last time I spoke with A.S. I asked him which factors allowed them to 
develop the cooperative during thirteen years of satisfactory activity. He answered 
without hesitation: ‘a mix of stubbornness, reliability, democracy and cooperation. But 
the most important thing is that we understood in time that none of us knows everything 
and is able to do anything, but everybody needs the others; therefore every person is 
important in keeping our cooperative in good health’.  
 
7.2 Second case study: a cooperative formed by socially useful workers (D.Lgs. 
468/’97) 
 
This project was implemented by the Municipality of Grottaglie, a town of almost 32,800 
inhabitants, located in the Province of Taranto, in south-western Puglia. 
The cooperative analysed in this case was formed by thirteen SUWs taking 
part in this project. Before starting to analyse the cooperative’s history, a short 
description of the projects start-up is presented, focusing on the important role the trade 
unions played in this stage. This PA was very active in promoting a large number of 
SUWs with the aim of activating as many unemployed as possible. In 1996 there were 
  
Labour cost 
(coop. members) 
Labour cost 
(coop. employees) 
Total 
labour cost 
Net result  
after taxes 
 
2005 504,229                      432,567                     936,796  -  123,132     
 
2006 602,782                      357,684                    960,466  -  63,936 
 
2007 422,832                     298,291                     721,123     3,810  
 
2008 410,640                      268,485                     679,125    34,999  
 
2009 420,995                      360,377                     781,372     18,533  
 
2010     444,584                      442,502                     887,086   2,284  
2011 209,476                      428,319                     637,795    54,402  
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155 people involved in socially useful jobs overall. Many of those had been recipients of 
wage compensation funds since the end of the ’80s and had been involved in the so-called 
‘Taranto dispute’. In 1995, there were still 3,350 unemployed who had not found jobs in 
that area, and the trade unions (CISL and CGIL) attempted to make the public 
administrations aware of the possibility of involving these people in SUJs projects. The 
majority of these workers were members of CISL and they worked in various building 
companies located in the Province  of Taranto. 
 
E.B. (Secretary of CISL in the Province of Taranto): On the one hand, many PAs were a little 
bit suspicious at the beginning; they did not know these people and were not keen on taking 
them on. When the administrations understood that it would be advantageous to have a 
qualified workforce at no cost, they became interested. On the other hand, there were those 
workers who were told by us to accept any activity the administrations wanted carried out. 
We told them that they should become more than useful, even indispensable, for the 
administrations. In this way, after two or three years, we asked the administrations to start the 
‘employment stabilization’, providing multiple solutions: some formed cooperatives, some 
were employed by the PAs and others by local private enterprises. Sometimes we argued 
with these workers, some of them withdraw themselves from our organization, but our 
strategy was successful: basically we told the administrations, ‘if until yesterday they were all 
useful, now you have to find a solution for all of them’. 
The municipality of Grottaglie had too many, about one hundred and fifty; we knew from the 
beginning that it was impossible for all of them to be employed directly by the 
administration. Yet, they did employ many SUWs directly because we promoted part-time 
employment. The workers accepted, but it is clear they were not happy; our aim was, first of 
all, to allocate as many SUWs as possible, and after, we fought to have their working hours 
increased.  
 
The Municipality of Grottaglie tried however to offer an employment solution 
to a great number of SUWs: 13 formed the cooperative and another 22 were employed 
with part-time contracts directly by the administration. The over ’50s benefited from 
early retirement schemes, the SUWs working in the schools were transferred under the 
state’s control and later employed by private enterprises and cooperatives. As a result, 
there were still 48 SUWs mostly working part-time in Grottaglie at the end of 2005, 
awaiting a solution. These workers were considered by the administrations as having little 
interest in the ‘employment stabilization’, and being content to integrate their allowances 
with an income obtained on the illegal market. The trade unions believed instead that the 
administration was not respecting its commitment for an employment solution to all 
SUWs and more effort should have been put into finding other services. There were not 
however services available to be outsourced to provide employment to such a large group 
of people; neither were there funds available to pay for these services.  
The trade unions’ strategy for championing solutions for small groups was 
far-sighted. The results were obtained through intense collaboration with a large number 
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of institutions working for the closure of SUJs projects in this province; some of them, 
like the prefecture
82
, do not have institutional responsibilities in relation to labour market 
policies.  
A.M. (CGIL, Province of Taranto, trade union leader): our problem was finding different 
ways to employ all SUWs, but we knew that it would be impossible to see them all employed 
in the same way and at the same time. We have always championed their right to work, to 
give them back the dignity of work. We could not agree on the ‘philosophy’ of allocating 
money for designated  “posts”83. The administration understood and not only found the 
money, but found the services these workers could be involved in. In this way it was possible 
to create concrete jobs.  
We did this work with many administrations in the Province of Taranto, but this was only 
possible because an agreement already existed between trade unions and all the mayors, 
coordinated by the prefect. The Ministry of Labour and various under-secretaries of state 
have always recognised this role of mediation by the prefecture. We had many meetings 
between trade unions, the mayor, the prefect, the representative of the Ministry of Labour and 
the executives nominated by the provincial manager for the labour sector. This was the 
negotiation board for all projects. 
Not all the administrations had enough money to employ all the SUWs and so our aim was to 
defend the workers, and it thus became a union ‘battle’. We had very positive ‘negotiations’ 
with the municipality of Grottaglie, but in order to find all these solutions, we spent many 
days studying different possible scenarios for the ‘employment stabilization’ for each group 
of workers.  
 
The PA asked for SCO’s assistance in June 2000. A group of thirteen socially 
useful  workers decided to form the cooperative ‘Orizzonte 2000’ (‘Horizon 2000’) that 
joined CONSEA, a consortium of CICLAT. On 20
th
 November 2000 the municipality of 
Grottaglie outsourced the following services to CICLAT for a five-year period on behalf 
of the cooperative formed by SUWs: 
 maintenance of public buildings and schools; 
 maintenance of urban streets and road signs; 
 maintenance and cleaning of town’s sewerage; 
 maintenance of public green areas and those in the town’s cemetery. 
 
The PAs had used its own staff to carry out these activities in the past. There 
were about thirty workers employed by the City of Grottaglie in the ’80s and all 
maintenance work was carried out internally. Many of them gradually retired and now 
there  remains only an electrician, a plumber, a joiner and a blacksmith. From the 
beginning, the cooperative was seen as an operative arm of the administration itself.  
                                                 
82
 The prefecture is a representation of the Ministry for Internal Affairs at county level. It is managed by a 
public representative called the prefect who is responsible for various issues concerning the local 
communities’ life such as public order, immigration, economy and, more broadly, represents the 
government al local level.  
83
 This term has a negative connotation because being given a post means the worker will receive a salary, 
but their work is not considered essential, while having a job meant providing a useful activity for the 
community. 
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The expected turnover of ‘Orizzonte 2000’ was 900,000,000 ITL (about 
€458,000) in the first year and 1,210,000 ITL (about €625,000) at the end of the first five 
years. The contract provided for an anticipation of 200,000,000 ITL (about €104,000) to 
be given to the cooperative in the first month; this money enabled the cooperative to buy 
machinery and to pay the salaries from the outset. As maintenance work is usually paid 
for in several instalments calculated on the basis of the quantity of work done (measured 
in meters, square meters etc.) the cooperative would receive its first payment when the 
first allocated work was completed. 
The creation of the cooperative was very much supported by the PA, 
especially by the councillor for public works and the mayor. It was also seen as a better 
solution compared to other alternatives. The people who chose to form the cooperative 
were the most productive and actively involved during the SUJs projects. The councillor 
however thinks that the members of the cooperative are not equal in terms of the effort 
they put into carrying out their duties and, subsequently, the salaries should be different, 
according to the quantity and the importance of the work done. 
 
C.T. (councillor for public works): All our SUWs were skilled. The differences in 
productivity were not because of their professional training, but their determination. When 
we started the meetings preceding the formation of the cooperatives, many of them were not 
convinced. A few of them believed in this entrepreneurial project from the beginning. We 
also tried to contact private companies to which we would have outsourced the services, but 
most of the private entrepreneurs did not want to employ SUWs. We also contacted the 
entrepreneurial organizations, but this did not work either. 
From the outset we decided against creating a JMPPC because we thought the productivity of 
labour would decrease. We have always thought that the workers, by forming their own 
cooperative, would take full responsibility for their work. If the cooperative produces, it earns 
money; if it does not work, it does not survive. But it does not work like this with the joint 
mixed private-public companies. 
When we began working with the cooperative there was a huge difference; we noticeably 
increased the maintenance work in our city. The citizens noticed this too and they started to 
be far more demanding, to notify us of work that needed doing. The relationship between 
administration and the community improved because of the cooperative’s good service. 
They [the cooperative’s members] are satisfied now, both professionally and financially. I 
think however there are some problems, for example their decision to pay equal salaries to all 
members. I think this is wrong, not only from a financial point of view, but I think they are 
also not equal professionally and some are less committed than others. 
 
There are two departments of the City if Grottaglie which deal directly with 
the cooperative’s work, maintenance of urban public buildings and the maintenance of 
green public spaces. As a great part of the services outsourced to the cooperative are 
under the supervision of the former, the relationship developed with its manager is very 
close. F.S. has supervised the SUWs involved in the project since the beginning and 
acknowledges that the quality of work improved after the outsourcing. 
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F.S. (public manager, maintenance of urban space): When they were involved in SUJs the 
most difficult thing was to control all the work-sites; we had quite a few and, although I used 
to visit all of them, I could not spend much time in each place, making it difficult to measure 
their productivity of work. The SUWs who formed the cooperative were people who used to 
deliver good work when they were sent to do something; they did not need somebody to 
continuously tell them what to do.  
Once a cooperative is formed everything becomes easier. I am the one who estimates the new 
works to be done and then I contact them. The cooperative sends the work-team and, once 
they have finished, we check the quality and quantify the work according to the contract 
specification, and then we pay. We use a price-list approved in our region; everything they do 
is in this list and so we do not argue over anything.  
It is enormously advantageous to work with the cooperative. If we had had to organize 
competitive tenders for all the work we had done with the cooperative over the last five 
years, it would have taken us fifteen years for the same amount of work. With the cooperative 
we can respond immediately. For the schools, for example, there are always things to be 
fixed. To give you an example, many schools asked to have security doors fitted in their 
multimedia laboratories. In the past we had to run tenders, then the company that won sent 
somebody to take the measurements, and this person did not take them well. The doors would 
not fit, and we had to contest the service and a lot of time passed before having the right 
doors in place. With the cooperative, all these kinds of problems are sorted out immediately. 
Street maintenance is the only sector in which the cooperative is not productive enough 
because they do not have the machinery to produce bitumen, so they have to lease such 
machines. 
 
The manager responsible for the maintenance of green spaces also deals with 
the cooperative, but also with external private companies that deliver specialized services. 
He would like the cooperative to be more involved in this service, but this would require 
investment in machinery, especially for the  pruning of tall trees.  
  
S.N. (public manager, maintenance of green spaces): they started with an advantage 
compared to other companies in the market, because a five-year contract gives you a lot of 
advantages. You can learn a lot, buy machinery, improve your skills. Their eyes are opened. 
The request for quality services is increased; there are other companies in the marked 
offering these services, also for private clients. There is no reason for them to remain outside. 
Another problem is their organization, they are too busy to respond to all our calls [many jobs 
in this sector are emergencies], and we are continually asking them to do something. Their 
management should revise the internal organization and the distribution of work.  
 
The cooperative managed to both respect the contract with the Municipality 
of Grottaglie and take work on the market, some of them participating in CTCs. They 
won a tender at Grottaglie airport, but the most important tender they won was organized 
by the Municipality of Grottaglie for re-building the town’s central square (p.za Principe 
di Piemonte). In this case they won it in association with a group of enterprises of which 
they were the coordinator. I will go back soon to this major contract. 
Although the availability of a five-year contract with the PA can represent a 
good foundation for the creation of a cooperative, this process always reflects individual 
choices. Those considering forming a cooperative need to trust each other and accept 
being part of an organization ruled by themselves. In Grottaglie, the group who joined the 
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entrepreneurial project was formed at the outset of nine members. F.S. (a member of the 
cooperative) summarizes this process in a few words: ‘we chose ourselves; those who 
worked together well during the SUJs project decided to go for the cooperative’.   
Before signing the contract, the PA decided to outsource the maintenance of 
green public spaces too, so another four people joined the group. The cooperative was 
now made up of thirteen members, but another five people were employed at short notice 
after the start-up. The employees were chosen for their skills, aiming to form a group able 
to deal with any kind of work required in the sector of maintenance services. The 
president of the cooperative is the leader of the group and a key person for the PA. 
  
C.C. (President of the cooperative): We started from a business plan. We understood that the 
outsourcing was feasible; the administration was serious and really wanted to respect their 
commitments. When there were nine of us, the cooperative was ready to be formed. Then the 
administration decided to outsource the maintenance of green areas and we grew to a group 
of thirteen. After the cooperative’s start, some of the SUWs who had initially refused to 
become members of our group contacted the cooperative; they regretted not accepting our 
proposal when they understood that the cooperative was serious, with legal salaries and 
national insurance paid to everybody. These people are still SUWs at present, waiting to be 
employed by the administration. Some of them are happy this way; they are not looking for 
work. The other employees of the cooperative arrived a little bit later. Our aim is to offer all 
those skills requested in the maintenance sector.  
 
As can be seen in the table below, the cooperatives’ turnover was stable and it 
exceeded the expected values written in the contract. This was because  the cooperative 
had won other contracts, through tendering but also working directly with private clients, 
and also from the increased volume of outsourced services by the public administration 
(especially emergency streets maintenance work for).   
 
  Table 7.4/CS2: Coop. ‘Orizzonte 2000’: turnover and net results 2000-2005 (Euros) 
 2000 
(Dec.) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(Jan.-Nov.) 
Expected 
turnover*  
38,734  458,419  485,469  498,381  624,913  573,267  
Turnover**  38,733  618,388  767,143  852,810  984,397  1,397,849  
Net result 
after taxes**   
-17,628  19,971  38,579  -3,054  -7,811  -10,273  
Source: (*) contract for services outsourcing between the Municipality of Grottaglie    
and the consortium CICLAT and (**) balance sheets, 2000-2005 
 
During five years of activity, the cooperative obtained many qualifications 
necessary to participate in CTCs in the building sector (e.g. SOA, EMAS). It did this 
alone, without support from its consortium tutor. The training was almost non-existent in 
this project and the PA always considered that, apart from the insurance paid by the 
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consortium at the beginning, to guarantee the contract, its role was insignificant and it 
represented a bureaucratic complication that obstructed the cooperative. Both C.C. 
(president of the cooperative) and C.T. (the town councillor) explained that the period of 
time between the moment being paid in and when the money arrives in the cooperative’s 
bank account is unacceptably long: the PA pays CICLAT (a bank in Bologna) which 
keeps its percentage and then transfers the money to CONSEA (a bank in Bari) that keeps 
its percentage and then pays the cooperative (a bank in Grottaglie). This whole process 
can take up to forty five days. 
These difficulties were, to a certain extent, increased by the fact that it was 
chosen as an ‘intermediate’ consortium as tutor for the cooperative. CICLAT created 
CONSEA which grouped all the cooperatives formed by SUWs and PUWs. The worry 
was that, if there were too many cooperatives they could destabilize the consortium’s 
internal equilibrium
84
. With the creation of CONSEA, an additional step was introduced 
in the payment process and this new consortium had to divide the percentage of 1.5% on 
the overall value of the contract with CICLAT:  
 
G.V. (President of the cooperative identified as tutor by CICLAT, at the beginning of the 
contractual period): Our interest was, first of all, to employ SUWs and PUWs directly and to 
deliver the services. All those cases involving new cooperatives between these workers were, 
for us, of marginal interest. As for Grottaglie, we were contacted during the last part of the 
negotiations when the cooperative was already formed and the PA was working on the 
contract. I remember we were asked to solve a problem concerning the contract: the 
transformation of a certain number of services delivered on a regular basis and any 
unexpected emergencies in a normal contract which would allow the cooperative to be paid 
in instalments. 
  
C.M. (manager of CONSEA): the money we took for the training was too little to allow us to 
visit the cooperative regularly. For some cooperatives we provided technical training and we 
had costs of at least forty five thousands Euros. We had no chance of paying back this 
money. The cooperative formed in Grottaglie created few expenses because they were able to 
work alone; we did not however forget them. We form cooperatives and after follow them. 
When they are stable enough we let them go on their way. We do not gain any financial 
advantage from this, only to have strong cooperatives in our consortium. If this cooperative 
wants to work with us, especially locally, we have no problems working with them.  
 
Both G.V. and C.M. were somewhat surprised that the cooperative expressed 
dissatisfaction towards the consortiums. For them, the unwritten rule of the training was 
                                                 
84
 Consortiums are formed by cooperatives which are their members and have vote powers in the 
assemblies. The management group of a consortium is expression of the most important cooperatives in the 
group. The new arrivals can change the equilibrium and, in the case of the cooperatives formed by SUWs 
and PUWs they were seen as outsiders of this network because they were formed ‘artificially’, as a result of 
a legal provision. SCO was aware of  these risks, but had little instruments to question these dynamics 
inside its three consortiums shareholders. 
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‘if the cooperative has no claims and does not contact the consortiums, things are going 
well and there are no serious problems in its activities’.  
The cooperative participated in various tenders alone and even CICLAT won 
a tender in a field that they had not been involved in before, although they had the 
qualifications requested. As a consequence of this lack of interest from the consortium, 
the cooperative refused to create any kind of rapport with CONSEA. On the one hand, it 
had a strong relationship with the PA, and any administrative problems were quickly 
solved. On the other hand, they worked with two professionals who were not members 
but were nevertheless very involved in the cooperative’s strategies and decisions. The 
engineer A.A. met the SUWs for the first time before the cooperative’s formation. He 
drew up the first business plan and became the cooperative’s consultant for CTCs. He 
also prepares the documents that are sent to the PA once the work is finished and the 
administration needs to check it. He also acknowledges the skills of the cooperative 
members, but also stresses the importance of having adequate machinery that noticeably 
increases the productivity of work.      
 
A.A. (external consultant with the role of technical manager): I think their success is due to 
more than one factor. First of all, it was important they were motivated, because this 
cooperative allowed them to build their future. We obtained many other contracts on the 
market; so they do not only rely on the contract with the PA. It was a period when the 
services for private clients were almost more than those we delivered to public clients. 
Another important factor is the quality of work. They all have very specific skills and there is 
also a high flexibility between them. Finally, the president was very astute since the 
beginning because he strongly promoted buying the machinery. Many cooperative members 
did not agree, but in the end the president convinced them and this was a very good decision. 
We brought a machine for the road signs and we did the same amount of work in half the 
time, using only half of the materials.  
 
The question of machinery purchase is one area of dispute inside the 
cooperative. The business plan made provision for enough money to allow the 
cooperative to buy the machinery necessary to provide a high quality of efficient services. 
The accountant C.T. is the other important consultant in the cooperative. She considers 
that the president is ‘too democratic’ because every time a new purchase has to be 
decided upon, he calls a meeting of all the members. She believes the workload is 
unevenly distributed between the cooperative’s members, and some of them ‘should 
change their attitude or leave the cooperative’. 
 
C.T. (external consultant with the role of accountant): This cooperative could have had a 
large number of fixed assets, but the members did not allow the president to decide 
autonomously. Any time it is necessary to buy new machinery he asks all of them if they 
agree. Since the beginning we have used this method and sometimes we have regretted it. 
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Some cooperative members do not have an entrepreneurial mentality and they are resistant to 
investments. Only ten members are entrepreneurial, the others behave as if they were 
employees; they are part of the cooperative only to secure their salaries.  
Another problem we tackled was their mobility. When they won tenders outside Grottaglie 
they had to move to those work-sites, staying away from home for ten, fifteen or twenty days. 
They made a decision on this aspect and all committed to respect it. I think that this 
enterprise would function better if the responsibilities were defined better, and this is very 
difficult in a cooperative. Another form of company, a ltd. co. for example, could guarantee 
jobs for those who do not want responsibilities and it would be easier to take certain 
decisions and to manage the business. 
 
The idea of ‘transforming’85 the cooperative into a limited company at the 
end of the contract was not an isolated one. The president was convinced that this would 
be the only way to compete in the market. He is aware of the difficulty in convincing the 
cooperative members to take this decision, but some of them could agree with him if they 
see their jobs saved. 
 
C.C. (President of the cooperative): At the end of this contract with the Municipality of 
Grottaglie there is no reason to remain as a cooperative. We will not see the services 
outsourced directly to us. We will have to win a tender and, at that point, it is better if we 
participate as a ltd. company. The companies can have a higher capital and they have fewer 
problems with the banks; they are seen in a better way, and offered major guarantees. The 
cooperatives are not considered well in Mezzogiorno because they are not considered 
functional for an entrepreneurial initiative. Remaining together in a cooperative is also 
difficult, as many prefer secure jobs (posto fisso). 
 
P.B. (member of the cooperative): We want to transform the cooperative into a ltd. company 
when this is possible. The number of members would decrease, but we are convinced that the 
management structure is important in a company. Those who are ready to accept certain 
responsibilities can be members, but those who do not accept could continue to work as 
employees. Being a member also means putting more money in, working whenever it is 
necessary, and not clock watching. If we become a ltd. company we will not have to respect 
the rules imposed on a cooperative, for example being controlled by the inspectors. This is 
maybe a good thing, but is something that limits your freedom in deciding the rules and 
regulations of a company.  
 
The contract with the Municipality of Grottaglie was meant to finish in 
November 2005. However the cooperative obtained an extension to this contract for a 
further two years and six months, the maximum time allowed by law. Law 62/2005 (art. 
23) entitled the public administrations to extend the contract for the outsourced services 
only once, for a length of time equal to a maximum of half of the original contract’s 
length and only if the price is reduced by a minimum five per cent. The PA renewed the 
                                                 
85
 From a juridical point of view it is not possible to transform a cooperative into another form of enterprise 
without closing it. The cooperatives of ‘work-production’ (cooperative di produzione e lavoro) are 
companies that respect the principle of mutuality. When the cooperatives fail their capital is not divided 
between their members, but goes into a collective fund for the cooperation; there are different funds 
managed by different associations of cooperatives and one managed by the state for those cooperative 
which are not affiliated to any association. The cooperatives’ members are allowed to take back only their 
shares of capital issued, but there is no way to divide the profits. 
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contract directly with the cooperative, without involving the consortium that complained 
about this decision, threatening to take legal action against the administration, but it did 
not. In this way the reduction of five per cent of the contract’s price was obtained, cutting 
the consortium’s percentage and asking for only a two per cent reduction to the 
cooperative. The new contract had an overall value of €1,781,000. As already mentioned, 
the cooperative won a tender in 2005 with the same administration for restructuring the 
square Principe di Piemonte. That contract was worth about €800,000 of work, to be 
completed in two years. 
Despite this impressive portfolio of work, the cooperative did not perform 
well. Trying to get in touch with some of my interviewees for data updating, it was 
impossible to find any of them. The only documents showing the end of the cooperative 
are the balance sheets and the figures that illustrate a significant loss of €291,458 in 2006, 
followed by another loss in 2007. 
 
Table 7.5/CS2: Coop. ‘Orizzonte 2000’: turnover and net results, 2005-2007 (Euros) 
 2005 
(Dec.) 
2006 2007 2008 
(Jan.-May) 
Contract extension*       59,386        712,392       712,392     296,830  
Turnover ** 1,397,849  1,157,462 887,777  
Net result after taxes** -10,273  -291,458 -53,968  
Source: (*) Town Council bylaw 455/2005 for the extension of the contract between the 
Municipality of Grottaglie and the cooperative, and (**) balance sheets, 2005-2007 
 
The documentation from the Court for Bankruptcies in the Province of 
Taranto shows that the cooperative presented its last balance sheet in 2007. The 
justification for the high loss recorded in 2006 seems to be attributable to an unexpected 
increase in the cost of materials used for the restructuring of the square Principe di 
Piemonte (Note to the Balance Sheet 2006). 
The warning from one of the PA’s public managers about the risk of 
participating in large public tenders without having adequate financial structure, seemed 
to be very real. 
  
S.N. (public manager, maintenance of green spaces): It is clear that the cooperative needs to 
grow, but good organization is necessary. I told them several times to be careful with certain 
CTCs because when the figures start to increase, the responsibilities and risks also increase. It 
could be that some prices are calculated incorrectly and the effective costs could change 
dramatically when the cooperative delivers the work. How can the cooperative respond to 
these risks? How can it anticipate certain expenses without having any adequate financial 
structure? With the maintenance service we are sure that they do not lose money. Yet, in 
some CTCs, they could find services where they are asked to cover some of the costs, and 
those situations could become very risky. 
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This pronouncement, given two and a half years before the cooperative’s end, 
now seems almost visionary. It is true that the management group of the cooperative was 
thinking of closing this practice at the end of the five-year contract with the Municipality 
of Grottaglie, but they had in mind a totally different closure and the start of another 
entrepreneurial project.  
 
7.3 Third case study: socially useful workers employed by a joint mix public-
private company formed by Italia Lavoro 
 
This project was implemented by the Province of Taranto which is located in south-
western Puglia and has twenty nine municipalities accounting for almost 580,000 
inhabitants in total. The City of Taranto is the largest among them, with 195,000 
inhabitants. It is important to understand the industrial history of the city and evolution of 
the long-term unemployment in this area which was significantly influenced by the 
development, and crises, of the steel industry. 
Taranto was dramatically transformed in 1960, when the construction of the 
Fourth Iron and Steel Pole (named ‘Italsider’), the ‘biggest industrial project of the Italian 
entrepreneurial state’ (Dringoli, 2000:17) began. During the 1970s its industrial capacity 
was doubled and it became the largest steelworks in Europe. The development of 
‘Italsider’ had a significant impact on the entire steel sector, but its continuous 
enlargements created a state of organizational confusion and also negatively impacted on 
the  industrial plant’s production capacity (Osti, 1993:214). The steel sector entered a 
lengthy crisis in 1975. In the early 1980s IRI (the Italian Institute for Industrial 
Reconstruction) re-organized the state enterprises and, consequently, ‘Italsider’ was 
transformed into the ‘Ilva’ group in 1988. 
 The new company performed well during the first two years, but emerging 
difficulties in the steel sector and several failures of Ilva’s industrial strategy, especially 
buy-outs of bankrupt companies, led to the second serious crisis in the 1990s (Dringoli, 
2000). In the mid ’90s, the state decided that public steelworks had no future and the 
companies should be privatized. In 1995 ‘Ilva’ was bought by the private group Riva, a 
family company involved in the steelworks since 1957. As a result of this acquisition, the 
Riva group increased its business considerably and from a medium-large company, it 
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became one of the biggest multinationals in the steel sector and the seventh producer of 
raw steel in the world (Dringoli, 2000:85). 
In 2012 ‘Ilva S.p.A.’ was involved in a scandal concerning high levels of 
pollution in Taranto caused by its industrial plant. The company was presented with a 
warrant and its activity stopped and a plan for the complete environmental reclamation of 
the area was requested by the Bench. It seems that the owners had used the industrial plan 
without paying attention to any environmental consequences although, when the public 
company was privatized in 1995, the technology was very new (Dragoni, 2012).  
The closure of this company was highlighted in the press and those in favour 
of the protection of the citizens’ health were almost equal with those in favour of their job 
security. ‘Ilva’ had always been important for the economy of Taranto. Its presence 
favoured the development of the province at higher rates than those registered in other 
geographical areas of Mezzogiorno, but also represented a strong attraction that 
disadvantaged other areas and sectors; the building and mechanical industries are the 
sectors that benefited most from the presence of this industrial pole, but their 
development was closely connected to that of ‘Italsider’, and later ‘Ilva’ (Cerrito, 2010). 
However, it is clear that every period of industrial restructuring of steelworks resulted in 
unemployment that was not easily reabsorbed into a strongly polarized job market. Many 
people dismissed by ‘Ilva’ and by the companies involved in its restructuring, received 
wage compensation funds for lengthy periods and finished by being involved  in socially 
useful jobs. 
Since the early 1990s, both the City and the Province of Taranto implemented 
SUJs projects involving a large number of people, with three hundred people working for 
the former and two hundred for the latter. Due to the early retirement of a large number 
of SUWs, this number fell substantially. The City of Taranto formed a JMPPC to employ 
the SUWs, which failed after the first five years and those workers once again became 
unemployed and the Province decided to give them job opportunities within a new 
JMPPC formed in 2004.  
The joint mix public-private company analysed in this case study, ‘Taranto 
Isolaverde S.p.A.’, was formed by Italia Lavoro and the Province of Taranto on 27th 
December 2004 with the aim of employing 229 workers: 118 were SUWs used by the 
Province, 101 were former-SUWs used by the City of Taranto, and 10 were 
administrative and technical staff recruited by the market. The JMPPC was formed with a 
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total capital of shares issued of €1,000,000, divided between the Province (51%) and IL 
(49%).  
The Province outsourced a wide range of services to the new company over 
five years, which allowed all workers to be employed for thirty hours per week: 
 Cleaning services of schools (green areas included), public buildings and 
the province’s land estates (83 people); 
 Security  services of the public buildings (10 people);  
 Maintenance of public buildings: precautionary and emergency (21 
people); 
 Porters for the Province of Taranto (12 people); 
 Administrative services in support of the centres for employment (15 
people); 
 Public lighting maintenance (15 people); 
 Maintenance of the province’s roads (60 people). 
 
Apart from the public lighting maintenance, all the above services were 
delivered for the entire duration of the contract. Other new services were outsourced to 
the company during the five-year period and, for each of them, the JMPPC had to take on 
other long-term unemployed, with either short-term or long-term contracts. 
The Province nominated the president of the company, while IL nominated 
the managing director, one of the former managers of IL in the region of Puglia. The 
managing director was not only a person who was very familiar with the territory, but due 
to his extensive experience as a trade unionist, had been involved for many years in 
policies combating long-term unemployment and also in the disputes concerning 
‘Italsider’/ ‘Ilva’.  
 
G.G. (Managing Director of the company): Some of these unemployed have a very long 
story, starting in 1973/’74. About 3,000 workers had been fired when the work for the fourth 
pole finished. There was a fear that they would be disruptive in any further work aimed to 
double the production capacity of the steelworks, and so they were given wage compensation 
funds just to stay home. Many of them remained unemployed for twenty years and some of 
them finished in the SUWs ‘basin’. At that time there was no limit for the wage 
compensation funds; it was possible to receive them for very long periods of time. Later, as a 
result of the Treu legislation, another category arrived, the PUWs who were not long-term 
unemployed beneficiaries of wage compensation funds. They were people who had never 
worked, those youngsters who registered themselves at the offices for employment while 
they were still going to school; just because they hoped to have some job opportunity in this 
way. In fact, many of them became PUWs. They increased the educational level of the whole 
group slightly, and the average age was reduced.  
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The employees I interviewed had not worked for ‘Ilva’, but they remained 
unemployed for very long periods of time before becoming socially useful workers. 
During the SUJs project, ‘employment stabilization’ was attempted for some of them, but 
the enterprises which delivered the services ‘sent them back to the public administration’ 
when the contracts finished. The likelihood of finding a stable job seemed greater in a 
company owned by a public administration.   
  
R.F. (employee of the company): I was a driver in the building sector; I worked for many 
companies. In 1986 I lost my job and I signed up to the list for special unemployment aid 
[provided for the building sector]. In 1992 I was called to join the SUJs projects started by 
the Province of Taranto. First we had an interview and we were asked what we were able to 
do. Drivers were not requested. I worked in schools doing any work requested (painting, 
cleaning etc.). I always worked for twenty hours per week. After a while we were passed to 
the company ‘Jet s.r.l’ which was given the service of maintaining public signage. It was a 
little bit better: we had a uniform, a clocking–in and out card and a manager. I always worked 
for twenty hours per week, but we were entitled to have bank holidays and holidays. A 
couple of months before the contract ended they dismissed us. They could not have the 
service given to them again because they should have to compete for it in a public tender. 
Probably they knew that they were not able to win, so they gave up. This happened when the 
JMPPC was starting, so the Province gave us another opportunity with this company. Now I 
work for thirty hours per week and it is said that if this company should fail, we will have a 
better chance of being employed directly by the Province. If this is not possible and ‘Taranto 
Isolaverde’ fails, there is no future for us. I don’t think we are entitled anymore to receive 
wage compensation funds and, in the job market, nobody would take-on someone like me. 
Everybody would prefer a young guy, with less experience but who costs less and for whom 
it is possible to ask for public incentives [usually tax reliefs for national insurance].  
 
The experience of long-term unemployment was devastating at a personal 
level. Although becoming a socially useful worker did not mean re-entering the job 
market, the delivery of practical activities for the public administration was, in itself, 
positive. For many SUWs, the activity delivered during the projects became actual jobs 
through the outsourcing. 
 
N.I. (employee of the company): In 1973 I started to work for the company ‘Mantelli’, a 
building company from Genoa. I am an accountant and in 1983, when they finished their 
operations, the company left Taranto. Because of a regional law I registered for the special 
unemployment aid and I remained unemployed for twelve years; I had almost forgotten to 
use a pen in such a long period! Since then it has been a long period when many enterprises 
were closed in Taranto; large and small enterprises. When a small enterprise closed and  
seventy-eighty jobs were lost, maybe this was not such a big story for the press, but nothing 
else came out later to substitute this lost. So before I entered the socially useful jobs I had 
built up a lot of anger over this situation. This law gave us a chance, it was very positive and 
later these activities also became proper jobs. As a SUW, I worked in the office dealing with 
bylaws and when this company started the activity I continued to work in the same office, in 
the Province. Many people employed by the JMPPC continued to do the same things, 
because they were needed. The public servants gradually retired and SUWs took their place 
and in certain services they became invaluable. Then our director asked me to work, more 
operatively, in our company and I began to do what I used to do almost thirty years ago. 
Years ago the Province outsourced certain services to two private companies, ‘La Fiorita’ and 
‘Chemi.pul’, but there were problems and these companies could not continue. Because of  
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the law the SUWs returned to the Province [the law provided for SUWs employed for less 
than twelve months by an employer, to maintain their status]. 
 
The full cost of the services outsourced was estimated by IL at €5,700,000 per 
annum. As the overall wage-subsidies and tax reliefs provided for the employment of 
such a large number of SUWs was estimated at €814,000 per annum (during the first 
three-year period) IL partially took into consideration this surplus and developed the 
business plan deducting it entirely from the cost of the services outsourced (first year), 
and by  half (in the second and third years). These calculations took into account the fact 
that the number of works remained relatively stable during the whole period of the 
outsourcing. Things did not work instead in this way and from 2005, the company 
employed different groups of long-term unemployed for additional services that had been 
allocated by the Province. For this reason wage-subsidies tax reliefs were, overall, much 
higher than those estimated by IL and they allowed the JMPPC to benefit from high 
profits during the first three years of activity. As will be shown, the cautious choice to not 
pay dividends and retain the profits, allowed the company to create a reserve fund that 
was used to face the economic difficulties encountered after 2008.  
From table 7.6 it can be observed that the company registered a serious loss in 
2009, followed by another more limited one, in 2010. The profits accumulated during the 
first four years were used to cover these losses, but the overall management of ‘Taranto 
Isolaverde’ entered a difficult period at the end of 2008. 
 
Table 7.6/CS3: ‘Taranto Isolaverde S.p.A.’: turnover, net results and tax reliefs provided 
by law, 2005-2011 (Euros) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Expected 
turnover* 
4,900,000  5,200,000  5,200,000  5,700,000  5,700,000      
Turnover** 4,902,656  6,132,737  6,288,437  7,305,084  7,215,339  7,095,410  6,765,670  
Net result after 
taxes** 
505,758  398,774  336,762  56,777  -575,715  -173,054  2,296  
Wage-
subsidies and 
tax reliefs of 
which**: 
926,982  1,224,718  1,120,283  216,701  179,879  100,200  79,855  
L. 407/1990 515,580  726,590  779,422  216,701  179,879  100,200    
L. 388/2000 51,948  47,970            
DLgs. 81/2000 359,454  350,158  340,861          
Other   100,000          79,855  
Source: (*) note prepared for the IL’s board of directors (December 2004) and (**) 
balance sheets, 2005-2011 
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During its first three years of activity, the company increased  its turnover due 
to new services outsourced by the Province of Taranto, but it had also to employ new 
people for their delivery 1) maintenance of heating systems (26 people with permanent 
contracts); 2) maintenance of the Province’s roads (35 people with short-term contracts, 
13 of whom had been employed with permanent contracts in 2008); 3) additional 
administrative services to support the  employment centres (15 people with permanent 
contracts); 4) seaside and seashore cleaning (seasonal workforce). The new employees 
were all long-term unemployed and the Province ‘had never asked the joint mixed 
company to employ “recommended people”86, as usually happens for these kinds of 
companies’ (G.G., managing director of the company, interview data). 
Moreover, in order to enlarge the range of services delivered, and also 
increase their quality, during 2005/’06 the JMPPC proposed three new projects to the 
Province: 1) a video-car was projected and made, with the purpose of monitoring the 
public estates, primarily for checking illegally constructed buildings; 2) a solar plant was 
projected and then mounted on the top of the building where the company has its offices, 
with the aim of installing other solar panels on all public buildings in the Province of 
Taranto; 3) a project for the transformation of urban waste into dry biomass was prepared 
in collaboration with the University of Bari, with the aim of beginning recycling waste 
collection across the entire province. However, none of these initiatives led to the start-up 
of new services and, after 2007, the outsourced services were unable to cover the 
increased cost of labour.  
Table 7.7 illustrates the changes to the average number of employees during 
and after the contract period. Italia Lavoro estimated that the cost of a total workforce of 
229 people would account for 78% of the overall turnover in 2009 yet the real cost of 
labour accounted for 85% in that year and fell to 79% only because of the use of wage 
compensation funds for a large number of workers during the last term of 2010. 
Article 3 of the contract for services outsourcing states that the contractees 
will revise the price after the first three years of activity, according to the new conditions 
put in place at the end of 2007, especially the full-cost of labour. In fact, when wage-
subsidies and tax reliefs ended in 2008, the cost of labour was €1,413,000 more than that 
registered in 2007, this increase accounting for 35%. A further increase of €730,000, 
                                                 
86
  The recommendation (la raccomandazione) has a negative connotation in Italian. It usually refers to 
political nepotism, especially those situations in which private companies are asked to employ friends and 
relatives of those who secure their incomes. 
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accounting for almost 14%, was recorded in 2009 (Incorporate Note, balance sheets 2008 
and 2009). In 2010 an average turnover of €7,100,000 was then insufficient to cover the 
cost of the activities carried out by 286 employees.  
 
Table 7.7/CS3: ‘Taranto Isolaverde S.p.A’: average number of employees per job type, 
2005-2011 
Types of jobs 
Part-time 
employees*  
(2004) 
Average no. of employees per typology of jobs** 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Managers 1 0.33 1 1 1.85 2 2 -  
 
Coordinators 6 
7.58 62.3 88.16 62.35 80.67 80 5 
White-collar 
workers  21 
Blue-collar 
workers 201 210.91 155.5 131.55 201.25 198.83 193 92 
Total 229 218.82 218.8 220.71 265.45 281.5 275 97 
Source: (*) Business plan prepared by IL (the figures represent the estimated number of 
employees part-time at 75%); (**) balance sheets (the average number is calculated on the 
basis of the overall annual number of hours worked per employee; the three types of jobs 
taken into consideration are: managers, white-collar and blue-collar workers)  
 
The figures shown in the table above take into account the use of special 
wage compensation funds, for four months in 2010 and eight months in 2011, which is 
why the average number of employees is smaller than the actual number of people 
employed by the company in these two years. 
Although the large profits accumulated during the first three years covered 
the loss, the discrepancies between the company’s increased costs and the shortfall in the 
value of the contract became evident. In October 2007 the JMPPC formally asked the 
Province to increase the value of outsourced services. With Decision 82/2008 the 
Province of Taranto acknowledged that this increase was equal to €850,271, but due to 
difficulties in finding new services, in addition to those already outsourced, it paid only 
€200,000 to the company (Management Report, balance sheet 2008). In February 2009 
the company asked for a further €420,000 to cover the increased costs of the contract and 
received €390,000 (Management Report, balance sheet 2009). 
Even if ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ encountered great difficulties in securing a 
sufficient number of services to cover its costs, the increase in quality of services 
delivered and productivity of the workforce remained one of the most important goals 
pursued by the company, with the aim of demonstrating its competitive advantages over 
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other competitors in the market. This gain was probably not true for all services 
delivered, but the JMPPC received positive feedback from the province’s technical 
divisions dealing with competitive tenders, especially street and building maintenance.  
 
G.G. (Managing Director of the company): During one particular period we did not have 
good relationships with the Province’s office over street maintenance because, as our 
company delivers this service, it placed limits on running tenders for similar activities. So 
they contested our work and did not pay us for six months. They argued this was because we 
had delivered work that was too little for the money they should have paid us. I wrote them a 
letter of complaint saying that we would bring a case against the Province for this service. 
The public manager organized a meeting to clarify how much should be paid for the work we 
had delivered and according to their calculations, we should receive €90,000; we invoiced 
them, instead for only €78,000. With such a discrepancy it became clear that our services cost 
less than others on the market, possibly because we do not include any profit and the 
Province pays only the industrial cost. 
 
M.R., technical manager of the company, was worried that SUWs would not 
have a proper ‘work mentality’ as a result of having been outside the labor market for a 
long period of time. He went to great lengths explaining to them the importance of 
delivering the work required in the given amount of time, of respecting the safety and 
security rules, and in combating absenteeism. The higher rates of absenteeism are 
recorded among the group involved in cleaning services, most of them older workers. In 
order to discourage this behavior, a bonus of approximately forty Euros per month is 
given to those who do record no more than two days’ absence. In addition, a 
questionnaire to verify ‘customer satisfaction’ is distributed to the schools’ directors 
requesting feedback on the services delivered by ‘Taranto Isolaverde’. The most 
important objective remains, however, the continuous benchmarking of the company’s 
costs with those normally paid by public administrations to companies which win 
competitive tenders. This is not an easy task because it requires the registration of all 
activity parts of a service.  
  
M.R. (technical manager of the company): We have a procedure for each service we deliver. 
Everything is recoded on specific forms and tables, and then individual reports are written. 
For example, with the building maintenance, each worker has to record both the materials 
used and the time spent carrying out any single activity. Then, adding the costs for labour, 
materials, machinery depreciation etc., we are able to have an industrial cost for each service; 
we need to have a measure of comparison with potential competitors. We want to 
demonstrate to the Province that the money spent on the ‘employment stabilization’ of SUWs 
has good return, and the Province can save money using us, as an alternative to running 
competitive tenders. In other words, that our productivity is competitive with that registered 
by companies in the private sector.  
The way in which our contract is set makes this objective difficult. ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ 
invoices the Province every month for a certain number of services delivered. Then, 
according to the prices of each technical division, the Province calculates its cost for that 
amount of work. If our price is higher than their price, the Province does not pay; if it is 
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smaller it pays, or at least should pay, the difference. For us it is important to demonstrate 
that our services can stay within that price. 
Recently we had a good opportunity to demonstrate our productivity and cost effectiveness. 
There is a famous high school in Taranto, named ‘Archita’, that was declared inaccessible for 
safety reasons. We were asked to rectify this problem in just a few days; so we had to use 
many workers on a single work-site, involved in a wide range of activities. The costs of these 
activities can be calculated from the price list used by the Province’s technical offices. They 
made all their calculations which suggested that all the work would cost €55,000 if they were 
outsourced through competitive tenders; and they would probably have to organize more than 
one tender. In reality, ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ invoiced only €38,000 for all the activities 
delivered for ‘Archita’, one third less of the cost estimated by the Province. This was a good 
opportunity to prove certain things that would be difficult to prove otherwise! 
 
The Province of Taranto is not only the company’s owner, but also its single 
(most important) client. The decision to form the joint mixed company seemed to be 
dictated primarily by social reasons, but it excluded the possibility of alternative choices. 
 
C.C. (councilor for public works): We are certainly very proud of our decision [of forming 
the JMPPC], because, beyond the economic issues, we provided a solution to a big social 
problem. Nevertheless, for us this solution signifies an economic commitment for several 
million Euros annually and this, in one way or another, blocks our balance and leaves us with 
few alternative choices.  
The former SUWs today are different from the past because now they begin work, at a certain 
time, every day, wear a uniform, respect an organization; all these things are a positive signal 
for the entire community. Nobody anymore can say that we pay people who work illegally, 
or who have two jobs. Providing such a large number of people with jobs was not an easy 
choice at all. This impacted on us spending in other initiatives that might give more visibility 
to the Province, also in the media. We decided to do the opposite; we saved the money in 
order to provide a solution to the occupational problem. 
 
Although creating jobs for almost 300 people did not pass unobserved, this 
choice did not make the enterprises that aspired to deliver these services happy. The 
councilor C.C. is convinced that a ‘certain balance must be maintained’ and the ‘market 
should not be penalized’ (interview data). He also thinks that it is not so easy to assess the 
economic convenience between the joint mixed company and others potential private 
competitors. 
 
C.C. (councilor for public works): Maintenance of the public signage, cleaning, and school 
maintenance are services that ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ delivers constantly. There is a very quick 
response now; in the past we had to wait a week and run a tender for repairing a tap. In any 
case, any bylaw we prepare requires time. In certain cases time saving means money saving. 
In-house provision of services has the advantage of immediateness, but I think that in many 
circumstances they are more costly. Today, as a result of a serious lack of demand, the 
private companies are ready to substantially squeeze their prices. In terms of economic 
convenience, and also of responsibility, when a service is outsourced it is as if one is washing 
their hands of it. An administrative bylaw is prepared and the delivery of services must be 
controlled, but there are no other problems. For the in-house provision, it is instead necessary 
to continually control the public expenditure that cannot be an overdraft, and this is far more 
complicated.  
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In fact, the Province managed to control this expenditure accurately and, due 
to a further reduction of public funds, the re-negotiation of the contract with the JMPPC 
became impossible after 2008. The province needed another year to find the money to 
buy IL’s capital quota at the end of the five-year period. The JMPPC became entirely 
public in March 2011, but its financial situation did not improve and, in order to reduce 
the labour costs, the company used special wage compensation funds for a period of 
twelve months during 2010-2011. Two hundred and eighteen workers remained out of 
work for an overall 13,200 hours per month, equivalent to 40% of their work time. 
Although this is not a sustainable path for the future, the use of social shock absorbers 
allowed the company to considerably cut its expenses: €519.213 (for labour) and 
€141,000 (for materials) in 2010, and €228,000 (for labour) and €270,000 (for materials) 
in 2011 (Management Report, balance sheets 2010 and 2011). 
Considering that at the end of 2009 the company increased the number of 
working hours worked per week from thirty to thirty two for the entire workforce, to a 
certain extent this situation is a paradox. This rise had an immediate effect on labour 
costs and, as it was not counterbalanced with additional  services, increased the 
company’s loss.  
COBAS
87
 are the trade unions most active in the company. They did not 
encounter difficulties in having their requests met: a bonus for being present at work, an 
increase in the value of lunch tickets and, most importantly, a gradual increase in the 
number of hours worked, leading to a full-time contract of forty hours per week. For 
many reasons, ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ appears to be a perfect employer, although the 
economic sustainability of the company was uncertain. 
 
S.S. (COBAS, trade union leader): I don’t think this company is the ‘usual’
88
public company 
because the management is adequately skilled. They agreed with our request to gradually 
move all workers into full-time jobs. We did not even have one day of strikes in this 
company. Why should we waste the workers’ time (and money) if we manage to get what we 
ask for during the negotiations? Admittedly, we are not foolish enough to ask for everything 
immediately: full-time jobs, a bonus for being present at work and better value  lunch ticket. I 
cannot behave in this way, also because this is not a private company, there is no profit here. 
If a company makes a good profit, then I will fight to transfer part of it to the workers. But 
from whom in ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ should I take this money? 
 
                                                 
87
 The acronym stands for ‘committee of the basis’; this organization presents itself as not being organized 
on a hierarchically basis, and as an alternative to the trade unions organized in confederations. 
88
 He used the term ‘carozzone’, that alluded to the lack of efficiency that is usually attributed to the public 
sector. 
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Instead, the managing director of ‘Taranto Isolavarde’ has another opinion of 
this. He thinks that ‘this is the problem of the public sector: the idea that a public 
company must not have profits’, but, at the same time, he does not believe in miracles 
made by the markets and magnanimous entrepreneurs: 
 
G.G. (Managing Director of the company): This happened when I was involved, as a trade 
unionist, in the privatization of ‘Ilva’. There was a group of ten entrepreneurs who were 
trying to make an offer to buy ‘Ilva’, but they were not able to get together at least one billion 
Italian lira. The president of the Association of entrepreneurs at that time made an unhappy 
observation: as there was something to be shared out, they all wanted to be present. So their 
worries were not about restructuring the steel industry, buying ‘Ilva’ and transforming it into 
an efficient company. What I want to say with this story is that if you give a company that 
has problems to private entrepreneurs, they will not solve the problems, and neither will they 
agree to deal with those problems without receiving something in exchange.  
 
When I called G.G in September 2012, the situation of ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ 
had  not  improved at all. The Province has not found the €8,000,000 necessary to 
maintain the company, and about sixty people would have to be dismissed to allow the 
company to survive with the funds available (Management Report, balance sheet 2011). 
To make this situation even more complicated, a recent reform of the public 
administration (L.211/2011) has threatened many provinces that are at risk of 
disappearing. The law states a minimum number of 300,000 inhabitants and a minimum 
area of 3,000 km
2
, and the Province of Taranto does not fit into these criteria. It is a 
predictable unification of the Provinces of Taranto and Brindisi that opens many 
questions regarding the movement of certain institutions from one territory to another. In 
addition, the recent decree regarding the spending review provides legal disposition 
concerning the public companies for in-house provision. According to this recent 
legislation ‘Taranto Isolaverde’ should be closed by 30th December 2013 or privatized by 
30
th
 June 2013. In this last hypothesis, the new private company would secure a five-year 
contract beginning in January 2014.  
 
7.4 Fourth case study: socially useful workers employed by a National Park  
 
The National Park of Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains (abbreviated hereafter to the Park) 
was established with DPR 5
th
 June 1995. It is a national public body which has as 
institutional mission to protect and promote sustainable development of its land, an area 
of 150,000 hectares, located in the Region of Abruzzi, but which also crosses the borders 
of the Regions of Lazio and Marche. There is specific legislation for the national parks, 
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which are public bodies under control of the Ministry of Environment. Like other public 
bodies, they are set up with a specific organizational arrangement provided by law, 
known in administrative jargon as the staff chart (pianta organica), which defines the 
number of employees and their functions within the organization. It is commonplace for 
the national parks to begin their activities with a very limited number of individuals 
(usually the president and the director) and the staff to be appointed after a certain period. 
The continued cuts to public expenditure during recent decades blocked the employment 
of civil servants and, as a result, the national parks appointed only some of the 
professional profiles provided by their staff charts. This chronic lack of personnel is 
partially resolved with temporary contracts, especially consultants
89
 who have contracts 
renewed over several years. 
The National Park of Gran Sasso was set up in a period of high 
unemployment in the Provinces of L’Aquila and Teramo, as a result of the closure of 
many building companies that had been involved in the construction of the L’Aquila-
Teramo highway, some of these during the trials opened by Tangentopoli. If on the one 
hand there was a social emergency, on the other hand the Park needed personnel, as many 
jobs were needed to make the territory accessible to visitors and to maintain conservation 
of the environment. In 1997 a training course for approximately 150 long-term 
unemployed was organized in both provinces and on 1
st
 January 1998 the Park started a 
SUJ project involving about 80 people. As a considerable number of these workers were 
over fifty years old, they benefited from early retirement and in 2000 there were only 37 
SUWs in the group. In the second half of 2000 the Park activated SCO with the aim of 
closing its SUJs project and providing ‘employment stabilization’ for all SUWs involved.  
I was directly involved in this first ‘employment stabilization’ that set in place what 
happened almost seven years later, when the workers were taken back by the Park and 
employed in positions that did not exist in the staff plan, and which were made for them 
on an ad-hoc basis. 
In 2000 the Park ran a public competition and thus managed to employ a 
large proportion of its staff (thirty people out of forty five expected) to fill both technical 
and administrative roles. When SCO started to work with the Park we were impressed by 
both its strong organization and determination regarding the future of SUWs. The first 
                                                 
89
 I refer to people appointed with contracts of consultancy and collaboration. The collaborators are linked 
to specific projects or are re-appointed with short-term temporary contracts, so are in effect working on a 
regular long-term basis for the administration. 
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President of the Park promoted the outsourcing of the Parks’ services to a cooperative 
formed of the SUWs themselves, while the director was more sceptical about the 
feasibility of this plan. The suggestion of forming a JMPPC with Italia Lavoro had been 
abandoned because it was not supported by the Ministry of Environment. In fact, as the 
Ministry made the necessary funds
90
 available for SUWs employment stabilization, it was 
the last to approve the project and the related costs.   
We explored then the possibility of SUWs forming a cooperative, but the 
group was not homogenous and they would never be able to agree on the many decisions 
that a company run by themselves requires. Trade unions also opposed this suggestion 
and promoted the employment of SUWs through an established cooperative introduced 
by SCO. This project was assigned to the consortium CNS which chose the cooperative 
‘29 Giugno’ as the future employer of this group. 
For the most part, the group was involved in land maintenance. These thirty 
one qualified workers had already carried out much environmental work during the 
implementation of a SUJs project. A small group of six were involved in auxiliary 
services such as cleaning, car maintenance and operating the telephone exchange. The 
table below presents data included in the business plan prepared by SCO which was 
annexed to the contract for outsourced services.  
The first proposal for the ‘employment stabilization’ took into consideration a 
part-time contract for all workers, for thirty one hours per week, and the labour cost was 
calculated based on the National Contract of Labour for Forestry which was related to 
this typology of work. The trade unions strongly opposed this proposal as all workers 
were involved in SUJs for thirty six hours per week. After negotiations it was agreed that 
all workers would be employed by the cooperative for the same amount of time and a 
different labour contract was applied for those employed in the delivery of non-forest 
services. Therefore the cost of labour slightly increased, yet it never exceeded 
1,200,000,000 ITL per year (about €620,000). It can also be seen that the important 
financial contribution from the Ministry of Environment (more than 3 billion ITL) 
                                                 
90
 The Ministry of Environment never agreed for the National Parks being part of joint mixed companies, 
but championed outsourcing of services to small cooperatives which would be formed locally. Five 
National Parks began SUJs projects in 1998, involving an overall number of 1,000 long-term unemployed. 
At the end of 2000 there were still 650 SUWs involved in these projects (NP Garagano 42, NP Gran Sasso 
37, NP Majella 36, NP Vesuvio 99 and NP Cilento 435). During 2001, 450 SUWs were offered the 
possibility of accessing ‘employment stabilization’ through outsourced services to cooperatives which 
would employ them or would be formed by themselves. The Ministry of Environment made 22.5 billion of 
ITL available (about 11.6 million Euros) to finance the contracts for outsourced services over a period of 
five years.  
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accounted for 61% of the overall value of the three-year contract. As these funds were 
given as a lump-sum for the closure of SUWs projects, and the cost of the contract would 
increase during the fourth and fifth years, the Park did not commit itself to a five-year 
contract from the beginning. Still the contract was necessary to maintain the jobs and the 
continuity of the services, and so the second President of the Park extended it for other 
two years. 
Table 7.8/CS4: Cost and relative funds concerning the closure of the socially useful jobs 
project implemented by the National Park of Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains (continues) 
FUNDS* (Italian Lira) 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
Ministry of Environment 1,007,768,956 1,007,768,956 1,007,768,956 
National Park, own funds 350,000,000 350,000,000 350,000,000 
Residual funds from SUJs project 80,645,008 80,645,008 80,645,008 
Wage incentives for SUWs 
employment (D. Lgs. 81/2000) 222,000,000 222,000,000 222,000,000 
Total funds available for the 
'employment stabilization' (A) 1,660,413,964 1,660,413,964 1,660,413,964 
COST* (Italian Lira) 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
Labour (37 people, part-time 31 hours 
per week, National Contract of Labour 
for Forestry )  1,016,649,000 1,016,649,000 1,016,649,000 
Materials 109,000,000 109,000,000 109,000,000 
Equipment (rent) 60,000,000 60,000,000 60,000,000 
Other  161,295,000 161,295,000 161,295,000 
Total cost 1,346,944,000 1,346,944,000 1,346,944,000 
Cost of services for sale, 
VAT included (B) 1,616,332,800 1,616,332,800 1,616,332,800 
DIFFERENCE (A-B) 44,081,164 44,081,164 44,081,164 
Turnover**(Italian Lira) 1,674,000,000 1,674,000,000 1,674,000,000 
Turnover** (Euros)            864,549             864,549             864,549  
Source: (*) SCO, internal documents and (**) Contract for outsourced services between 
the National Park of Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains and the consortium CNS 
 
On 27
th
 May 2001 the National Park of Gran Sasso outsourced the following 
services to  CNS for a three-year period on behalf of the cooperative ‘29 Giugno’ which 
employed the socially useful workers: 
 cleaning of the Park’s offices; 
 administrative support  (operating the telephone exchange) 
 services protecting the environment (environmental recovery of damaged 
areas, construction of paths and dedicated areas for wildlife protection, 
restoration of shelters, maintenance of Park’s signage etc.). 
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As will be explained in the following section, after six years of work, these 
workers were dismissed in 2007, and then employed by the National Park of Gran Sasso 
in 2008. 
In October 2001 the cooperatives ‘29 Giugno’ (located in Rome) and 
‘Formula Servizi’ (located in Forli) formed a consortium called ‘Formula Ambiente’ 
(FA) specializing in a wide range of environmental services. The contract with the 
National Park of Gran Sasso passed to this new company together with their thirty seven 
employees, former SUWs. In 2002 the President of the Park changed; the new president 
managed the contract for the outsourced services and developed a collaborative 
relationship with FA. He considered this company a good entrepreneurial instrument for 
the Park, despite still being too costly. 
 
W.M. (President of the Park from 2002 to 2007): Nowadays it is more important to have 
highly skilled people in the public administration, rather than a large number of civil servants 
who do not know what to do. The national parks should be allowed to form public companies 
in order to manage their estate patrimony in a more entrepreneurial way, but for this activity, 
skills that public staff usually do not have, are necessary. I think the public administration has 
to use the market mechanism for certain activities, at least for those requiring specialized 
management. 
FA worked well, but they were always complaining over money. On the one hand we did 
other projects with them; for example we opened a restaurant in a road inspector’s house that 
had been restructured with our funds; this was a window for the Park, for its local products 
and traditions. On the other hand, the outsourced services cost more than when they were 
produced directly by the Park. I always managed to find money for this contract, thanks to 
our relationship with the Ministry of Environment and the Region. 
In 2008 SUWs returned to the Park and became its direct employees; they saw this as being 
their real ‘employment stabilization’, and considered it a reward. These workers have been 
always useful to the Park, but I think that they could be managed in a better way today, more 
productively. 
 
At the end of the three-year contract, W.M. championed the formation of a 
cooperative among the workers, but they refused; the proposal to form a public joint 
mixed company was again rejected by the Ministry for Environment. The contract with 
FA was then renewed for a further two years, at  a higher price. SCO was not involved in 
the contract renewal, but during a monitoring visit to the Park, in June 2004, we were told 
that FA had asked €1,250,000 per year for the new contract, an amount considered 
excessively high by the Park. 
The administrative coordinator of the SUWs group had a clear idea about the 
reason behind the failure of the formation of a cooperative among these workers, but she 
underlined that it was always clear that the Park was their primary employer. 
 
A.F. (Park’s employee, administrative coordinator of SUWs until 2002): The SUWs never 
wanted to form a cooperative. They felt that being the Park’s employees had always been 
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their dream, but at that time they were threatened by the uncertainty and precariousness of 
their  work. They were very unionized and rather quarrelsome, as they are still now but they 
are professional  and carried out valuable work for the Park. 
The first president, G.R. proposed they form a cooperative to which the Park would  
outsource these services. The second president, W.M. did the same, and if the cooperative  
had been formed, the Park would not have renewed the contract with FA.  
SUWs worked well also when were employed by FA, but in reality their work did not change 
too much. They were however managed by the Park; FA nominated one of them as 
coordinator and had a manager who kept contact with the Park.  
As far as the Park’s employees were concerned [those employed in 2000], they felt solidarity 
for SUWs in 2008 [when they became the Park’s employees], but the consultants felt they 
were in competition with them, because the number of posts available was insufficient to 
employ all precarious
91
 workers. 
 
 
All former SUWs (today’s Park’s employees) highlighted the importance that 
the Park’s management had on their work. P.T. (Park’s employee, former SUWs and 
coordinator nominated by FA) described this organizational model as follows: ‘FA was 
our employer, but it was always the Park who ordered  the work to be done, through its 
consultants’.  
As a result of the constant monitoring carried out by the Park and the fact that 
FA was far from the employees’ location, many SUWs considered this company of little 
significance  for their ‘employment stabilization’.  
 
R.DD. (Park’s employee, former SUW): This employer [FA] was only symbolic, on paper, 
because we were managed by the Park and its consultants. So this company existed in name 
only,  it was not physically present. 
 
S.M. (Park’s employee, former SUW and trade union leader): True ‘employment 
stabilization’ would have occurred if FA had arrived here, had taken other work in this area, 
had employed more people. It should have participated in CTCs in our province. It had asked 
for money, instead, only when the funds finished; and the justification was that they would 
keep our jobs. 
 
FA nominated new heads of the four operational squads, who were not easily 
accepted by the others. As a result, the group’s dynamics changed and many tensions 
appeared. During the SUJs project the workers used to organize their daily activities 
themselves, although even then it was not easy to meet everybody’s expectations. 
 
S.M. (Park’s employee, former SUW and trade union leader): When I was a trade unionist 
[until 2002] we had no problems with the Park, but with the workers. When the Park gave us 
the programme of activities to be carried out, we used to organize our work autonomously. 
For some people this did not work, they did not want to take responsibilities without 
                                                 
91
 The expression ‘precarious’ job or worker (precario) refers to those situations when people are employed 
with short-term contracts for long periods of time, for regular activities that would require permanent 
contracts. Although there is a specific labour regulation, the use of short-term and flexible contracts is 
abused in Italy and, for the PAs banned from employing staff for many years, this became common 
practice. 
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receiving anything in exchange. So they opposed every proposal; they said ‘I do not want to 
do this’ or ‘if I do this what do I get for it’? The coordinator nominated by the Park [who was 
a consultant] did not want to become involved; he said from the beginning: ‘I do not want to 
deal with these stories, the only thing I am interested in is to see the work done well and on 
time’. So we had to deal alone with our quarrels. 
 
The group conflicts also explain the reason why the formation of a 
cooperative between these workers was not achieved. 
    
S.M. (Park’s employee, former SUW and trade union leader): I’ll tell you why it was not 
possible to form the cooperative. In my opinion the whole discourse started badly. When the 
cooperatives are formed, they should have a future; they are not formed just to get rid of 
workers, who then have to find a way of coping with the problems.   
During the meetings [the training course run by SCO] my colleagues were only thinking of 
how much they would  earn if they became members of the cooperative. Five of six people 
thought of being coordinators since the start-up, while the others would carry out  the work. 
We had never discussed about activities, skills, budget, and everything needed to start an 
enterprise. There was not enough mutual  trust between us. 
If I had received a certain number of services with a contract, and I had had the possibility to 
choose my work colleagues, I would have agreed immediately to form a cooperative; but it 
would have had only nine members. I was told that this is not acceptable because all of us 
have to be stabilized together. 
 
However, despite the new organization introduced by FA, the former SUWs 
acknowledged that this company offered better salaries and career prospects than those 
available for the Park’s public employees. In the end, work experience in the private 
sector, can be valuable in the public sector as well.  
 
R.DD. (Park’s employee, former SUW): The only thing I am sorry about is that I spent so 
many years in socially useful jobs. I think that before starting a public job everybody should 
spend fifteen years in the private sector; they would understand then what work means.  
    
The contract with FA finished at the end of  the maximum period of five 
years, in May 2006, when the Park had to decide on a further extension of the contract or 
to find alternative options. The continuation of outsourcing services to FA, or through a 
new CTC, would have still cost much more than the Park was able to afford. At that point 
in time, the idea that directly employing SUWs would cost less and would be beneficial 
for the Park, started to gain ground. In 2005 the National Park of Abruzzi received funds 
to employ its precarious workers, and this began precedence for other parks facing 
similar problems. Making the former SUWs the Park’s direct employees was both 
politically and economically attractive. 
A large group of institutions worked around this plan: the Park, trade unions, 
the Ministries of Environment, Public Function and the Treasury, and some MPs elected 
in the Province of Teramo. The financial law of 2007 (law 296/2006) allowed the 
National Parks of Gran Sasso and Majella (both located in the Region of Abruzzi) to 
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employ, in positions ‘outside the staff chart’92, the precarious personnel used by these 
public bodies. For this purpose, an annual fund of €2,000,000 was transferred to both 
Parks. The amendment
93
 states that the funds should be used for the stabilization of those 
working as consultants for these two National Parks; the Parks were allowed to carry out 
this operation during the period 1
st
 January 2007 – 31st December 2008. The former 
SUWs had been included in this category, but the fund made available had to be divided, 
and the National Park of Gran Sasso could employ 36 people in total.  
The Region of Abruzzi paid the extension of the Park’s contract with FA until 
April 2007. On 7
th
 June 2007 the company dismissed the workers, while the trade unions 
helped them have access to mobility aid with derogation, a special aid introduced to 
tackle the unemployment created by the financial crisis begun in 2007.  
The National Park of Gran Sasso and the CGIL in the Province of Teramo are 
the protagonists of the SUWs ‘occupational adventure’ in this stage. 
 
M.M. (Director of the Park since 2004): before the second president left, in 2007, I raised the 
problem of SUWs ‘employment stabilization’. We had to find the best way to close the 
contract with FA who was claiming the money provided by the financial law for 2007. They 
claimed that that money had been made available to pay for the outsourcing. 
When I prepared the documentation for the Ministry of Environment, which was working for 
the insertion of this amendment in the financial law, the SUWs were in an uncertain situation. 
Some maintained that this provision was for SUWs, while others claimed that it was for the 
consultants. In the end we considered both categories. If the National Park of Majella also did 
not receive these funds, we would have ‘stabilized’ all our precarious workers.  
There are two fundamental values that supported these operations: the economic convenience 
and the determination not to abandon a qualified workforce. In addition, I wanted to prove 
that a park’s administration was able to offer solutions when facing  employment difficulties. 
There is an historic conflict between the Park and local people which goes back to basic 
fundamentalism; the people did not want the park because it brought with it limitations 
related to the protection of the environment. So I wanted to demonstrate that the Park is able 
to help the community and to create employment in a transparent way. My dream is to 
organize the economic activity in this area with a team that works with us. Relatively 
speaking, thirty six people working for the Park is the equivalent of two hundred people in an 
enterprise. 
 
Looking back at the difficulties encountered during the implementation of 
this project and the subsequent results, D.F. (Director of the Park from 1998 to 2004) 
acknowledges the role played by SUWs in the realization of a great deal of important 
environmental work and services, but does not consider their becoming public employees 
as the best solution. He believes that the outsourcing of services to FA was the best 
possible solution during the period and, only because of the gradual reduction in the 
number of SUWs, their ‘employment stabilization’ within the Park became feasible. 
                                                 
92
 This means that the personnel employed in this way occupy positions that do not exist in the staff chart. 
When they retire, the public body is not permitted to replace these staff. 
93
 Law 27 December 2006, n. 296, article 1, come 940. 
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D.F. (Director of the Park from 1998 to 2004): We started the SUWs project when the Park 
was just  beginning; we had no employees, just a few consultants. It was an enormous effort 
for all us, and having eighty people to manage was not easy. We used them for all light 
environmental restructuring and they did many good jobs. This happened because the Park 
was asked to take on long-term unemployed. In 1998 many public administration did this, but 
the numbers were limited as our municipalities are usually small; so all those who did not 
find a place, were supposed to work for the Park. I remember the fierce arguments I had with 
CGIL who wanted to send all of them to us. Undoubtedly, the Park needs these skills but the 
problem is that you need to match  the right number of workers to a certain type of work. 
Eighteen is certainly acceptable, but one hundred twenty or eighty was totally irrational. 
There is also another aspect that was never taken into account: the young consultants working 
for the Park are all very motivated guys. People in their fifties however, with a long history 
of work and experience, when inserted into socially useful jobs at that age, are not motivated 
to work for the Park.  
The outsourcing of services to FA was a good choice in that stage. The Park would not have 
been able to manage the SUWs, on top of all the organizational problems we had at that time 
and the solutions we had to find for various problems in the local communities. Although the 
cost with FA was higher, things were going well at the beginning. The SUWs wanted, in any 
case, to become the Park’s employees and this created tension. The Park would have 
preferred to outsource these services to a cooperative formed by them. It would have secured 
an annual income, certainly not one hundred per cent of its budget, but a good share. It was 
impossible to convince the SUWs, although some people were more inclined to do this. 
 
D.F. thinks that the principal role of a National Park should not be that of 
providing jobs and offering solutions to employment problems. 
 
D.F. (Director of the Park from 1998 to 2004): The social problems of the local communities 
and employment are not the main purpose of a Park, but one cannot wash one’s hands 
completely of it. A partial vision of the function that a national park should have in Italy is 
not possible, because in this country humans occupy every centimeter of this land. So it is 
impossible not to take this aspect into consideration, but a certain balance must be found and 
the functionality of the National Parks should not be unbalanced. In my opinion the Park 
should be a soft agency in a territory which promotes its sustainable development and 
protects the environment. It should not do business, run restaurants, hostels or provide guest 
rooms. My major regret is that the parks have become possessions for political parties and 
they have lost sight of their fundamental mission. 
 
The workers’ transition from FA into socially useful jobs, before becoming 
the Park’s employees, was strongly led by trade unions. The management of the 
provincial section of CGIL in Teramo was particularly involved in this complex process. 
Timing and understanding many juridical aspects were fundamental in reaching the goal. 
  
G.DO. (Secretary of CGIL, Province of Teramo): The Park considered organizing a tender, 
extending the contract with FA or finding other solution for these contracts, but the problems 
was that it would  have to find the money every year. In 2006 the Park did not have enough 
money to pay the contract because the Ministry had discontinued the funds for this 
outsourcing. So one year we asked elsewhere for this money: €300,000 arrived from the 
regional councillorship for agriculture, €300,000 for training courses, and a small part from 
the Ministry. The Region of Abruzzi could not continue to finance this ‘stabilization’ because 
this is a National Park and the Region has its own regional parks to finance. So we worked 
around an idea that was not so fashionable, which is how the regular activities of a public 
administration should be carried out. We did not understand why these activities must be 
outsourced by force. We believe that it is not true that the outsourcing to private companies 
necessarily brings savings. Maybe this is true in certain cases, but it was not in our case.  
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We hold many meetings with the Ministries of Environment, Public Administration and 
Treasury, during a period of harsh cuts to public funds; all of the ministries wanted to know if 
the Park would save money as a result of direct employment of these workers. We did our 
calculation and showed that there was about 40% savings: 20% from the VAT, which for the 
Park is an additional cost, and 20% from the money cashed in by FA. Another problem was 
juridical: how can the Park be allowed to employ these workers directly? We knew that the 
enlargement of the public staff chart was not possible, so we worked with the Ministries of 
Environment and Treasury to insert an amendment into the financial law which would create 
a regular fund for these workers. Once the legal provision was done and the funds were 
available, the Ministry of Public Administration prepared a legal document to create these 
posts, external to the public staff chart. The Ministry which had the most resistance to the 
whole operation was, as usual, the Treasury. The Ministry of Public Administration asked 
who would pay, while the Ministry of Environment said it was okay as long as this would not 
impact on the public staff charts of the National Parks involved.  
 
When everything was ready we then had to manage the return of these workers to socially 
useful jobs. After they were dismissed in June 2007, we asked for mobility aid with 
derogation, because they were employed with the national labour contract for forestry and the 
regular mobility aid was not available for this contract. We met the Ministry of Labour first 
which recorded the justification of the return of these workers to SUJs: the ‘employment 
stabilization’ with FA was an afterthought because, as they were dismissed, they were not, in 
fact, ‘stabilized’. This was not, however the first case where workers employed by private 
companies returned to socially useful jobs within  public administrations. 
After that, as these benefits were managed at regional level, we only had to produce the 
documents and present them to the Regional Commission for Employment, without the 
formal approval from the Ministry. In 2007 the crisis was just beginning and the mobility aid 
was still linked to the implementation of projects for re-insertion with clear job perspectives; 
today, with such high unemployment, it no longer works. When the workers obtained the 
mobility aid we asked the Park to prepare a project for their ‘employment stabilization’ 
which declared the intention to employ them directly. As the Park is a public body, it had to 
organize a public competition and, until that point, these workers had been paid in this way; 
in fact their work continued almost without interruption. 
 
As the mobility aid is similar to the allowances for socially useful jobs and  is 
given for twenty hours of work per week, the Park made up the workers’ allowances to 
the maximum of thirty six hours. It did this for a period, but as a number of workers were 
not employed (there were 18 jobs for the consultants and 18 for the SUWs), the Park 
decided to save this money for those who would not pass the competition.  
 
R.DD. (Park’s employee, former SUW): After we were dismissed we continued to work for 
the Park. The money came from the Region and at the beginning the Park gave us the 
increase. After a while the director told us that they would cut it as they wanted to save 
money for those who would remain outside. We were thirty workers in total. After the 
selection only eighteen of us passed, and twelve workers remained outside [nine of them did 
not meet the minimum requirements
94
], together with a few consultants. 
 
There was however a commitment to finding a solution for those who 
remained outside and the director of the Park was searching for some companies that 
could hire them, but he considered this should not be the responsibility of the Park only. 
 
                                                 
94
 The minimum requirements are related to number of years of education. Civil servants in Italy must have 
completed at least secondary education.  
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M.M. (Director of the Park since 2004): We are trying to find an indirect solution for them, 
we are searching for some companies in our area that would agree to offer them a contract. I 
have told trade unions that the Park put great efforts into closing this project and other 
channels should be found for those who remained outside. All these responsibilities cannot be 
placed on our shoulders.   
 
Finally, the opinion of ‘Formula Ambiente’ on the development of the whole 
story is different from that given by the  public actors and the workers. They believe that 
this outcome is a result of the workers’ aspiration to become public employees, and this 
never changed. The manager who was responsible for this group maintained that their 
experience of this contract with the Park was, in general, positive. He believed that FA  
worked well with the group of SUWs who demonstrated a good mix of skills; the 
presence of the Park’s consultants, who maintained constant contact with FA, facilitated 
the organization of work locally. They felt that they were present enough, and they did 
not obtain other contracts in that geographical area because no CTCs had been organized 
while they were working for the Park there. At the end of their contract they would also 
have participated in a competitive tender, if the Park had organized it. 
 
F.R. (manager of the group of SUWs for FA): It was a very positive and interesting 
experience but it did not finish in a way I had envisaged for the ‘employment stabilization’ of 
SUWs. The Park should have had the courage to outsource the services through a competitive 
tender. We would have participated, because we were always there and we were interested in 
continuing to deliver these services. Sure, there were certain economic conditions: if the 
contract had been economically feasible, for example one million Euros, we would have 
competed; but we would not, for six hundred thousand Euros, for example. After five years 
of contract, when we repaid our investment, we were also able to offer a better price. And, 
still, we had not won, the workers could have obtained better conditions with another 
company which would have won the tender. 
 
F.R. is strongly convinced that the outsourcing of public services brings better 
results to the public administration and is also beneficial for the workers. 
  
F.R. (manager of the group of SUWs for FA): I have always been a supporter of the 
privatization of public activities. A public administration must govern, control, but should 
never deliver the activities directly. The fact that the SUWs had been employed directly by 
the Park was, in my opinion, an error. During my career I have always noticed a general 
decrease in the quality and productivity of work, a repose for those who work in public 
bodies, because they do not have incentives. In comparison to a private company, the public 
administration does not aim to gain profit that can be reinvested, which serves to improve the 
company itself. For me this is not positive because the commitment to work tends to lessen, 
leading to lower levels of quality. 
 
The trade unions consider the work aspects from a different perspective and 
they are not convinced that the public administration is per se inefficient and ‘relaxed’.  
 
  
G.DO. (Secretary of CGIL, Province of Teramo): The direct employment of these workers by 
the Park brought into question a basic rule of the outsourcing: the Park makes the projects, 
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the external companies fulfill the work and the Park pays. If it has to pay more, we do not 
understand why the Park is not allowed to do the work itself. 
This is valid also for other public administrations. Before deciding whether to outsource or 
not, they should determine how much a specific service costs when it is provided in-house. 
The public administrations have the responsibility for public tenders, they should check 
under which conditions the workers provide the services, and if they are paid. This is the 
main problem concerning the public tenders regarding the rule of maximum price reduction. 
For certain offers it is clear, with such a reduction, that a company is not able to pay the 
minimum salary requested by law. So the public administrations should check these 
situations; they already know that either the company comes from “strange backgrounds” and 
it is involved in another “business” or, it will not pay the salaries due to the workers.    
Finally, something that should never be forgotten: the work is fundamentally important for all 
of us, irrespective of educational background. It is a way to define ourselves as human 
beings, and not only as an economic necessity. The workers wanted to prove that they were 
able to be employed by the Park not only as socially useful workers, but because they were 
useful for the Park.   
 
 
Recent legislation (DPCM 23
rd
 January 2013) concerning the rationalization 
of public expenditure again cut the funds allocated to public bodies, national parks 
included. All parks had funds for their regular staff cut by 10%. The staff employed 
outside the staff charts were not taken into consideration, and the funds available for them 
remained intact. Ironically, after many years of tumultuous events, SUWs presence was 
beneficial for the Park, for financial reasons too. 
The four case studies presented above investigated different typologies of 
‘employment stabilization’ and a large range of aspects connected to them. The role 
played by institutions was analyzed, together with the many factors that influenced the 
varying degrees of these projects’ success. Although the PUJs project implemented by the 
Municipality of Casabona represented a springboard for the cooperative ‘Giovani of 
2000’, its entrepreneurial success can be largely attributed to the important role played by 
the consortium tutor in the cooperative’s growth. The Municipality of Grottaglie played 
an important role in the development of the cooperative ‘Orizzonte 2000’, yet this was 
not sufficient enough to influence the choices made by the cooperative and to prevent its 
closure. The Province of Taranto championed the formation of the joint mixed company 
with IL, but it could not sustain its costs. Despite the efforts made by the management of 
‘Taranto Isolaverde’ to keep the costs under control and to account for the company 
accurately, the services outsourced were not enough to cover the effective costs for their 
delivery, and in particular the large workforce. Finally, the National Park of Gran Sasso, 
strongly supported by trade unions, promoted the direct employment of the socially 
useful workers, but this was a drawn out process in which the services had to be 
privatized. The lack of public funds made the Park aware that the least expensive way to 
maintain the same services was to employ the SUWs directly.  
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In the next chapter, themes resulting  from the policy process evaluation as 
well as the case studies analyzed in this chapter, are pulled together in order to draw 
patterns illustrating the ways in which the policy outcomes were achieved, and their 
significance within active labour market policies. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
‘When the last men who have driven and cared for 
steam locomotives retire – and will not be long 
now – and when engine-drivers will be little 
different from tram-drivers, and sometimes quite 
superfluous, what will happen? What will our 
society be like without that large body of men who, 
in a way or another, had a sense of the dignity and 
the self-respect of difficult, good, and socially 
useful manual work, which is also a sense of a 
society not-governed by market-pricing and 
money: a society other than ours and potentially 
better? What will a country be like without the 
road to self-respect which skill with hand, eye and 
brain provide to men – and, one might add women 
– who happen not to be good at passing 
examinations? Tawney would have asked such 
questions and I can do no better than conclude by 
leaving them with you’. 
(Eric Hobsbawn, 1984:271-272) 
 
 
In 2006 an Italian opinion poll asked the following question: ‘some people prefer to have 
a secure job, earning less money during their lifetime; others prefer a less secure job but 
with potential to earn more money. Which statement do you agree with? The answer was 
71% of the sample interviewed agreed ‘with the former’, while in 2001 only 59% of the 
sample did so (Floris, 2007:29). If the poll was repeated nowadays, during an economic 
crisis, the number of people giving this answer would most likely have increased. This 
does not mean that people in Italy are more risk averse than in other countries, but rather 
it sheds light on how perilous losing one’s job is perceived by the majority of Italian 
workers.  
The development of the policy evaluated in this thesis shows high importance 
attached to the stability of jobs for those who experienced long periods of unemployment. 
Before being involved in these projects, the majority of socially useful workers had 
received wage compensation funds for many years and, as a result, they became a 
specific target for active labour market schemes. It was explained that peculiarities of the 
Italian conservative-corporatist welfare create disparities in terms of granting social rights 
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(Esping-Andersen, 1995; Ferrera, 1996, Ferrera et al, 2003) and this fact reinforces 
preference for those jobs that allow access to the safety net. 
The industrial restructuring following the oil crises, the rise of the global 
economy and new challenges in sustaining the competitiveness of the national economy, 
brought profound transformation to economic conditions, political choice and consequent 
economic policies (De Cecco, 1989, 2000). The major changes concerned 
deindustrialization, privatization of public assets, market deregulation and a steady 
decline in expenditure on public employment. The new economic scenario was associated 
with a new structure of social risks (Bonoli, 2007) which the Italian welfare state was not 
prepared to undertake.  
The growing gap between the potential supply and demand for labour across 
various Italian regions generated serious problems of non-employment and 
unemployment, as described in chapter 3. The social protection was unbalanced, and 
these distortions within different sectors of the labour market became more evident in the 
last decades and favoured older workers and specific economic sectors (Ferrera, 2007). 
The majority of socially useful workers belonged to these categories and they are part of 
the last group of unemployed who benefited from targeted policy measures which helped 
their re-insertion into the labour market through state intervention. As explained in 
chapter 4, the enlargement of this policy to long-term unemployed who were not entitled 
to receive benefits had a limited duration and received criticism. This fact was, however, 
important as it represented an attempt to move towards a more pluralistic welfare regime.  
Instead of integrating new sectors of the labour market into the existing safety net, the 
labour market deregulation was pursued with increased force after 2000. As a result, a 
variety of flexible contracts providing minimum social rights and no unemployment 
protection became very popular after 2003. Job instability was then made ‘by law’ 
(Gallino, 2007) and labour market deregulation further increased inequalities between 
various categories of labour. 
 
8.1 Policy transformation during the paradigm shift 
 
In this thesis political economic concepts were used to examine the underlying economic 
drivers of change, and in particular the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberal economics, 
although most attention was paid to the policy response. The policy of socially and useful 
jobs has lasted for almost twenty years, with early programmes implemented before the 
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1990s. In chapter 3 it was explained that the programmes developed rapidly after 1994, a 
period of harsh budgetary constraints brought about by Italy joining the EMU. On the one 
hand, several Italian governments operated to maintain fiscal austerity, low inflation and 
promote labour market deregulation, while on the other hand, there was a clear 
commitment to finding new solutions to reduce the long-term unemployment which has 
reached worrying levels in certain geographical areas. This goal was resolutely pursued 
on a national scale through the activation of labour demand in the public service sector. 
Hall (1990:59) calls ‘the overarching framework of ideas that structures 
policy making in a particular field a policy paradigm [that] defines the broad goals 
behind policy, the related problems or puzzles that policy makers have to solve to get 
there, and, in large measure, the kind of instruments that can be used to attain these 
goals’. Looking at these three aspects – goals, related problems and instruments – in the 
case of the policy of SUJs and PUJs, the policy paradigm had a strong Keynesian 
approach. Firstly the persistence of long-term unemployment was seen as a 
demonstration of inadequate aggregate demand and the state itself promoted the use of 
this surplus labour supply in the public services sector; secondly, despite limited public 
funds and cuts to public expenditure, welfare rights of certain categories of workers 
continued to be preserved; and thirdly, a large number of job-creation schemes was put 
into place in order to promote the re-insertion of socially and publicly useful workers in 
the labour-market. The state acted to correct the market failures. In fact, the institutions in 
charge of the policy implementation were responsible for the achievement of the 
employment goals and, when they failed to achieve them, new objectives were pursued. 
Therefore, both the policy choice, analysed in chapter 4, and the policy implementation, 
analysed in chapter 5, preserved the main features of the Keynesian welfare national state 
(Jessop, 2000). Recognizing a labour market policy as an institution of its own (Schmid 
and Schӧmann, 1994) that reflects institutional choices which determine different kinds 
of measures to alleviate the consequences of unemployment, the policy of SUJs and PUJs 
included: collective agreements with the social partners, legal provisions, wage subsidies 
and tax relief and, most importantly, the involvement of the state as role of employer. 
The transformation of the policy at the end of the ’90s brought, in the first 
place, cuts to public expenditure and the reinforced ethos of public services privatization. 
The implementation of new services was blocked, and privatization was pursued as one 
of the policy goals. The neoliberal turn became apparent when the policy had already 
reached an advanced stage. The main changes introduced in 2000 concerned the 
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promotion of flexible contracts, the strengthening of incentives to take part-time jobs and 
to exit the projects, and pressure put on the public administration to promote outsourcing 
of public services. Nonetheless, SUWs and PUWs kept the right to receive an offer for 
their ‘employment stabilization’ at the end of the projects, this representing the most 
important element of the KNWS that was preserved.  
Another element of continuity was the financial support provided by the state 
which, despite the administrative devolution of its authority to the regions, continued to 
provide all the funds necessary for the projects’ execution and closure. These aspects 
were investigated in chapter 6 which analysed the policy take-up and its outcomes. 
Figure 8.1 presents the main structures of the policy choice, implementation 
and take-up, which were analysed using a categorical framework designed to capture the 
role of institutions in determining the policy process. This framework was adapted from 
Schmidt (1997a) and, concerning the last two stages in particular, new categories have 
been introduced to analyse the ways in which institutions structured the interactions of 
individuals (Hall, 1986:19) and the key variables that influenced their actions. These key 
variables form the catalyst structures of policy implementation and take-up which 
accelerated (or impeded) the achievement of the policy goals in each of these stages. 
The early stage of the policy presented in the ’80s dealt with groups of 
outcast unemployed, that numbered many, in geographical areas such as Naples and 
Palermo. After the economic crises began in 1992, the phenomenon of unemployment 
spread and it became clear that the wage compensation funds, usually used to fight 
temporary unemployment, were instead used to tackle long-term unemployment. Due to a 
new system of benefits introduced in 1991, a large number of people who had received 
wage compensation funds for many years, and who did not return to their enterprises 
(which often were downsized or even closed), became formally unemployed. In certain 
geographical areas, due to the restructuring occurring in many industrial sectors, and the 
creation of very few jobs in other sectors, unemployment lasted for long periods. The 
policy choice for the involvement of these unemployed in the sector of public services 
corresponded to a large and unfulfilled demand for workers in the public administration. 
For this reason the policy choice was welcomed by public bodies that saw in this policy a 
way to resolve their major problems, the lack of employees due to the block of public 
recruitment and the cuts to public funds.  
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Fig. 8.1: Stages of the policy process and relative structures 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY CHOICE 
 ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES FOR LONG TERM-UNEMPLOYED AND 
 JOB-CREATION SCHEMES FOR THEIR RE-INSERTION INTO THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
 
 VALUE STRUCTURE           solidaristic-cooperative 
 
 ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURE              corporate regime moving 
                                                                                     towards pluralistic regime 
 
 MARKET ECONOMY REGIME          social market regime 
 
 STATE’S LEGAL STRUCTURE          civil law 
 
 
 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
START-UP OF SUJS AND PUJS PROJECTS AND THEIR EXECUTION 
 DELIVERY OF ACTIVITIES OF SOCIAL USEFULNESS FOR THE PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
 COMPETENCE STRUCTURE                       demand-oriented 
 
 DECISION MAKING AND 
       RESPONSIBILITY STRUCTURE                  hierarchical-centralized 
 
 FINANCIAL AND PRODUCTION                 public 
     STRUCTURE 
 
 CATALYST STRUCTURE                            1) project length 
                                                                                                               2) number of unemployed 
             3) part-time vs. full-time 
          involvement in the projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY TAKE-UP 
‘EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION’ OF SUWS AND PUWS. CLOSURE OF PROJECTS  
AND OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
 COMPETENCE STRUCTURE                     demand and supply-oriented  
 
 DECISION MAKING AND                          autonomous-decentralized 
       RESPONSIBILITY STRUCTURE                                    and cooperative 
 
 INCENTIVE  STRUCTURE                     economic and legal 
 
 CATALYST STRUCTURE                           1) suitability of services 
                                                                                                              2) cost of outsourcing 
                                                                                                              3) duration of outsourcing 
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By using socially and publicly useful workers, an economically convenient 
and well skilled workforce was available, whose costs were completely supported by the 
state. The Keynesian character of the policy embraced both these sides: the response to 
the long-term unemployment problem and the public production of a large range of useful 
social and public services. 
 
8.2 Policy process evaluation: achievements and limitations 
 
The research method chosen in this thesis applies the institutionalist approach to policy 
process evaluation. The socially and publicly useful jobs for long-term unemployed is an 
active labour market policy with a demand-driven structure. The ultimate policy outcome 
was the re-insertion of long-term unemployed into the labour market, but, as explained in 
chapters 5 and 6, there are at least two other policy results that were assessed: the 
activities carried out by the unemployed during the projects’ execution, which represent 
an implementation result, and the outsourcing of public services at the end of the projects, 
which is a result of the policy take-up. I refer to these results differently during the 
analysis to distinguish them from the statutory policy goal, which was the creation of 
stable jobs for socially and publicly useful workers. In fact, the activities provided during 
the projects’ implementation were policy outputs, while the privatization of public 
services was a policy instrument for creating new employment. These results should then 
be taken into consideration within the policy evaluation.  
The policy evaluation presented in this thesis captures different types of 
problems that policy-makers were confronted with during different stages of the policy 
process. One of the main problems acknowledged during the policy implementation was 
the length of the projects, due to the addition of several extensions beyond the period 
provided for legally in the legislation. This key variable represents the measure of the 
distance between the policy fiction and the policy facts (Brodkin, 2000) and led to the 
policy change in 2000. The policy fiction in this case, implies the statutory provision of a 
project length of twelve months, renewable for a further twelve. The policy facts 
illustrated the implementation of significantly more lengthy projects that had several 
renewals before being closed. Despite this considerable variation of the policy in respect 
to the statutory provision, the central state did not apply the penalties provided by law, 
which would have ended the projects and required the public bodies to return the funds 
spent during their implementation. The main reasons for this fact are: firstly, the social 
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utility of the activities carried out by SUWs and PUWs and secondly, the lack of better 
alternatives for their re-insertion into the labour market. 
Finally, the assessment of the activities carried out by SUWs and PUWs also 
has a financial aspect. Given the low cost of this labour (an average cost of €400 per 
month, for a part-time worker), if the same services had been carried out by a public 
workforce or through outsourcing to private companies, they would have been more 
costly. Furthermore, many new services would have never been implemented because of 
the lack of public funds. The cut to the public expenditure was, in this way, 
counterbalanced by the use, for public purposes, of this surplus labour supply. 
An overall evaluation of the policy impact on the reduction of unemployment 
is not possible due to a lack of data before 2000. However, the data analysed in chapter 6 
show that during a ten-year period after 2000, more than 34,000 jobs
95
 were created, that 
represent 70% of the workers involved only in local projects paid with national funds; 
63% of these jobs were in the public and quasi-public sectors, while 34% were in the 
private sector. The creation of such a large number of public jobs was an outcome not 
anticipated by the policy design. This provided various norms and regulations as an 
incentive to outsource public services to companies which would employ the SUWs and 
PUWs involved in these activities. The possibility for public administrations to hire the 
unemployed directly was added later and it was primarily applicable only for those 
activities which were not suitable for outsourcing. Despite a clear preference for the 
privatization of public services promoted by statutory provision, the expected results 
were not met. As explained in chapter 6, the main driver of the privatization of public 
services was the dispensation from free-competition rules that allowed private companies 
to have the services outsourced without competitive tendering. This legal incentive, 
although temporary, was a key determinant for the outsourcing, and most of the jobs in 
the private sector were created when this dispensation was in force. After 2003, when it 
was removed, many private companies lost interest in these services and also in acquiring 
the shares held by Italia Lavoro in the joint mixed public-private companies. This again 
led to public intervention and, as a result, the majority of the JMPPCs were acquired by 
the public administrations and, because of specific legislation, funds were allocated to 
those public bodies interested in hiring SUWs and PUWs directly. The central state 
                                                 
95
 The total number of jobs created is much higher if the national projects are taken into consideration (e.g. 
the people working in schools, the projects implemented by various ministries, by the national parks etc.) 
and if the jobs created before 2000 and from projects paid with regional funds are also accounted for. 
Unfortunately there are no consistent data to account for the overall employment created. 
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institutions continued to play an important role in this stage, but the role of trade unions 
and public bodies, championing the unemployed hired directly by the public 
administration, was equally important.  
The major job creation schemes promoted during policy take-up were 
analysed in chapter 6, while the way in which they impacted on the creation of new 
employment was investigated in great detail through a multiple case-studies analysis, 
presented in chapter 7. A complex reality emerges from these case-studies, suggesting 
that a web of factors determined the policy success or failure in a local context.  
Some of these factors can be attributed to the policy itself, firstly to the role 
of public administrations in determining the projects’ closure and the outsourcing of 
public services. Other factors, and in particular the entrepreneurial propensity of certain 
groups of unemployed, go beyond the policy process, although the role played by the 
consortium tutor during the start-up of the cooperative formed by the young unemployed, 
was relevant. 
Public employment became possible when the public administrations were 
able to involve other institutions in pursing the goal of ‘employment stabilization’; in 
fact, while the National Park succeeded, the joint-mixed company of the Province of 
Taranto became economically unsustainable after 2007. These two case studies show 
how the broader framework, within which the privatization of publics companies had 
gained priority, impacted on the policy outcomes. 
There is a large body of literature detailing the effects of active labour market 
polices on the functioning of labour markets that make use of both quantitative methods 
(quasi-experimental and experimental analysis, aggregate impact analysis and cost 
benefit analysis) and qualitative analysis (Pierre, 1999; Martini and Sisti, 2009). 
However, ‘the net effects of ALMPs may be difficult to identify because of their 
interaction with other policies’ (Pierre, 1999:5). Calmfors (1994) and Schmid (1997a) 
assert that three types of controversial effects can be identified: deadweight, substitution 
and displacement effects. 
In relation to the policy assessed in this thesis, the deadweight effects refer to 
the utilization of SUJs and PUJs projects for activities that would have occurred without 
the policy; the displacement effects refer to those cases when socially and publicly useful 
workers, favoured by the policy incentives, would have displaced other categories of 
unemployed who would otherwise have obtained the same jobs; and the substitution 
effects refer to different policy programmes that competed for the activation of SUWs 
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and PUWs. Although the policy target was very specific and the creation of new jobs was 
stated as a statutory goal from the beginning, the validation of the propositions listed 
above would necessitate complex econometrical tests and accurate quantitative data.  
It is instead important to understand whether and in which terms the policy 
feedback, the fourth stage of the model proposed by Schmid (1997a), occurred. We could 
expect that in the presence of adequate decision-making structures, the political system 
learns from the policy process and this has repercussions on the policy itself. In fact, the 
restricted legislation aimed at ‘freezing’ and ‘emptying’ the unemployed pool 
implemented after 2000, represented the most important learning moment during the 
policy process. Following the exponential increase in number of the projects after 1997, 
the central government ‘learned’ that local administrations would not have brought the 
projects to an end if they had not also been involved in the responsibility for the projects’ 
closure.  
The SUJs and PUJs projects  lasted for many years but no similar policy was 
promoted afterwards. It is difficult to determine to what extent the abandoning of this 
policy stems from a negative assessment of the implementation results, mainly the 
projects’ length and their cost, or to other factors that have speeded up the privatization of 
public services and promoted labour market deregulation since the late ’90s. Many policy 
makers interviewed for this research stressed the fact that this policy was linked to a 
‘hard-to-employ’ group who needed specific interventions. They also underlined that the 
policy implementation and take-up were possible due to ad-hoc regulations as the 
derogation to the European legislation for competitive tendering. The positive policy 
impact on the creation of new employment would not have been possible without  strong 
intervention from the state. 
Thus, the lessons learned from the policy process appeared to be negative on 
the grounds of the difficulties encountered during the policy implementation and take-up 
in geographical areas experiencing long-term unemployment. However, despite the fact 
that the policy makers do not see a possible replication of this policy, they acknowledge 
its positive results, in particular the activation of a large number of long-term 
unemployed, and the delivery of relevant public services that would have been disrupted 
as a result of the severe reduction of the public workforce.  
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8.3 Policy patterns and the role of institutions 
 
Reflecting on the recent financial crisis, it can be asserted that the instruments used to 
contrast high levels of unemployment have very little, if anything in common with the 
proclaimed new agenda in the field of active labour market policy. In fact, the old wage 
compensation funds became of primary importance once again for an increasing number 
of people out of work, in geographical areas facing an exceptional reduction in  labour 
demand. The return to passive benefits which were used extensively in the past shows 
that radical policy innovation is difficult to be achieved and path dependency is strong 
during the policy process (Krasner, 1998). Indisputably, the wage compensation funds 
have been of great importance for income recovery during economic crises, but their 
transformation into a more active instrument of labour market policy does not appear 
achievable without a radical transformation of the Italian welfare state, which would 
involve areas such as the introduction of a minimum wage, the revision of poor 
unemployment benefits and pension rights for the weakest categories of labour, and also 
a new role of training in maintaining skills or re-skilling those out of work for long 
periods of time. 
The concept of path dependency is linked to that of incremental returns of the 
policy (Pierson 1994, 2001). In fact, the implementation of SUJs and PUJs created a new 
category of ‘users’: the former beneficiaries of wage compensation funds became socially 
useful workers and their new ‘status’ made entitled them to become targets for further 
policy actions. In response to their new needs, a large number of job creation schemes 
were implemented. Once the policy had promoted new legislation and concentrated many 
resources on the ‘employment stabilization’ it would have been difficult to switch to a 
totally new route. 
Finally, some of the policy results influenced the policy process in a way that 
was not expected during the policy making. The first set of rules stressed the creation of 
new enterprises and jobs in the private sector, but  after the abrogation of the legislation 
that limited competitive tendering, the interest of private enterprises in hiring SUWs and 
PUWs noticeably diminished. Many public administrations decided to hire these workers 
directly and the majority of JMPPCs formed by Italia Lavoro were acquired by public 
bodies; these policy outcomes are unintended consequences of the policy choice at an 
early stage (Baldwin, 1992). 
240 
 
 
Looking closer at the role of institutions in shaping various policy patterns, it 
can be observed that the central state, the public administrations and trade unions were 
the main actors involved in both policy implementation and take-up. The public agencies 
Italia Lavoro and SCO played the role of policy facilitators in the last stage: the former 
was directly involved in the formation of JMPPCs which employed SUWs and PUWs, 
while the latter was responsible for the tutoring of cooperatives formed by the 
unemployed themselves. The case studies analysed in chapter 7 reveal that the durability 
of the policy’s positive results beyond the first five-year period can be attributed to 
diverse factors. In the case of the JMPPC formed by IL, there was insufficient public 
money to fund the services necessary to maintain a relatively large workforce, and this 
was the cause of the company’s loss. The diligence of the company administration in 
retaining the profits and attempting to control the costs, however, was not sufficient for 
finding alternative solutions to save the company and, most likely, after the foreseen 
privatization the number of employees would be drastically reduced.  
The cooperative formed by the young publicly useful workers was successful 
due to its motivated management group and the positive role played by the consortium 
tutor in their entrepreneurial formation. In fact, the cooperative no longer delivers the 
services initially outsourced to it by the public administration, and it has become an 
independent company operating in the market. This aspect seems particularly important 
for those groups of unemployed who chose self-employment. The cooperative of social 
useful workers had a less successful history and miscalculations concerning the feasibility 
of external work seem to have brought about its closure. In this case the positive 
disposition of the public administration for outsourcing the services could not, however, 
have changed this outcome. 
The case of the national park is even more unusual because it shows that the 
outsourced services could be more costly than the in-house provision. In this case, 
because of efficient organization, this public body was able to cut the costs by almost 
20% (plus an additional 20% for the VAT). These additional costs included the contract 
management cost and the relative share of profits cashed in by the private enterprise 
which delivered the services during the first five-year period. This last case helps in 
understanding the dynamics of the privatization of public services that was paid entirely 
with public funds, and was convenient for the public administrations only when the 
incentives provided by law for the ‘employment stabilization’ of SUWs and PUWs were 
deducted by the overall cost of the contract.  
241 
 
 
Despite the fact that the services delivered  by SUWs and PUWs could not 
have been provided by lower labour costs, the private employers were largely interested 
in employing these workers only because they would provide them with direct access to 
the outsourced services, thus avoiding the rule of competitive tendering. 
The number of unemployed involved in the projects, the availability of public 
funds and the suitability of services to be outsourced, are the three key variables which 
determined different patterns of the policy process leading to different policy outcomes. 
The interaction between various sets of factors was influenced by the role played by the 
main institutional actors, the central state, public administrations and trade unions. Figure 
8.2 describes these patterns highlighting various outcomes as a result of different 
combinations of these three key variables. Two assumptions have been made in all the 
cases: 1) when the services were suitable for outsourcing, the public administrations 
would have taken this choice; 2) on the contrary, when services were not suitable for 
outsourcing, the public administration would have chosen to employ the workers directly 
and, if this option was not possible due to insufficient public funds, they would have 
chosen to outsource the services to a joint mixed company controlled by the public 
administration itself. 
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Fig. 8.2: Policy patterns and the main institutions involved 
 Small number of unemployed 
 Public funds available 
 Services suitable for outsourcing 
 
 Small number of unemployed 
 Public funds available 
 Services unsuitable for outsourcing 
 
 Small number of unemployed 
 Public funds not available/insufficient 
 Services suitable for outsourcing 
 
 Small number of unemployed 
 Public funds not available/insufficient 
 Services unsuitable for outsourcing 
 
 Outsourcing to private companies  
which hire SUWs/ PUWs 
  Outsourcing to cooperatives formed 
by SUWs/ PUWs  
(if self-selection is possible) 
 Full-time jobs 
 Maximum duration of outsourcing 
 Jobs for the public administrations 
which implemented the projects 
 Long term full-time contracts 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
(less involved in the 
case of cooperatives) 
 SCO  
(for cooperatives) 
 Central State 
(specific legislation) 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions  Outsourcing of a limited number of 
services to private companies which 
employ some SUWs/PUWs    
(partial solutions and different 
timing) 
 Project extensions and  need for 
additional funds for outsourcing 
 Part-time jobs 
 Short duration of outsourcing 
  
 
 Central State 
(additional funds) 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
 
  Central State 
(specific legislation 
and additional funds) 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
 Project extensions and  need for 
funds for public employment  
 Flexible contracts with the PAs 
 Project closures without 
‘employment stabilization’ 
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 Large number of unemployed 
 Public funds available 
 Services suitable for outsourcing 
 
 Outsourcing to big private companies/ 
cooperatives which hire SUWs/PUWS 
 Outsourcing to JMPPCs formed with 
Italia Lavoro 
 Full-time jobs 
 Maximum duration of outsourcing 
 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
 Italia Lavoro 
(for JMPPCs) 
 SCO 
(for cooperatives) 
 Large number of unemployed 
 Public funds available 
 Services unsuitable for outsourcing 
 
 Large number of unemployed 
 Public funds not available/insufficient 
 Services suitable for outsourcing 
 
 Large number of unemployed 
 Public funds not available/insufficient 
 Services unsuitable for outsourcing 
 
 Jobs for the public administrations 
which implemented the projects 
 Outsourcing to JMPPCs if the number 
of public jobs available is  insufficient 
 Full-time jobs 
 Maximum duration of outsourcing; 
JMPPCs become public after  5 years   
 
 Central State 
(specific legislation) 
 Trade unions 
 Public 
administrations 
 Italia Lavoro 
(for JMPPCs) 
 
 
 Various types of  ‘employment 
stabilization’: outsourcing to private 
companies,  formation of JMPPCs, 
public employment  (partial solutions 
and different timing) 
 Project extensions and need for 
additional funds for outsourcing 
 Different kinds of contracts 
 Various time periods for outsourcing 
 
 Central State 
(additional funds) 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
 Italia Lavoro 
(for JMPPCs) 
 Project extensions and need for funds 
for public employment  
 Flexible contracts with the PAs for a 
limited number of SUWs/PUWs 
 Long duration of the project 
 
 Central State 
(specific legislation 
and additional funds) 
 Public 
administrations 
 Trade unions 
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The eight policy patterns illustrated above show some common features of a 
wide range of projects: 
 The availability of public funds influenced the number of jobs created, while 
the unsuitability of public services for outsourcing mostly favoured the 
creation of public employment. 
 The outsourcing of services to private companies or to cooperatives formed 
by the unemployed was more likely to occur when the number of 
unemployed involved in the projects was limited. The projects with a large 
number of unemployed had different forms of ‘employment stabilization’ 
which, in many cases, included public or quasi-public employment 
(formation of JMPPCs).  
 The lack of public funds generally led to many extensions of the projects, 
while insufficient funds favoured partial solutions and different timing for the 
‘employment stabilization’. In the case of insufficient funds the small 
projects had a higher probability of finishing without ‘employment 
stabilization’, while the large projects, due to stronger trade union 
involvement, continued to be extended. 
 The public administrations were responsible for both project implementation 
and take-up, while trade unions were particularly involved in the last stage, 
usually as support to the target group. However, the creation of stable jobs 
was influenced by the availability of funds and by the nature of the 
outsourced services. Insufficient funds led to the promotion of part-time jobs 
in order to allow as many workers as possible to be employed, while the 
duration of outsourcing went beyond the first five-year period when regular 
public services were outsourced. 
 The role of the central state concerned two different aspects: firstly, the 
creation of the legislation necessary for public bodies to be entitled to hire 
socially and publicly useful workers directly, and secondly, the transfer of 
additional funds to the public administrations which pursued ‘employment 
stabilization’.  
There are however other factors that are not captured in these patterns. On the 
supply side, it should be taken into consideration that different attitudes towards 
‘employment stabilization’ were influenced by socio-cultural factors and historical-
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political events. On the demand side, it could be argued that local labour markets played 
different roles in the creation of a variety of jobs, especially in areas with large number of 
long-term unemployed.  
There are at least three main areas that could be explored with further 
research. Firstly, new policy patterns could be identified according to a more complete set 
of factors; this could be particularly relevant for certain regions that encountered great 
difficulties during the policy implementation and, especially, take-up. For example, the 
evaluation of the policy process in the Region of Sicily, which had its own funds and 
promoted specific legislation, might reveal different patterns and institutional 
arrangements that could be strongly influenced by regional characteristics. 
Secondly, a comparative study between different active labour policies 
designed for hard-to-employ groups, in different political and institutional contexts, could 
also be extremely valuable. The recent economic crisis has offered a large area of interest 
to researchers involved in labour market policy evaluation, from a comparative 
perspective. Although these policies differ from state to state, there are common features 
that vary from enabling to workfare polices, in all European countries. 
Thirdly, the research method used in this thesis is innovative. The 
institutionalist approach can be applied in the context of policy process evaluation for 
other public policies than those concerning the labour markets, to understand the role of 
the institutional actors in shaping the policy choice and implementation, and in 
determining its outcomes (e.g. environmental policies, housing, health, education etc.). 
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